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Cadiz ; aails t u  the moiitli of the T3p.us; returnn to Cdiz-Prinoe 
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-Tema of itJiinot mtnrns to Lislion-Xcgotintcu for P. convention 
-Sir John 3imret troops Iand-Shte o f  tlie piiblic mind in bsbon- 
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against thti convention in England and in Portugal ; soon ceases in 
. Portugal-the Spmish general Gduluezo refuses to acknowledge the 
conveiition ; inrestii furt Lalippe ; Iiis proceedings abaurrl and uiijusti- 
firlle45ir John llope rnzwlieu azain6t Km ; lie alters hia m i l u c t -  
Crarrim of  Ldippc-1iIarcli to Lisbon-Embarked-Gnri.iaon of 
Almeide ; march to qiorto; att,wked anrl pIuntlered by the Portn- 
guece-Si Hew Dalrymple and  ir Harry Ihirrnrcl recnlled t o  England 
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chievoua cffccts thcrcof-Opcmtiona of Spnish nrmics dter tho 
battle of 14avlen-Mudnn wrny arrives at Madrid-Valencian nmg 
marches ta &e relirf of Zamgozdeneral  Irerdier mises the siege- 
~~ eakrs MaJrid-C!ontumaciousconduct of Q d u z z r c D i s p u h  
betwem Blake and Cuesta-Dila* condad of the 8pxniards-Sap 
Wow ohservation of Napoleon-Insurrection at Bilban; queUed by 
geneml Merlin-French q s  appromhes Baragoz~Palafofox alarmed, 
tbreatens t l ie  m c i l  o f  Cwtille-Council of wxr held mt U d n d - P h  
of opemtions-Castadoa unalile to  march for mtlt of money-Dad con- 
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Int-l poIitical t n a s w t i i P a c t i o n s ~  in Wlioia, A&* h a ,  and 
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voun t o  es'hliii~h anorthern cortea-ilctivity af the council of hstille ; 
ropwee a siiprcme govcrnment ngreenhlc b tohc publielocal juntaa 
gccome gencmllyodious-~orkn ncet at Lugo ; declnrc for a ccntnl nnd 
siipreme govemment-Deputies rtppointed-Cl~moura of the Galiician 
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eirknordimw, $c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ID0 
* 
Politicd positiiin of Nnpoleon ; ha retwtves t o  cm~h the Spwihrda ; hlrr 
encrgy ltnd activiQ ; marches his amiea from rrvcrg p r t  of Eump 
tomrils Spin ; Iiis mtion to his saldiera-Confmncc st Erfurth- 
Neptiationa for peace-Petuliant conduct o f  Mr. Canning-160,000 
conscripts enrolled in Franee-Power nf th& aiunt~-Xapoleon's 
apeech to tb senak-fle repairs to Dayonne-Eembmess of tbe 
Enzlish cab'inet-Sir JoIin 3Ioore appointed. to Iead an xnny iuto 
Gpain ; wnds L a  artillg- by the Mdrid  roa4 and marches himseK 
by hlmeiJa-1'11e c m t d  junta imptient  for the arrival of theXnghh 
a m y a i r  David arrives at Comiia; is refused permission to 
diseinlmk his Imps-)fr. Frere and tire marqaici PE Rornaria. srrivs 
at Coiuiir; acwurit of  the Iakter's escape flvm tlie U-uisli isles- 
Central junta mwlvd not to appint a p n M m 4 l o o u i y  a ~ p d  
UfaffYrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  205 
Movemenia of the Spsniah gemdar on the Ebro; thair ~~bemrd aun& 
denee, their wmt OT ey~tarn and ormcerd&neml opininn thRt the 
Frcnch um wesk-R7irl utrenflh nf the kineMnmhri1 Ney md 
geneml Jnudan join the xrmy-ñfilitirry m o m  of the king expored 
by Nrapleon, who i n s tn~c t~  bim h m  to m& ar-Jowpli propeca 
six p h a  of opemtion~bsepv8tion~ thcwupon . . . . . .  223 
CrnPTER V. 
Fdition and ahgnsh of the French anri 8panish mise-i?iake movm 
frum Reyuosn tu tlre Upper Ebm ; sends a div%ion to Bilbtto ; Ymnch 
retire from thnt tom-Ney quits llis pmition n m  l ,o~mtio, nnd 
retakes 13ElbeThe amiea of  the centre nnrl r i ~ h t  nppmx~h tlie Miro 
and the Amgon-Various evolutions-13lake attvxks and k~Ires Bilbtw 
-1Iead of the grand Frencli anny ñrrivm in Slinin-Tha C a s t i l f i  
join tlie smy of the centre-Tlis Murixns join Ulake-hputl~y of tlie 
centml juriLMaabíios joinu the snny; holda a oonfii.ence witli 
Painfiix ; thoir &~@MUS position ; tlrmnga n plan ofofoycntionri*i'lio 
Spaniadg cm- hhe F:h%The k i n ~  0~1ei-9 xgenornl xttnck-Skirmiph 
at Sanguessx, at L o p í i o ,  and Jerim-Z'lie Sptniards drii-en back 
over the Ebro-Loyriiin tíiken-Colunel Cruz, wi th a Spani~h httlttalion 
mrrenders at Iprim-Fmncim Palafi>x. tJie n i i T i t a q  depiity, arrives 
at Alfam; Iiia exceediiig Folly snd presumption ; controla and insulta 
Cwkzii-Force of tlic Rtnch arm increms hourly ; liow cmmposed 
and disposcd ; nlnke asccnds the vakY of Dumrigo - Ezttlle of Sornosr 
-hnch retake B i l b d o m l w t  at VVdme&Obmrvation p. 286 
BOOK TE03 FOURZH. 
CHAPTFJR 1. 
Napdeon arrives st Ikt~fo~o-í3k+ke ad~anm M d s  Bi lbeTi i e  
munt Delvadere arnvcv at Burp-Tte  b t  and fourth corps ndvarioa 
-Combat of Guene+Dhke ret ~tu-Napoleon at Vitoria ; hiu plan- 
8oult hkea the m m m n d  of thc scmnd corp+l3nttle of Gamonal- 
Burgon *en-httle o€ Eqiriom-Flight from I&yno3x-Soult o- 
nins the MonCqna, de SinPinde~, &?id sours Leon-Nnpoleou 6%- 
his head-quarton at Ijnrgos, changes Lis front, lets 10,000 cavdry 
loose ulioii Castille and Leon-$lGti~hxls h ~ e a  and iiey d i r d  
akminat Cmhios-FoUy of ttho con trd J urih-General St Juan uccu- 
pii!s thc p a s ~  of tho  S a m o s i ~ F o l l y  af t h p n e m l a  on  tho hxro- 
Raktle of Tudela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
CHhPrn 11. 
Napoleon marches q i n g t  Zhe wpia ; forcea the patr of the 8 o m o s i m  
4 t .  Juan murdered by his men-Tumults ia PIadrid-Frt-nch army 
a r i v e s  tkere ; tlie Retira &wmed-1'orr.a mpitiil;rte+llemnins of 
C~tafios's nrny driven acms the % í y u s ;  rctim to Cuenm-Napoleon 
explains his poliey t o  the nobles, c l e ~ ~ y ,  xnd tribunds of Madrid-His 
wt pllranq onormoua forc+DEfoncelc;is nbte  of Spain . , . 268 
Bir John Moore &ves at Wmanca ; he- of ttie battle nf Espin- 
Bis rlangerous position ; diswvem Ilie real shte oof ?.ffiirs ; contem- 
plates a, hardy enhrphe ; heam of the defeat of Tudeln ; m I v w  to 
retrebt ; mita for gmml Hope's division-Danger of that gcnemt ; 
his &le wncluct-Centrnl junta ff y ito nñslajos-Mr. Frere, inciap,llile 
of judging rightly, npposw the r e t w t  ; his wmkiiess and levity ; 
inaults tha genord ; mds colunel Cliamilly to Salnrtrñnc+>fanlp 
conduh of 8ir John Mwre ; hk able and bold phn o1 oper&tions, 279 
CIIA'PTEZ IV. 
Britiuh armv advmm tmmrds Durps-French aatposh mrprised at  
~tuusd+lkltar f m  Berthier h Soult interccpted-Ui~ectiun of the 
mar1 h chitnged-hlr. Stuart and a sember of the junta m i v e  at litnd- 
qurbrs-Arrogant nnd inaulting letkr of Mi-. ProreNoble m e r  
of sir John Ilooro-13ritish nrmg unitcd nt Mayorgn ; thcir fowe nnd 
composition-Inmnmstcnt m d u d  of llamann ; his chxm&er-%ultb 
pontion snd ~ O T C ~ ;  ciincentmtcs hia a m y  aZ CarriunXornhat of 
,cavíilq rit hhqnn-The llritihh rirmy rctirea t o  IIeneverite-The 
emperor movm from Ilxild, p m w  the Ciiadaramx, arriven at Terde- 
sillsn, expects to in terru~i t  he Uritidi line of retrext, fails-Bridge of 
Gwtm Gonzalo destroyed-comliat of caralrg at h ~ i w e r i b Q e n e r a l  
Lefcbre taken-Soult foiices the bridze of hlm~i~iilla ; t;tkt?s Leon-The 
emperor uniks his army at A s t o r g ~  ; hears of the hustrian wwnr ; orders 
maixhal Soult to pursue the Xngliitli mny, md mturna ta France, p. 296 
CRiIPTER V. 
8ir 50h M m  r e h t s  bwanln Vigo ; i s  c1w1y pursaed-Miserable 
m e  nt Bembihre-Excewwi nt Villa Frtuia-Comba* ,tt Cal~zlx l l l lo~  
Denth d sneml Coll~i-t-llnrch tn Nople-Lime nf retrefat chnnged 
fmm Vifin t o  Coruda-SkilFril ~ ~ - 1 9  iif the bridge of Conshnti~io ; 
skirrnisli there-nie aimy halti at Liig-Xir Jnhn Monre ofFera 
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Tms Histay I dedicate to your Grace, because 1 
have served long cnough under your ~omrnand 
to  know, mhy the Soldiern of the Tcntlz Le@ 
were attached to Cwar. 

F a  mx yeam the Peninsuln wss dmta ted  by the war d 
independenoa. The blmd of Fmnce, Geruiany, Englsnd, 
PortngaT, and Spein shed in ths contest, and in each of 
those cciuntries, authom, desirons of reooding t l~e  suffcrings 
or celebrating the valmr of tteir c m t q m e n ,  have vten 
Iargeiy touchig that fierce etruggle. It may therefore be 
demrtuded, wby a thrioe-told tale sbmld be rcnewedl 
answer, that twa men observing the aame obje& wjlI deacriba 
it d i v e I y ,  amrding to the paint of view h m  which either 
beholds iti in the eyes of one it shall be a fair proapect, 
fb the other a bamn m&, nnd neitber may aee aright ! 
Wherefore, truth being the legitimate ohject of Iiistory, it ifi 
bettsr that &e should be aiought for by mmany than by few, 
lest for wmt of aeekeeiw, ~mongst  tlie mists of prcjurlice and 
the falee lights of ititer&> slie h loat altogether. 
Thirt niucli injustice bw been done, much justice Ieft nndone 
by tha authors who Iiavc hitherto written concerning tliis war, 
1 can a6rm from a personal Hnowlsdge o€ fbicts; thnt aimiiar 
errara bsve been avoidd in tliis ~ergion i s  more tlim mnF 
be safelg asanmed; but an endeavour lins been rnade to render 
as impartid an acconnt of the Penhsuh ampnigns M the 
feelings whicb mnst warp the judgrnent of a conbmporay 
Morian wili pemit. Having Ritnea~ed mnny af the trans- 
actionq ~ n d  f m  m wide aocpintnnce witli militnry men 
been enahiai to wnsult mauy distinguished ufficer~, French 
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and English, by w h w  siiperior knowledge my qwn i m ~  
dons hiive heen m&, my work ia ofercd to tlis morld 
witli lws fwr, and it ccrtninly aonhins origind and autlientio 
statements which, withaut other me&, would mffice to  give it 
interent. Nany of those docnments I owe to marslial Sodt, 
who diadaining national lwejudicw yilticed them with the con- 
fidence oE a great mind at my dispwl  without a reinarli to 
check tlie freedom of my jud-pent, and I h k e  this oppor- 
tunity fo declare a respect, whicli 1 believo every Briti~h 
oficer who lios had the lionour tci serve apinst hirn feeIs for 
hia militarg talenh. By him the French cause in Spin w a ~  
Iong uplield, ami ttfter the battle of Salamanca, if his muwl 
had been followed by the intrusive monarch, tlie fate of the 
wnr rnight Fiave bcen chan-4. 
Miliearg. operatiom aire so d~pendent upn  wcidentaI cir- 
cumstances, tht, to justifp msare, it should al- be shown 
how an unsuocesful genernl has violated the remived maximei 
nnd estnblished principlea of war. That nile Iras been my 
guidc, bnt to preserve tlie nmtiverj nnbroken, tlie observsr 
tions are placed after transactions oE mapitutle, where, their 
aource behg knoi~n, they will only p w  for their worth; 
and if the lohtic friils 1 surrender them to better jnd,ment. 
0 f  the traneactions, wliich commend witli the smret treatp 
of Fonttainebleau, md endd  witli the Assemlilg of Notablea 
at hyonne, little is knom, except througb the exculp&t;tory 
and contdictory puhliclitions of men interested to c o n c d  
tlie $rutli. l o  me it appenrs, tlie passions of the present 
generation m w t  subside aud the iiltimate fate of SpEn be 
lrnaim, before that p r t  of' tlic sulijact can be justly limdled. 
No more tlicrefiire is  retntcd of tlie politiaal affuira tlinn what 
may suffim te  iiitrodnce the milihry eventa; nor have the 
disjoiiited operati~ns of the nutive annies been alwvays told in 
detail; for 1 cared n o t  to ame11 my mork with apoe'yphal 
mtrtter, and negIocted tlie tliousand n m w  hbbIing currentri 
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oF Spanish warfare, to follow thnt mighty English atrerim of 
battle which burst the barrieig of the Pyrenees and left deep 
traces of its f q  in khe soil of Franca 
The Spnni~rils have Iioldly asserted. a d  the world h a  b 
lieved, the delivermce of the Penimnla to be the work of taeir 
hands. This cleún, so untruthful, I combat. It i~ unjust t o  
the fame of t h e  British general, injurious to the glory of the 
British arme : mili* virtne iri not the growth of a day, nor 
is there any mtion 80 nch and populms, that, deqising it, 
can rest secnre. The imbecility of Charles IV., the d e -  
ricas of Ferdinand, ths compt.ion imputed to Gorlay, werc 
uadoubhdly the proxlmate eaum of the cahm%es which 
overwhelmed Xpain; but ithe primary, the historical =use, 
was the despotism springing from the union of a mperstitious 
court and a sanpinary prieathood, a despdsm which a n p  
pressorl knomledgg mntmcterl the public minrl, snp@ the 
fotuidation of milikry and c i d  Grtue, md preparecl the way 
for invasion. No forcip potenttito would bnve attempt~11 to 
&al inte the fohresses of a great kiigdom, if the prying eps  
and clamorons tongues of a free p r w  h d  been rmdy to 
expose his projects, and a disciplined amy present to avenge 
t h e  rnBnlt : Spain, destitute of both, waa firBt circurnventod 
by the wilea, and then ravaged by the arms of Napoleon. 
Xhe was deceived and fettered because fhe public voice was 
stifled ; @he wna acourged ond torn bemuse ber dlitary ineti- 
tniione were decayed When an English forca took tbo field, 
the Spaniad ceaaed t o  act as princYpale in a contast arried 
on In the h& of their country, and invalving bheir existente 
as an independent nation. They were seif-snfficient and their 
prida wns w o d e r l  hy inault, they wcrc mipemkihious and 
tlieir religims feelings were ronsed t o  f~bmtic fnrg by an dl- 
powerful clerg who feiared fo  lose their own rich cndow- 
menta, ht atfter the first burat of indignation the cawa of 
indepcndence created little enfiusiasm Horrible barbaritres 
b 
\vere exercised un French soIrliera flirown hgr aickness or the 
fortune of mar into ths power of tlie invaded, and thb 
dreadfal spirit of personal hhxired m kept alive by the 
cxactions and severe retaliations of the invader ; but no g m t  
qeneral exertion to drive the Intter from the ~ 0 i 1  ww made, 
at l& norte m sustainerI with stedfast courage in inhe 
field : mmifestriea, decrses, lofty boasts, like a cloud of m v m  
cowring i mtkn hull, rnrid.de a galIant appearance, but real 
&en@h and h n e s s  could nomhere be found. 
Stmnge indeed was the spectacle preaenteri Patriotism 
supporting B vile ~ystem of go~ernment, 8 popuIai assembly 
iwirking to restore a despotic monarch, tlie higher classes 
qeeking a foreign master, the lowr amed in the cause of 
bigotry aud mimle.  Tho npstart l e d e 3  secrctly abhorring 
f r d o m  thougli governing in her narne, trembled at the 
democratic they excited; and while cralling forhh d1 
the bad passions of the  mdtitude repressed the patriotism 
that wouId regenerate ns well as save: thc country suffered 
ths evils witl~out enjoying the benefita of a revolution. 
Tumulta and assassinations terrified and disguded the gen- 
sibIe parb d the commnnit~; e comipt adniini&mtion of tlie 
resowes extinguishcd patriotk, neglect ruined $he m i c s .  
The pwnnt-soldier, usunlly flying at €he firnt onsct, flircm 
away his armu and went home; or, attiaekd by iyhe liccnoe of 
the pwrtidw, joined the bnnners of men, the rnost part 
ong.inaIIy mbbem, who were SS oppressive to t h e  people as 
lthc enemy ; md t h e  pm'h chicfa wonld in tlicir turn Iirrvc 
beEn quickly exterminated, liad nat the Frendi, liressed by 
the I3ritish battalíons, been compelled to keep in lar, m e  -es : 
thw rras the isecret of Bpanish constancp. Copious supplim 
from England nnd tlie vn1ous of t l ~ e  AngIo-Portupese troops 
supporterl the m, and it wns the pgantic vigour with wliiclt 
the duke of Teliiigton resisted t.he fiacenas of Frmce, and 
siwttiined the weairness of asee inefficient cabinets thai 
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delivered the Penlnsula, Panlts he committed, whn in wm 
has not? yet shmll kis rcputntion atsntl upon a mre founaatiun, 
a simple ma,icstic stpucture which mvy cannot unndermine, nor 
the meretricious ornaments of parhy p n e m e  deform. Thg 
eqIoits of hi6 army woro grent in tI:~rnxelves, gcn t  in tlieir 
consequmces; aboundi  in signal examples of beroic coursge 
and devokd emI, they slilioulcl neitlier he d i s f i p d  nor f op  
gottsn, being worthy of more fame than the morld haA yet 
aocu& them-worthy alm of a better historian. 

OP the mnuscript autlioritiea consulted in this liistorp, 
those rnarked with the letter 8. the autlior owes to the kmd- 
ness of marslid Goult. 
For tEie notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of cam- 
p & p  sketched out by i y g  Joseph, he is indebted to his grrice 
the dnke of Ilrellington. 
The returnu of the French arm y were extracted frem the 
original half-monkhly statements presented by mnrslial M L e r  
to the emperor Kapoleon. 
Of the other authorjties ?t is annecessary to sap more, thm 
that the autlior had access to the original papers, with the 
exception of Dupcint'~ Memoir, of wliich a copy onIy maa 
obtained. 
hZ Thiers, in the ninth wInme of bis <Ristory of the Con- 
suiate nnd Empire' has, and no doubt will oonfinue to m i s r ~  
present the &arder of the Britiah army, and misstate the 
numbera of French and English engnged ín tlie Peninsula 
For that nnfairness 1 rebuked him, througli the medium of the 
T<me~ journaZ (see lntter end of tliis volume), and I corrected 
his errors as to  the Frencli forces by referenccn to the imperial 
mrrster-rells, referenees hyond oavil, h u s e  1 h d  access to 
the original booh hnnd in grm,  wliicli wero prepwed for 
NapoIeon's private informatiion every Eurtnight, aiid 1, on 
gowl udvicq avoided t71e y d l m  bound returns, which mere 
concoctcd to rniuleod fricnds nnd enemics during tho mar. hf. 
TlrEers in reply, has Iaid dawn very succinctly three wtartliing 
l~ositions,-vix., 1'. flmt h i ~  nunibera mu& be accunite, bemurre 
lie obtained them froin a lnberioua comparison of cuntrndic- 
t o r y  do~urncnh.-2~. "Xliat rny lrnowledgo of fuctswns cntircly 
dcrivctl from some subardinat~ &cera of Mamhal Soiilt's 
~t&.-3". Thnt he, M. Tliiers ia, in respect t o  the sdmission 
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of an enmny'a merit, inconteatibly the most impnrthl and 
gencrous historitin uf Europe ! 
Co&atoos scream out ' pmtty oockntoo,' with g e a t  compia- 
sency, whiie their auditors think them very noiq disagreenble 
birda, and it is possilile M. T11ier.g' etitimata of Iiis oiv~i mt?rita 
rnny be no bcttcr foundcd. dt al1 event~i be hss not ottnined 
to it by compring contrtadfctory opinion~; far in the world 
there is but one, namely, that he is wpble o!¿ anytliing, 
except firmnas in danger, to forward bis projccts. 1-Ie elinll 
nol, however, alunniate the Britisli army witli iilipunity, and 
it is only necemry to examine two o€ tlie tliree ~asitions 
above-mentioned to demonstratc how antrustworthy hc is as an 
historian. For, in the first plnce, it is evident that he knew 
~ i o t  of the imperial nruster-rolis until 1 informed him of their 
existente, or he mould not have laboured tbrouglt a mass of 
coiitrridictory docunients, circuitouslg to rencli a vague rosult, 
d i c n  such nutlientic documents m the empenir's rnustm-rol18 
mere open to him. Ana ncxt, M. Thiem had, orbad not, aecn 
my work when he mote his reply to  my letter in the Times. 
IE he harl not seen it, he disreprded the decencias of literature 
and of saciety ia weriiting, witliout knowIdge of tlie fa&, 
thnt it reñted on no aiitliorities beyond some of mmhnl Soult's 
stnff. But if M. Thiers hrid men mp work, he, with an ' 
effrontery pdniul to haracteize, asserted what every page 
refutes; and this dkregard of f d s  wbere investigation md 
p o f  were so easy, deprives him of al1 titls to credence where 
!:e Smnta of obscure tnsactions. 
In former editions al1 obligaiions to frienda and strangers for 
morterinIs hnve been ~ k n a w l d g e d ,  and it i~ but just, th2i-e- 
fom, now So avow whnt i s  due ta  a lady, witliuut whose aid 
my work could not h a ~ e  been written with a competent knew- 
l d . ~  oof eventa. 
Xhen the immense masa of kiug Joseph's correspondence, 
taken at Bitoria, was first pllaced in rny hnnds, 1 wns disrnnyed 
~t finding it to be a huge collection of letters, without ortler, 
snd in three lxnguages, one of which 1 did not understand; 
many also were in very crabbed and ilegible c h c t e r s ,  espe- 
cidly those a£ Joseph's o m  writ in~,  which is nearly as difficult 
to r e d  as Napleon's: the most imparht documenta ivere 
jn ciplier, rand thcrc was no key ! Despniring of  nny profit~ble 
examinat:on of these mluablc rnatcrinlq the thought erossed 
me of giving up the work, when my rPife undertook, frrst ta 
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amnge the Iettor~ by dates and suhject~, next to malrc a tabIe 
of reforence, tmslating and epitomizing ti10 contents of eucli; 
and tliiti, withuut neglecting for itn itistaut tIie m e  rand educn- 
tion of n very large fizmily, slic effeded in euch a uimple nnti 
comprchensive mnnner, that it wns 1 x 9 ~  t o aacertain tlio con- 
tcnta of any letter nnd lay hnndñ on tlie original rlocument in 
a fcw moments. She also nndertuok t o  rlccililier t he  secret 
correqondence, and not only succeeded, but forme11 n key tto 
the wliole, dekecting even the niills rind stops; ~ n d  so accurately, 
fhat w1ien in oourse of tirnc, the orighal key m 4  pIaced in 
my hantls there was nothing to learn. Bnving mentioned tliie 
to  the dnke of Wellingtoil, he seemed at first incretlulous, 
observing I mnst metzn tliat sho had made out the contents of 
aome letters; several persona had done this for him, he said, 
but none hrrd evm made out tlie nnlls or formed a key, adding, 
' 1 wonld llave given twenty fhousand puunds to  any person 
9~110 C O U I ~  l i ~ l ~ e  done tbat for  me in the Peninsula" 
Lady Nnpier'a mode of p r d i n g s b e  hm thus ¿lescribed:- 
' Bf lany letters fimongat Josepli Buonaparte's correspondence 
were entirely in cipher; perhaps about one-liaIfof the contents 
of some l e t t m  were in that form; otliers lmd only a few 
words occasionally in cipher. These few words p m e d  in 
many cases to be eitlier the mme of some particular general 
OF "cofps d'armge," or tlie nurnbcrs of t h e  particular army 
ñ.hich mna tlie subject of the letter. No key wwns at first sent. 
Lady Nap'er began her attempts to  deciplier Iiy these occa- 
isional wonls, judging by analom with respect to the remainder 
of the Ietters mhat they were Iilcely t o be, antl pcssing se~eraI 
monasgllabIes and sliort words, ivhich shc found occurred vcry 
frequently, mch aa No. 73, wliicli she imqined mmnt cLcle," 
No. 514 'carmée,*' &c. &c. A Iittle troiibIc aiid patieiice 
confirmed tliose pesses, and dheae fimt discoveries were of 
great use in the lirosecution of tlia hsk; so. 13 not only 
meaning " dB " as a. single ward, such as duc de Dalmatie, mrps 
ZarrnGe, &c., but ~epresenting ck as tlie component syIlzble of 
longer words, such as indqendant, dssartlre, &c. 
' Wlien a certain numlier o£ t1iew discovqries llnd beenmtide, 
Lady Napier founda few lettem in wliicli the dinrt uentencea had 
dready been dcciphered and the trauslntion written overthem; 
fllese coiifirmed her o m  pmvioua piesses, md aome new 
syllablea were ndded to her vocaliulnry. Tliiis die liad discovered 
in n grent mcaoure a ]coy to tliis modc of  cipliering, aud Iind 
mude con~iderrtble progress in trandating lotEi tlie rnixed nnd 
the entimly ciphered corresponderice wIim tlie key of tlie 
ciplier waa found and wnt to gcncml Xrpicr, Afterivards 
xxiv NOTICES. 
the task was of come eomparati~ely eapy, thongh fm the 
multiplicity oT nnmbers, md the minute, intricate, m i e d  sub- 
divioion of wurds, it waEi still n tvark of time and pntience. 
: IR thc coume af the early attempt~ Lndy Nnpier x~.marked 
several numbers o h n  recurring, which she belicvcd to be 
nnUs, nnmeaning7 and at al1 eventa foming no part of any 
w o d s  or sentencas, and as mch clismrded them. On exarnining 
tlie originnl key, s2ie found that most of tliese meant fnll s top,  
commnq marks of interro~tion, parentliescs, &e; and a few 
of them were intended to n d ü y  the nurnber that preceded 
them.' 
To this dmple account of a, task, reqniring wondrona subtilty, 
it is necessary to add, that she d s  out al1 my rougli, inter-. 
tined, nnd illegiblc mnnuseripta wlien I could scarccly do it 
myficlf, and m o t e  out t h  mtiole work fair for the p r i n h ,  it 
may be aaid t h  times, so freqnent were the changes d e ;  
bnt her statement conveys no just imprassion of the concentrated 
tllought, the pmtient ecutenees, the q i e t  pemevernnce and 
oon~titnncg required, nnd for many yenrs exercisecl, ~inabated 
by severe aufering from illness and heav  grief. A stmng 
he&, an uucloudcd brain, and invincible resolution, enaliled 
her horrever, mt only to  (lo thia but to make otlier exertions, 
of a differei~t miuro, requiring mcli an enduring forhitude, 
that tfh pomer exerci~d ~eemeci, even to those wlio Iieheld it, 
awm1y credibk 
mr. S A P I ~  
H I S T O R Y  
OP THE 
P E N I N S U L A  W A R .  
BOUH THE FIBST. 
T ~ E  Iiostility of arjstocr~tic Eiirope forced the repubIican 
enthusinsrn of Frnnce into ta c o m e  of mili tay policy, out- 
raeaeous in apperirance, in reality one af necessity; for up to 
the treaty of Tjlsit, her wars were essentially defensive. Her 
long and bloody continental 8tnrggle was not for pmeminerice 
amonpt ambitiona powers, not a divute for some accession of 
te f i to ry  or TnOnlBntrbry poIitiml nñmndmcy, but s dendly 
conflict to  determine wlietlier ar idocmq or demomcy should 
predominate, equaliv or privilege be the prineiple of Euro- 
pean civilization. The Fxench revolution wra howevei pushed 
into exi9tence before the hour of ita natural birth. Tl~e 
aristucratic principle waa still. toa vigorous, too much idm- 
tified with the monarchic, te be successfulIy resisted by 
virtuous democrncy, much lesg could it be overthrown by u 
democracy, rioting in innocent Slood, and msnacing destmc- 
tion t o  political and religious &aSlishmenta, the gtowth of 
ccnturies, somewhtnt decayed indeed, yet searcely showiog tlieir 
~ c y  hairs. The first  milita^ events of the Revolntion, the 
distiffeetion of Toulon and Lyan~, tho  civil war of La Tendfie, 
the sliglit though sucwssful reaiabnce made to tlie duke 
of Bmswick's inwrsion, the frequent and violent change GF 
d e r s  whosc £al1 none regretted, were proofs tliat the French 
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revolution, intrinsicaIly too feeble ta sustain the pliysical and 
moral force pressing it ciown, mas fasb rrinlring, \yhen the won- 
derful genins nf Rapoleon, baffling a11 rensonable cnlerilntion, 
raised and fixed it on the basis of vicltog, the only one capable 
I of wpgorting the c r d e  product.ion. 
Tbat great man, perceiving the revolution mas not snE- 
cientIy in mison witli the feelingv af tlie age, eu 1:avoured to 
disiarm oi. neutraiize monarctical and sacerdotd enrnity, by 
restoring a cliurcli establisliment and becomi~g a nionarcli 
h h e l f  His vigorous cliam&er, and tlie critica1 nature of 
the times, rendered liim imperious; but whlle he sacr:ficcd 
political liberty, nhich to tlie great buIk of manliind hzls never 
been more than ;n p~msiog sound, he clierialied wjth tlia utmost 
care equality, a sensible good prodncing increased satisfahion 
as it deacends in tbe scaIe of society. This, the real principie 
oE his pvernment tlie secret of his populluity, made liim tlie 
people's monarch, not fbe sovereip of the ar js tomy;  rand 
liencc &Ir. Pitt justly called him ' the cliild md tlie championof 
democr~cy;' Mr. Pitt himself being thc child and charnpion of 
mistocrncy. Hcnce also the privilcged classes of Europc, con- 
sistently ttmnsfmcd tlieir impIucnh1e hatrcd of thc French 
revolutioii to liis person; for in him tliey sm innovation find 
a, protector, and fclt thnt bc only wns nlile ta  consolidnte tbc 
Imtcful aystem, and wna rmliy whnt lie callctl liimself, 'tbe 
Statte.' 
The trcaty of TiIsit gnvc Napolcun a commnnrling position 
ovrr the potcntates of  Europr, Sut jt iinmnskerl thc war of 
principles, bringing Englond rand himself, the charnpions of 
cqr~dity md privileges, into direct c o n t h .  P m o  could not 
be while botli were strong, the Frencli emperor liad onlp s i n e d  
the chdcc of his future brittIe field; and a5 tlie fight of Txnfalgar 
forbatle the invasion ofxngland, Iie with fertile genius pnr: 
puaed t o  Finp her nnvd and commercial strength kiy blirring 
the contincnt agninst hcr rnxnufacturerr This contineritd 
systcm was homcver inopcrativc d e r c  not cnforccd by Frencli 
troops. It ftiiled in Portugal, Britich influence being tliera 
prtmmoiint, notwithctunding tFic tcrror inspircrl by tbc cmpcror, 
~ m n ~ e  se1 f-interest is lasting, fcnr rnoinentary, wlicrefore Por- 
tugal wes virtualIy en ungunrdcd provinoe of England, from 
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mhence and from Qibrnltnr Englkh goods pnssecl into Sliain. 
Tu ehcclr tliis trnIlic l?y forcc wns not e n g ,  and otherrvisc 
Spain wne to France aearly what Portugal vas nFonnienr 
to Great Staiii. Priendship for EnglandQs e n e q  Cllamt~~nv'a 
Iteport. 
mturnlly followed the well-known seizure of tlie ,,,, U&, 
Spiauisli frigiites in time of pencc. Tlie Frencli lW7. 
c:Luse was tliedow popuI~.r iil Spnin, nnd tlio we& court 
subsen-ient; yet notliing muld keep tlie people from a proflt- 
&le contrabad tmtle-they ~voiild not yield to a fiireip power 
what they refiiced t o  their own government. XeitJier wns 
sristocrntic cnmity to Napoleon nslcep in Spain; a pro- 
clamatiun, issued beforo tlle liattle of Jcna, and Iinstily witli- 
drawn after that action, indicahd tlie true feelings of the 
Spmish couA 
Tbis sitate of nflairs turned the emperor's WRpofeon 
tiiondits towarris tiic Peninsiiln, and a clinin of I.RH C:ib=& 
~ t rnn f i~  events soon intluced liim t o  remove the :t:;:ad. 
Bourbons, nnd place bis brotlier Soseph on the 
Spanish Uirone. He thaitglit tlie people, sick o f  an effete govern- 
ment, woulil he quiescenh, anrl Lis ueinterrupted goorl for- 
tune, matcliless sa iu~ i ,  anrI vast Iiewer, niade him disreprd 
ulterior &nsequeiices. IIence tbe crn~inp af  hie  milita^ anll 
political aystcm, tlie dangerous vicinity of a Bourbon +&y, 
and still inore tlic tmptntion offcrcd by I miraciiloiis folly, 
outruiining cvcn liis rlctiirrs, u q e d  hini to a deed, wliich, 
wIl accepted wuuld bxye ln-01-ed bencficial to the people, btit 
enforced contniry to tlieir nisliea wns unliallowd by justice 
or benevolence. In an wil Iiour for ltis own greatncss anrl 
tlic linpplnatrri. oP otlicrs hc comrncnced tho fntnl projcct. 
Pouudetl iu violente, attendsd ~vitli frnud, it spred de~~li i t ion 
throu~h tlie Pcninsula, mri calamitous to France, destructive 
to liimself, and tlie conflict hetween his hardy vetemns and tlie 
vindictivc racc hc insulttcd \vas af unmitigwted femcity; for the 
Spatiirtr~ls defended f,lieir jitst cnuse with proverbial, liereditiiry 
cruelty, whiIe the French struclr a terrible bdunce of bmbwous 
actions. 
Napoleon, dthongh sttirfled at the enwgy of the Penin- 
sular~, then Gcnt his wliolc force to the ivurk-Enqlzind lent lier 
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pomer in opposition-and the two leading nntions o€ the world 
were thiis broiight into m n t a ~ t  when both were disturbed by 
angry passiona, c a p  for great cventa, and of astonishing 
dominion. The Freneh. empire, including Upper I tJy,  the 
confederation of tlie Rhine, Ewitzerland, tlic Duetiy of T!'nrsaw, 
nnd the dependent stateJ o£ Hollantl and Nnplcs, eiialiletk 
Nntpoleon, tlirough the conscription, to amar an army niime- 
rous as the host wliich followed the Peraian of old, and tlioucli 
like it gathered from mxny nations, trained with Romnii 
discipline, nnd Ied with Cartliagnian genius. Tlie ofñcers, 
hitbitirated to victory, were Liold and enterprising, as tlie 
troops they led were hardp and rcsolute. And bo tliis lmd- 
pciwer was joined a formidaljle mvy, for though tIie sl~ips of 
Prance were chained in liarbours,her mnal strength 
h'npoleon*~ H ~ , , ~ ,  r a s  only rebuked, not dectroyed. Inexliaustible 
resources for building, vast estafilisliments, a wrist 
Iinc of irnmense length, and the creative genius of 
Napoleon au nurcing a mvy, which the m r  then 
impending Iietwccn England and tlic United Statcs 
promised to render effici~nt. hlaritrrnc comrnerce 
was fainting, yet the French interna1 mrl conti- 
nentd tr&c was robust, manufactures were 
rapidly hproving, the debt \vas mall, and fimciat 
operations mnducted lvjth exact economy; the 
supplics mere aU raised w i t h i  the yew witliont 
great pressure of tnxation, mil from a metallic 
cnrrencp. There seemed no renson therelore wliy 
Napoleon ihoufd fail to bring any war tto a fwouralile conclu- 
sion; for bp a happy comliination of vigour and flattery, of 
oder, discipline, and motnl cxcitement, adapted to the genius 
of his peqple, he had crested a power seemingly resistless. 
And it would have been ao iE applied to only one gretit ohject, 
at a time, but thi tlie ambition of tlie m n ,  or rather tlie 
force of circumstances, did not permit. 
EqIand, omnipotent on the ocean, WRS little regttrded as a 
military power; her enormoua debt, rearly augmenting in an 
aocelerxted rdo, a necessary consequence of antieipatiiig the 
. . 
national resouroes tbnd dealing in a fictitioua currenq, wns 
sapping lier vital gtrcngtli. Nercliants and masufac turertl 
were indeed tliriving frum incidental circumshnces, but tlie 
hliouring popuIation suffered and degeneratea; pauperisin and 
its mrc nttendant crilne were aupenting in the lancl, and tlie 
community splitting into classes, one rich and mogant, the 
other poor snd discontented-the first profiting, the second 
~ ~ S ~ R S S B ~  by the mr. Of Ireltanti it is unnecessary to speak, 
her wrongs, hber misery, peculiar and unpardeled, ate but too 
well known, too little regaded. 
This comparative statement, so favourable ta France, wonld, 
however, be a hlse &terion of reldive streng-bli with regad 
to tlie utruggle in the Pcninsula. A mitw manifcatly unjust 
is a Iieavy wciglit upon t:ie operationa o€ a general; it recon- 
ciles men to desertion, sanctilies wunt of  xeiil, furnisliea pre- 
texts for cowardice, renders liardshipe more irksome, dangem 
more obnoxious, glory leas satidmtory to tlie mind of tlie 
snldier. The invasion of Spain, n-batever its real orjgin, wtis 
an wt of vlolence repugnant to the feelinp of nkkind;  the 
Frencli were burthened with a sense of its iniquity, the Eritish 
exhilaraeed by a contrairy sentiment. Al1 the eontinental 
nations had s m a d  nnder the smord of Napoleon, yet none 
ivero cnishetl except Pniasia; a common fe~ling of liuniilin- 
tion, tlie liope o£ revenge, the rendy subaidies of England, 
were therefore bonds of union among tlieir governments 
stronger tlia~i treatioa: France conld calculate on tlieir 
feas, England on tlieir ~eIf-love. Hntred of French prin- 
ciples w u  generd with the privilegd classes of Europe, and 
they peaonally hated Xapoleon, becnuae hii genius bd g i ~ e n  
shbility tu institutiozis p w i n g  out o£ the revolution; 
h u s e  liis victories, baffling their hopee, hrtd shaken their 
Iiold uf powcr. Chicftain nnd cliampion of new Fmnce, he 
wns constribincd tci mntinrie liis mreer Until hlr destiny wns 
accornplislierl ; and this necessity, overlooked by tlie generalitg, 
fuusnislied plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition, 
uf nvicli aniple adrantajie mas taken. Ispacity, injust iq 
insolente, even cowardice, wcre stird to be insieparnble from 
the French ch~mter; and, i t  was more tlian insinrixted, tbat 
al1 tlie enemies of Franca were iaherently virtuous and dis- 
iiiterested. Unhappily, historp is a record of crimes, and the 
arrogante of men buoyed up by a apring-hide of militnry 
glofy, did mith Jlies, ne wcll a4 with vanqiiislied enemim, 
produce suficient dispst  to insura bciief in idsn nccusri- 
tions. 
Mapoieon wns the contriver nnnd support of a politicd 
system, requiring time and victury to  cousolirlr~ke; lie wns the 
connecting Iinwer between the new RIN~UI v i e w ~  und ivl~at wnu 
still vigorous in the oId; lis held tlicm togcther, yet liclon~od 
to neitlier, niid wm in dunger frorn L ~ t h ,  Eis power, un- 
senctifid by prmcription, lid to be as delicately M iU ~ m s  
vigorously exercised, and was mt1ier pereniptol tlinn des- 
pot,ic: tliere were questions of aduiinistration with wliicli he 
diiretl not meddle ei-en wiaely, mucli I ~ s s  arliitrnrily. Ciistorns, 
pjudimu, nnct the dregs uf revnlutionary licence, rentlered 
Iliu poIicy complicated. and dificuI4 tho policy ol his adver- 
axries msy ; for tlle delusion of pnrlitlnientiiry re~)reseiitation 
gave tlie Engli~h governnieiit unlimited puwer over persona 
aiid p r o ~ ~ r t y ,  and a cowupt p ~ s  gnve ft iiearly tlio snme 
power w e r  the pubtic rnind. Endisli cornmcrcc, penetratina 
as it  were into e v e y  Iroine ok the fnce of tlie gldie, sup1iIietl. 
a tliousund clianiiels o l  intelligsnce; tlie spirit of trallic, wliiicli 
seldom aclcnowlwlges the tieñ of patriotisni, \va? iinivemdly 
on tlie ~ i d e  of Great; Eritain; and t h a ~ e  tiviii curses, pnpt!rp 
money anii public credit, so tmly derccribcd as tstrengtli in 
tlie liefiinning, wedrnees in tlie enrl,' were reclcI~dy nused by 
statesmen, h o s e  policy discartlcd the rigllts oi posterily. 
These wers tlie ndventitioua elemenh of England's liowcr, 
anrl her natJurd reesoumes were many and great. If crcdit is 
t o  be $ven to the cansus, the population u-as at tliat period 
twenty millions; Franee reckoned but twentpseven millions 
when Fxderjclr the Qeat said, "f f e  were her líing, not a 
gun ~hould be fired in Eiirope ~iitliout his leave.' The Frcncli 
m y  ww very formidable from numbers, discipline, aníl skill, 
mcl bravery ; y&, contrary to general oliiiiion, tlic Dritish 
a m y  mas riot inferior, save aa to numbers: in discipline it 
was ~uperior, becanse a natioml Torce; will bear a sterner code , 
tlmn a miued one will mfíer. Vi th  the latter, militriry crjmm 
may be punislied, when moral offsnccs can hnrdly be relwessed. 
Men mil1 endure severity in regulations they know to be 
necessarg, but tlie constrriini of petty tiiough wholesome d e s ,  
they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny when 
not bound bp iiatiand ties and customs; the dis,pce of bad 
conduct attaches onEy t o  the peoplc under whose coIom they 
serve. Grcat, indeed, iis tlia genius mliich keepa men of 
clifferent nations firm to  t2icir culeurs, and cnforcca tl rigid 
cliscipline. Napolconk rnilit,nry ~pñteni  was, frorn this muse, 
looser t l i~ti  tlie Rritisli, wliicli couibines tlio solirlity o€ tlie 
Germnn with tlie rapidity of the French, exclwfing the 
niechaiiical dulaess of tlie one, and the dan,wous vivacity o€ 
tIie other; yet, before &he Penimula l i d  proved ik cxceiience, 
the British t r o n p  were absurdly underrated ia foreign coun. 
tries and despised in their own. Tliey conld not then move in 
lrarge bdies so readiIy as the long practised French, but tbe 
soldier was sti,patized as ~tupid, the oñicer ridieuled, and a 
Rritish amy eoping with a Frencli one for aingle cem- 
pniga wtis considered R cliimem 
Very suhject to ftilse impression~ nrc the Engliqli; nnrl 
heing proud of their mdulity, as if it were a virtue, tliey 
ding to error mith a tenacity proportioned to ita grossnes?. 
dn  ignorant contempt for the soldiery wa.q prevalent long 
before the ill-success in 1794 abd 1739 seemed to justify 
puhlic prejudice; the cause of fhose failures was not traced; 
the exccllcnt systm introducd by tlis dulcc of York wns 
disregardcd; and Enginnd, a t  Iiarnc and rtbrond, was, in 1808, 
~ourned ns a milihry powor, when sho posñeseed, witliout n 
frontisr ~~vnllowinp armics in its foitressas, at 
1 ~ , t  twa hunrlred thousand ~olrlierd, the bwt dia- 2;g:rf: 
ciplined, and Sest equipped hithe u n i ~ s e ,  to~ether 
with an immense recmiting esta.bIisliment, and the power oE 
drawing, through the militia, rrithout Iimit on tlie population. 
Many were necesswily emgleyed In defence of the colonies, yet 
enough remained t o  furnish a force greater thm Xapoleon 
had at Austerlitz, double that with which he conquered Italy. 
In materid resourca dso, the superiority of English mccha 
nicd a1ciU WM shom, and fhat  intellectual powr which 
in seicncc, nrts, and liternture is nationdly con~picuous, wsdi 








Fon many yellr8 antecedent to tIlo French im:asion, the royal
fnmily of Slmin had beeD distracted by domestIc, <J.uan~ls; the
son's hund 'I'M ugainst the mother, tllO father 11 agamst the
SOil' lllld the court was a scene of oolltinul\1 broils, under cover
of ;hidl artful men, as is usual ill such cases, pushed their
own interest, while seeming to net for the party whose cause
they espoused. Charles IV. uttributed this Ull-
hapllY state of his hoMe to the int.rigues of his
sister-ill.law, tile queen of tJ1(l Two Sicilim~. Hc
was a weak old man, governed by his wife, nud
she by dOD 1fanuel Godoy, of whose person Bhe WlIS cnn.moured
eveD to folly. From the rank of a simple gcntlcnw.1I of the
royal guards, this mall had been raised to the highest dignities,
and was called Prince of the Peace! a strange title to be con·
fiI~ded for ever with onc of the bloodiest wars filling the pages
of history. }'erdinand, prince (,f the Asturias, hated this
fuvourik, and the miserable death of his young wife, Ius own
'youth, alld lIppllrcntly forlorn condition, made the people par-
take of lJis feelings; thus the disunion of the royal family,
extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court,
involved the natinn in ruin. The hatred of Spaniards is so
venemous, that 00(10)" who was really a mild good-natured
man, has been overloaded with imprecations, as if lIe alone
llad been tlie cause of ,,11 disasters; but it Wll8 not so. The
canon Escoiquiz, 8 subtle intriguer, the ellief of Ferdilland'g
party, finding the influence of Godoy too strong, looked for
support in a powerful quarter; and under his tuition, Fer.
dinand wrote upon tllC Ilth of OcWber, 1807, to the emperor
Napoleon, complaining of the influence wllich bad men bad
obtained over his fllther. He prayed t1lcrcfore for the
inl.erfeffJnce of the 'hero destined by Proviuence,' so runs
the text, 'to save Europe and to Support thrones" asked an
allillllcc by marriage with the Buollaparte fu,milr, :nd desired
bis commnnication might be kept secret from liia father, Iest 
it ~ h w l d  be taken as a pmof of disreapect. He received 
no aaswer, ttnd fresli mfitter of quarreI being found by his 
enemies rtt honie, he wm placed in amest, and hie filtlier 
dénounced him to tIie emperor m guilty of tren- 
29th 
~ o n ,  i~nd  projecbing hhe ssswsination of his own Octolier. 
mother. N~poleon s ~ k d  this pretsxt for inter- 
fering in the domestic policy of Spain,-and tlius the honour 
and independenca of a great people were Jeopardized by tlie 
squabbles of the most worthless persons in the nation. 
A short time befare this, Godoy, instigated by ambition, or 
fewrinp the Cleath of the king would expose him t o  Perdinand's 
vengennce, groposed to tlie French empcror the coaqueat and 
divjsion of Portugal, pmrnising tlie aid of Spaia if a princi- 
pnlity for liirnself should be sct aetpiirt from the ~poil. 
NapoIeon aclopted tliis project. Under pretaxt of supportr 
ing his nrmy in Portugal, he rniglit p u r  troops iiito Spnin, 
and aeize a prize which tlie royal ~quabble, r s f e d  to hia 
arbitmtion, placed wxthin his reacll. A aecret Oreaty and a 
dependent convention was therefore concludod at Fontainblean, 
by mruslial Duroc on the part of Trance, Ugenio Ysquierdo 
on the pmt of Spain. It wm ratified by Nrspoleon the 29th of 
October, 1807, and provided, lo, Tbut tlie honse of Brnpnxa 
ehould bo drivcn from Portugal, and that kingdom dividctl Into 
tliree portiune, one of wliicli, tlie Entre Minhu e Duero, incliid- 
ing t l ~ e  city of Oporto, wns to be called Nortli Lusitttnia, and 
@en to tlie dispossessed mvereip of Etrui-ia so, The 
Alemtejo and Alprvea to form a grincipnlity for Godoy, who 
was still to be in some respects a dependent on the Spanish 
crown. 3'. TLe Tms ofi Montes, Beiral Estremadiira, nnd 
Iisbon, to be held in deposit until z general FeaceI and then 
exchxnged, under certain cnnnditions, apinst English conque&. 
4". Tlie transrnarine dominiuns of the exiIed family to be 
eqiidly dividcd, nnd mithiii thee y m  the king of Spain to 
I~xvc the title of Ernperor of tlie two Americas. 
Tbc cenvention prnvided tlint Frunce w ~ s  to employ 25,000 
infantry i ~ i i d  3,000 cawlry. Spnin 24,000 infantry, 30 p n b ,  
and 3,000 cnv:tlry. Tlie Francli contingent to ha joinerl ut 
Aleiinttira by t b  Spaiiisli rrrtvdry, artiiiory, and one-tliird o£ 
tlie infanty, and from thcnce to rnnrch to Lisbon. Of the 
remaining Spnisli infrvntry, 10,000 were ta occitpy tthe Entre 
Minlio e Duero and Oporto; 6,000 to invade Estrcmadura 
and thc AI,ww. Meantime, 40,000 men asscmliling at 
Eayonnc, wcre to take the ficId by tire 20th of Novcmbcr sliouId 
XugInnd interfere, ar tlie Portupcso pcopfe resist; nnd if tbe 
king of S p & i  or any of his family, jjoincd the amy, tlie com- 
manrl WAS to be vested in tlie pemon so joining; uritli tliat 
exception, tlie French general was to Iic ulicyed wlienever tlie 
troops of the two nations camc iiito contiict. Uiiring the 
inrircli tlimrigh Spdn, tlie French suldicrs mcrc t o  be fcd by 
thah countl ,  paid by tlieir own. l ' h e  revenues of the con- 
qriercd provincea werc to he ndniiniqtcrcd by thc gcncral 
tactually in possession, and for tlic benefit of tlie nntion in 
whose narnc t Iic province was licld. 
Tbia treaty and convention cerhinly ennbled Sapoleon to 
pmr forces into Spain without crcnting much snspIcion. Yct 
it docs not folloiv, ae some ctutliors hnvc ~ = a c r t c t l ,  thcy  mcre 
contrived by tlie emperor to render the roya1 family odiouj: to 
tlie world, rind dcbtir intcrrst in thcir fatc, ~vlícn it slioulri 
bc convcnicnt to apply the snmc mcacure oC injustiec to them- 
sclves, Sucli rt policy, foounded on the ermr thiit justice nnd 
not intermt ~sm79 govcrnnicnts, woiild hnve bccn Fiilly. Por- 
tugnl was intrinsicnlly a grmt object. Histoiy apcnliq not o f  
thc time wlien the iiihnliitants wantcd spiBt; the natl~ral 
olidnclcs to invasion bed often Liaffled largc nrmiaq; 2nd the 
lonp line of cominunication from Baponne to the frontier 
could anly lic siipportcd with Spnnisli eo-opcmtion. More- 
oacr England ctutild so easily givc nid, tliat it is prtiliable 
Napoleon's fird rlcsign accorded with tlie liternl mmning of 
tlic treaty, and h i9  siibscqucnt projccts rarase ns the rvonder- 
fiil iniliecility of the Spnnish Bourbons b w m e  manifcst. The 
convention also sent Spaeish nrmics to  tlie north and south, 
from \vlienee tbey eoulcl most rearlily succour tlieir own country; 
and, in fnct, Solano's und Turanco's troops did form the nucleusi 
and strength of tbe hdal i tq ian and Gallicim armies, one of 
wliich geined thc victory of Bnylen, and tlie otLer coiiteude(d 
for i6 at Elio Seco. 
From Eayonne, tlie force destined to invatle Portugnl 
actually ente& Spain before tlie treaty was signcd. It w a ~  
called ' Th f rst army of th7ae &ronde,' and WM commarided 
by Junot, a young pnernl, bold and ambitious, but of greater 
reputation than he wu1d support, and his conscript solcliers 
were ill fitted to cndure the Iinrdships awaiting them. He 
marched in small divisions, nnil tho  6pani~lrdq 
nircbarrrt, 
from Iiitcnt fear, or tlic dic;lilce to forcipers k:xp. an 
usunl witli in seclircied peoplq werc! uafrie~~dly. 
At &lnm~nca he Eiultwl to complete tLe orpeization, nnd 
awmG a favournble mument for passing inta Portugal, bnt 
political e~cn t s  rnarched so fast that tthe emperor ordered 
an immerliate adrance; whereupon the: Brngaiiza fnmily 
emigrated, and tlie French eiitered Lishon while LSp~in waa 
bending to the firsi. g u s t g  of that htrrricane which wa4 to 
sweep over hcr mítli such ddructive violeace. 
JudiciaI procecdinp had been instXtutec1 againat Ferdinand 
for trensan nntI iritcnded nlntricide. He ms absoIved oF 
tliose hnrrid mimes, hit  ucltnowleclgerl liis otIier offcncca, 
sqing lie bnd beeii instigater1 by liis friends to deerls he 
abhorrerl; n~vertheless, the intrigi~es contiuu~l, and Nnpo- 
leon's phns wem thereby necessarüy ahanced. And thougl~ 
tlie Fontainhlenu convention prwided only for a reserve at 
Rayonne, otlier troops were assembled at diff'erenh points, 
antl, in December, two corps cntercd Spain, antl murched to 
Vittorin. Tlie one, under gcnernl Dupont, wns n,tnrn of 
cnll eil 7% swond m~ of th& (;~~P'o?z.&,' the t l iu  Brench 
army. A p  
atlier, iinrler niníslinl Moncey, wm cnlleri ' 2'168 prnrlix. 
amTy qf tJw C ~ B  Ochn.' Tbey mnstered e;;t;sd 
fifty-tliree tliriuxantl men, forty thousand b e i n ~  cipcratioiis, 
mitlr the eaglcfi. Dupont soon advmccd upon ""J. 
VxlIdoIid, £m whencc four tliousmd sevsn hundrerl of 
his men, desiped to reinforce Junot, moved to Balamanm. 
Tliese armics seemed Co follow the natural line o f  cnmrnu- 
nictition ~ i i t h  Fortrrpl : brit Diipont and AIonccy rcnllp 
mt oft'tlic nortlicrn provinccs from Natlrid, and 
Notes nf 
secirretl tlic rniul from Ri~yonne to t l i a t  cnpitxl. saplmn. 
S m J l  divisions conti~iualtlly rcinforced tliem, and $Tyy 
twelve tliousand men, iindcr genera2 Duliesme? 
pcnetrating by the Eastem Pyrenees, entcred hcelona. 
Tbe rnyai family qiinrrel was aow brouglit ko a crki~ .  'She 
king, deoeived and f'rightencd, ww g0in.g it i a  aaid, to take 
rehge in America, and preparrntions fox a jonrney to &ville 
were in progress, wlien, on tlie 17th of Marcli, tlie prince's 
groome cornmenced a tumult, the ppulace of Araiijuez joined, 
and qnietnes was only rwtored by an wsurance tlizt no 
journey was contemplgted. On the 18th the Madrid popu- 
lace mked the house of &doy, and tlia 19th tlis riots 
recommenced in Arnnjuez. Tlie fwourita seciwted l~imself, 
but wna discorered arrd on the point oE being Billed, wlien 
the ~oldiers of tbe roya1 guarrl rescued him. Cliades, terrified 
by tlie vioIenco of Iiis sulieds, l i d  abdicatcd tlie rluy I)eforc, 
tlint eweiit m procIaimer1 at Ndrid tlie 20tIi, nnd Ferdinund 
wna clednred krnp to  tlie great j uy of ttlie pciople, Tlie faLle 
of tlie frop demunding rs monurcli was repentd. 
During tlicsc tmsnctions, Murat, p n d  diilrc oT Berg, 
Iiming aysurned commnnd of tho Frcncli in Xpnin, pasacd the 
Sornouierrn, and thc 23rd cntered Marllid with hfoncey'~ ccorpa 
and a fine body of cavulry. Dupont nlso rnrarclled by &pvin 
to the Esmrial md Aranjuez. Ferdinaad arrived at 3Ti11udrid 
the 24th, and though lie was not recoguised as lring by 
Murat, thnt dangerous gu& demanded the sword of Francis I., 
and it was delirered to him wih miich cereniony. Clrarlw, 
homever, protestea to Xurat that his abdication had Iieenforced, 
and also mote  ta  Napolcon in t h e  same straiu. 
This state of afffnirs disquictcd the cmperor, and he sent 
general Snvay to conduct liis plans, which appenr to hare 
Rapoieon been deranged by tlie vehemence of  tlie people, 
in LUU nnd the precipitation witli mhicli hiumt bad 
Casss. seized the capital. Hnvvever, p~evious to Xa- 
vary'e arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ii'erdinsind, 
departed from Madrid, hoping t o  mcet tlir: empemr, who WM 
confidentlp e~pcted  in tliat city. l ic  was followcd on the 
10th by Yerdinand, who liad instituted a suprerne junta, of 
which his uncle Don Antonio n.as president, aud filurnt a 
membw. Tlie true causes of their joarney llave no& yct been 
exposad, and perliaps wlien they shall bc mnde knowr~, some 
~wtty iiitrigue will be found to havc hnd more influence than 
tlie p n d  mcliinationa aktntiutcd to NapoIeoq who could 
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not have anticipatd such surprjging we&ness rrlicn framing 
a great political scherne. 
Everywhere the psoplo displayed anger and nlann at 
Ferdinantl's journey, At Vittoria t h g  mif tlie trmcs of his 
carringe, and galhnt men offcred t o  carry him aivay liy scn, 
rtcspite of tiio Frcnch troops on tho roml. Unmoved bq- tlieir 
sed, arirl regarlless uf tha warning contaiiiad in a letter lie 
received Eroin Nnpoleon, wlio, witlliolding tha title of mqesty, 
é;Iiarp1y reproved liini for ]lis past conduct, Fedinand con- 
tinued t i a  progess, and the 20th of April found hiinse'lf a 
prisoner in Dayonne. Eis father liad, mean~l~iIe, m u m d  
tlie myd autliority under the protection of hlurat, nnd then 
obtaining Godoy'sliberty, quitted Spain, and dso placed liirnself, 
his cause and kingdom, in tlie empemr's hands. These events 
wcre s~~flicient to drive a more cautious people tlian tlie 
Spaninrds into nction, if other measures liad not c x p o d  tlie 
French dcsigns; liut thcir troops, ~lmittcd franlcty into ~cvcral 
fortresws, l i d  abu~ed tl~nt Iiospitnlity, nnd by iy+nrious nrtifices 
got poasesaion of tlie citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, Pam- 
peluna in Navarre, anJ of Pigneras, Monjuik, nnd Dnrcelona 
in Catdonia. f iu s ,  in a time of profound pace, a foreign 
force was suddenly establi~lied in tlie capital, on tlie communi- 
catiunri, and in tlii? principal fortresws; itc cliief wns admittetl 
inh the government, and thc nntion wns laid prostrnte, witli- 
out n l ihw struck, a warning voiw rniscd, or a suspieion 
excited in time ta resist an intrnsion on wliicli al1 gazed with 
sttipiíl nnineement. 
3t is idlc to attribute tliis evcnt to Nnpoleon'a subtlety, and 
Godoy's trmchery ; sucli a cnlmity could only resu1t from 
prcvious bad gomiiment, znd tlie consequent degrdatian of 
puMic feeling. Tt is however easier ta oppress tlie people than 
t o  destroy t h i r  generous scntimenta; antl when pfitriotism is 
lost amongst thc iipper classes, it may still be found among t he  
lower. In the PeninwIn it wtta not found, it atnrted into life 
witli n fervor anrl cncrgy cnnoliling cven tlie wild nnrl s w n g e  
foim in wFUch it appeared; nnr \vuq it the LM aclrnirülile tliut 
it bumt fortli attended by many evils-the good feeling dia- 
played was the geople'a own, their cruelty, folly, and perverse- 
ness were the effects of long misp~eeniment. 
Xapoleon had many reasons for rned(flinc nitli the affairs 
of Spnin; tliere seeins no good orie for 11is riitiiiner of doiiig 
it. Tlie Fpnnish Dourbnne oould not be sincere fricnria to 
Pmnce wliile Iie Iield tlie sceptre, and tlie procfnmiitiun 
is~ned hefrire t,lie hnttle of Jena, evinced their secret enniity. 
l t  did not follow tliat tlir people aympsttised witli the govcm- 
inent, Iliit Napoleon loriked more to tlie court tlian tlic nation. 
ITiu1 3ie Iiriiuglil tlir:iri iuto collision firsdand niany occnsions 
wulil Iinuc licvn fout~rl-lie woultl have appeared, not m the 
trenclieroiis ai.liitr:itor in a domestic quamel, but as tbe 
dclivercr a!' a gre:lt peuple. 
FPrdiiiiintl'a jouriiey, Godny's liberation, Charles's fli~1:li t, 
IIurat'~ seot in tlie junta, mnid tlie concentGc rnovemcnt of tlie 
Prencli troops t.ownrds Madrid, awdc erl al1 thc slumbering 
pasríion of tlie Spaninrdri, producin,rr tumults aiid as~assinaf 
tionu. rlt Tolcdo a serious ricit occurred ori tlie 23rd uf 
April, m(t the country people joineíl tlie citisens asinfit tlie 
French. A dfvisioil of infantry and some cuvnlrj- oof Dupont's 
corps, tlien quw~ered at Araqjuez, rest.orctl arder, Iiut the 
agitation of tlie public mind increnmed; for tlio Freiich troolia 
Iieiog o€ tlie I~LF;L WIIGC~E~I~~OII ,  young, md mTy disciplined 
after tliey entererl i31iin, tbeir appnrent feclilene~s cxcitsd 
the tontempt of tlie Spnnirtrds, who pride themselves ulioa 
pemonnl Iiriiwem. Tlie swelililg tumour Iirolte at la&. On 
tlie 2nd of hIay, t.110 people gatliered in front of tlie IiIdnirl 
palace alinut s cnrriage, rl~si;j,-ed as they riupposcd to con- 
vey Don Aiitonio to France. Tliey would not, tliey sñid, 
let the last of the roya1 famiiy be spirited awxy, nnd, witli 
irnl)~ecntrom, ciit tlie traces. At tliat rnornelit, La Grange, 
Murat's aidade-cnmp, carne up ; Le ms maltreatetl, ttnd in 
an instiint the whole city rme in commotion.- Tlie unarmed 
Frenc11 soldiers, expectinn no violente, were killed in every 
street, and tlie hospital was attackecl, but tlie attendnnts md 
sick men dcfeuded it siiccessfuily. m0 alarm spred  to the 
m m p  ouiside tbe city, the cava17 gdluped in by tl~o p t e  of 
Alcalal general Lanfranc entered the Calle h d i a  de h r -  
nardo with tliree thousand infmtry, and when crostiing tbe 
street of Mnm~ellm, a cannon was discharpd +yctinst his 
column by Daois and Velarde, two Xnanish officers in a state 
of great excitement from cLiink. TEe French voltipurs 
imaiediatelq. kilEed them, and tlie coJumn continuing its morch, 
released, not without bloodshed, several superior oficert~ 
besieged in their quarters. Tho cavalry, treating JIemdr of 
the aff¿Ii~ nri a mcrr: riot, for no Spnnish soldiers Azanrñ iiid 
toolr pnrt, onl y soiight to mnkc prisoncrs, tIioiigIr O'l'B.TP'l. 
orime persons were killed or maimed liy tlie hoises. Finxlly, 
tranquillity wm iseetored in the city by tlie exertions of 
general Barispe, marshal Moncey, and Gonzalvo O'Farril, I~iit 
tlie peasant~ of the neighbourhood, amed and in consider- 
abIe nurnlier~~ beset the gxtes after niglitfnll, and about sixty 
were killed or wounded by tlie guad. 
bIurat? incensed at the los3 of his goldiew, had the prisonem 
capitdly condemned by a rniIihry commission, yet, when the 
municipality wgcd the crueIty of visiting thia natural ebnlli- 
tion of nn injured anci inmltcd pcople so severcly, he yieIded to 
their nsguments, nnd forbnrl exeeiition. Nevcrblieless, go~iernl 
Grouchy, in whose irnmediste poiver tlie prisoners reinained, 
exclaiming, that his own Iife liad been attempted, that tFie 
blood of Kench mlioldiers waa not t o  he spilt with impunity, 
that the captivea liad been condemned by a councii of lrar 
and ghould be executed, proceeded to slioot thcm in the 
Prado, and forty mere thus eEain before Murat could intcrferc. 
Next day, the Spanish rruthorlties discoverinptbet rt a lonel  of 
tlie Imperial Gunrds still rctnincd many prisonera, applicd to 
Murnt, for tlieir releuse, and it is said by some, tl~ougli 
denied by others of greuter autliority, tliat the oolonel, beltring 
of tliis, and enraged at the loss of Ls chaieo solliers, put 
forty-five of biri captivees to death, before bis bloody procced- 
ings could he staycd. 
This celebratcd tumuit, in which the mild cry oT Spnnish 
warfare \vas first bend, has been representd by autliors ivlio 
adopt al1 t11e reports of the day, sometimes as a wanton 
mawacrc, ~ometirnm ns a bnrbamus political stroka t o  impress 
n drcnd of Frcnch powcr. It wns ncitbcr. Thc ficry tcniper 
of tlie Spaninrdci, excited by strnnge eventa nitil the recent 
tumults a p i n ~ t  Glodoy, rendcrecl an expIoaion inevitablo, and 
so it hapgened, If the French bad stimulated this dispositiori 
to violenoe, with a view te an example, tliey wodd Lave 
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prcpnred some clreck on tha Slianish gnrrisan; t h g  would 
not havc lcft tlieir liospitnl unguardcd, or hnve so nrrnnged, 
that tlieir own loaa should surp~ss that of the Spaninrds; 
dnally, tliey wouIrl hnvc profited from tlicir p o l i l  aftcr linving 
hruffcred tlic i n j i i l  Monocy nnd Ht~rispe werc, 
ManlFestoof 
tile councü ho~evm; most active in rmtoring ordcr, and, in- 
nf cartile. cluding tlie pewants killcd out sirle tlie grites and 
X'ugc 28. 
tlic executions afterwards, the whole number of 
the Xpanish alain did not cxceed one hundred and tlventy, 
wliilo more than f i ~ e  liiindrcd Frcnch wcre killcd. Amongst 
tlie wounded were aeventy of the imperinI pards, 
Snrdcal 
c,,pnifle vhich wouId done disprove any premditation ; for 
Ofnnron if Mumt wcrc betse cnough t o  sacrifice Iiis men with 
Larrcy. 
sucli a detestnide policy, he would bave given the 
conecripb to slaughter rather than the aelect solrliers of tlie 
emperor. 
It was certainly accidental and not hloodp for tlie pntriots, 
but pelicy induced both ~ i d c s  to nttributc scerct motive8 and 
exaggcrnte the loss of  life. Thc Spaninrrls souglit to impress 
tlie p~oviricts with an opinion of Yrench ferocity, and thereby 
cxcitc t.11crn to insiirrection. Tlic Frcnch, fceling sucli rin 
iinpreseion could not be effaced by nn accnrnte relntfon, 
eneouragcd the worst aceounts, to convcy a terrible idea of 
their powr and aeverity. Eence tlie extraordinnry stories 
propagated, of citizens immolated by Muret in nurnbers 
varying from h e  to foiirtcen tlioncnnd. It is thc part of 
histoy to reduce such amplificationa; yet none can he un- 
mover1 hy tlie galIaritry and de~otion of a populacc mlijch 
dawd to oesnil rin nrmy, rather than abandon onc of their 
princes. Such, lio~vever, were the Spaniards throughout tha 
war. Ranc t o  sudclen and ranh d i o n s ,  they wcre iicrce and 
confident indiridudlp, and, though meak in rnilitary execu- 
tion, dwaya manifcstcd an intuitive pcrception of what wiie 
great and noble. 
Riis commotion wns tho forernnncr of insursections in 
every part of Spxin, few of nhieh werc so honourable. Un- 
prineipled villains, taking tliis opportunity to direct the 
pasions of tlie multitude under tlic mnslc of patriotiism, 
tutned the u n t h i g  fury of the pwple agninat whomever it 
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pIeased tliem to rob or t o  destroy. Pillap, mwsacres, 
assnssirlation, cnreltiea of the mwt revolting kind were cvcry- 
wlicro perpetratcd, antl thc iiitrinuic porlness of tlie cnum 
disfigurcd by t l ~  enormities oonimitted at Cndix, /,ville, 
R~lajoe, anrl Valencia, pr~minent  in Iiarbarity wlicn 811 were 
barharous! Tlie fimt Iiurst oE popular feeling Iiei~ig thus 
misdirected, tlie energ-y of the people \vas wasted, anrl lussi- 
tude succeeded tlia insolcnce of tumult at the approach rrf real 
dünger; for te sliine in tLe work of butcliery is ensier than 
to eshblish discipline, which can alone sustaili the co-e 
of tlie rnultitudc in the liour af trial. 
To covw the suspiciouc measurc of introdiieing more troops 
than the convention warrmted, a variety of reports had been 
propngrttd. At,onc time Gilirnltnr wns to  be Licsicged, and 
officrirs were di~pittched ta  exmine tlie Mediteri-i~neitn conqts 
of E'ipnin and Barliary; at anotlier, Portugal wm t.0 he t l i ~  
tlieatre of great eveiits; nnd a mystcrious imporhnce was 
given to the movernents of tlie Freneh armies, with a view to 
deeeive a conrt, which fear and slotli disposed for bciief of 
anything but the tmth, nnd t o  irnpose upon a, people wliose 
unsuspicious ignornnoe was nt firat mistfiken for tamenes~. 
Active agents siso gm~ght o form a Frcnch pnrty in thc capital; 
and as tlie tumults of Aranjuez and Mnilrid tauglit Nnpuletin 
how fierce the Spmish krn~ier \vas, he enjoined more wutiun 
upon Murat than the latter m a  disposed to pmctise; for liis 
precipitation disclosed tEie crnperor'g real plms before thcy 
were rlpened; Lis concentric movement on the chpital, and his 
resolution to controi tlie prodncial goveniment, liad darmed 
the people, and the riot st Toledo inclicatd the i r  feelings 
before tlie explosion nt 3fadSd placed tbern in direct hostility. 
Be seeins to have been intrusted with only a half confidente, 
and liis nattiiml impetuosity urpl  him to apperir as B con- 
queror beforc ra ground of  qiinrrel wris Inid ; yet he waq not 
entirely witliout excuse, for n lette~ remived liy him aliot~t 
tliiñ priod from Napoleon, contnined thcfie eñpressions; ' TIM 
d d e  of I m f d a d o .  km a pmty in Madrid; D &E attu& you; 
d2882'pate & m d  ~ & a  t l ~  g o v m m . '  
At Bayome the political events kept p w  with those of 
Mdrid. Charles mlaimed hi3 rights in preswce of Kap-  
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leon, md commanded Don Antonio to reliaquisli tlie presi- 
d e n q  of the governing junta to Murat, who received tLe title 
of lieu tenant-general oT the kingdom. This appointmen t, anrl 
tlie restomtion of Charla to the repl dignity, w m  l~roclaimed 
in Madrid, witb tlie itcquiescence of the counci1 o€ Castille, on 
the 10th of May; but five clays previous to t lat  period, the 
e1d rnonarch hnd apin ceded bis aiitliority ta NapuIeon, and 
Ferrlinancl and himself were consigned witli larga pensions t o  
tlie tranquillity of private life. Tlio riglit to  fill tbe t h n e ,  
tlius rendered v m t ,  was assumed by tlis emperor, jn virtue of 
C%arles"s cession, and lie deairerl tbat a mcmlier o£ his own 
hrnily mmight be choeen kiiig of Spain. After some liesitation, 
tlic counciI of Castille, in concert with $he mnnicipality of 
Mildrid and the governing junta, declared tlieir choice to have 
Tnlfen u p n  Joseph Buonttparte, then king of Xaples ; and the 
Carrlinul Bourlion, primate of Spain, first cousin of Clinrlm m,, 
and arcllliishop of Toldo, nccerlinp to t l i i~  a m g e m e n t ,  mote 
to Nnpoleon a formml expliclt d h m i o n  to tEie new order 
of thinga. Joseph a a s  alrerulg journcying from Naplcs to 
Bayonne, wherc he arrivcd thc 7th of Junc, the principd 
men of Bpnin baving been previotialy invihl  to meet tbere on 
thc IGtli. Tliis w a ~  cnlled thc Assembly of the Notrtblw, 
Ninewne Spaniatds of eminence nppenred, unnnirnously 
mptd Joseph as their king, and dismsaing in detail n ncw 
constitution prwcntcd by Nnpoleon, uftcr ~ievernl aittings 
wlopted it, and more to mnint.riin i t ~  provisions. 
Cnlculatotl ta draw forth al1 tbe rcsourccs of Spaim, 
this conatitution, comparcd to the old aystem w a ~  a blcssr 
ing, and wauld have bcen received ns such unrler diferent 
circumstranw ; now a r m a  were to dacide its fate, for in every 
province the ay of wnr hud becn raiserl. In Catalonia, in 
Vnlencia, in Aiidalusia, &trerndum, Gallicirt, md tlie Astu- 
riw, the peeple fiercely dcclared theii determination to reuid 
Frenc.h intrusion. h'everthelm Jmph crossed the frontier 
on the 9th of July, and on the 12th arrived at Vitoria. The 
inhabihnta, still rememliering Ferulimnd's joumey to Bayonne, 
seemed disposed to hinder his entrance; but their oppositlon 
did not break out inko actual violence, and the next morning 
be wntinued his progress. The 20th of Juiy he cnterd 
Madrid. The 24th he m prodaimed kiag of Spin and the 
hdiea, with al1 the solemities usual upon auch oocasiona, 
thus making himaelf the enemy of eleven d l i o n s  of peqde, 
the object of a mtion's h t r ed  ? With a strange ac.ccent 
be d l e d  from the midat of foreign bands npon a fierce and 
haughty raw, to w p t  a wmtitution mhich they did not 
understand, his bupe of s u c m s  rmting on €he shmgth of his 
bmther's srm% bis claims, npon the consent of an imbecile 
monarcli, and tbe wealrness of a few pusillanimow nobles, In 
contempt of the right~ of milliom naw arming to oppose km. 
This wns the unhallowed part of the enterprise, this it waa that 
rendered liis ofered constitution odiow, covered it with a 
leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution 
of itri toucli! 
FENINSDLA WAR 
d o s ~ ~ n  required the council of Cutille to take the oath of 
aIlegianee prescribed by the constitution, but that body, 
hitherto obsequious, met Lis ordcrs with a remonstrance; for 
Memoir of war, virtuslly dedared lin the 2nd of May, wns QG 
Wpiirril and tliia time raginp in al1 prts of the peninsutn, and 
AZMIU. the council was smetly apprizd t L ñ t  a grent 
misfortune had befallen tbe Freneh arms. It wns no longer 
et qiiestion between Joseph and BOme reluchnt public bdiec; 
I t  was an awful strugge between great nations; and how tbe 
spirit of insurrectioxi, breaking forth &multaneously in eyerg 
grovince, was nourislied in each until it racquired tLe consistente 
of regular warfure, &all now be slioivn. 
Just hefore the tumult of Aranjuez, tlie maquis of Solano 
y Soccoro, comnianding the Xpmisli auxilias. foroe of the 
AIemte.jo, receivd m orcler from Ctodoy to take poat near 
Andalusia, t o  comr the projectcd journey of Cl~arles IP. 
Rapoleon, atvare O£ tbis order, would not i n t m p t  its exe- 
d o n ,  and Solano quitted Port-ugd witliout difficulty; but iu 
the latter part of &y, oobserving the general ~gitlition, be 
repired to his go~emment af Cadiz, whcm five Prench sail 
of the line antl a f t - i~nte  liad just hken refuge from the 
3Snglish fleet. Seville was in R ferment, and Solano being 
required t e  Iiead an insurrection in faronr of Fertlinand, 
refused and went to * C d z .  Leanuvile cerEain persone at 
Sedle, assuming the title of the ' Supreme Junta of Spain 
and the Indie$ dedared war in f o m  qainst the intrusive 
manarch. They called oa tlie troops in the camp of h n  
Roque to ael~lcnowledge their ~uthorityJ ordered al1 men between 
rixteen and forty-five to  take ams, and directed Xolnno ta 
attaclr the French squadron. He refused to wknowledge tbis 
s&constitated go~ernment, and while hesitating t o  commit 
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commenced a mwacre of the French. resident~; and his 
ruthless viIlmy wami uncbecked until, French Pictims fa& 
ing, his tliirwt for murder urged him t o  mentlce the local 
julitn uf pvernment. This body, mith the exception of Mr. 
Tupper, tlie EngIish consul, liad not opposed bis previous 
m violcnce, but now redily fomd th0 meam t o  crush him: 
wliile in th0 nct of brnving their autliority Iie \vas seieed by 
~tratqem mcE shngled, together with two liundrcd of his 
ban(1. XerXielloni, mptain-general af the province, then pro- 
ceetled ta organixe an mmy, wting in unison with Ilis old 
count Noida Blanca, who brad mcanivhile puiit liimsclf at .the 
Iieul of the Murcian in~urrection. 
In Catnlonia tlie pwsence of thc French troops nt first 
mpressed popular cffcrvmoencc; thc insurrcction broke out 
notwitlihding at Mai3resn, and s p r d  to al1 pmh of the 
province. 
Tn dragon thi? &val of don Joseph Palafex kindled thc 
fire o€ patriotism. Hc had escaped from Rayonile, and his 
family were g~eatly esteemed, as af tlie notiIest among a 
people abrmrdly vain of their ancient descent. Shc captain- 
general, fea- 8 tamult, ortlercd P Jdox to qr~it hc province, 
but thii circum&nce, joined to some appearance of mptery 
in his escape fmm Bayonne, inmeascd the passions of the mul- 
titude; a crowd surrounding hia abode, forced him to m m e  
the commaad, the captain-general was codned, some persone 
were murdered, and a junta was formed. Pdafox was con- 
sidered by his companiom as of sIendcr capacity and p a t  
vaaity, and there is nothing in bis exploih fo render the 
justness of this opinion doubtfd. It was not Palnfox who 
npheld tlie glory of Ilragon, it wm the ~pirit of tlie peoplc, 
which lie had not excited md covld so little direct, tliat, for 8 
long time &er the cornmencement o£ tlre first siege, be was 
kept tb aort of prisoner in Zarqoza, hia courage md fidelity 
being diabs ted  by the population he is supposed to have 
ruled. 
This &ate of k o n  arauaad the Navmse, and L o p ñ o  
became the f o m  of an insurre&iou which extendd along 
most of the vallep of that kingdom. In the nortliern and 
ae~tem provinoes, the spirit of jndependenoe was as fierce, 
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md ae decidedly pronounced, accompanied dm by tlie name 
excesces. In Badajos the conde de la Torre (le1 Frenio was 
butcliered by tlie popiilece, and lila mangIed carcass drngged 
fhrough the streets in triumph. At Talalavera de la Eepa, 
the corrcgidorwihh dificulty escaped a similar fate by w bnstp 
flighk Leon presented ia n r l e  unbroken scene of anarchy, 
and al1 ~vho opposed tlie people's wielim mere slaia 
Gstllicja held back for a, moment, but the example of Leon, 
and tlie mivnl of an agcnt from tho Astarias, wbcre tlie 
iiisurrcetion nws in fulE force, produced a gencrai movemmt. 
A junte wns fumcd,  and Filanghicri, nn Italian, governor of 
Coriiílit, IW desired to cxcrcise tlic functioiis of rognIty bg 
declnring war in form ngaingt Franw. Like cvcry man o€ 
gense in Spuin, Eie wm unwilling to commence ro revolution 
npon such unoertain grounda; tho impatient gopulace seught 
his death, and tliough saved at the moment by the courage of an 
officer of  hii shff,  his horrible fah was onIy defemed. Able m d  
sincerely attached te Spain, he exerted hirnself ts organize the 
military resources of tlie province, and no suspicion athhed 
to his condiuct; yet sucll was the inlierent ferocity of the 
poople and of the time, that Uie soIdiers of the regiment of  
Nafram seized him at TYlla Franca del Bierzo, and, acmrdiing 
b some, stuck him ful l  of bayonets; aocnding to otliem, 
phntcd their wmpons in tlia groiintl, tossed him on to tlreir 
points, left Iilm there to struggle, mil di~bmded themselves, 
The Astnrians had baen tlte first to exercise dleindefcwilile 
demomtic riglrt of &blistijng a ncm gwernment when tbe 
old one cwed  to &ord protectian: a locai jmta deched war 
against the French, ttnd sent deputies to rrolicit assidance from 
Englancl. The p t  fowns in Biscay and tlie Castiileg were 
ovcrawcd by fifty thoiisnnd foreign bayonets, but tIie peasantry 
commenced a war in tlieir mtbnner against tlie atrsgglera and 
fhe si&, and thua a hodile cliain cnst roimd the French amy 
w5s completed in everp link. Thia simiiltnneons ñsing o£ a 
wliolc notion W ~ R  heheld by tho rest of Rurope with astonish- 
ment and edmiration-ashnishment at the energy of a people 
deerned u ~ e r v e d  and debased-admiration at a s p w e  
which, seen at a distance, and its dious parts unknown, pre- 
sented the ideal bmuty of Nummtisn virtue, In EngIand, 
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d't classes, with a generon8 ~ p p a t h y ,  dtributed to disiii- 
t ~ r e n t d  vipur of clameter, wliat was rezlly tlie effect af 
many .oo+pemting causes, mmy of which mere mytliiug ht 
comnieniiable, 
Constituted as modem dates are, mitli sgskms ill adapted 
to nourisli intense feelings o€ patrintism, it aould llave been 
iniramlone if renl grandeur had been rl iplycd by a n~tion 
which, for b o  conturieq had lieen debasd by civil and 
religious tleripotiñm. Tlie Slianisli chzrnct~r, iii reli~titinn with 
pulilic aKuiix, is mnrked by inordinate prids nnd anrigxnce. 
Diintory, irnprovident, singly nnd in maw! fFicy clicrisli un 
atisuril confidenoe tliat sverytliinpv suggasted by tlieir Iieatetl 
imnginations is pnacticnlrle; t,i~iicy see no tlificulties, tilid tlie 
obstnclcs ~ncauntcrcd nrc attribukd to t8remlicry; lience the 
surlden mnriler of BO mnny virtuous mm in tliis commotian. 
KinJ and warm in his attnclimcntq savagc in his enmity, the 
Spnnid ia patienk iinder pivations, fim in bodiIy mffering, 
p o n e  t o  auddcn mp,  vindictive, remcmbering insult longer 
than i n j r q >  bloody and cruel in revcnge. With a naturd 
perception at what is noble, liis promise i loftys but as his 
passione always oremile Eiis reason, liis priurmance is rncan. 
IR this war, tlie tenwity af vengeanee pemiliar t o  tlie peuple 
supplied the want of m01 peiseveriag intrepidity, xnd leil to 
deeds of cr~f i  and cruelty Pather than daring opcn warftire. 
The abstraction of the royd family, and Eapoleon's insnlting 
pretensions to the c m ,  arouried al1 the natitional priile; thc 
tumnlta of Madrid and Aranjuez h ~ d  preprired tlie putilic fvr 
violent movements, aad the French protection o€ Gotloy 
increased the ferment, bcertuse a dearly-clierished vengenacc 
was thereby fnistmtecl at the moment of its expectd accom- 
plishment, anrl the disappointment excited tbe uncontrollnble 
fierceness of gpanish passion. T h  carne t11e ku~nult of 
Madrid, awollen, disbrt~d,  cast lika Cesar's b d y  befom tlie 
people, to excite them t o  frenzy; and m d l y  tliey aaise, nwt 
boldly to confront a danger nnderstood, but to slakc tlieir 
thirst af blood. 
Godoy's administration had trenchd on church pmperty, 
and France and Itdy gaw tmtimony that Joseph wiiuld con- 
tinue hrat policy. Tbis invoIved the hwrests and stimulnted 

No stoq was too gross for their belief, if it ngrecd with their 
mishes. ' Es verdad, loa dicen,' ' It  ia true, they aay it,' was 
thc invariable amwcr whm an absurd report waa doabted. 
Tempemte in food, possessing IitUe fumitnre, Iioading al1 tlie 
gold he m get, a Spaniard is little concerned to relinqui~h 
liis abode; bis doing so m u ~ t  not be mesured by rtn English 
scale; and, once engagd in nn dventure, tbe lightness of l ~ s  
spiritg and the brilliancy of his ~ k y  mnke tlie angry lieasant 
careless of wandering, T'he evils nfflicting 8pak previous to 
the invarrjon, had terirlec1 also to prepare tbe peciple for 
violente. Poverty, disease, fmine, tlie loss of commerce, 
restridions on inter~al trade, wiaqnal taxtition, oppression; 
t h g  had eadmd d, and could not be enthusiastic for such s 
system. But t h y  had h n  tauglit by ths  clergy 
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1, G~~~ to believe &doy the sole autlior of their misery, 
contra and to look to Fe'erclinand aei tlie rerlrmer of their poIcon. 
g-riemncas, The Prencli were tlie protectors uf 
ths fumer, the oppreasors of tfie latter, aiid it was easy to 
add tliia liitterness h tlie nntural liatretl of fareign domina 
tion. 
Such were tlie principal causes of this revolation, so fertile 
nf great e~ents, witliout rroduciug one men of eminent cap* 
city to wntrol, or direct tlio spirit thus accidentally excited. 
ClmrIy clocs tliis fact diow tlic I~~brogencoiia naturc of tlio 
faelings nnd iritercsta hrouglit togctlier. It cannot be attri- 
buted to deficicncy of nfitriral talen&, the geniua of tlie 
Spmish people is notoriously srdcnt, subtlc, unrl vigoroiis; 
but therc wns no commoa bond of focling, nave htrtred to the 
Frtnck, by which tb ,pat mnri muld infiuence largc meases. 
Sapc4ous persona saw very mIy, that tlie Spanish rcvoln- 
tion, like a leafy shrtib in a violent gaIe of wind, grcntly 
@tated, yet disclosing only digl~t uncennected s h a ,  alforded 
lio sure bold for tlie nmbition of a master-spirit, i f  such tliere 
aere;  that the cause must fail nnless supported by England; 
und that sbe mould not Iet her resoitrces be wielded by men 
whose views md policy miglit afterwardm thmarb her own. 
Nor ñTas it diificiilt t o  pcrceivc that the downfall of Napo- 
leon, not the regeneriition of Spain, was tlie objrct of lici 
cabinet. 
Spnni~h public f~eling was fierce in leirpression, because 
~rulitical pmsions will dwap be veliement at first with a 
people new to civil commotion, antl musd to have tlieir heat 
evaporate in public discnssione. The resnlt was a monderful 
change tu tlie a h  of Ewope; it seems yet mdecided 
whetlier for bettw or worse. h their struggle, tha Spadards 
developd more cruelty than courage, more violente than 
intrepididity, more pemonal hafred than entbusiasrn; they 
openerI rs wide field for the cxertions of others, presented t,he 
fu lmm for R lcvw which moved tlre civilizeíI world, but the 
impdting power cama from anothcr qiiartcr. Uscful wcce- 
aorirri tliey werc; m principds they displayed neittier wisdom, 
spirit, nor slíill suficicnt to resist tlie proiligious force ?>y 
wliich they were assailed, If they sesmed at fimt heedless of 
danger, it m s  not because tliey were prepared to periah 
rather tllm submi4 but that they were reckless of provoking 
a power whose terrors they could not estimate, ancI in tlleir 
ignorante despised. 
It is not surp~ising thnt grent expectations were tit first 
fomcd of tFie lieroimn of the flpnniard~, and t h o ~ e  expecta- 
tions were greatly aubugmented by their agreeable qualities; 
there is not any people more attractive in the intercourse of 
soctety. Thar majestic lanpage, fine persona, and becoming 
dress; thcir liveIy imaginations; the inexpmsible beauty of 
fheir momen, and the air of rommce they throw over every 
action, and infi~se into every feeling, combine fo delude the 
ciernes antl imposc ttpon tlic jurlpcnt. A s  companions, ihey 
are tho mosG rqremlilo of mnlrind, biit danger and dis- 
appointment attend tlie man who, confidiig in their promisea 
md energy, ventures upon tb diffiwlt enterprisa a nfever do 
t o d ~ y  wwhat you can put oE unta to-morxow~,' is the favouritc 
praverk of Spah 
CBSPTER IV, 
Tnx commotion of Aranjuez trsuglit the French emFeror tbnt 
be wm to d d  wjth a people nho would not bbo quiesceiit 
under insult ; and, tlioiigli he pzmued his swreh policy witliout 
relinquishing hope of succesti, lie manged a profound plan of 
milibnry operations, and RO ilixtril~ii-hrl his forces, tlint wlien 
Spnin pured  forth her ñwnrtliy bands, lie coulrl concentrtite 
rnwses on the most hportitiit pints ,  comliined in n, miuiner 
to overwlielrn ~elmrntely enrli pruviiic:e, no threo of whidi 
could act in conccrt witlioiit first tenting n Frsricli co~ps; nnr1 
if any mns se beaten, tlie otliers mulrl unite mi? rc-h1ie tlie 
offcnsivc. It wns tliis akill wliicli c ~ ~ ~ ~ b l c d  scv nty tliousnnd 
nien, ~ y i r e d  over n grcnt extent of cutintry, t o  h ~ v e  tlie 
simultnncoiis fury o£ clcvcn millions of p~oplc, witl~out bcing 
trarnpled undcr foot, and lost amid~t  lie tumultiiou.. upronr. 
In a politicnl l-icw tlie inconvcnicnce of sufi,riiig n rcgitlnr 
Spnilish nrmy to tnka thc ficld wols cvidcnt. Tu clinrnctcriss 
Qie opposition of tlie Rpnnisli peoplc, ns a p r t i n l  insurrectioti 
of pen~:aits instiptcrl by somc cvil-diaposcd pmons bo act 
qnlns t  tlia widics of t.lic rcspcctnlilc pnrt of thc itation, wonld 
givc somc coloiir to the nbcorl~ing di~rkiiess o£ thc jnvamon- 
mliile tlie pemitting an in~urrection a£ peesants, to take 
form and coiisistcncc IE nn nrniy, would Iinvc bcen a mili- 
t a r y  errar, dangerous in tiic extreme. S~liolcon, knowing 
acicntific Fvar t o  3ic only a n-ise r.p!*licntion of f o m ,  laughed 
at the dcliision of thosc mlio rcgtlrUcd thc want of regular 
armies as a favo~irable circumshnce, and lictilerl tlic nndie- 
GipIined pcaqrint ns tho hcttcr defcnrler oF thc country. Ha 
knew a gcncrnl insurrcction to be n militnry anarchy, a 
thing o f  no endunince. Be knew th& the discipIined 
liatkxlions of Valley Forgc, not thc volitntcers oof Lexingbn, 
cstnblished dmerican indcpcndcncc; tlmt thc ~ c t e r m  of 
h u l e  and Marengo, not thc repulilicans of Talmy, fixed tlie 
fate of the French renolntion. Whercfore he strove to hinder 
tlie ghthering of  regular soldiers, a thing eesy to liappcn, for  
the organized Spaniah foroes were in hlay above one liunrlreil 
nnil tiventy tliliusiind of nll nnns. Fifte.cn tliouaand were iu 
Rnlñtrin, undcr tlie mwqiiiei of Romnnm, hut twentg thou- 
saud were ahcxdy partially concontrated in Portugal; the 
~emiiincler, in wliicli were comprised eleven tliousmd Swise 
and thirty thousand militia, were disperried in wiririus parts OE 
the kingdum, principally in Andalusia. Tliere d,, 
!vas algo a local reserve ca1led the usban militia, 22:F 
mucli neglecterl indeed, nnd more a name than a x.iliuleon 
realityx pet the advantagc! of siich an iwtitiitron UUoU8"afiev 
mas considertlble; men wcre to bc had in abiindxncc, nntl ns 
tlie grcntent dificulty in n sudden crisis is to Iirepure tlio 
fmmework of urder, it was no smaU resource to have oiie 
knom t o  the peopIe. 
Of the French m y ,  ei& thouslind strong exclusive of 
thme mith Junot, seventy thousancl were in the field; tlie rest 
wwe aick or in dep3ts. Tlie possession of the fortressea, alid 
the positions oceupicd, gavo it strcngth, but it l i d  many 
jvcnlc points. Composed cliieRy of cunscripta, it mustercd iu 
the rtsnks, &nch, Ttalirtns, Poles, and even Portugiiese, 
whom Jiinot had eñpatriated, and some of thwe l ~ s t  remained 
in B p ~ i n  until the irar terminated. A few o£ tlic imperial 
giiards were employed, and here and thme an old regiment o£ 
the line to give tlie yoiing troops mnsistence; but witk time 
exce~itions tlie French army s x a  a raw levy, h s l t  
from the plougli md umcq~~ninted witli dis- 
~~~~~~. 
ciplinc: so late even m Augt~at, mzny of t8Iic ymdix, 
Ii:~ttnlirins liad not completed tlie first elemcnts of "O. a' 
tLeir drill, and if tliey ha11 not been Sormed upon 1Pliirbault. 
gnd skeletona, tlie differenw betmeen them and ~ u p o n t , ~  
the inswgent peasantry would have been trifling, M;F' 
This fact explaim, in some measiure, the other- 
wise incomprehensible checks and defeats wlllcli the Frendi 
stistained r h  the commencement of the contest; it likewise 
proves how little 6gour there waa in Spanish resishnce at 
the moment of the greatest enthusi~m. 
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Napoleon attendd principally to the ciecurity of Madrid. 
A8 tlie mpihl, and wntre of al1 interests, its iinportsince WIM 
manifest, wd tha gseat line of communication Zietween it nnd 
Bqonne nas early and constantly covered witli troolis. 
Nurtit, by draiving Xoncey and Dnpont to Mndrid, and by 
1% awn h~uglity ~ I C ~ ~ R T I O I I ~ ,  foreeJ on tlie crisiq ntid com- 
pellcd Ynpaleon to Iiasten tlie advance of other troopa, tlius 
mnlcing a grcntcr display of forcc tlian m wnsistent witli 
Iiis policy. Fur whilc thc movernentti on tlie cqiittd provolred 
the Bpnniadq, it atrippcd tbc line of oommutiirr~kion witli 
Fmnce, nnd ttie arrivnl of fresh Linttalions to rcmcdy tliia error 
g e n ~ ~ t e ' d  dditional snger at. a aritid period. 1 
To 'o11 tlie void Id by Moncey'a advnncc, a f r d  corps 
entered Spain, and bcing by degrees augmenkd 
Eg" tO taenty-thm tbausand mcn, was eslled the 
pcndix, 'ru-my of the- fmestern m n c e s . '  Marshd h a -  
Eio. 2. siSres msumed the command, fixed hia head 
qunrtem a t  Burgos, ocmipied Vitona, Miruida de Ebro and 
other towns, and pushed advanced posts into Leon. FXe thus 
protected tbe line from Eayonne to the capital, m e n d  the 
Astnrias and Bismy, eommandcd the valby of tlie Duero, 
and kept the lringdom o!¿ Leon and the provime of Segovia 
in check. Bnrgos became the entre and pivot of liis opero- 
tioas, and intermediate psts and forbressee connected him 
with Bayome, where a reseme of twwty thousand mcn waa 
formed under generd Drouet. 
Niipoleon could, nnder flie convention, send Iorty tlionsmd 
men into the north uf Bp~bin. The exercise o£ tbia rigllt 
being expected, di8 not create mueh alam, but he liad not 
indicated any desire to pasa troops by Catalonia; neither tlie 
treaty, nor the con~ention, authorixed that measure ; nor 
could the supporting of Junot be used ap a pre- 
' tvm teme. Nevertheless, m early as the 9th of Sapolrmt% 
notes, AP- Februarg, eleven thousand intantry, sixteeri hun- 
pendix, 
NO. e. dred cavafry, and eighken pieces of artillery$ 
nnder the cornmand of general Duhesme, cros~ed 
the frontier at h Jonqaera, and marched upon Barcelona, 
leravlng a detachment at the town of Rg-vem, the at~ong 
atadel of which camniands the principal pass of the moun- 
180a.] BOOK L-CHAP. 4. 8 1 
tains. In Barcelona Diihesrnc m a i n e d  uncler the plen of 
waiting for i n s h c t i o n s  fmm 'hIt1drid rclativ~ to 
Diihemn@s 
a pretendd mar& upon Cadiz. lIis secriit orders fnstmctioiib 
were to obhiain exact Lnfomtion concerning the $id E!;, 
Gatdonian fortreases, depbta, and mng&es,-to 
ascertsin th0 state of public feeliig,-to ppreseme a rigid 
disc!pline,-scnipulousIy to ayaid giving any offence to t l ~ e  
Spaniarda, and to cornmnnicate with mmhal Moncey, then 
comrnmding al1 tbe French troops in the north of iSpaia 
Politjcai afiiirs soon indicatcd scrious rcmlults, and whcn thc 
troopa in tiie nortli were in a condition to exemite tlieir 
orders, Duhasme, whose report liad been receiveil, wm 
directed t o  mize the citadel of Barcelonn, and tlre fort of 
lfonjui&. The citadel m gained by stratngem; the fort, 
of celebratea strengtli, wras ~umndered by the govmor 
Alvarez, because tliat brwe and wortliy man knew that from 
s baga court he should rcceive no support. It iEi =id, that, 
stung by thc dirrgracc of his ~itu~tion, he was at one time 
going to spring rp mine beneath the French detachmeuts, 
but h i ~  mind, betrayng hin spirit, riunk uuder the weighi o£ 
unexpeded evenh What a pidure of human weakness 1 
The boldest shrinking from t.hc discharge of their trust, 
Iilre the meanest coward-he wisest f o l l o h g  the march of 
events, confounded and without a rule of &ion ! When the 
beroic Alvares conld think the d i s p c e  of surrendering his 
charge at the demand of a pcrñdious g e s f  a leas miafortune 
than fhe mger of a miserable court, wliat muet tfie &te 
of p~~hihlic feeling Iinw hcen? Anrl bow cnn tliase who, liIre 
O'Fard and Azmze, ~iet-vetl the intruder, be with ju~tice 
blamed, if amidst the general strignation they coulrl not per- 
c e i ~ e  the elements of a ~alutary tempept. Napoleon seeing 
these things, mi$€ well enlarge his ambitious des@. He 
erred not in the projection, ao mmh m in the execution of 
design. Nations, like single persam, are creatures of circum- 
stmcea; naw weak, trembling, submissive; ano% proud, 
h ~ ~ ~ g h t y ,  daring ; nowl events o h n  aff cct puhlic sentimcnt in 
a mnnner distinct from, and even opposed to tlie nationnl 
oharacter. 
The Barcelona trtreachery waa repeatd at Figuerna, the 
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ímprepnlile citadel of Femnndo feU inta tlie hnnds of the 
Frencli detucluiient left tliere, and Catalenin beirig tlius opeiml, 
tlie magwines of Barcelona werc filld, and Dulicmc's i;roops 
took tlic titlc o€ tIie ariny oF thc Eastcrn Pyrenecs.' Tliis 
sffiilr m s  momentous. Nnpr5leon enrnestly desirerl it tu 
tcminrate Iiefore the events n t  31sdrid sliould diselose his 
ulterior vfews. Barcelona, \Gth its iinmciise popufrttion, 
gmt rielles, good liarbour, nnd strong forts, migIit Le called 
tlie key of tbc ~ o u t h  of France, or Spain, it liappenerl to be 
in posseesion of the one or the otber. She proximit.y of 
8ici14; wliere a l q e  British army was kept in a state uf 
constant pre~ümtion, marle it more than probable an English 
force woi~ld r e ~ c h  Barcelona, to establish a s a r  at tlie tlireshold 
of France; and Nupoleon, seeing tlie extent o€ tliat dunger, 
obviated it at tlie risk o£ rendering aliortive tlie attempt to 
crente a French party in Mndrid. For he welI knew tliat 
thirty or forty theasand British troops, occitpying an in- 
trenched camp in frunt of Earcelonn, supporterl Sy a power- 
ful f l e 4  ancl Iia~ing reserved depbts isi Xicily and tlie Spanish 
Island~, might llave Fieen so wielded as to give ample oocupa- 
tion to a h n d r e d  and fifty thouaand Fm~cli .  Proteeted by 
such m nrmy, the Spanish levies mi& liave been orpnizcd 
aad instmcted ; their actual numhem could hnve been mnsked, 
incrensecl, or diminisbed; tbe fleelt would be mdy to co- 
operate, and the 6011th af France, wliei!ce the provitiions of 
tlie enemy must llave been dmwn, mould l s v ~  been exposed 
to  descents, and the inconveuience of nchrd hostilities. Tlie 
Spanisli proGnce~ of Valencia, Murcia, and ewn Andalucitl, 
being tl~uu~ COVCTC~,  the war wouId have been drawn to a 
head, and eoncentrated about Cntalonia, the most warlilre, 
rugged, sterile portion of Spain. Duhesnie's mccess olivixted 
tliis danger ; tlie Frcncli troops were imme(1iately incrensed to 
twenty-tma thorimd rnen, their general corre.glionded directIy 
with Napoleon, and Barcelona becnme the centre af a system, 
disti~ict from tliat wliicli held the other corpa rolling round 
Madrid ns their point of attrnctioa 
That capital is atuated in a plain. A semicimlar range 
of mountains calIed the Sierra de Guadarama, the íkpen- 
tanos, and the Fiemt de Gnadal~xnrx, sweep in one unbrolren 
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cliain from west ta east, falling on the Tagw at either end. 
Al1 the d i i ec t  communications between Madrid and Francc, 
or between the forma and tbe northern provinces of Spain, 
pass over one or other of these %errm, which are sepnratcd 
from tlie Pj~enees by the valley of the Ebro; from the 
Biscnyan and Astiirinn mountuin~ liy thc vnllcy of the TJucio. 
There are four principd rmds lending from Fmce to 
Madrid. 
First, a royd museway lmsing t l ia  frontier at lrun, nins 
near Xan Sebastian, and thence tbroufih a wild conntry, full 
of dangerons defiles, to the Ebro; it, crosses that river by 
a stone bridge at Mirandn, p e a  to  Burpa, ancl then, turning 
s110rt to the left, ia carried over the Duem at Aranda; it 
aurmounk tlie Cnrpentxnos by ttic Eomosiem pass, and then 
desoends upon the  mpitnl. 
Xecond, m inferiur road peuetrnting by St. Jean Pied de 
Port, Pampeluna, and Tafdla; it crossea tlie Ebro at Tudela, 
and antera the basin of Madrid by the eastern rnnge of t l~e 
Sierra de Cuadalsxnm, nihere ths declination of the moun- 
tains presents a less nigged bwrier than thc mowy summits 
of the nortliern nnd wcñtcrn part of the chain. 
Tliid, a r o d ,  not practicable for p u s ,  threade the Fymnees 
I>y Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragor4i, and uniting with tlie 
second, crusses the Gludalaxam ridge. 
The fua-th ia tlie gest rouk from Yerpignan by Figuerm, 
Gemnn, Barcelona, Cernera, Lerida, and Z~ragoza, to Madrid 
Zafagoza being the capital of a provinca, uniting two great 
roads, and cnntaining one of tlie gmt  Spanish arsenah, was of 
stratcgic imrortnncc. An a m y  conld, from tbence, operate by 
eitlier bank r f  tl~e Ebro, interccpt tliq communimtion bctween 
tlie Eastcrn hncl Wostcrn Fyrences, and bloclr thrco out of 
tlie fout grat routes to Madrid. Rd the French occupied 
it in f o r q  their army in the capi@l could lmve acted witli 
gecurity ngainat Tnlencia; and the united form of Gallicia 
and h n  would have been less daugerous when tLs Eurgos 
mad ceased t o  be the only line of retreat from Madrid. 
?Jevatlieless, Yapoleon n g l e d  Zaragoza at first, b ~ ~ s e ,  
having no citadel, a ama11 body of troop~l could not control 
tlie inhribitants; and a 1mge lorce, creating susficion h o  
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soon, wodd llave barred the attempts on Fampelana and 
Barcelona, objecte of still greeter importnnce. 
Murat aníl :%mry remnioed lat Madrirl, Ttiey nppemred to 
direct the exmtion of the emperor'n projects, but he di 
truated their j n d p e n t ,  ancl exacted tlie moat detrailed 
inforrnation of every movement and tmnsaction. In tlie 
cwrse of June, Nuimt, suffcring frorn illnesa, quitted Spain, 
leaving licliind Iiim R troulilctl pcople, nnd a name for crirdty 
foreign to  his cliaracter. Savary remaind tlie sole mpreseii- 
tatative of tbe  new monnrch. He ~vns in tlie inidst of cumm+ 
tiorr, and on wery sido belield the violenm of insnrrection, tha 
fury of m insulted nation, Eacli Spnnid~ province lind ita 
junta of governrnent, alike enrnged, yet not nlilce dnqcrous. 
Gatalonia Iind grcat resonrccs, ht i t \\.as in 311trcin 
Cabanea' 
ñr, i, anii 'Valencia the gnrrisons nf Barcelona, &ron- 
Fntn'onfh jnick, and Fiperng rallied on tEic patriotic stand- 
1st Part. 
~ r d ~ ,  antF hcing modly Rpnnisli and Wrdlooii 
ginrda, furnislied the bnsis o€ an nrrny ~vhich mnld be well 
sitpplicd by thoso rich provincw, nnd fumished from the 
amenal of Carthagcna. A direct movement on hfdrid from 
this qmrtcr could only provoke a battle, not much te bo 
feared by Samy; but a mmch on Zamgoxa, to unite with 
tlie Aragoneses would bave rnenaced thc French communjea- 
fiona, supported the Gatdoniran warfrrre, anrI given a point of  
union foi three gretlt pro-ikes. In this lsy the stlng of the 
Valencim insurrection, to besiege Zaragoza and prevent the 
junction was the remedy. 
AndaIusia was of p a t  importante. Solano's troops were 
disciplinetl; a large veteran force was in the camp of &m 
Rape, unrIcr Castaños; the gtbrrisona d Cetita, Algeziraq. 
C d i  Granttdq and other plsces were nnikd; a superb 
cannon foundrp at SevilIe, antl tlie araenal of Cadiz, furnished 
tlie rneans of equlpping a train of artillery ; an active inter- 
conme was maintnined b e t k n  the patriots and the English, 
and the m p r e m q  of the Seville junta \vas admitted by thoee 
of Granada, Jaen, and Cordova, and by tlie asmy of Eaitrema- 
r1u.m Tlius Andatusig ricb, distant from the capitd, md 
, stliartg wI1 fenced by the Sierra Morena, aforded means 
Latcm; vide to establisb a sjstematic war, by drawing together 
al1 the scattered elements of resistarice in the ,,,,,,, 
southeni and sestern provinces of Spain and tnry Papers. 
Portngal. Tliia danger, pregnant with future mn- "'O' 
squencee, was, howwer, not immediat.e; there aas no line of 
offensive morement agninst the fla& ar reai of the French m y  
open to the Andalusian patriots; and as rs march against 
Madrid would have bcen tcrliorts and dangcrous, thc tmo 
poIicy of the Antlalueiann wns pdpably derensive. 
In  Estremarlum, neitlier the activity nor meanei of tlie 
junta were at fimt sufficient to excite much attention; bnt in 
Leon, Old Caatille, and CSallieia, gathering clouds hdicated a 
pedous stom. (Xregoria Cuesta \vns cap&-geneiral of the 
two former kingdoms, Inimical to popular movements, 
haughty and resolute, he nt first checlted the insurmtion 
with a rotigh hand, and thus lnitI thc faundntion for quarrels 
and intriguea whicli a f t e m d s  impeded tlie militrary opera 
tiom, and split the nortlieim pravincm into frtctions; yet 
finally Im joined the side of the pat.riots. 13ehind him, the 
kingdom of GaZlicXn had, under the dircction of Filmghicri, 
orgmized a large force, chiefly eornposed of the troops with 
which Tarnnoo liad seixcd aporto, Tlio gnrriaons of Ferro1 
nnd Coruiin, nnnd a number of ~olrliers flying Erom tlie countnea 
occupied by the French, swelled thie army j British venta were 
active to blow the flame of insurrection, md money, arma, and 
clothing were poured into tlie prosnce throngh their hands, 
hecause &niña afforded easy intercome with Erigland. 
Clme communimtion was mnintained betwcen tlie GaIliciw~ 
and Portiigiteso patriots, and tlie frscility of estnhIishing tho 
base of a regulnr systematic war in GalLiciia wm, ttlirefare, as 
geat as in rlndalusiB, The resourcesl were perhap greater, 
on accoant of tlie proximity of Qeat Eritain, md the dvan -  
tage of position was in famur of Galliciq became the sourcea 
of her strength were as well covered from the dired line of 
fhe Frcncli operations ; the slightat offensive movemcnt 
uport hcr part, by thretrtcning the cornm~inicntions nf tlie 
French army in hfdrid, enrlangwed t.lit: safety of any corpq 
niarching from the capital against tbe ~outhern pravincea, 
To be prepared qainst the Gdlician f o r w  was therefore 
of pressisg importaste ; a defeat from tliat quaartr rmld have 
n 2 
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Leen felt in al1 parts of tbe army; and no considerable, or 
sustaiiid opemtion, could be undcrbalíen aguinst tlie other 
imurgent forcm until her strength liad been first brokea 
Tliis tlia great object in tlie nortli, becausa Riscriy antl 
tlie Aatnrias h d  neither regular t roop  nor fertified to~vris; 
nnd the contractd sltnpe of tliose provinws plmed then 
within tlie p w e r  of tlio Fr'rencli, d io  haJ. notling to fear M 
long a4 they could 1101d the m-port.9. 
Fmm tliis sketcli it resulta, thnt %vary, in chsing. the 
dangem of liis situation, slioukd have rnted Gnllicis md h n  
in the first, 7mragnxn, in t11e s~conrl, Andolu~im in tfie tbird, 
and Valencia in tlie fourth mlc, md so regulated his opera- 
tiom. Napoleon tlius loolred at tlie affair, but fiavary, wavering 
in h i ~  opinions, missed tfie spirit of liis instructions, and sunk 
under dificultiea createa by liirnself. ' 
Fifty tl~ousand Frencli and eiglity guns wcre di~po~rtble for 
offensive opemtions in the hgiuning of June. Collected into 
one inms, tEiey were siificient t o  crush any or al1 the imurgent 
amies, bnt it m s  nwessary to asmil ~cvcral pointa at once. 
In (Iojng thia, tlie wfety of sacli minor botly depended upou 
the dabiiity of the h e  whcnoc it emanated, and the 
~tr-miritj of each base depended on its comrnunications mith 
Fmnce: in other words, Fhyomc was the base of operatiow 
againat Madrid, and Madrid the base of opemtiona agRinst 
Valencia, Murcia, and Andnlusia. To combine aU the move- 
ments o€ a va& plan, cmbracing tha opmtions ngainst 
Cntalonia, Aragon, Eseay, the Asturba, Qallicia, Leon, 
Caatille, Anddusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in such a simple 
manner, na tbat the diffcxcnt armies, working upon onc prin- 
ciple, might mutunlly ~uinpport and ritrengtlien eacli otlier, 
mrl at  the mmc time prcserve their commnnicrition witli 
France, e, the peat problem to be solved It reqnk~d 
a master mind, and from Eayonne Napolmn direeted the 
general movcment, and with thc grcatcat caution; for it is 
an error, though a aery ycneral one, to mppose he pliinged 
into tbe contcst without foresiglit, as having ik~ do witIi 
adve&es he despised. 
In  his inatructiam fo Savnry he saya, "n a aciw of tlab m& 
it M WXWII~TTJ ta mt w i t l b  pbimm, aodness> and upon c a l w  
&atior&' ' In dciP m 8  ia & i m p w t ~  g & ~  d y  which 
s h d d  Iw p d & u e  w t  aot go to rdl p l m ; '  and he 
forbd the s p r d n g  of troops over the eountry witliout the 
power of unitbg upon emergency, as a. dangerou display of 
acti6ty. His principie r q  be illnstrated by a cIosed hand 
thrust f o m d  and tlie f t i p  afterwada extended ; whiie the 
wrist is sound, the hand and fingers may be moved, buh a 
mniind in tlie former pamlyzw tha mhole. Rcnce the mp(!fui 
distribufion of troop dong the 7Iiirgos r o d ;  hen'noe tlie 
seizure of the Eortresserc, rind the reserves nt Bnyonna 
When the insumction commenced, Bessikres -rrras o r d e d  
to pub Burgos In B, stste of defence- to detach four or 
five thousand men, under Lefebre Desnouetteq against Zara- 
goza,-to destroy the mrtnufactory of a m  at Placencia 
in Gnipuscoa-to kccp down tlie insurgents of Biway, the 
Asturins, und Old Cmtille,-to observe tlie n m y  assembling 
in Qallicia-to occupy itnd watch Nitli jealone carg the 
port of Xantander and the coaat t oma.  A reinforcement 
of nine thausand men mas prepmd for Duhezime, to 
enable him to trangnillize Catalonin, and cooperate with a 
divieim mrtrehing from Mdrid against Valencia, Drouct'~ 
Peaerve ~t Rayonne m nonii~hed by drriftri from the interior; 
it supplied Bessibres with reinforcements, md dorded a 
detachrnent of four tliaueand men to watcli tlie 
wapo1eon'a 
opening d the Pyrenean d l e y ,  esespecIally ,teir, 
towards Jaca, then iu possessian of the Spanisli ;",p': 
inmrgents. A smaller reserve r a s  established at 
Perpignan ; anotlier borly mtched the opeulngs of the eafitern 
frontier; mrl nll thc genornls commmding corps, or emn 
detnclimenta, were directed to correspond clnily witli Drouet. 
The renr, tlins uecured, tFie mnin body at Madrid com- 
menced offensive operatjans. Moncey marched, S, 
with part of his corps upon Cuenca, to bar the xournai of 
Monmy's 
mrch of a VaZencian army npon Zaragoza,- 
~,,aim, 
Dnpont went, with ten thousand men7 apinst filss. 
C&e,-md the remainder of his and Noncey's 
tmops wore kept near hlndrid ns re.mcs. 
~ ~ ~ l e ~ ~  
Napoleon ordered Sogovia tu be put in I stata of mntlix, . 
cfefenoe-Gobert's dividon of Muncey'~ corp to 'O' 
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co-operate ~ 3 l - 1  BessiEres w the side of Vdaddid-and 
moveablo columna to scour thc eounty in renr oF the acting 
Ziodies, nniting again at s t a a  times upon points of sacondary 
interest. Tbus linking his operations together, he hoped, bp 
grasping as it were the pngl ia  of the insumction, to reduce 
it ta a few convulsive motions. How the execution failed in 
the band~i uf hia lieutenants shali be shown in the next 
chapters, but his plan embraced erery probable chance of war, 
and even provid4 for tlie uncerkain eontingency of nn English 
army Isnding T o n  bis flanlrs at either end of the Pyrenean 
frontiw. Ncither his power, nor his forhinc, nnr tbe contennpt 
he felt for the military pomer of the 8paniads rnade him 
remiss. Tbe conqueror of Europe was as fearful of malring 
false movemmts before an army of pensants, as if Frederick 
the areat had beea in lus front, and yet he failed 1 Xueh ia 
war! 
OPERATIOBS OF KAIl6HAL BESSIIFTtES. 
TI~IS  offioer l id  ñcareely fixed 3iis qutirtem at Burgos wl~an  a 
genera1 revolt took place. On his riglit, the bisliop of LSm- 
tander excited tlie inliabitants to t&e arms. In nlonitcur. 
liis rear, a meclianic assembled some thousand 
urrned peasrtnts at the town of Logroño. In front, 
fivc thoiisand mcn aciaorl tlic Spnnish artillcry des han. 
d6pbt nt Scpvia; nn cqual riiimbcr nsacmhlcd at qaiL 
Palencia, axlranced ta tlie town of Torquemndn; und Cuesta 
toolr post, witli some regular troops and a body oT orgsnked 
peasantry, on the risuerga at Cabecon. 
Ressibres, who had twelve thousand diposabTe men, sent 
moveable columns to disarrn the towns and attplck Ohe insutc 
gents, nnd he wns aided by n division of Dupnt's reserve, 
under general f iere,  coming from tlie sirIe of hInrIrid. Tlte 
opernkions were rapid. Geneml Tsrdier, falling on Lo,mfio 
tlie Gkhf ddisperaed the peasantry, and barbamusly put the 
lcaders to death &er thc action General Lassalle, passing 
tho Pisuerga with a brigade of ligbt mwIry, defetitcd tlw 
S p n i a d a  at Torclnemada on the Itli, p~muecl witli a, rnercilcris 
sword, burned tliut t o w ,  and entcrerI Pdencin thc 8th 
Fmro brolte tlie jnsurgent force a€ Segovia, and took tliirty 
pieces of artillery. General MerIe, mmching througl~ ttb 
country between the Pisuerp and the Duero, joined Laasde 
nith a divjsion of infantry at Dueñm on the X2th, and tlicy 
overthrcw Cuesta, at Cabqon, witli. great slrtnghter, the losa of 
h i ~  nrtille~, anrl scveml tliousmd muaketa. 
Tbe í?at country being thus subdued, LassalIe remained to 
keep it under, while bIerIe, marching northwarcl, wmmenced 
operatiom, in con& with general Ducos, against t6e pro- 
rinc~ of Santaildcr. On tlie 20th, tlie latter drove the 
Spaniards fram tlie priw of Sencillo; tlie 21st lie forced the 
pass of Venta de Escudo, descending tlie vralley o£ the river 
Pm, and approaclied Gantander tlie 2211d Merle, after oome 
resistance, penetratad by Lnntucñn, folloived tlie coume of the 
Bcsaya to Torre LR Vegrt, tlien turned to fiis riglit, nnrT entercd 
Santander on tlie 23rd. Ducos arriverl at the sanie time, tlic 
towm st~brnitterl, rtntl t l ~ c  lisfiop fial with tlie g-rentest part oF 
the clcrgy. Tlie autlioritics o€ Scgoviti, Valludolid, Fi~lcncia, 
md S~ntandcr wcre tlicn compellcd t o  senrl dcputiw to hlre  
the oath of alleghnce t o  JosepL. Those provincea were dia- 
armed, and so awcd by tlic activity o€ Bessifircs thnt no 
ftirtlier insurrcetions took place; liis m d r y  mised contribu- 
tions nnd collected provisions without the le& difficulty : 
Frere'a division then returiid to Toledo, and from thencc 
marehed to San CIemcntc, on tlie Iierders o€ Murcin. 
While Bcssiiires b m h  the northem insurrection, hfebre 
Desnouettes' march brought on the first aiege of 
Gnvallero. Zaragoza. Ta that place had flocked from the 
most diiitant parts, eoldiers flying from Madrid and Fam pelma, 
engineem from the achool of  Alala, and al1 the retired officers 
in Arrigon. T i t h  their wistance Palafox's forces were 
mpidly orgmked; the arsenal of Z a m p a  hrnished him with 
arms, and numerous battaliona were post&! on the roads lend- 
ing to Navam. Tlie baron de Versage, an oficer of the 
Walloon gu~rds, occupied Calatapd with a regirnent of 
studenta, and a levy made there by him, pmtected tlie powder- 
milla of Villa Felice and kept the communication with Xoria 
and Eguenza; tlie people of Tudcla brolre tlieir bridge on 
the Ebro, and Pdafox reinforced them with five hundred 
fuzileers. 
5. Lefebe commenced 6 s  march from Pampelunn, 
J o m a 1  of the 7th of Jnne, h d n g  three or four thousand 
hfebre ' s  
owmtma& infmtrg, some field batterim, and a iegiment of 
BISS. Polish c ~ d r y .  On the 9th he forced tlie passage 
Monitem, of tlie Ebro, h a r h s l y  put the leaders of the 
victoirese* inñurreation to  dmth after tbe &ion, and then 
Conqiii.r- 
des rsnndi, continued liis rnovement by the rjght bank to 
C a ~ ~ e r o .  3Iailsn. Palafox defended the Hueclini with ten 
tliousaud infuntry, two hunched dragoons, and mglit guns, but 
he was overtlirown on the 13th. Another comba$ snd victory 
on the 14th cnrried Lefchre rscross the Snlon. Tlie 15th ho 
waa on thc Hucrb$ in front of the heroic city. 
Zaragoza mntained ftfty tbowand inlabitants. Tlie city 
was en t l ~ e  riglit of the Ebro, the mburb on tlie left, but con- 
nected by a stone bridge. The vickiity m flat, md on the 
sitbrirb side mrtrshy. Tlic Hiicrbn ciits thc  plnin on t hc  right 
Iiank, florving in a deep cleft perp~idi.cniltirIy towards the 
t o n ,  until close to the wnlls, when, turning ta  tlie riglit, it 
falls into tbe Ebro, nwly  opposíte to the mouth of the 
GalIego, írhicli cuts the plain in like manner on tlie 
Ieft bank. The convent of San Joseplr, on the 
right of  the Huerba, covered n bridge orrer 
tliat torrent, md at ciglitecn Eiiindrcd ynrds zwom 
distanee roae tlie Monte Torrero. On tliis bill, 
whicli couimandd sil1 tlie plilin, and everIooked the town, 
several stomhouses, built for tlie uae of the c d ,  were 
entrenchecl md mxupied by twyelve hundred rnen; tlie m 1  
itsdf, rt noble work, furnished wnter-arriase, u-ithout a 
single locl:, from Tudela, to Zaragoza. Surroundetl by a low 
Iiriclr wnll, the city pmsented no rcg~ilnr dcfcnm, and pos- 
sesacii very Eew gum in e semicersblo st-ate; but the Iioiism 
tvere strongly cor~stmctetl, for the most part of tiwo stoñes, 
each story vaulted and ncarly fire-pmof. Every h s e  liad its 
gsrrison, and the mwaive convents, rising Iilre cast1es around 
the circuik and inside the place, were crowded with meil 
rnen. 
Lefebre Dermoaettes' movements liad cut tlie direct mmmu- 
nication with Calahpd, and forced the baron Vemge to 
retire to Rclchite; find dim Fulnfox occupied S. 
tlie olive graves and hou~es Zietween tlia convent Jm1rnd of 
Zefehrt"s 
of Xt+ Joseph and Monte Torrero, his men, wwed opprazron~. 
by previoua defeats, were easily driven from Bss. 
thence on tlie 16th. The t o m  was tLen closely invested on 
the right bank of the Ebm; and BO grmt was the terror of 
Cnvsllem. the Spaniarda, tliat some of the Frcnch penetrated 
witliout d i f id ty  into the street of Em Engracia, 
and were lilre to lime ttilren the city. Pulnfox anrl 1121 
brother Francisco, hnving an escort of one hunclred dragoons, 
endea~ourd, under pretence of seeking succour, to pass out 
by the su6nrb at the moment the French were entering by 
the side of X a n  Engracia; but the plebeian leaders, suapicious 
of his intentions, would not oufer him to depart witliout a 
prtrd of  infnntry, comrnnnded by 550, or goodrnnn, Jorge. It 
was tliis person md 2% Marin who defended the city, 
Palafox, who has g~thered tlie lionours, wodd hnvc flcd at one 
gate while the enemy was pressing in rit anothcr, and Z m -  
gis= was on tbe verge of destmction; for the streeh were 
tilIed with clamour, tho troops rnakhg littIe resistance, and 
al1 things in confusion. Homever the Fnench, fearfu1 of an 
arnbirsendc or i g o m t  of their advantages, retired, md the 
people changing, m i f  inspired, from the extreme of terror to 
tliat of courage, sucldenly fcll to cmting up defenws, piereing 
loopholes in the walla of the houses, constructing iñmparts 
.mrth aand-bnp, and working witli such vigour under the 
direction of tlieir engineers, that in twenty-four houw tbey 
pnt the place in a condition to mithstend an assadt. Lefelire 
fhen, confining his operations to  the right bank of tLe Elro, 
establislied posts dose to the gates, and maited Eor reinfows 
ments. 
Memwhile, Palnfox remossed the Ebro at Pina, joined 
Trersaze at Belchite, md ha;ving collected seven or eigl~t 
tliousend men and four pieces of artillery, gahd ttLe Xslon 
in rear of the  French From thence he proposed to dvance 
tlirougli Epila and relieve Zaragoza by a batklc, bnt l i i  offiws, 
maed a t  this p j e c t ,  resisted his authority, and Cavallero. 
would have reti rd npon TTalencia. Nevertlieless, 
ignorad of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge, he expressed 
11is detemination tu fight, saying aith an imposing air, 'thnt 
those who feared might retire." Touchd with s h m  dl 
qeed t o  follow him t o  Epila, bnt two Prencb regimcnts, 
detached by Lefebre, de£ea.tod them on the rnsrch ñ i th  great 
103s; and Palafox, notaithstanding his speech, muñt hava 
fled early, for he reacbed Calatayud in the ni#, and yd, 
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many of Iiis &opa amived tliere unbroken the next morning. 
Xftec this di~st~er ,  leaving Tersage nt Calatayud ta make 
fresh levies, he repnired, with al1 the bmten troops tbt he 
could colle&, to Belchite, and, always accompanied by Tio 
Jorge, regained Zaragoza on the 2nd of July. - 
Durlng liis abscncc Lcfcbrc took Monte Torrero by assault, 
nnd lind been joined by n division of infnntry and a tnttering 
train under Verrlier. Hmbvin2) then twelve thousand men, lie 
attaclred t1ie convents. of St. Joseph and the Capuchins, tlie 
d q  Palafox returned. The ht assault on Xt. Joseph failed, 
tlie second aucceeded; the CapucEns, after some fighting, was 
set fire t o  by the Bpmiards. The suburb m not ín~*ested, 
and Napoleon, blaming thiri m d e  of attetck, aent R. 
ordcrs t o  tlirow rs hridge acroas tho Ebro,-to 3mmd0f LfFebie'S 
p s a  the s i e p  on tlie Iefh bank, and profit of the Op~.mtions. 
previous sueoew, by raisig a breaching battery 
on the convent of B& Joseph. A bridge waa rtccordingly 
oonstructed at Xt. Lmbert, two bundred yar& abore the 
t o m )  and two attacka mero mded on a i  tlie same time.; 
biG the empcror now directed Lefebre to rcjoin Bessibes 
~vith a Zirigade, and then constitiitiug tlie ten thoussnd mera 
who remaiiied witb Terdier a wparate wrps, gave lim the 
co mmand. 
Verdier pressed &e siege, rind scnt detach- 
N~~poIwri'H 
ments againat the insurgents, who were forrning , 
smnll nrmies on every side Go enclose him in liis pc"di*p 
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canip. And it is remlrable tliat with eio few 
men, md riaily fighting with the besieged, he conid scour ths 
country, and put dou-n the insurrection, as far as Lerida, 
Barbnstra, TudcIa, Jacg and Cklatnsyud, without any assist- 
mce, save whnt the garrison of Pampduna gave him. I n  
onc of tliese axpcditions thc powdcr-mil11 of Villa Cniallm. Felim, t b t y  miles distnnt, were destroyed, and 
the baron TTersage chiven towrards Vdmcia. 
In the murse of July several uariuccesaful assault~ were 
made on &he @es of El Carmen and the Portillo. Tfie 
besieged, reinforced by eight hundrerl old ~oldiers of the 
regiui~nt of Estremaiiura, m d e  a sdly ko rcakei the Torrcro, 
Iiiit were beaten with the losa of their commnder. Regulas 
npproaches were lthen comrnenced against the quarter of 8anta 
Engracia, and against tlis castle of Aljaferia, which stwd 
outRide the wnlls on tlie mest, Two hundred Spanish gaard~, 
volnnteers af Aragon m(l some mtiller~men, now entered the 
place, and t l ~ e  Frencli force m s  a u p e n t d  to fifteen ihou- 
sand, by the iinival of two veteran regiments, 
On the 3rd, the breacliing bntteries opened, the place wm 
bomberded, and a Rpnisli powdw mapzine, situatd in the 
a s s o ,  a public maIk formed along the ancimt Moorish rnm- 
parts, exploded with a great alctestruction. Tlie place was 
summonetl in vain, and on thc 4th, tlie oonvent o£ Santa 
Engracia vas stormed. The Fxench penetmted to the Cosso, 
where a terrible tumult took place; for while some S p n i d a  
defended the houses, and somc the gtreets, others fled by the 
subiirb to the country beyond, and were charged by t l ie  
cnvalry on that ~ide. Cries of tmson, the sure signaI of 
msacsination then amse on every side, the puhlic bospitnl 
for maxl persons wm set on fire, and the insnne creatures 
carne fortli, mingling with the combritrants, muttering, sbout- 
ing, ginging or moping, according t o  the cliaracter of tlieir 
clisorder. AU seemed lost, when some of ttl-ie French began 
t o  plunder, and one coIumn, seeking a way to the  bridge, got 
entmglerl in the Arco de Cineja, a loag crooked street, and 
were chiven back. Then tEe Xmagozans recovered conrage, 
xnrl figliting rlesperritely, set fire to the convent of Frnil- 
cisco, which checked tl~e attack: at elose of da7 ttlie French 
remained in possee.gsion of one aidc of the Cosso, the Spnniads 
of tlie other. From tliia time the fighting wa9 mur de ron^^ 
md consta* rine p r t y  endeavouriiig to take, the othcr to 
defend &e housea. Skill \vas nwly useless, Yerdier wzs too 
S. meak to make rapid pro,mss, and disastrous events 
Joarnai of b a h g  taken place in atber pnds of Spain, he 
Lefebre's 
UperirEiooe, mceived, about tlie 10th orders from tbe king 
m e .  fo  raise tbe siege, md retire to Lo,mña.. 
lo. Professional expwtness and enterprise do not consti. 
tiite a, great gened. Lefebre Desnoiiettes, active ind bol4 
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defeated tbe insurgents in several actions, with a titlle of 
their numbers, snd scourd the apen muntry; the snme 
Zefebre, ~vanting the higher qualities of a gened, failed 
where tliat intuitive sagacity which r e d  prigsing events aright 
was required Thousmds in the French army codd have 
done aa weII as he in tlie field, few codd have reduced Zara- 
goza; nntl yet it is rnanifest ahe owed hw safety to accident; 
the ciespernte resistanoe was more the reault of channce than of 
mny peculiar v i h e .  
2'. Defeated aE MaUen, 3 the Xalon, at tbe Monte Torrero, 
at Epilei, the Bpaniarda mere terrifid wvben the h n c h  pme- 
tmted hta the toum The flight of Falafox under the pre- 
tence o€ seelíing suceour; the msault which called forth tha 
energy of *he Zasagozans, and failed oniy because tbe Frencli 
troops plundcred, and misstng the r o d  t o  tlie bridge miased 
that to victory, pro5-c thet accidcnt mved tlie city. It is tliese 
nice ctinjuncti~res tbnt men of genius know how to  srizo whils 
others leme thcm to  the decision of fortnne. NevertheEess, 
Lefebre and Verdier, especially the latter, displayed vigour 
and talent; for it mas no mean exploit to que11 the imrrec-  
tions t o  a diatance of fifty milea on eveq side, at the sane f h e  
investing double their own numbers, and puhing the attaclr 
witli such ardour na to reduce t~ extrcmity s city so defended. 
3'. Romantic tnles of women rnllying tlie t r oop  a d  Ieding 
them forward at the most dangerou~ periods of tliis s i e p  were 
currpnt; but their tmth may be doubkd. Tet, when wddenly 
enWoned with liorrori;, the sensitiveness of women driving 
them to a ki id  of frenq,  miglit llave produced aetrons abovt! 
the heroism of mm, and in patient suffering their ~ q m i o r  
furtitude is xcknomledged by nll nntions : whercfore, ncitlier 
wlio2ly believing nar al~~olutely  denying t l ie~e xploits, i t  mrty 
be remarked, tlmt for a long time nfterwerds, Slmin slvsrmed 
with Zaragoza heroines, clritlid in half uniform~i d tlieatri- 
cally loded with weapom. 
4O. Two circumstuilces pnncipally oontributed to the wcoeas 
of tlie defence. The bad discipline of the French, and tlie 
sptcm of tcrror c~tablislied by thc Spmish lenders. Fcw 
uolrliers can be retitrninetl from plunder wlien n town is takcn 
by msault; yet there i s  no period wlien the chanca of war are 
so surlden, so decisive; none where the moral re~ponsibility oF 
e geneml is se great. Will iilitrsrg reguIations done secure 
thc nccessnry discipline at siich a morne.nt7 Tlie French a m y  
hm SL ~tern code; tlie English army is the be& re,daterI 
o€ modern times; y& Lefebre failed to talie Zmgozs in 
default of discipline; nnd in tho couirie of tliis work it wiIl 
npp~ar, thrit no wild liorrle of Tnrtar~ ever fe11 witli more 
Iicence upon rich neigliboura, tiian did the Rnglish troops 
iipoii tlie Sp~nisb fewns takcn by storrn. Nutional inotitu- 
tions only will procluce tliat mora1 discipline necegsary to 
mike n mldier fiilfil hia wlioIo duty; yek tlie lnta Lord Mel- 
ville m s  not aghamed to declare ia parliament, tlrat tlie worst 
rnen made t.he Iiest soldiera ; and tliis odious, n~mw-minded, 
unwortliy mxim liad its aiImirers. ThaE s fiystem of terror 
was employed itt Ziirngoas is unclouhtd. ! l l a  eommmdmt of 
Monte Tnmro, ostensibfy for suffrring himñclf to he def~xted, 
but, acmrding t o  some, for the gratification of private d i c e ,  
xTm tried aníl put t o  rlewth; a general of artillcry wss lrilled 
u-ithout rany trinl; nnil the chief engincer, s. mnii of slcill nnd 
unrlnunted cournge, wns ~rbitmrily imprisoned. Tlie ~ligl~test 
wod, or even pñture of ~liscantent, was pnni~hed by murder. 
Cavnlllrm. A stem bnnd of priests and pleheinn I endcq  in 
whose liands PaIahx wm a tool, mled witli nucll 
furionu energy, that resiñtnncr: to the cnemy wus ICSR dan- 
gerom than disobedience to tlieii orders: ~uapicion WTM tlie 
mamnt of denth, and this sp tem c w e d  not r~nt~il the town 
was taken in the ~econd s i e g ~  
' I ~ A R ~ N A ,  when It fe11 into the liantntis of tIie French, had a 
S p i s h  garrison of four thousand men. Affrap soon hap- 
pened beheen  the goldiera of tlie two mtions, and Duhesme, 
fearing a serions collision, permitted tbe Xpaninrds 
t o  csc~pc by whalo prt ics;  he svcn smt the :,"E,";- 
regiment of Estreindiim entire to Leridii, wliere 
it wm denied admittance, and m d e  ita m y  to Zarqozo, 
during the siege of that place. Many thousand cXzens dso  
fled from IBarcelona, to join tlie pntriotic standard; and Jthongh 
after the first ebullitian at Manrcsa, the inoumaction I in~ercd 
awhih, tha Qeronn junta wna vcry zcalalouñ, a genorr~l commo- 
tion was manifcstly at lmnrl, nnd thare were, including those 
mho carne out of Barcelona, five tbousand vetcms in Catnlonia; 
ten thousand more were in the Balearic islsnds; an English 
army was in Sicil~, English fleets in the hfdterranean; and 
the Catdonim oonstitution compelled the active malc popula- 
tion to nssemblc in ench district with arma and ammunition, 
wlienever the somdr. was rung ; hence the term m t m ,  
and these mrlike peasants wsIl knew Iiy tradition tlie miiitary 
value of their mountain holds. 
Hostilities soon commenced, and Duhesme, foIlowing his 
original ins'trnctions, rietached'five thousnnd two hundred men, 
nnrier general (%abran, t o  secure the fortresses oE Tamgona and 
Tortma, i, incorparate the Swiss regimcnt of Timpfen, and 
t o  airl mnrshal Moncey agaiost Valencin. Al; tlie sitme time, 
soma tlisea ttousmd Slviss, &rmsn% md Italkns, under 
general Smartz, were sent by the way of MartoreI aad Monb 
serrat t o  Mmresa. Thia general had orders te mise contribu- 
tiom,and put doran the incurrection; to destroy the powder-miIls 
at Manresa, get possession of Leridn, incorporate the Swiss 
troops found there, pIace five hundred men in the citadel, 
and finally to enter h q o n  and cooperate wihh Lefebre 
apinst Zaiw,noza. He quitted Barcelona thc 3rd and 4th of 
June, but a Iieavy rain i n d u d  liim to halt the 5th at hlvlartorel, 
aud the 6th he rw~imed his march carelessly and witliout 
milibry premutiens, altl~ough his expedition m knom, 
and the somaten, ringing out among the hilla, had brought 
together in ams  al1 the peasmts of eight districts. At the 
p s s  of Briich, the most active, assistd by a few old soldiew, 
observing Swarta'~ careleas march, cpened a distant fire from 
tlie M C ~ S .  He IW surliriseii, but beat tlie Catalans from their 
post, and pursued t h m  to h a  Wansmna, a distitnce d five 
miles, where t h g  separated and fled, pnrt towwds $hntsemat, 
part towarda Igualada. Swartz then halted, and the Cata- 
lans rallying in rem of Casa Yamana, dime his advanoed 
p a r d  bwk, mhereupnn he hastily retired towards E s p n m  
,nuEia, followed and flnnked by clouds of somatcnm, whose 
courage and numbers increased every rnoment. At &par- 
raguEra, a Ibng  ingle ~treet, the inlidiitmta prepnred an 
aniliush, but Swartg learniiig tlieir design, p s e d  to tlre 
right and left, and reaclied Martorel tLe 7th. He lost a 
gun and many men, and returnd in such dirtler, that 
Dubesme, foreweing a general expluñion, immediately recalIed 
h h r a n .  
Tliat &cer 11ad entered Tnmgonir tlie 8th witliout enooun- 
tering an enemy ; but when he retumdI the inwrrgents were 
posted at Vendrills, Arhos, and Tilla Franca, ancl mpmd 
Jong  tlie banks of tlie Llobregat. From Vendrills they fell 
Jiack to Arbos, diere tFie Freiicb beat tliem, set fire to the 
tonn, and proceetlcd to TilEa Frnncn, Here tlie excesaeu, so 
somnion among tlie SpanTards, were not sp~red. The 
gol-crnor, an old mnn, ñ-m mudered, togetlier witli severa1 of 
Iiis frienas ; mtd tlie perpetrntors of tbcse crimea, ns miglit be 
expected, made no defeiice agaiiist tlie enemy. Dulicsme, 
moving out of Barcelona ta meet Ewnrts, cleared tlie 
Llobrcgnt, holr some guns, Iiurned San Boy, and seiit 
general Lechi to mect Chabran. When his force waa tlius 
re-united, lie detachd Cliabran, with his own and 6warts"Ei 
Iirigade, to Xanresa; but the soniatenes, reinforced witli regular 
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troops and artillery, again defended the pass of Bmch, and 
Chabm, more timid even than Swartz, fled, after a slight 
skiimish, from those g ~ l l a n t  peasan-b, antl WM p u m d  with 
eiceffa md R galling firc to the v e y  walls of Ehrcelonn. 
miis auccess, nttrihuted to tlie holy influence nf the Lady of 
Nontserrat, apurred on tha in~urreetion. Gerona, Boaaa, 
HostaIrich, oind Taragona tuok arms; the somatcmea of the 
Ampurdan forced the French fo abaudon the town of 
Rgueras, and confine tbemselvea to  tbe fort of Fernando; 
the cwntry bet~veen the Ter and the Besos smrmcd mith 
insurgenta, and tha commnnicittian with Fiancc ma cnt off. 
Duhcame aow took six thouaand of his beat troop, with 
eight pieces of artillery, nnd mmcted ngainst Geronei, To 
avoid tlie castle of IlostaInch, he followed €he corrst Bne, and 
was attendcd by a French privateer. TLe somatenes irnme- 
dmtelj assembled in two great bodies, one on the 3ioncscla 
heights, aix miles fmm B~~rcelonn; the other on the ridge of 
Mongot, which 3 the gamo rlidnnce abub upn  the @en, 
At Mongot tbe Spaniarcls I d  an entrenched castle, antl B 
battery of fifieen guns, bnt were beaten by Duhesme on the 
XTth, and a detachment from Bmcdona defeated those at 
Monda. The 18th, Duhesme took Maftaro, and plundercd 
it. Tho 19tb, he beat tlte somatcncs at St. Fol. Thc ZOth, 
at nino o'clock, Iie a p p e a d  before Oerons. Tliis toivn is 
built on the right of the Ter, but the Oña, a confl iient of that: 
river, flows tiirougb the place. On the eashwd, rocky billa 
overlook the town at different distantes. Port Nont Jouy, a 
reguTax fortification, croi~ned tlie neareat height, five bundred 
y d s  dishnt from the walL9. Three o t h c ~  forh, cal IHI the 
ConstnLle, Bt. Anne, nnd the Capuchins, eonnected Liy a ditch 
and rnmpart so as tn f o m  one irregular outwork II tliousand 
p d s  long, crowned a second Sdge five, e!ght, md tweIve 
liundred y d s  from Gerona, sixteen bundred from Mont 
Jouy, irom which i t wss also sepmted by the valIey md 
stream of the Gdlepn. 
South-w~t, bctwccri the left of the Ofía rrnd the Ter, the 
country ia comparntivelp flnt, but full of hollows and cleftrr 
neor the town. Tlie body of the plncethere, w&s defentled hy 
a ditch, ttnd five regular bastions connected by a wall with 
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towers, Westward, the city wwns covered hy tlie Ter. Qn 
the east it was fortified ~ 6 t h  a Iong wall aiid toivers, with 
irregular basitiuiis at each extrernity, aud ha\rinp smiill detuclied 
works nt t1ie openhg oE the vtilley of G)ttllcgan. Tlie garrison, 
c o m p o ~ l  of tha regimnt of  Ultonia, tLree hundred strong, 
antnd some urtillery-me~i, witr nssisted liy ~olunteem, citizeiig 
and somntenegj utho nssenili~erl ou the Ieft of the Ter to dispute 
tlie pmswge oF tlic river. 
Dulieaine, d e r  provokiing Eiome sliot Ei.oni tlie forts, ocm- 
pied the villaga of St. Eugenin iii tlie plain, add then, 
feiguing to puss tlie Ter tq t l ie bridge u£ Sdt, eripgd ths 
somatenea iii a useEws skirmisli. Gratt pnrt of tho duy mas 
8peilt in preparing l~ddcrs for the nttuclc, but at five o'cloclr 
in tbe evening tFie Frencli artilleiy oliened from 
st. cyr. the heights of Palau, and a column crossiiig the 
Oiiq passed Iietween the outworks and the tolvn, und tlirow- 
ing out a detacbrnent to check tIie prrison of tlie fonner 
as&lted tlie gate of El Carmen, but tlie attempt fdled 
witli great loss to tlie assailants. TIYO liours after, anotlier 
oolumn, advancing by the Iefl of the Oña, assaulted the 
hstioii of Santa Clara, but with little mangement or disci- 
plina Tlre stormbg party lwxl only three or four 
Lufnille. larlder~; and though, by favour of tlie liollows, it 
reached the walls unperceived, and tliough ths Elmipolitan 
colonel, Ambrosio, and the engineer, Lafaille, actudly gained 
4 e  top of the r q a r t s ,  tbe confusion prevented succew. 
Next day, Duliesme trid negotintion, m d  it is said the town 
would have yielded, if, clreadilig a longcr absence from Basee- 
lona, he had not mddenly qnitteil bis cump, and returned by 
foroed marches, lertving b b r a n  with some troops in BIattaro 
as lie passed. During his absence, the victorious somatenes 
of Bruch bad descended the Uobregnt, rallid triose of tLe 
lower oauntq, got mhillery from Tamgona and otliar fortrssses, 
planted batterics at the diferent pwsages of the river, and 
being jo ind  by the Swiss regiment of Wimpikn from Tara- 
gona, entrenched a lino from San Boy to AIartord. 
Regular officers now took the commannd of tlie pensmb. 
Galoncl Milana assembled a body nt Granullew; Juan Clhros 
~nit liimself at tlie hcad of the peasantv of the Ampidnn; 
colonel Bqet  took the comrnend of those at Bruch; and wlien 
Ghabran, nfter resting at X~attaro, made a fomging excur- 
sion through the &strict of E1 ValIes, MiIans, wlio held the 
valley of the Congoattl, cneount~rcd him ncnr Granollcm. 
Botli sidcs cEnimcd thc vic to% but Chabran retirccl tci Barce- 
lona, ranri Xilnns remahed cin the bnnks of tho Be~os. Tlio 
30t11, Duhesme c a u d  the somatenes on tlie Llobregat to be 
attncked. Lwlii menniced those at the bridge of Nolinos del 
Rey, while the brigadca of Beasieres and Goullus, crossing tlie 
river 3 Xan Boy, surprised a battery, and turned their line. 
Lechi then pmscd by tlie bridge of Molinos, ascended tlie lcft 
bank, hok al1 the  ahllery, b m t  ~cveral viilqea, md pnt tIie 
insurgnts to flight. Tliey mllied at Rnicli and Tgunldn, 
and, returning tlie 6tli, infested tlic viciiiity of B r d o n n ,  
t a k g  possesaion of al1 the Uls between San Boy rand 
Iloncada, md connecting their operations with Milaw ; other 
parties also colIwted betiveen the Besos and the Ter) the I i e  
of insurrection extended to the drnpurdm, and Juan mros 
owapied t ~ i e  flat wuntry nbout ~orias1 ~ h c  ~rcncli  p ~ r i s o n  of 
Fcriiando hnd partly burnctl tFic t o m  of Piycrna, liut wero 
themselves blocked up in tlie fort by tlie somntenes of the 
Pyrenees, and t l ie Im perieuse and the Camliriaii, Englisli 
frigates) crnized between nosas and 13arcelona Meanwhile ti 
nest of privateers was formed in Paiamos Bay, a junta was estst- 
blialied a t  Lerida, intercommunicrition n.as had mith Bragon, 
Vnlcncin, Scdle, Gibraltar, and tlie Ralcnric Islilnnds, and i t 
m a  dccreed that forty tcicios or rcgirncnts, ~ c l ~ c t c d  from the 
somatenea, should be arganized añd paid as rcgulnr troops, 
and forty more form a reserve witliout pay. 
Tliis state of aft7airs being d e  knoivn t o  Napoleon by 
the moveable columns watching the valIeys of tlie eristern 
Pyrenees, he orde~ed general JZeille, tlien cainmnuing the 
rescri-c at Perpignnn, tu tdre the fimt soldiem nt  bond and 
mnrch im tlic rclicf of Fcr~iibndo (10 Fípems. This cffcctcrll, 
Reille, with a form iiicreascd by drnfts from the interior of 
fi-i.nnoe to nine thousand, ww to assault Rosas bsnd bcsiege 
&ron&; and the emperor thought the fd of Geronri wouid 
induce tlie swender of Lerida, nnd so tmnquillize í&talonio, 
that frre thousund men might be dctnelictl toiswds Valericin. 
E 2 
Reille, brrving two battdions of Taecan recniit.8, conducted a 
convoy safely to Figueras, and mis& tbe blockade tlie 10th of 
July; not, however, without diffimilty, for his troops 
FOYS BiatPry. were greatly eerrified, and could ~ c d y  be k g t  
to their coloun. On the same day, Duhesme, 
dwiping a gecond attmk on Gerona, quitted Ihcelona d t h  
six thousand infantry, some cava1ry, aud a battering train of 
nine guns, together with a grertt train of country amiag.es, 
transporting amrnunition a d  ~tores. General Leclii remained 
with five thousand men in BamFonq and tlie citizens mere 
Lora Col. disarmed. Reille meantime having received his 
1 i n ~ ü . a  reinfomment from France? invcsted Rosas, whew- 
Dwpahh* npon Juan ClAros raised the country in Lis rear, 
the Montape, English seventy-four, arrived on the c w t ,  and 
her captain, Otway, joiniag the mipeletes with some gertmen 
and marinea, a skirmish took place, which obllged Reille to 
retire with the loss of two h u n d d  men. 
Duhesme's mar& wvas apin by the coa&, md difficult* 
The somatenes broke up tlie road, MiIans hung on his la 
the Imperieuse iinder lord Cochrane, a i d d  by some Spanish 
vessels, cannonaded his right, and lie waa forced to halt for 
five days near Arenas de Mar. At lmt, dividing his trmps, 
he sent one part over the mountain~i fo Vilagorguin, the 
other to St. Isicle. The fimt attacked Hosttilrich, and failect 
The second, beating Rlilans, dispersed the Bomatenes on the 
Tordera, and Duhesme a,@ united his troops under tlie 
walls af Gerona, but he l od  many carrjqm. Tlie 23rd he 
diapersed the migueletes gurrrding thc teft bank of the Ter, 
and thcn Reille, comEng from Figuersc with six thousnnd mkn, 
took poat at h e n t ~  Mayor, arid the t o n  wns inveated. T%e 
gnnison, composed at firat of five hundred migueletes and tIie 
regiment of Ultoniri, was reinforced the 2Stl?, Gth tbirtecn 
h~indrcd of thc regiment of Brrrcclona, nnd two guns. Hever- 
theless, in the night of the 27th, a French column, pnssing 
the vaIlg of Gallignn, gaincd the tmblc of Mont Jouy, seiacd 
tliree fortified towers wlildi the Spnninrds abnndoncd in a 
pnnic, nnd Duliesme, after an examination, resolver1 to brealc 
gronnd thcro. But a prst chango had occurrcrl in Crtb 
lonian &irs. Tlie insunection 1Utliert.a oonñned to the 
somatenes was consolidated by a treaty between lord Col- 
li~igwood, commander of the Britidi fleet, atid tlie marquis 
of Palucioa, captnin-gene& of tIie Balmric iales; a treaty, 
which set the Spanish ffeet and troops, hitherto blockaded ia 
the islands by the EngIish, free. Palucios then sent the 
regirnent of Barcelona to Felice di Qttixols, from mhence, as 
before statd, it rwhed Gerons. Phlacios himself disea- 
bnrkd with four thniisnnd mcn nnd tliirty-s~ven gunn at 
Tmgona, and his arrivak excited such a vdicment desire for 
fighting; that the supreme junta repairing to that tom, 
immediately rnade the marquis their president, 8a.d com- 
mander-in-ehief, subject, however, t o  the tukla-r Saint Nar- 
cissus, who wm, at the same timc, proclaimed generalissirno 
by sm rtnd land, tlie ~ p b o l s  of authority being solcrnnly 
laid on liis ooflin. TJie fimt nset of Pí~lncioa wtrzr t o  send the 
count of Caldapea with eighteen liundred men and fuur 
guns, to re-estnblish the line of the Llobreptt; md that 
officer having formed a post rat the bridge of Molino del Rey, 
fixed his qur~rtcrs rit JlartorcI, and wna joincd by coloncl 
Rnget with tJirec thousand ncv levics. Tbia lino wns only a 
few milea from ~ e l o n n ,  but it m a very strong one, and 
tlie right bank was steeper, hd easier communications than 
tlie Ieft bank, a commandins riewj and rongh defiles belund 
fitted to cover a retreat. 
Lechi, thns hemmed in on the me&, wac nlso hmpcred on 
the nortll, because the mountnins, filling the npnce tctween 
tlio Llobvt md ths Besos, send tbeir ahoots within two rtnd 
thee  mil- of Barcelona, and tlie somatenes of t h e  Manresa 
and TaZls distncts alcirmished from thence daily with the 
French outposts. &yond the Besos, bounding Barcelona on 
the esrstward, n lofty continuous ridge, extendig to Hostalrich, 
ruiis parallel t o  and nt t11e di9tnncc of tmo or tlircc miles from 
the sea coast, ~epamtm the mn3n from tlie mnrine roaris, m d  
sends its ~hoots down to tbe water's e d s .  Tilis ridge also 
smrmed with somatenes, who mt the communication with 
Duheme, and invcsted tbe castle of Mongat, in mIiicIi wcre 
eighty or ninety Frcncll. T11e Crtml~rioi rind Im~icricztso 
frigatm blockaded tlie liarlionr of  firoelons; and lord 
C:&mne bringing t h  e latter alongside of &fongat, landed his 
marines, and Iiraving, S,in concert witli thc ~ornnt~cnca. t~lími it, 
destroyed the worlrs, androllerl theroclrs arid ruina d o n  iri such 
a mnnncr ag to block thc road. Tlius,whcn Duhesme comrnenccd 
tlie sicge of Geronn, hc wras eiit oíT from Barcelonta rand thnt city 
wns mensccd. Rcillc's communicntion mith Fi,rrcrns was like- 
wise jnterruphl ; convciys were lathiclrerl thc 28th 
St. Cyr. 
of Jirly and 3rd of A~ips t ,  and so Rercely on the 
6th, that a Kmpafitan bi~ttnlion Iost a hunrlrcd and fifty men. 
Pnlncios, whose forccs nugmcntcd dnily, sent Cnlrlngics tu 
mccour Gerona, at tlie Fiead of tliree or fvur tliousnnd troops, 
p~rt migueletcs, pnrh regulars; he was t o intcrrupt tlie proprws 
of tlle siege, anir tlie rnnrquis Jesignerl to  folivrv Iiimsclf Gtli 
grerater forces. Caldagnes, mnking a cireliit lip Tnrmnn, Snlm 
delI, Gmnollem, anrt Stbn Ccloni, rcncl!licd Rostrilridi tlic rnorning 
of thc IOtli, whcro liis force mas increnficd to firc tltoiisnnd 
men and foitr guna. On tlie 1 4th he rcachcd Castcllnr, m ~m11 
placc bcliind the ridgcs ovcrloolring Gerenn, five inilca from 
the Frencli crimps, \vlvllcre Juan Clilros met liim witli two thaii- 
~ a n d  five hundrocl rnigicletes, rnixed with some Tl'rilloon and 
Spanisli Gt~artrds fiom Roma. Milnns dso joinerl him u-ivith 
eight hundred somntcries, and n comrnnniciation witli tlic jiinb 
df Gronn wns opcncd. At tliis timc tlic Mont Jouy wm hard 
prc~scd, hiit tlic Frcndi, ignornnt of C~ilrlngi~m' approncli, lid 
Iienped thcir forccs in the plnin lietwccn the lcft of tliei OGa 
nnd tlie Ter, Icnving but f i  slcntler pmrd on the liills, nnd nne 
lmttnlion t80 protcct thc brttterica rn isd ripinst Mont Joiiy. 
Tlie Spanisl~ grncrrsl, un catcrpn'dng mnn, ~ e n t  ~evcrnl ooliimiis 
on thc 16th, @nst the wcdr part of the besiegers' linc, and, 
iit the snme time, thc gnrrison wllicd frum Mont Joliy; the 
Frcnch wcre tlius oveqowered, and driven iicross the Ter. Tho 
Catalans m-fomd on tlic hills, cxpecting to bc nttacked; but 
Duhesrnc nnd Rcille wnited nntiI dnrlr, nnd fhen Red, tho one 
ta  Figima, thc otlicr to Rareelona, Teiwing nrtillcry nnd stores 
belilnd. Duhcsme deigned h retrcut by thc const, bnt hcaring 
at ~ ~ l l c l l ~  that the rond wns cut, the ~ o m a t ~ n c ~  on thc hcights, 
nnd m Engli~li frigike ~earty to rnlce his columns, lic dcstroyed 
his amniunition, t2irew his srtillery over tho roclw, took to the 
mountains, ~ n d  forced R p w g e  tl~mugli tlie ~omatenes to Mon- 
gnt, wliere Lechi met him antl cwered tlie retreat to Barcelona. 

between bcing gorged with mountnins, and studcled with 
fortiíied plncea wliiclr comrnand the maiii roads, So few and 
contracted are the plains and fertilc vnlley~, thnt Cablonia 
may, with the exception of the ricli pmts aliouh Lerida rrnd 
the Urgel, be dcscribcd as a huge masfi of rocka and tomnts, 
inciapahla o€ supplying mbsisGcnce cvcn for tlic inhabitnnts, 
wlrose prosperity dqends upon munufactures nnd commerce. 
Bnrcelona, tlic riclicst and most popitloiiai city in Spnin, is thc 
limrt of the provincc, and wlio holds it, mriy siiclr tlie stren$h 
of Cntdonis mmy. Rut n Frcnrh n m y ,  witfiout o cammnnrl- 
ing ficct to assist, cnn ssnrcely h11e or Irccp Bnrcclona. Tlta 
troops must bo tnipplicil by convoya h i m  Fnincc; tlie for- 
treses on the Iinc of commvnication tnkeri nnrl prnvisiorierl; 
tlie active intelligent populntion o€ the coiintry bcnten from 
tlie rivcss, puraucd into their Tnstnmcs, and wnrred d o m  by 
exertions wluch nonc hut tlic h t  troops nre cn~m1)lc of: for 
tlie Catslanti nrr! roliust, uumerous, nu~ l  brave enougli nfter 
tlieir o m  rnamer. 
3'. It follows from tliis expsition, tluit Duliesmo ~Eiowerl 
Iittle mifitnry foretliought, in neglecting to secure Gerom, 
Hostalrich mrl Taragona witli garrisairs, wlien his troopa were 
receivd into those places. This negligente made the repulse 
of 8~~ antl Chabran vital; it eiilibled some pmr, injured, 
indignad peasants to kindIe a migllty wwar, which forced 
Napoleoii ~t this time to smd tliirty Shomnd men to the 
relief of Barcelona, occupied for severa1 years aftermmds I q e  
anniee, and never entirely eeased nntil the Prench retired. 
4'. Duhesrne's energy and intelligence biive been p r a i d  
, gp by Napoleon. Yet an absence of military a m g e -  
~enaix,  ment and discipline marked his op~rntiom in 
NO. 2. Catalónlo, Witness his attncks on Geron~,  fhe 
w a t  of ladders, tho oonfnsion of tbe assaults ; hia raismg of 
tlie second siege and flight from bldagues, whose enterprise, 
though ~nccessful, should have been made fatal ta  himself. In 
these mattem Duliema displayed no talent. In the saelring 
of Mnttnm and t1ie buming of villages, whicb he 
st. Cyr. 
executed 6 t h  the extremest rigour permitted by 
tlie harcrhest laws of war, an oodioua energy m npparent; and 
as the rtrdour of the somntenes waa incrensed by this severity, 
liis conduct was as impIitic as it waa barbaroirs. 
It hm, huwever, been srtid, t h t  Lechi was the Lafalllc. 
rnm who perpetrateJ. these things, n,nsiinst the wishes oT 
Dulicsmc, who wm hummo and jlist. 
5'. The Cntnlnns unitcd to the usunl cruelty of Sp-iniarila 
more than their usual vanity and supmtition. Their coumge 
w a s  however liigher, their patriotism pmer, their efforts 
more sustained; the somatenes mere bold in battle, the ppu-  
latiuna of the t o m a  firm, and some of  tbe juntas appii- 
rentIy disinte&. The prniao mcritod, rand bmtowed, zipon 
thm peopla o£ Znrago~a is great, yet Geronn more justly clbims 
+,he admiration of mankind. For the Arragonese troops were 
by Lefebre driven from tlie open conntry in crowd~ to tlieir 
capital, whem a little would llave rnrids thern snrrender; it 
was only at the last hour that, pthering courage from despair, 
the people of Zaragoza put fortli. a11 tlieir energy. Geronn, 
attacked hy n p a t c r  foreo and possicasing fewcr mmns of 
defence, without any internnl ~ystem of terror ta eounter- 
balance tlieir fear of tlie enemy, manfully resisted from tlie 
first. me people of h g o z a  rallied on their hearthstone, 
those of G e m a  stood firm at the porch. But quitting these 
mattem, the contempomy occurrences in b-alencia must be 
rclatcd. 
aster Cdvo and Ks marderous follomers had been stmng.1 ed, 
tha liorrirl aspect of the VaIencbn i n s u d i o n  was entirely 
changed. The apirit of mnrdcr was checked, and the patriotic 
energy assumcd n much nobler appearance. Murcia md?Taiencia 
were uuited, snd tlLjrty thousand men, arme8 and providecl 
with artifiery, attested tlie resourca of tlieee rich provinces 
and the activiv of their chiefs. Tlie Vdencians then resolved 
to mar& on Aragon. Napoleon foreseeinng tbis, ha4  on thc 
30th of May, ddirccted iiToncey, with ten thousand mcn upon 
Cuenca, to watch the cuuntry betmeen tlie lower Ebro nnd 
Carthagena; and ta act against the city of Talencia 
S. if he judged it fitting. norn Cuenca, a short J~~~~ M 
movcmeiit to tho lcft would phce hirn betrvmn M O ~ ~ Y ' ~  
Qpmtiona, Valencia anci Zaragoza; a few mr&w to tlie w y ~ .  
right woiild place Iiim on the junction of rrmds leebding 
from Cartlingene and Valencia to Madrid; and if lic mrtrched 
xgainst XTlilencia, Cliabrm mas to coaperate from thc side 
of Cahlonia. The operations of Lefebre Desnonettes at 
Zaragoza, anrl of Duhesme in Cataloniq merc thus wvcred 
fmm thc Tdcncians, and thc flunlr of tlic Frcncli a-t Maclrid 
protected from the Miircims. 
Moncey w l i e d  Cuenca the 1 Ith of June, and tlierc lenrning 
liom veq- fierce tlie BaIencians were, hom strong thcir army, 
and also that tlicir projcct ms to rclicve Znrrqoxa, he 
resolved to rtttaclr their city. Supposing C%nbrrui to Re then 
rat Tortoza, lie urdered him to march nt once uyion Cmtellon 
de le Plana, a town eastward of thc Gurtdnlrivirtr, for he 
h igned  to clmr al1 tlie country wcstwnrtl of that river 
hirnself. He fixed tlie 25th June ns the latest period for 
tlie union of thc t r o  wiiimns near 'Zrnlencin, and quitting 
Cuenca the 17th, marchcd by Tortoln, B~~cnaclies, Mntillq anind 
ErIinglrinilln, t o  tlic bridgc of  Pnioso npon the ri\+cr CnbricI, 
ahere he mived the 2 l st. Hitlierto hc had scen no inlinbi- 
tanta, fexr or hatred l i d  caiiscci dl t o  Ay, hut tlic bridge was 
defended b? some Spanish guards, a Swiss rcgiment, and a 
body of nmed peasaiits, and thia sudden apparition at rtn im- 
portnnt p ~ ,  afeer auch dcsolntion, prognosticated a dc~perats 
conffict, yet swrccly any rcsi~tnncc wna rnadc, and Clinbm 
IVIL~ immedintcly appriacd of this succcss, ancl directed to 
effect ra junction at Valencia the 27th ar 28th. 
Qn thr! 22nd Yonoey ieachcd Utiel; biit ten or tmclve 
thou~nntl patriota hnl-ing rallicd, wcrc cntrcnching thcmselves 
on Iiis left, nt Ciihrillm, in nrlvnnce of t11c Sieta Aguag, nnd thsh 
position was ~ c r y  strong, for the flnnks restcd on dccp mwn- 
tayus, snd thc only appromh in front m s  thiougli higli scnrped 
T O C ~ ~ S ,  whose topa, momricd by amcd pcnstint,s, were inncccssible 
on tlio Frencli side. A dircct nsgnult whs liopele~s, liut tlie 
Spmiards were deceived by fcints, while Earispc turned their 
left, clii~pemcd tliem, nnd took m11 tlieir guns, nmmiinition, and 
bnggnge. Tlie Swiss regiment tlian cnmo over t o  hhe French, 
and Moncey resuming his formcr line of mnrcli, re~cliedVnlencia 
tlie 27th. Thc nnciant walls of Uiis ceIcbmtad p l m  WWB 
complete, the appronches covered witli aorlcs newZy rGsed 
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or repaired, the citade1 in a state of defence, and the popu- 
lation willing to fight. A city conhining eighty thousand 
people actiiated by violent passiona cannot be ea~ i ly  overcome, 
nnd Tnlencin hnd nlso nrtificinl strength. Riiilt on low gronnd, 
anrl encircled witli numemus mnais, and cuts for irrigtion, 
its deep diteh was filled with water. h'o apyroacli could 
be made except apinst  the gxtes, but it is ~ a i d  a smuggler 
promised t o  betrtby the place during the atttick, antl it is 
probable some secret nnderstrinding of that kind induced 
Nonccy to nsmil. An dvanccd ginrrl of  fotir thoirsrtnrl mcn, 
commnnrIed 1)y Jañcpli Cnro, n lirotlier of Romnnn, W ~ B  
entrenched ah Quilrte, beliind tka canal of Nislata, five miIes 
ia advance of 'Valencia, but after a vigoroiis resistance were 
chased into tlie city witli tlio Ioss of some guns, and the 
next dny the French occupietl thc principal avenucs of the 
town. 
Entl~usiaatic iyhiIe Monccy m s  clistant, his appearancc filled 
the Vatencixns with terror, and a viprous acsault might have 
succeeded; yet the favonrable apportunity, if It really existed, 
quiclrly pnssed away. Padre Rico, a  fria^, cdidinguished l)y his 
rcsoliition, bnring o C ~ R B  in one hnnrl, und n sworrl in the 
odier, aronsed the sinking apirit of the mnltitul; fear of 
retaliation for the massacre of the French residents g ~ v e  force 
to his exhortatima; and istnrlisciplined mmses pass suddcnly 
from ona cxtrcme to nnother, hc soon proclucerl ~ntliusinsm. 
IVliile tlie impression of CR~D'E defent wns fredi, the governor 
ww snmrnoned; lie declared hig resolution to fight, and tlia 
Frencli fire opened, but was soon overpowered by the heavier 
rnetai of the p l w .  A w a m  slrirmish at the suburbs antl the 
gates ensued, tlie Valenciana foughfit well, tsnd when nigl~t feii 
rio imprcssion hnd been made on the defcnm. Repnlserl nvith 
loss at every point, the aituation of  the mnrslial becarne deli- 
a t e .  Pernoni sent to seek Cliabmn couId g i n  no iiitelligeace 
of lils mwemeilts; the socret oannexions in thc hwu, if any 
there were, liad failed; the ammnnition wag ncarly expend~l, 
m d  t hc  m y  was  enrmmbcred with seven or cight biinrlred 
wonnrled men, nmong them tlic genemi of engineera : Rloncey 
rclinquisheil Iiis attndr, nnd fcll Iinck to Quarte. 
Wben it is cansidered, that in e p a t  city, only a mal1 
numbcr af persona cnn wtimatc jriatly thc immcnse sidv~IIt%ges 
of thcir sitirrition und thc cornparntivc wcalrness of nn cncmy, 
it must be confcssed the Viilcncians' spirit was great; but it 
ended there. Notliing wortliy of ssuch an encrgetic carnmence- 
ment wns altcmnrds pcrforrned, a1 thoiigh vcry considerable 
nmlm were cither mised or mnintninerl in tlie province. 
WliiIe still at Quartc, marslial Moncey rrsccrtnined tlint the 
aptrain-pnerril, Serbelloni, wns coming from Murcili upon 
Almnnza, with design to interccpt bis eommunicntion by 
Chieva and %Gol; whcreforc, rdinquishing the line of 
Cucnca, lie rwolved to athck tlic Spaniarcrds on tlicir murch, 
Dircctiiig liia rnovement on Torrente, he linlted at niglit, and 
next dny fnrccd a rnrirch to hlcir~h onc le i ig~e from the 
Xucar, nnd from tliat plwe advised Clithrnn of tho cliange. 
Scrl.icIloni, siirpriacd nnd rIisconccrtcd by thia rnpidity, too l~  8 
position t o  defend tlio piissnge of tbc Xumr, nnd tIie line wns 
atrong; hut tlie Spnninrtls impmdcntly occiipicd botli Iiiinks, 
and in t l i i ~  sihriition were attaclced on tlic rnnrning of the 1 s t  
o€ Jiily. The division on thc Frencli side of t he  r i v e ~  wns 
overtlirown, tlie paspnge forccd witliout loss of timc, nnd Ser- 
belloni retired t o  t,he Iieights of San Felippg covering the 
mnin rnnd from Alcirn to Almnnxn, and boping ta semire ehe 
defiles in front of tlie l a t t~ r  town. Moncey wm again too 
quick for him. h v i n g  Snn Felippe to his left, he continued 
Iiis march by mother route, mil seized the defiles near Alrnanza 
late in the night of the 2nd. me Spani~h troop fipproxclied 
his pmition, yet he dispersed tliem at dayheak on the 3i-d, 
captured sonie of their mns, and entered Almanza. Be after- 
wrds marched by Aibonete and Chinchilla to Albacete, where 
be got inklligence that Kere's division, wlUch he expected to 
find at .San Clemente, was gone t o  Fkqueña. 
To undersbnd this a t e  uf affairs it must be rememhered, 
thst d e n  Dupont atid Moncey quitted Madrid, S a ~ ~ r y  
retained Tedel's and Gobed's divisions Gom the former, and 
Fiere'a from *he Eattex, resemes. Fxere had been sent fo 
aid Bessihes, but soon returned; and following Napoleon's 
ordem, Globert shouId then h a ~ e  been sent to TalFadolid, Frere 
t o  San Clemente, a central point from i ~ l ~ e n c e  h could have 
tnkea the road to Bwille to  ald Dupont; or the road from 
Cuenca to TTalencia, to aid Jlonccy's advance; or the rosa from 
Valencia to Murcia, to aid Es retrext, 8 a ~ a r y  ~ e n t  both Vedo 
and Gobert direct to Dupont, and Frere to Requeña, on tlie 
Cucncn, rond, wlicn Monccy ww on tlic road to Murcia; rind 
thin he {lid Iiemuss the peeple of Cuenclr lid overpowered n 
French dekhrnent left there ; but he d s o  directed Cnulnin- 
conrt from Tarancon against these insnrpnts, who mere broken 
with grertt slaughter and Cuenca W ~ S  p2laged on the very 
day Noncey defeater1 Serbelloni. Thus Frere, mho had qiiitted 
San Clemente tlic 26th of June, found Regueiía trnnquil, licnrd 
of E~ault~iiicourt's AUCCCAS, of Monccy's mnrcli an Mtircin, tlnd 
returned with troops sickIy and -hausted by nssless marches 
ia the heat d ofmmer, 
Moncey nom rsorpnined his forces, and wsrs preparing 
artillery and other meang for a seconci attempt against 
Valencia, when &vary, alnrmed a t  the ~ d ~ n n C e  of Cuestn, and 
Blake in tlie nortli, reciilled Frere toivnrrls Ndrid; whereupon 
hfoncey, extremely offcnded tliat Savary, inflated ivith momen- 
tary power, should treat him with so little cere- 
FOT'E 
mony, abandoned San Clementq and rcturned by UibloTpi 
tlie way of Ocaiía t o  the caliitril. 
1". Moncey'~ cnmpnign wns proel~Tmcd by tlic Spnninds as 
a decisive failure, and it produced extravspnt hopes of final 
success; a happy illu~ion if t.he chiefs ]Id not pmtaken of it; 
hnt, with self-gratulations and exnggerations, they stifl ed 
reason. Moiicef's operrttion was in tlie nnture o i  a rnoreaMe 
column. The object was t a  preven the junction o€ tlie Vrilen- 
cinn ~ r m y  wihh ttlie Arqonesc; thc attcrnpt npon the city ivna 
an experiment, to produce great effeck if successful, ancl, fail- 
ingn was of trifling conyusnce i a  a mjlihry view : 
Yalencia was riot the esential object af tlie expe- 
ditioo, and the gerterd canipaip depended upon 
the armies in Old Cnstile. 
S". It wm conaoliiig thah a p t  city liad not fallen; yet a 
want of real nerve in tlie Spanish insurrection was visible. 
Murcia rand Valencia acting in concert, contained two oi the 
richest sea-port towns in tlie Peninsula; their united force 
amounted to thirty tliousiind oganixed traops, exelusir~e of the 
amed peasants in variotw distnets; aiid the populnce of 
Valencia were recent from the massacre of Ffinch resiclents. 
Here then a strenuous resistntice \va$ to be expectsd, yet, 
nevertliclesq Moncey, wk~ose force ivae at f is t  only cight thou- 
sand, and never exceedcd ten thousand, warred ívitliout eessrt- 
tion for a month, Torced t~vo of the strongest rnounbin p s e s ,  
crosseci several dificult rivers, and even penetrated tlie suburhs 
of Valencia. XSisappoiuted of assistnnce from Catxlonia, he 
get extricated himself, dcfcaterl hia opponents in five sctionq 
lcilled nnd wounded a number equd in amount te the whole 
o€ his omn force, and made a circuit of three Iiundred miles 
through a hostile popnloua country, without any seriow losg, 
nitliout zny desertion from tlie Spanish batttiliona incorpa- 
rated mith his oivn, and, wbat WIM of more importante, having 
tlrose ht.talions increased by desertions from tlie enemy. ' h e  
m1 objccta l id  bcen attaincd, the plan of rclicving Zarqoza 
wna frustrnted, the orgnnization of an eefficient Spnnisli force 
re tded.  Moncey did not capture Valencia, because, to use 
Napleon's wards, a &y, ~ 6 t h  dghty t ~ t m n d  inlzabitants, 
6umncacEoed s h - ~ ,  and ar t i lh j  plaeed at t ! ~  gates, c a ~ t m t  Be 
TAITEN BY THE COLL-4n.' 
3'. Frere's march to Requeiía, so hurtfuI to tlie French, won 
for Savary 3 severe rebuke from the e m p m r  : ' It wac a foliy,' 
he said, ' to  dream of reinfoicing Moncey, because, if tliat 
marshal failed in taking tlie city by a sridden maadt, i t became 
an aF$r of  a r t i l l e ~ ,  and twenty t,liousand men, more or lega, 
would not cnaBIt! him to succeed." Frere could do notbing 
at Valencia, Iic could do a grcat deal at San Clemente, becnuse 
from tliat -post be couId a~ipport either Madrid or geneml 
Diipont.' Nouccy nlso m slightIy blnmed, for not halting 
witliin a duy'a mnrch of 'VnIcncia, in order to brcnk tlic sliirit 
of the pcoplc, aiicl makc tlicm fecl tlic weiglit of tlie wnr. 
But Iiis jiistifiextian wns, tlrnt liis line of opcrntions from 
C~IC~IM WPA iilfestcd by insiugcnts, liis nmmunition nearly 
axlinusted, ruid be coulil bear iiatliiiig of Cliulimn,-tlint tlia 
rvliolo forcc of Murciit wus cnllecting npon lifs flnnk and 
reur, the wuutry Euvournlile for bis adversuries, n ~ i d  Lis army 
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mueh cncumbcred by a anunier of wounded meii : to rsoperi 
bis cotninunication with Madrid wm tlierefore pruderit. 
4". By some authors, the repulse at Valencia hrt~ lieen clessed 
upitli the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen. Thcre \Y=, 
however, a wide diff'erence betwcen the events, the gcncrals, 
aud the multa. MonccjvF nltlioiigli old, was vigorous, activo, 
and dkdetl, m13 tlio dicclr he received psoduced little effoct. 
Dupont wns irresolute, dow, and incapablg íf not M-ome; but, 
before descrihing his c a m p g p I  tlie opcrations agplnst the 
armiw of Gtallicia and Castille must I>e idated. 
FTNIh'fiULA WhR 
OPEi7ATIOYB AGAIBST BLAKC AND (3L'ESí'A. 
W ~ L E  Bessikres' moveable columns, rangiug over tke Ash~rian 
and Biscayan mountains, dispersed the insurpnt patriots of 
those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by bis defeat at Cabezon, 
c o l l e d  another army at Benevente, md prepared to drance 
again towards Bnrgorr. He m supported by the Gallician 
army, which Filanghieri lind organized without difficulty, h- 
cause the aliundant supplies poured in from England were 
heginning to h felt, and Spanish patriotism LlIwaya required 
lnrp  suma of rnoncy. Tarnneo's soldims, joined to the garri- 
nons o f  Ferro1 and Coruña, liad heen incmsed by new Ie~ies  
to twenty-five thousand men; and being wcll eqnipped, and 
pro~ided wjth a eonsidedlo train of nrtilles; knd cncrtmpcd 
nt hynnaand, a strong post in tlie mountins twelrre milee 
heliiiid dstore 
Tliis city offcmd geat  ntlvnntngca t o  tlie Rpmianls; it~l 
MoorisEi wnlls were ccirnlilete, nncl susceptil-ile of lieing 
strenghhened to ~ustain n sliort siege. But a siege could not 
Se iilidertnl~en by u ~ r n n l l  furoc, wliile tlie srmy uf Gallicia wizs 
entreilclied at Manzmal, and d i l e  Cuesta remained at Bene 
vente: neitlier could BessiEres, witli any pnidence, attnck the 
Gallicians at Bianzanal wliile Cuesta was at Benevente, and 
wliila Aators  contaiiied a stiong. @son. Filangkieri liad 
commend  an entrenched camp in the mwnttiins. When 
he was murdered, Joiichim Blake succeeded Iiim, and probably 
fearing a similar fate if the army remained stationnry, left one 
diviaion at Manznnal, and marched to mite with Cuesta. 
Bessikres imrnediatdy collected his scattemd colnrnns at 
s. Falencia, and 11is plan, founded upon instructions 
;ronmal iiof from Bayonne, nas to strike nt  atesta wliile 
Iie~iGi.ea' 
O~~rnt imt& IBlakc mas still behind Astorga; then to  drive tbe 
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Gallicians back to the mountains,. overrun the
flnt conntry mith his cavalry, aud open a commnnication witli 
Portupl; nnd, nfter rmivirig certriiii reinforcemetits ivhirnh 
were beiiig pepared for l i i  lio wa9 to sulidun Galliciii, 
or move to the assirtance of Junot, ns miglit seem most 
fitting. 
ht thia period the king WM isn his journv to  Madrid, and 
tlie p ~ a t  milita7 scheme msa brought to its first viprous test. 
On Hcagi6res' succcss dcpcndcd tlic invnsiona of Valencia aiid 
Anrltrluaia, ltecnuse Bessierm' defmt would sh81~e the Frencli 
liold of Madrid, which WM tlje base o£ those operationa. It 
mas for tliis NapoIeon liad directed Segoviu t o  be occupied, 
Gobert to enter hlIadolid, and Vcdd snd F ~ r e  to remain in. 
La, AInnclin; thc ono a fcw marclics from Mnilrid, the otlicr nf 
San Uemente, t o  connect Diipont nnd Rloncg with t.1i.e 
capitsl. X a v q ,  misjudging the relative importante of the 
different points, sent Tedel and Ctobert to reinforce Dupont, 
ivlicn he should rathcr hravo rcenlld thc ltatter from bcyond 
ths  Morena; and he sent Frere to Requeña, and Caulaincourt 
to Cuenca j thus dispersing and harassing liis reserves ia the 
south, when the essential interese was at stake in the n o d .  
Now, atruck with fmr nt tlie approach of C u e h  nnd Blake, 
wliose armies he Iind hitlierto disrepprderl, Ire precipitately 
recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobcrt, and ercn Dupont to Madrid; 
uio late t o  talce part with Bessisres in tlie ooming battle, but 
cmctly timed to frnstmte blonccy's pmjects, m d ,  M isve $hall 
E~ereafter fincl, to ensure the n ~ i n  of Dupont. In tliis manner, 
steering his vescel against every wind that blo~ved, he could 
not fail of ~ t o m s .  
Qreatly wm Nxpoleon discontcnted with ihese emrs. He 
relid on tlie ahility of B~mibws for n reme*, but to B~vary 
he sent tlie following instructions, dated the 13th of July; 
The P~mcl¿ tzfairs im flpaa'a d d  be im an mcdCmi staie 
$ Gobwt'8 diwisim i d  rnrd~d upm PdIuhld,  m d  Prere'g 
rsanl oacupkd San. dTlemimte, G t h  a movercble eohn filme OT 
fm marclm upon €la of gmerrak B q m n d .  Gdwd Im-iny 
6em direcid wpm Dupmt, F~are &ng wiM M o m j ,  iwcb8mE 
a d  mfalilerE h j  mclses aowE countmardam? t l ~  ' t h  qf 
tl~! E'rmh m y  i a  become adv&agm.  
Mamlinl i?ep&rw a i  tl~k &y u$ Jfcdirda del KEa SCCO dIi 
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jftm t?mmnd mera, infawtry, cavdqj, a& d i h j ;  t ! ~  
16th OT 16th he w'8 adtmeh Bm@u&e, o p a  o communicatim 
witA PwtqaII driw ~JLB w.Elida i d o  G a l l i k  a& seim L m  
If 76w qwatim w ~ c m d  thrs, u& a Wiad mmnm, IL 
patitio7a o f t ? ~  P ~ I L  a m y d l  aqah be m gmd m i t  anm. 
' If g w d  Cwta  si%^ fm 3-h witlmt fql~tiwy, 
?M v d  m e  by X m a  m d  Sdiamanca 80 gain Avila amd 
fiqnviQ, mtmin ti& i?m BP~&M mmt pwmc I~in, mI 2n 
&C c m ,  Iktl WQUM be m& .7/ t1t.e m j  qf Gdlkia, wrm8ti 
a d v m d  p i w d  & at Lsm Tlie g m d  wlaa mmands d 
bf'radd mml flma IM alilr! to a b e d l e  mk w mtm h ~ U 8 d  
mm and marcJ1 wpm h t n ;  f i e  &tide? of Beeq&u mwt be 
ocmpid by thee w fww l~udred ~ l e ~ c m t s ,  w i t f b m 
g u s  a*wl m i  w&' Kgcuit. It wm a great faull wot to Imsd 
occzcpid t l ~ i q  &tude2 w l m  the wajor~enerab oderaí it; of di 
t&s psible  positim, Seg& ia t7le m t  dangmm for the 
amy; the cm@d of a potr ' f ice ,  a& 8it2co~ed h t w w  ttm 
youte-s, 2 deprives the c m y  of a.D it8 commwnicatem, and the 
-9 macs p.& itz t l ~  e2tudeS t h  Frmh amay cmmt 
db?Odgd I L ~ W I .  T?LW W f~ ~ u P I ~ w ~  & s ~ ~ s ,  U g00d 
c o m m d n t ,  and a S@ of adllemj, unvil ~ender IJE ml&g of - 
flegovia impqnable fw m e  tim, a& d l  e m w e  to mg, 
tlle . im~untpoai lwa of Sqmnk 
'If g e n d  Cw8ta tl~rms himself iw Gallidffi m?i& 
&JEtinq w. mfm.ing a defeat, th po&m af tile amy wiaikl 
h e c m  Iimer; of  SE 2 di be st t l l  hetw IJL does so a@ 
a dejat. 
'Jf w s M  Besdrm facm Cuesta at Bmevmfe w i t h t  
aanckiag Aiml or hi: & ~epdud ?HJ h h ,  J&- oliect mwt 
d w y ~  ha lo  GOW Rwrgoa, und lo M in clmk aa 
long cw p&b; hB could,prnP'Iu1pa, E14 winfwmd wWIIir~ t 7 ~  t 7 m  
t?umqad t v m p  of tJle lim wI~icli, mcmnpamy t b  ?&rqI lmi tim~ 
#@re wo& I ~ B  m mcm for l d a t i m .  If B~Bz'drw T ~ Z ~ P B  
d o e s t  IP hdth, ?M must b wiqfowed irashnily u i t 7 4  mix 
t J d  men. If ?M ~ e t m a &  a bbatlle wh&m 71s ?m8 
sufwed p r d -  los#, d m'ZZ 6e m e s m j  to pea$ d i ~ o F i t h ;  
ta lacal Prere, Gobwt, C a J k m s t ,  and Pdei by f m d  
w c h  to M u d d ;  to w i t 7 h w  Dupnt into the S h a  
N~rena, w m briw Jkim w r a  to Kadd (hepiw him 
as r n  a d n d  gwmcd to Gae m y  qf Aradal& in 
c m . '  
Before Besaikres conld col!& h i ~  troop, Blake b d  effected 
s junction with Chab nt Benevente) and three courses were 
open to them. 
19 To remove into the rnountnins, and take a position 
covering Gallicia. 
23 To m~bintain tbe hesd of tlie Gdlician army in d ~ a n c e  
of Astorga, while Cuestii'a Castili~n~ns rnade forced marches 
through Xalamanca and dvlla to Segovia, 
3". Ta advance together into the plaine, and try the fate of 
a battle. 
Cuesta, wsurning t,he oommand) chose the last, though he 
had few borsemen and EessiEres had many. E e  left, against 
Blake's wkhes, a divi~ion at Benevente to protect hii stores, 
and led tmenty-five thousand regulur infantry, n fcw liundred 
camlry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artilIery, in tlie 
dkection of Palencia. Savary was dismqed. To ose 3íapo- 
teon's expreasionq LAe ealm hcad bm I~itImto a c t i q  as if tlaa 
m y  qf~d~ick eaaa a o t  irt. &tmzce, mtd m i f ~ e s & w  
WIGX &y heaha' But thht rnarslial, firm and experieiiced, 
witlidrem wen his p r i s o n  from the impwtant post of bn- 
fander, colIe&d f i f h  thwsmd men and thirty piecea of 
artillery at Palencia, and moved f o m r d  on fhe 12th of July 
to the cnconntec. Ha lid two divigions of  infirntry, one of  
- - 
light ctbvalry, and twenty-four guns in first line; four battaFious 
and some horse genadiera of t h e  guard, with six p a  in 
reserve. Balting at Ampudia) and Torre de Mormojon thi. 
ISth, on the 14th he d m e  back some Spanish 
cnvalry, and at nine o'clock renched Rio: Seco to ~mirngi  ot 
spring on Cuesta, as active wild beast leap-ps on ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o .  
a heavy domeatic animiil 
me fimt line of Bprbniaril~, and the hei~vp p n s  nccnpied tlie 
edge of a steppe af land, having an abmpt fall wwarda tlie 
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French. The E E C O ~ ~  line, compoecd of the best troops, 
aupcntcd,  not atrcngthcncd, by somc eigIitccii tliciusand 
armecl perasantg, nlns n pene dishnec beliind tlis firnt, nnd 
Rio Scco u w  in renr of  tlic ccntre. Rcssikrc~, stnrtled tit tlicir 
numlici.~t, doiirit~l if lie siliouW athck ;  but soon percciving 
tlie vice of Cuestd~ dispo~ition, he ortfcred Lnsiille to inalre u 
feint in f r~n t  MtJi Uie liglit cnvnlry, wlii1e liimñelf, mnrching 
oliliquely to the rigl~t, nverliipperl tlie left of tlie Spnniartin. 
H~ving thurt enelosetl tlic entirc flnnk, lie, nitliout Iieriitafion, 
tlirust tlic wliola oF Mcrlds nnd Jtoriton's divisions nnrl thc 
imperid gpuarirrlci, liorse nnd foot, hetween tlie l ine~,  und 11ut thc! 
firht into confusion; at thut rnolncnt h n l l c  cliarned, al1 the 
Bpanish front went down, and fifteen liundred dead liodies 
strewed tlie field. 
Bessihres' r a n h  wese, Iiowewr, disordered, ttnd Cuesta mride 
a gallant efort to retrjeve the tlay. Opening a fire from liis 
lighter arti l le~,  he pushed tlie second Eine fommtI, ond with 
his right wing tool~ aix guns; but tlie l& wing Iiunn bwk 
and exposed the flank of the right. Bessieres immediately 
fe11 on this naked ffank with Mcrle's division and tlie Loma 
grenrtdiers, wl~ile the fourteenth provisioaary regment made 
Iiesd against the front. TLe Spriniards overcome and broken 
in tbe fierce struggle tlien clispersed Yeanwliile, 
8. 
J,,i ,f tlie 6rst line liad rdlied in Rio Geco, but were 
agdn o-rertlirown by Mouton's division, and flcd 
arer tlie plain under tlze swords of t.he carpalry, 
Mr. 8tuai-t'a Fi-re or six tl~ousand men killed or wonnded on 
rnpers. the beld, twelve hntlred prisoners, eighteen guns, 
and large stores of ammunition, were the resuIt of thia battle. 
The fugitives sought safety in al1 directions, cliicfly toii.wds 
Benevente. The generals separnted in tmth, Blake made for 
the Gallician rnoiintaiina Ciiewta went towards Leon, thc 
division left at Benevente dispersed. The Frencli h d  fifty 
kiIled, throe hundred wounded. They halted the 16tli, bu% 
the nevt day entered Benevente and &ptur~d many tliomantl 
English muskets, and vast quantities of  ammunition, clotliing, 
and provisions. 
Tlie cornmunicntion with PortugnI being now opaned, 
Besaieren thought to give liis liand to Junot; bat henring the 
ftigitives were llkelr to rally on tLe aido of Laon, he pursued 
tliem by the rmd of Villa-ferc, and h e d n n  on tlie mmch tliat 
Cuesta liad gone to Mayorga, turned mide to that plwe, 
nnd captured there ttnother peat collection of dores ; for tlie 
Spnnidi gcncrnl, with thc usunl jrnprovidcnce of his nntion, 
liar1 establislicd al1 his rnngazinw in Uia open towns of tlie 
Ilat country. Bs3si6res then entering tlie city of Leon 
rcmained unti1 tlie 29th, received the submission o£ the muni- 
cipality, and d e  prepmtions t o  carry the wnr into (Xallicia. 
hlennwhile, the junta of Cnstille and Lcon, wliosc autl~ority 
l i ~ l  Iiithcrto h n  rcstrninecl by Cucstn, rctircd h Pucntc- 
F e d z ,  mmirned supreme authority, snd as the guarrel Iietween 
tlie generals wm now rancorous they sided with Elake. This 
appeared a f a m b l e  occasion to tamper with the fidelity of 
tlie cliiefs. Bosgidres scnt bis priaoncrs bnck, nrgucd thc 
Iiopeleso stnte of the insurrection, oflered tlie vice.-roydty of 
llexico to Cuesta, and promised military rwk  and hononrs 
to Blake. Neitlier would listen to him, and he marched 
n g i v s t  Gallicim, Iiut liad only renclied Puente Orliip whcn 
he uras remlld t~ protect the king: Dupont h d  surrendered 
mith a whole army in Andnluaia, the victory of Rio Seco was 
rendered usdess, the eourt was in consternation, iand Bessihres, 
returning to Mayorga, took a defensive poaition. 
1". Bldce wm o v m l e d  by Cuesta, md it ia hard t o  say 
whetlier the latter or Bavary oommittcd most erroiyi. Hatl 
Gobert's divjsion gone to Valladolid, Bessi6rea ivould have l id  
twcnty-two thoiiwmd mcn nntl forty picces o€ rartillcry in the 
field; a force not too great, when the fate oof tliree FrericIi 
armiea depended npon n fight, tu whicli the Spanhds mi@ 
llave bmught donble the number. Cuesta chose a field of 
1)attIe where his enemy's powerful c~rahy hnd free scope; nnd 
when he sliould huve broirght up evcq mnn, Iw left b n  tliou- 
aand good troops t o  guara positions that could not be 
xpproaclied until he was benten. Nis time also was ill chosen. 
I-Iad he waited a few daya, eigbt Englkh f r ip tes ,  and a 
Spanisli forcg undcr gencral Da Ponte, wouId have attacked 

Dnrowr marclred npinst Catliz rvitith tlie Spnish Swiss regi- 
ments of Preux and Redig-Barbou's Prenct in- 
Journnl d fantv-Fresia's cava1ry-a rnarine batttalion ol  DuDont.s 
the imperial guards, and eighteen yieces of &E- 
;lrz~ons, l e  Thw thoumnd infantry, five hvndrcd 
cavalry, aad ten guns from t?ie army of Portngnl, mere to 
jotn him at Seville: three ather SNiw regiments wme i n  
Andalusia, and it wm hoped t h q  and the troopa at San 
Roque would come over to the French army. He tmvrraed 
La Mancha in May, entered the Morena liy the Despenas 
Perros, and reached Audujar the 2nd of June. There he 
learned that a mpreme junta was mtablisked at Sedle, minor 
juntna in Gninadn, Jan, and Cordoba ; thnt war ww dedared 
qainst the Frencli, tlie mhole of Andalusia in arme, tlie h i s s  
refiments mnged nndsr the Spanisli banners : lastly, that 
'Avril's detaehment, from Portugal, had halted in Tavora and 
would return fo Liabon. 
Dupont imrnediately m o t e  to Mumt and h v q  for reh- 
fomments, closed up the rear of hi columna, sstnbliuhd 
an hospital at Andujar, and crossing the Guliddquiir, con- 
tinued his march towarcls Cordoba, following the Ieft bank of 
the rivera Two leagues from tbat ancient city the r o d  
recrossd the Guadnlquivir by a long stone bridge, at ths 
fnrthest end of  wliich stotid the villngc of  Alcoleo, in  front of 
wliicli the French amtved the 7th. Tlle Spankh general, 
Echevaria, Bd fortified the head of the bridge, placed twelve 
guns in battattery on the right bank, and brtrred thc pasaage, 
with three tliousand rep lm,  and ten theunmnd new lcvies 
and smugglem He hsd a reserve encampii near Cor(Z&a, and 
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n cloiid of armed pmsantq Crom the side of Jaen, h o v e d  on 
the liills behind tlie French, ready t o  fxll on tlieir mar when 
they shouId attack the brids. Dupont mnde bis cnvalry, 
Swiss rcgiments, and marine battnlion, fnce the liill:, while be 
stormed the bridge with Barbou's diriaion, anrI the Spxniards 
were soon driven acrarw tlie river, and flcd in mnfiisiun to 
the mmp at Cordoba, The pcasmts corning down from the 
hills, during the battIe, wcre beaten back by tlic cadry ,  
and Diipoiit, leaving the mrrrines at dleolca, advanwd to com- 
plete thc  victo^. Thc Spaninrdg toulr refugc in Cortlloiia 
and opened a fire of rnuslrctr~. from tlic wnIls, Ziut tlic Frcnch 
hv ing  burst t1ic gntes with tlicir field-piccw, n confuscd fight 
cnstrcrl, and Rchcvnrin's men fl cd nlong tlic Scville mnd pur- 
siicd by tlic cnvnl~y~ TTlic infi~ntry wcrc vcry liccntiuus nt 
first, k i t  tlie citir,rria toolc no pnrt in tlre contcst, discover4 
no nversion to tlie French, nnrl wvlicn tlie disodem nwmsiinly 
attendnnt on a street figlit mnsed, tlie toivli ~vns protcctert 
niipont fixing Itis quarkw tlicre, scnt pntrole~l evcn to 
Rcijn, witliout finiling nn encrny. A11 were ~iitimiññive, biit 
in Seville, t?ie arrivul of tlic fugitives ~ i o  terrificd tlic jttnto, 
that its greates dread of tlis 1101)ulw~ done pi-evsntetl a fliglit 
'~cllerto. t o  Cndia; tlie menibem even hlnlketl of nlinndon- 
ing Epain for Soutli America. 
CnstnGos, now cnptnin-general, wlis in mrtrch ~vi t l i  seven 
thouaancl replar troops froni San Roque; 1ie reacl~erl Seville 
t,he 9tli, had a conference ivitli tlic junta, 2nd procceded to 
rally Echevaria's force, wvl~ich l id assembled at Carmona. It 
ws, however, m disorgabnized, so moorly, that Le returnerl, 
and Iiaving persuaded the president Snavedra ta accompnny 
liim, 6 x 4  liis quxrterñ at Ubrera, drew tonetl~er tliree ttiousand 
replaig from thc nearest prrisons, called up the new levieci, 
Sir Rcw and limtened tlic mnrch of his own mcn from San 
DniryrnplVa Roque. IIe also preesd generul Epencer ta dis- 
l'ap"" embark and take x position nt Xeres; but khat 
oficsr sailed to Apmunte,-tllus aripenting a general distnist 
of tlie English, prevajliiig at the time ancl secretly fomentd 
11y Morla and severa1 membcrs of tlie junta. hdalusia wm 
!ost if Dupont hail advanced. Instead of piishing his victory, 
be wmte t~ iSaw for reinforcements, and to dvril for aid, 
rcrnaining meani~rl~ile in Cordoba, overwlie3rned with imaqinary 
dangem. For Binugli Cmtnlios did in R f ~ w  d ~ y s  crillect nt 
Carmonn nnrl lhierri, swen or eiglit thousand regutxrc, and 
fifty thousand fmh levies, and harl intercepted Dupont's 
desponding letters, such was his or l i  hopelessness, that mder 
pretence of completing the defences of Cdix,  he 
embarked tlie lieavy artillery and steres at Sevillc, No. 13. 
Section S designing, if Dupant n<lvmnccd, tn bi~rn tlic Iim'licrri 
o€ Iiis freid guns, and retreat ta h e  Isla do Leon. Xmer- 
tiieless he continuad to orgnize Iiis forces, being assisted 
by the marguis of Chupigny, a cra&y French emigrant of 
some experience in war; and Reding, a Xmiss, bold, lionest, 
and cnterpririaing, biit without judpnent, nnd of very modcrntn 
taIent for war. 
Cnstriños desired t o  mnke CarZiz a place of a m s  dtl i  an 
cntrenched camp, where &ded by ten or tmelve tliousand Britifili 
troops, he miglit organizc nn cfiieient army; bnt ho had 
anly tlie ririrne and cnrw of s g~iiernl ditliout the lautliority. 
Norhwm his enemy, and mzny of tlie junta, de- 
sir ECW termine11 to use &ir pomer for gain aad tlie ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 4  
petificntion of private vengeance, fcaring hc would P a p M ,  
MSS. 
coutrol tlieir Inwlesa procwdings, tltivarted liim, 
liumoured tlie imolent caprices of tlie pupulace, and meddIerl 
with aí%irs foreign to thc mar. Heiicc as tlieir forces 
augmented, fear evwpíirsted, and phns were laid for wrround- 
iiig Diipont. Oiie dctnclimcnt af  pewnnts w i i a  scnt tindcr 
reg1:ir uGficer*s to occupy tlie pwses o€ t1ia 3furenn Ienrling o11 
Estremadurtr; anotlier n ~ a r c h d  f m  Granada in company witli 
a r c~ imcn t  of the line to seize Carolinn, and cut off tlic com- 
niunication with La Manclia; a tliird, under colonel Talder- 
~ i i o -  ln-opomd to rtttnck tlie Frencb in Cordolin witliout any 
iisoktnncc ; nnd this cnprness f o ~  nction wns increiised by tr 
know~edge oof t h ~  sitt~ation of affairs in l'ortti~?, and by 
nimoum exaggerating the strcngth of Fi!anghieri and Cuesta. 
It was betieved tlie latter liad reached Tallaclolid and orered 
Mnrat tlie ieption of abidmg an r t tkk or retiring immetlintdy 
to Frnnce by stnted rnnrchm, and tliilt tlie prince was fortifying 
Iiirnself in the Buen Tlme reporte cauried tlic defen- 
&ve plau oof Cnstaiios t o  be rej ected E and Dupont's de~patchw 
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atill mpifying hiri dsnger and pressing urgentl J for reinforce- 
ments, being ap in  interceptd, it was resolved te attack 
Conloba Immetliately. 
Dupont's femx outstripped Spanish impaiience. A h  ten 
t l q a  of inactivity, by which he lose tlie immediate fniit of hie 
vietory, the Eead in an offensive cltmpaign, and the imposing 
niorai force of French prowess, he resolved ta fdl back to 
Joiund of Andujar, because Savary at this period promised 
h e o n t 3  no succour save whnt Moncey, after subduing 
Qperations. Valencia, could give by the circuitoas route af 
0,Iurcia. Re mtreated the 17th of June, followed by Coupigny 
14th tlie admnced gumd of tlie Sndalusians. On 
note9**P the line of march, and in Andujar, he had ter- p.ncliq 
WO. 1. nble proofs of Spanish ferocity; his stqglers 
I'Jhrttbrn had been assassinated, his hospital taken, aiclc 
hnm'n, 
Sccrct m rnen, medieal attendants, couriers, shff oficem, in 
~swnf ienm fine, al1 mho were too weak for defence had been iritli sir H. 
Iinlrgmple, bukhered with extraordinaq barbarity : four 
JISS. hundred harl perished in this miserable manner 
gime the fighk at Alcolea. The fate of coiunel Iiuponr 
-fl Hen6 was horribla EmpIoyed on a misaioa to 
l i i ~ b ~ .  Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostili- 
Vicbireaet ties, he was on Ms return, travelling in tbe ordi- CunquGtes 
des Fran- nary mode) without a m ,  attaclied to no army, 
pis. cngngd in no oprations of wnr, yct he was fimt 
meIly mutilatcd, thcn pl~ced living bctwcen da1 p h k s  and 
mwcd in two! 
At Andujm Dupont collected provisions, desiping to 
wmain unkil reinforced, bnt he sent tho n a d  cnptain, Bnste, 
to punisb tlie city of Yaen, from whence the bantls had come 
to murvler his sick The soldiers, inflamd by the Ziarl~nrity of 
their enemim, jjnfiicted a severe mcnsuie of retaliation; for It 
is the nature o£ crueltg. to reproduce itself in w ~ í ,  and tliere- 
foro, attliough the virtne of clemency is in d1 persons most 
becoming, it is peculiarly so to an oficm, ihe want of it l ead in~ 
t o  such great evils. Castaños remained quiet, and Dupont,, 
hearing Vedel ww corning from lk Nancha ñith a convoy, a 
division of infantry and sorne dehchments, EienG Baate with a 
fresh column to aid him st tlie Despeñas Permri, now ompied 
by insurpntai and mugglsrs from Granda. This paasa of 
increhile strength, the Spaniarda were enkenclied and l id  
artillery, but thek commiinder, a cdonel of the lime, deserted 
t o  the Frencb, snd before B&e could arrive, Vedel liad forced 
his way to Carolinq left a detncliment t,here, md descended 
t o  Raylen, u small place aixteen miles from An- Jdy. dujar. The Granada insurgents were liowever 
still namerous at Jaen, nnd rnenaced the Linhares road; 
wllerefore Vede1 sent Cassagne to dispem them aod gather 
provisions. They were defeated witb great slaughter, anri Jaen 
waa tuken, but Cmsrsgne Iost two hundred men ancl brought 
bnck no f o d .  
Tedel's etrrivd did not allay Dupont's feara. Tlie position 
of Andujar covemd tbe main roed to Carolina, yeh it could be 
turned eight miles below by the bridge of Narmolexo; sixteen 
miles higher up by the rods l d i n g  from Jaen by the ferry 
of Mengibar t o  Bay1en; nnd beyond them otlier r o d a  led by 
U l d a  and Linhares to the passes of El Rey and DespeGas 
Perros. Tlie Guadalquivir was fordnble in many places, the 
rrgulnr force nntIcr Castaños daily incrcnscd, the population 
m nctively Iiostile, and tlie young Frencli soldierrs: droopd 
uuder privatiom and the Leat of tlie ciimate: B ~ X  
hundred were siclr, and the ñrhole discouragerl. :,"Urz 
It is at such times the worth of the veteran is 
felt. Tn battle tlie nrdour of youth nppenrs to 
sliame tlie cool indifference of tlie oEd soldier ; but 
when the strifc is between fortune'a malice and man's fartitude, 
between human suffering and human endurance, the veteran 
becomca t.ruly formidable wliilc thc young soldier gields to 
dwpnir. Vedel l i ~ l  pliiced Ligicr RelTnir's brjgade n t  Mcngi- 
bar, having o. detacbment bepend the ferry; this outpost w m  
dri~en over the river the 13th, but the 15&, Uohert, ~ h o  
aIiould have been aiding Bessihres, reached Baylee with hia 
dividon and aome cuirtissiers. Vedel then marcbed v&e,c 
to Ncngibrr, nnd 'it wns fulI timc, for tlie whole Pieci~ 
Spnisii army wm now on tha opposite bmk of  
tlre river. 
Then Dupont's retreat frustrated the project of whittinp- 
I i n n i ' ~  Cui. 
surronnding him in Cordoba, Castnños would liave ,,,,,,. 
resiimed liis d ~ f c n ~ i ~ c  11111~; nnd tlie junta elice, 
aquiesccd at fiiat, h t  getting intelligence of 
Tedel's approacb, ordered thdr genernl to attack Anclujar 
liefore Dupont nFas reinforced. Castafios dvanced to Pormiíias 
mitli twenty-five tliousasd regular infantry, tmo tlioiismd 
mvalry, and vcrg lieavg artillery. The numhers of the armcd 
peaantry under officem of tlio line, varied from hp t o  day, 
but the whols multitude, replais and irrejiulnrs, mns not less 
tlian fi&y tbousand; tience Tedel's presence did 
mitting- bam+n not much abate the general fiercencss, C L ~ . S ~ . ~ ~ O S  
r w w -  was tlie least sanpine, and liearhg tliat Speiioer 
enca. had returnetl tr, Cacliz, agah prayed liim to tnke 
post at Xeres, and thus $ve a point ~f retwzt in tbe event of 
disaster : Spencer consentd to diseinliwk, yet refused ta atir 
lseyond Port St, May. From tlie 1st t o  tlie 1 ltli of July, tlie 
Bid. Spanids  rem~ined in position nenr Pomiñm, md 
tl~en a council of ~csolved that Reding sl~ould , 
crosa the Guadalquivir at ;trengibar ~ind gnin Ea~len;  that 
Coupipy sliwld crws rit Tjlla Nueva, between Blengibar and 
Andujar, t o  support Ming; that Castaños, advnncing t o  the 
lieights of A~~onil la,  ~hould assail Andujar in fmnt,whilehdig 
and Coupipy, descending from Eaylen, attacked it in rear; asd 
a detaciment of light troops under wlonel Cmz wa.s to pasc at 
~Iamolexo, and seize the pasm leading through the Morona 
Go &tremaxlura. 
In pnrmance of kllis plan, hdjng,  ivitli one dir;ision and 
Ilnd. Tour thonsand m e d  peasants, drove Ligier Bel- 
lair'ñ outpost across the Gunddquivir on tbe 13th, 
and Coupipy a d m n d  t o  Villa Nueva. The 15th Castaños 
crownd tlie heiglits of Argonilla 114th a. grezt multitude, 
Gupigny slrirrnislied witli the Prench mvalry post at 't'ille 
Nueva, aníl Reding athtacríed Ligier Bellair, but retired at the 
Dopont'a 
apyiroacli of Tedel. When Dupont mw tlle l~eightg 
joiirnai. of Argonilla covereQ with enemies he ~ e n t  o  
voy. 'STedel for aucconr, Iiroke tlie bridge at &Inrmolexo, 
occnpied an old tower on that of Andujar, and detaclied 
cavalry p h e s  to watch the fords above and belom. Ctastaiios 
cannonacled the bridge of Andujar tliat evening, and the next 
day tbtktcked the French in front, whiie Cruz, who liad passed 
tlie river near Rlarmolexo, feU upon tlieir rMr: 
Vrdels 
~ r u w  Cruz was chased to the hills by a single battalion, 
aiad the battIe ce~ased at Andujar before Vede, 
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who lrnrl miirclied al1 night, could ~rrive. Reding lid mean- 
wliile passed the river at Mengihr, driving Lig-icr Bellair 
liefore 11im j Iiut h b e r t  carne up d renewed tlia Gght uutil 
he n w  mortally wounded, when liis successor, Dufour, fe11 back 
to IIaylcn, and Reding retitrned to Mengibar : a rgort tliab the 
Spnniafds were rnoving by Linhares on the passes beliind the 
French fhen mcl ied Dufour, wbri, finding Reding did not 
follnm Rim, crditcd it nnd rctrentctl to Cnrolina. 
Dupont IiearR on the eventng of tlie l G B i ,  thnt Mcngilinr 
bar1 been f o i d ,  and senk Tedel to Baylen, Iiut with anch v a p e  
instnictians, tiiat he followed Dufonr the 17th; whereupon 
Iteding, who liad remined inactive at Meqgibar, being noiv 
ioined by Coupigng, seized Raylen in the nigl~t, with twonty 
tliousand combetnnts of di  kinds;, ímd tlimwing out a p o ~ t  of 
ohservnt,ion hwnrtIs Cfirrnlinn, toolr B position f h n g  Antli~jnr. 
Tlie nmies were tlius interlnced in a strnnge mnnnsr. Dupont 
mas lsetmeen Mng and Castahos, Reúing b e t m r i  Dupont 
and Vedel. It waq an afair of time, yet Cnst~iios remained 
trnnq~til in Iiis catrtp, and 13iipont, althoilgh Iie Irncw or, thr: 
17th of Vcilelk rni~rcli to Cnrcilinn, (lid not qnit Antli~jtir until 
the niglit nf tlie 18tli. Bis movement was undiscovered by 
CRstaiios, and af daybreak lie reaclied the Tiedrm, a torrent 
with q g e d  banb, onlp tmo miles f~om Reding's position, 
which was atron~, :,haded with olivc tneca, and intersected by 
dccp rnvinea. %he Frencli generid pssed tlie Tiedrttrr .Gn 
attack, lea&? 13nrbou ~t the bridge of Rumblar witli some of 
tbe test battalions to watcli for Castaños, and gnard tlio 
baggage-trrtin, wliich was very large and mixed ivith tlie troops. 
At first he gnined groiind, but liis men, ainking rvith fatigue 
snrI Iient, coulrl not f o r ~  tlle jlri~lcipal p in t s ,  and Iost counge. 
Two thousand were killed or hurt, the Smiss ment owr to  tIie 
Spaniniards, and nbout noontide Dupnt, wouncled and despon- 
dent, proposed aa arrnistice, whicli lteding, who could scnrcely 
Iiolrl I i i ~  groiintl, joyf~il l y grantcd, fmiing Vcdel's arrivd. 
Thnt general had quitted Carolina at fiw in the morning of 
tlie IDth, the uound o€ battlc became distinct as he dvanced, 
yet he hnltcd at G~i~iarornan, two lengaes from Foy. Xnylsn, for ~eveml Iinirm, to rcfrcch his m n  and 
to ascertain if any enemy was at Linhrrree. %%en tlis firiny 
lid entirely cerned, he resumed Lis march, and c o m i y  
Journsl oí npon the rear of Reding; after some fighting, ccnp- 
Diipoui'a 
Opcrntiong tured ~ W O  guns and made fifteen hundretl prisoners. 
n? SS. bn aidedu-camp of Dupont" then brouglit him 
an order to ceasc the attack, wberenpon he awaited tlie resnlt 
of tbis singular crisis. 
Castaños did not discover Dnpnt's retrcat vntil eight lioura 
after his departure, and then only aent La Peña's 
rnitthg- 
ham.s division in pursuit. La Peña reached tlie Tiedraa 
mpond- about f i ~ e  O ' C ~ O C ~ ,  and 6oon after, one Villoutreyq 
ence, MS8. 
a French offieer, pwsd his posts, going to ask 
Castaños' consent to the terms accepted by Fhling. TiielOtli, 
gencrds Rlarewot and Chabert; went fo Andujm, eempowered 
liy Dupont to conelude G convention. They proposed that the 
French army ahould retire peaceably upon Madrid, w d  &- 
fafios rsgeed, bnut bmry'a letter, mitten juat before the battle 
of Rio Sccq to rcenl Dupont bcing intcrocpted, 
W b l t t i n ~ .  
htimba coic W R ~  at tl~ia momcnt brought to the Spanish hcad- 
rcmnd. quartcrs. Dnpont's and Vedel's aurrender waa 
cnw, nms. 
f hen demanded, their troops to be aent to Frernce 
by sea, the first as pririoners o£ war, fhe second under conven- 
tlon; and withont besitntion t h w  terms verc accepted! 
Meanwhile Vede1 proposed a joint attaclr on W n g ,  and 
generbl PrivE gnve like counsel. Dupont in reply, 
Tedel's 
p,i, of odered Vdel  to  give np his prisoners, and retire 
Operatronfl- t o  Carolinn. Caataiíos mcnaced Dupont with a 
massacrn if Vede1 did not return, and be gavo tho 
oder o€ r e d  to Vedcl, wl~o carne bwk, mand surrcnrlcrcdl 
Thus eighteen thoumad Fmnch soldiera Inid do- tlicir ame 
before a raw anny, incnpnble of resisting Iialf tliat nurnber led 
by an ablo man. Nor did tliis ond t1ic diagmccf~il trnnsiaction. 
' Villoutrey~, as if te sliliow haw fnr fear and folly comliined will 
debasa men, passed t2ie Morena witii n, Spnnimh eswrt, gntliered 
up the detachenta left by Dapont in La Mancha, even to 
within n ahort dishnce of Tolerlo, and aent tliem tu Andujar 
as prisoners under the convention : be evpn informed Castaha 
how to capture tmo Prench httalions g u d i n g  tlie passes i n h  
La Mmcha. h d  these unheard-of proceedinga were quictly 
submittcil to by men belonging to thab army wliich, for fifteen 
yeam, had been ihe terror of Europe! a proaf how much tlie 
charttcter of soldiem depends upon theis immedinte chid. 
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T l i i ~ i  cnpitirlation, shamcful in itself, wns shnmefully broken. 
Tlie French troops were rnitltreatod, and nnnibera of them 
murrlcred in cola blood, especially at h b r k a ,  where above 
eighty oficem were massncred in the most eowardly manner: 
with their sworda, they kept tLe assassins for aome time a! 
by, in an opcn spmc, birt a firc from tlir neighbouring honw 
wm continucd until tho lact of tltliose iinfortiinnte gcntlcmcn 
fell. No clistinctiori was m d e  Iietween Dupoat's and Vedel's 
txoops, All who suwived tlie march to Cadiz, after being 
exposed to every spwies of indignity, were cwt into the hulks 
nt Cndiz, whencc a few hundreds w p e d  two years afterwards, 
by cutting tho cable~i of tlicir prison-ship and drifting upon a 
lec diore in a storm. Tlie remaintler, trnn~ported to tlle dcsert 
iahnd of Cabrera, perished by lingering tormenta in such 
numbers that few remaincd alive at t.he termination of the 
war. Dupont liimaelf WQS permitted t o  rehirn to Pmnce, and 
b l ~ e  with Eiim nll tFie gcneriil~ :geneml Prive, wlio 
had remonxtrated strongly against the cnpitula- E$&: 
tion, and pressed Dupont on the field to force a 
passage tthrongh Reding'~ nrrn9 waq, however, left behind I 
Morla, nfter a ynin nttempt to involva lord Cnllingwood 
and sir H m  D a l r p l i l e  in the trnnsnction, formalIy defended 
the conduct of the junta in breaking tlie capltulation; and 
soon afterwards, with consistent, slmmeless viilany, betrayed 
hiEl own country. 
Tliis capituIutien wm smetly known in Madrid ar ewIy m 
tlie 23rd or 94th of JuIy; but the Prench were uaable to 
acquire distinet information, until the lring sent 
two divisions into La Yancha to open the com- cr2Tn 
municntion. At M~drilejos ono tilindred and 
twenty miles from Baylen, they met Tilloutmya witli his 
Spanish escort, oollectiug prisoners, and apparently intending 
fo proceed in his diTaceful task to the very p t e s  of Hadrid. 
The divisions ehen retrsced their ateps, Joseph called a council 
of wnr, and it wna preposcd to unite al1 thc Fmncli foroes, 
place a srnall prisnn in tlie Retiro, and fa11 upon tlie 
Xpitnish armies in succession as tliey adnnced towvarris the 
capital. But a disliie to  the Far prevailed in tlie bigher 
ranks o€ the French amy, the injustice of it was too glaring, 
and a rctreat, which rnight> pcrchance,induce Napoleon to desist, 
was adopted. T i a  king rnnrcll~l, on thc 1st of August, by 
the !3oinosierrn; 33es~ii.i-ea covrr~d tlie m ~ v ~ m c n t  until tlie 
court P P ~ ~ C ~ P C ~  Rurgos, nnd tben fe11 Iiack Iiimsell, and iri a 61iort 
time tlie Freridi were al1 hdiiiid tlie Ebro, tlie s i e ~ e  of Z a m  
g o r ~  wns rnisiwed. nnd tlie triumplimt c r y  of tlie S p r t n d a  was 
i i ea~ l  tliroug1;liout I3iropc. 
lo. Dupont's corps, when it first e n t e 4  Spain, wm about 
tweiity-four thousiuid men, witli three thonsand 
Return of 
i i ie Fwnrh five hundred borses; of tbew twenty-onc thou- 
nmy. "P- mnd wem RC for duty. It was afkerwards lxrirlix- 
eitrengtliened by a provisionary regiment of miras- 
siers, a marine battalion of tlie g i i ~ d ~  and the Swisfi re@- 
ments of Preux and Reding; it con!d not tlicrefore hxr-e 
been lcss than twnty-four tbousand fighting men in Anrlx- 
lusia. TIie whole of Tedcl's and great pnrt of Gobert's 
division joined before tbe capitnlatlon, and eigliteeii thousand 
effective men laid clown tlieir arms; the 108s by wouuda, deser- 
tion, nnd dcriths in hospitril. or tlic ficld, waa thercforc ahout 
f i ~ e  thoiisand. 
29 Thc o d e r  for mnrching iipon Cdiv, cnmo frorn Rtyonne 
before ihe insnrrection hroke out, wlulicrefore nnpant dlould 
bnve dmn~ntnricd fresh orders, wlicn hc fountl nffí~irs rliffcrent 
from what Xaliolcon hd contcmplntcd. If thc cmpcror 
JutFgcd it necerjsiiry to  rcinforce liirri witli a dctnclimcnt from 
Portugnl Iiefore tlie inuurrection brnlce out, Iiis fir~t ordem 
were clenrly annulled wlien ao great a wnr liad co~riiiicncecl, 
irnd when the det~chment from Portugnl hnd fiiilerl to 
Dupont'a join. Dupont said he marclied to Clordolia with 
ñrcmoi~, t l ~ e  conviction tliat success was l iopel~u : a &m- 
11ss. natory ~YOH-al. 
3'. At Curdobrt Iie remrrined torpid for ten r l :~y~,  tIie setand 
of B series of imlefensibla errorB. He should h a ~ e  followed up 
hi8 victory, or retired to Andujax at once, since he wuld not 
defend himseIf at CordoL& An advance would llave @ven 
Iiim Seville and time for tlie arrival of his second and third 
divbions. He h d  indeed only ten tbousand men ;it h t ,  but 
he says he defented forty thousaad st  Alcolea without Iosa to 
himself; against mch amies  he rislced Iittle by 
IiiIpmtk 
advancing. Be retired from CordoLia, he said, Joiinid op 
because to figLt when a vict;ory would be use- 2:: less, mns a , p i n s  all discretion; yet to mdce no 
i ise af victnr~ i~ tlie srame tliing, nnd he dioulrl nevcr hnre grine 
bcyond Andiijnr, iinlcss to enkr Seville. TIiese ~ m m  -wvem, 
Iiowever, redeemal-ile. The check given to tlle patriota at Jaen, 
&he arrival of Vedel, md'the opportune junction of Gohrt, 
prwed, that not fortune but common sanse had deserted 
Dupont ; the Spmiards, by extending in his front fram A r p  
nilln to MengibAr offerd him nn casy rictorv, which he npg- 
lec td ,  aiid tbeir fabe movements a p ~ i ~ ~ r e r i  sl ilful. 
4". Rt Mengibar a variety of rosrls b m c h  off, Ieading to 
Jaen, t o  khares ,  t o  hyicn, nntl othu places. From Rndujrar, 
a r o d ,  nenarly p&p111lel mith the Gudalquivir, went to tlie fcrry 
uf Mennibaf, frirming +,he Iiwe of n triimngle, BnyIen lieing tlie 
apex j tlie distance of this town from the ferry is about six 
miles; from the ferry hdujrar eigliteen; from the latkr t o  
Baylen sixtecn miles. Fifteen milcs abuve Brtylen, the town 
af Cnrolina, situntcd in tlie gorga of the Sierra Moreun, wnq 
the point of cominunimtion wivith La Mancha, tlie line of 
retreat: hence Bayleq not Andujar, TVM the pivot. of opera- 
tions. The Frcnch werc lcast numcrous, yct Dupont dis- 
scminnted h i ~  fclrmq, and lct Crtstnñn~ hlre tho nli,,nnt'ri 
initiutive, Dupont's men were oxliauated by Joiirnai, 
nseless marchw,-lis orclem were rnishken or BISS. 
diaobeyc¿i,-one position m forced,-another abmdonecl, 
and be finally surrendered with eighteen thousand mcn, 
iiecnuse bis fightiug force wns reducetl to two tliousand What 
became of the w t l  Wliy liad he so fewP Thousancis never 
f i r d  a sliot. ?Vas there then something worae tlian ineripa- 
city? Dupont'a oow ooffcera, nnd the Spxniards alike dcched 
tlii~t, Iiis pcnronal bo,ggagc ans fillod mith piunrlcr, nnd to snw 
it he snrrenclered. 
59 Tive courses, eitlier of d i c h  pmmised mccess, were 
open on the 14th. ' First, to send al1 iiiicumbrances ta La 
Manche, seciire tlic pasam, mite  tlio tighting men at Gardina 
and fdl on the first Spanish mrps which nrlvanecd; if this 
V O L  f. Q 
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a k k  failed, a retrak waa aemire. b o n d ,  to occupy Cam 
lina by a detachment, place posta of observation at Andujar 
and hlengibar, unite the mms on the 15th at Bqlen, nnd 
await the enemy, Lf the Spaniarda had presented thernsd~es' 
simuIttineously on htli roa&, tbe position m strong for 
bnttle, the retreat open; if one came before the other, they 
might have been Geaten in detail. 
6'- Reding'~ march was in the right direction, and shonld 
have been followed by tbe whole amy. me Argonilla heights 
wonld bave screened the movement, and a rear griard witli 
aome heavg guna, lefi, in front of Andujar, would have 
demived Dupont. Castaños rben separated from Reding WM 
endangered. Vedel's arrivd from Mengibar, gave Dupont 
twelve thousand fighting men on the morning of the 16tl1, 
enough to overdhrow Cad&os at Argonilla, and afterwards 
take  Reding in dank while Gobert assailed hia front. Dupont 
let the occtision pasq sent Vedel to Baylen, followed himself 
two d a p  latei, and, meeting with Reding, joined battle, lioping 
that Vedel, who had p n e  further, would retuni. To force 
Reding'a position bdok Castaños could m e  up was  essential, 
yet he formed a resemG a first and second lime, and hnlf a 
dozen punp colurnns of att.ack, insted of rnarching his 
infantry, camlry, md artillery to strike for life and honoar at 
one point. The battle abodd have been one of hdf an hour, 
he madc it one of t ~ n  hours; yet so bdly did the Spaniards 
figbt, tht neither prisener nor pn. was lost En tlie raction. 
Rcding's fcarrr of the remlt were emnced by bis redy  acaept- 
ance of fhe armbtice. And then Vedera capitulation after 
his retrettt WRS secured!-Vedel, mho might h n ~ e  
disputcd thc victory by hirnsclf ? Joscph calred h'o. s. 
Dupont'~ ~urrendm a ' df~~~im.' 
7". Cwtaños, active in prepnration, was in the fieFd slow, 
and his movements generally fdse. The attempt to turn the 
Ficnch position at Andujar by detacliing four ttiouaand men 
across tho river, was i1I wnceived, badly supported, md t o  be 
clasried with tlie isolatd muvment of Roding. Tiiis b t  
general certafnly gained the victory; yet, if Vedel bad 
returned fmm Cnrolina the 19th with ordillary diligence, 
Baylen wodd have Eieen &e Spaniarda defeated. Rding 
inated of tsking a pasition there, should bave fallen down at 
once rin 13u[iont1s mar, Ienving a fnrce to wntcli nnd dclity 
Vcdd; he knew not the value of time, tind acted radillilg, 
yet f o r t ~ ~ a e  favonred him, md With her nid war ia Ziut cliild's 
P I ~ Y .  
So. Joseph'a retteat from Madrid, jiidged as a poIitica1 or 
rnilitary measure, was unwise. Bessieres had seventeen thou- 
aanci ~ctctoriouni soldiera, with farty pas, &nd hrad paralgzed 
tlie no r thm irianrgcnts. Thc Anddusinn foros waFi too 
distant from. ths Valeiiciana to f o m  a junction, and tlieir 
united reglar troops would not bal-e exceeded fortp tliousand 
combatnnts, ill provided, and under jealous, independent 
chiefs. "Be king, without weakening Bessibrea too much, 
conld hnve put in line tri-entgr tllouswd infantry, fifiethauarind 
horse and eig11t.y guns. a0 Seco bad indicated wlmt sucb an 
army could rFo, and policy and honous alike cdled for daring, 
t o  put away the ignominy of Baylcn. 
9'. Mdrid  being ui~nndoned, thc linc of the Duero shou2d 
have leen taken. Holding A m d a  as a centre, and fortifying 
Somosierr~, Sepvia, Vnlladolid, Falencia, Burgos, and Ebria 
M porits in the circumfcrence, two ordinnry marches would * 
have carried a reserve from Arnndn to any lioint. Tlie 
northern would thua have Iieen cut off froni. tlie southern 
insurgents; for Blake codd not gafely mnke e flank movement 
by the Gudmma to join Castnños, nor ctruld Castaños alone 
rcmnin nt; Mndrirl while the; king held thc Eomosicrra. The 
siepe of Zaragoze, miglit havo continued, bemuss from Aranda 
thk miirch wag nof longer than from Vdencia; Soriab was 
onIy thrae marches, and from thence Verclier could have h r i  
auccoured if the Yalcncinna incnnced him; and Castaños could 
not have disturlied the s i e p  under a month. 
IDo. Soseph by adopting the line af tlie Ebro aliandoned 
the plan of confining each province t o  its own insurrection, 
m d  thus virtutilly resigned tho tlirone. For howevcr m h  
tha insurredion niight appear ak first, no pntriot couId hold 
back wlien the nide enera  of the people bad triumphed. Xn 
thia mmner Kapoleon was baffled without having misal- 
culated difficnlties or resourcea. Eessihres' operation s only 
bad been quite succeasful, yet the loss of a d i o l e  army could 
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hwe been borne, so vigorously and wisely liad the emperor's 
plan been concocted, if the king by abandoning Madrid and 
raising the siege of Zaragoza liad not given undue force t o  the 
catastrophe of Baylen. Even tlicn, the political hold only 
was diaken o& the rnilitq grasp m scarcely loosened: the 
Xpmiads could not folIow up tlieir victov. Napoleon in 
Joseph'e place wuld bave decided tlie fate of Span, for there 
kere many resources. suppose the troops licfare Zaragoza, 
and al1 the detnclinients oon t1ie line of cornmunication l i d  
concentrated n t  Parn pelma ; tlmt Joseph uniting with Bes- 
siAres had marched fortp thousand sbritrcing into Portugal. He 
would have arrired aliout tlie period of t l ~ e  baktle of Vimiem, 
and o~*envhelrned the Englisii: a demonstration against 
Heville would tlten have s u f f i d  to keep the Andalusinns at 
liome, and three montlis later Kapolcon would hwe been on 
the Ebro 6 t h  two hundred thousand men l 
11'. In its moral eñects thc battle of Balen was one of 
those events mhich, insigificmt in thcmselves, cause p t  
changes in tlie affiiirs of nations. The defeat of Rio Seco, the 
prep~rations of Moncey for a second aittack on Yalencia, the 
misemble pliglit of Zaragoza, tlie despondency of the ablmt 
men of Spain, and the disgnst and terror generall~ excited by 
the excesses of  the populsce. weighed heavy on tl~e Spanish 
cause: one victo7 niore, md t.hs moral as well as tlie pliysicral 
force of Spin woiild llave been crushed. The victory of 
BayIen opened m it mere a new crater for Spznish pride, 
vanity, and arrogante; tlie glory o€ pnst ages seemed to be 
renewed, e v e T  man tliougl~t himself a Cid, and, in tbe 
mrrender of bpont ,  aaw, not tlie deliverance of  Spnin, but 
tlie immediate conqueat of France. "ll'e are oliliged to onr 
friends tlie EngIislii mas a common pl~rase smong tliern when 
mnveraing witli the oficcrs of Sir John Moore's army ; me 
fhnnk them fur tbeir good-will, we sliall escort them through 
Fmce to Cdais, the joiirncy will be ppleasanter tlian a Iong 
voyabe; they sha11 not bave tlie trouble of fighting tlie Fivnch, 
and me  hall be pleased to have them specttltors of our 
vi~tories.' This a h u d  confidcnce might hnvc 1cd to grent 
tbings if supported by wisdorn, activity, and valour, but it wm 
' a voice, and riotliing more,' 
BOOK II,- CHAP. 1 ,  
BOOB THE SECOND. 
CHAPTER 1. 
N~wmolu's nnintempted plucceas for ~o many years h d  
givcn him a moral jnfluence doubling his actual force. 
Exciting &k once, terror, adniktion, sud Eiatred, lie nbsorlied 
the attention af an astonished world, and, openly or eiecretly, 
al1 mmen acknowldged the power of his genius: the contjnent 
bomed before him, and in Rngland abaurd and vimlent IibeIs 
oii Iiis person and ciiaracter constantnUy increasing, intlicateci 
the growth of  secret fear. Ris in~mion of Xpain was at firat 
viewed with anxiety rather than with the hope of mst ing  it; 
bnt when tlie fuIl cxtent o€ thc injustilx bcmme mnnifcst, the 
pulilic mind wm vehemently sxcited; a sentimenh oE some 
extmrdinmy cliange being about to hke  place in the aKairs 
of the norld, prevailed among a11 dclasses of society; und 
wheu the Spanish people roae against tbe man fearcd by nll, 
t.he admimtion w1iich energy and coumge exact, even From 
the base and th id,  became enthushtic in a nation wnscious 
of the snme qualities. 
No fnctious feelings interfered to check this entliusin.m, 
Tlie pnrty in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system 
n e c e s s q  t o  their omi political existenoe, rtitw with joy the 
~ t a m p  of justice and high feeling, for the drst time. ahub to 
be affixed to their poliey. The p ~ r t y  out of power having 
always derided tlic irnpotence of the rrncient dpastiea, and 
assertd that regular amies done were insufficierit means of 
defenw could not consistently refuse their approbntion to a 
~truggle, originating witb, and being maint~ined entireIy by 
the niultitude : the people nt large ew1t.ed tlint; the superiority 
o plebeinn virtue nnd patriotism was acluiowledged. Tlie 
arrivd of the &.urian deputies Wa5, tberefore, universally 
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bailed as an auqicious emnt; tlieir wEslim wcre foresklled, 
tlisir niggmtion~ received witli wgerness, tlteir demnnrh 
mmplied with; antl tlie riclies of E n g l d  were 80 proftis~ly 
tended by the miniatem, aa to engentler ran incredilile 
nrrupnce and extrawgancc with the pakriots. Tlicre is a 
wi~y of confeming n favour wlrich appeam like accepting one, 
and t h i ~  secret being dkcovered Ly klie Engliah cabinet, the 
Spnninrds soon clemanded aa a right what they h ~ l  at first 
mliciteti as a boon. In politim it is n grievous fault te be too 
genero115 gratitiide in ~tnte nffniru is a deluuxiun, tlie nppear- 
ance o£ disintereskd kindness never deceivcs nnd should never 
be m m e d .  
Tlie captare' of the Bpanish frigates in time of peace had 
pIsced Great Brit~in md Spab in a state af liostility without 
a declaration of war. Tlie invaaion of Napoleon produced a 
friendly alliance between them without s trmty for the 
cewation of hostilities was not proclaimd until loag after 
succovrs hed lwen mtit to the juntas, Tlie minidere seemed, 
by thek precipitate memures, to be more afraid of losing tlia 
as~ishnce of ttie Spnniards, than prepred to talce the lcad in 
a oontest, wl~idi cuuld only be mpportecl by tlie power and 
riches of Great Britain. Insteacl of la statesman with mnk 
nnd mpmity to atablish the inflnenwi of EngIand by judici~m 
counsels and applications of aucoour, a number of obscnre md 
inexperienced men were sent to varions parta of the Peninsulra, 
and were empowererl to dhtribnte rnoney and mpplies at 
discretion. I n s t d  of carefully sifting the in formation 
obbined from snch agents, and consulting distinguished 
military md naval officers in the amgernent of ot compre- 
hensive plan whlch might be supported vigorou~ly, the 
ministers formed crude projects, parcelled out their forces in 
small expeditiom without any definite object, d k d  their 
plans witli evey idle report, and changed their cornmanders as 
lightly as *eir plans. Discarding di1 prudent considerations, 
nnd entering into formal relationa with every knot of Spanish 
politicims wuming the title of a mpreme junta, the govern- 
ment dealt with nnsparing hands, e n m o n a  suppIies at the 
demand of tho~e  self-elected autliorities. T h g  msile no 
conditions, took no security for the B U C O ~ U ~ ~  being justly 
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applid, and with afected ewnestnegs renounced the nght of 
int~rfcrir~g witli tlie Spnnisli interna1 arranga- 
meiits, wlien tLe. ablest Spriniards expecteri and EzF~' 
desired auch interference to repress f d y  and i.omi w. 
RcntincPn violente. England was entitled, in policy and ,itto. , 
justice, to direct the Gpanish eouncila. Spain 
~oliciteil her aid in a common rrrurie, and a p.enerou~, vigornirs 
i ~ k r f e r f m c ~  wna necessary t o  save thnt cause from a few 
ignoran& oonceited men accidenk1Iy invested with authority. 
Numeroua and ill-chosen militarp agents aiso 
produced Iiifinite misel~ici. Sdcctcd principdly yzdzfl 
becnuac thcy 8pke Epanish, fcw of thcm heiE Sor sir Tho. 
Uycr+ &c. 
any knowledgge af w beq-ond regimentd duty, porlismen. 
and there wm no controlling autliority : each tnry Paper~  
2809. did what seemed gaod to him. T h e  Spmish 
gcnerals willingly received men whme incxperienca wnq a 
recommendatiuii, m¿i whose friendslip could advance their 
consequence. Tbeir Aattering wnfidential politeness diverted 
tlie attenttion of the agents from the frue objects of their 
mission; they looked not to the efficiencgr of the armies, but 
dopted tlie inflitted Ianpage md extravapnt opinions of Ghe 
chiefs, and by their reports, raiaed emneous notions as to 
the reIatim situations of &e conknding f o m .  Some excep- 
tiom tliere were, Iiut the ministcra wers tietter plenrted with 
the wnguine tLan the cautious, and made their own wkhw 
tbe measum o£ their judgment. Awordlngly, enthusiasm, 
numbem, courage, and tdent, were pt i i i t ou~ ly  found fm 
wery ocwion,  and monev, amrr, and clothing were demaitdd 
incmsnntly, and fiiipplied witlii profuriion. Tho arms wcro 
however generally left in their cases to  rot or ta fa11 into the 
h d s  af t h e  enemy, and sometimes they were sold to foreign 
rnerclimb; Ghe clotliing sddom reached the soIdier7a bmk; 
the m o n q  always misapplied, was aometimea embeealed by 
those who receíved it for the nation; more often empluyed tu 
forwanl tho private views of the jiintris to the 
detriment of public afiair~; and it ia a fact that ñ o .  13. 
from tha beginning to the end of the wm, an 
Englisli musket was rarely to be seen in the bnds  of rr Spanish 
soldier. Bitt it iF1 t ime  t o  quit this subjcet, and &e the 
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reign was  overi Lord Strangf04 the British plenipotcntiary, 
wliose previons efforta to make tlie roya1 family emi,mte had 
entirely failed, was then on board the aquadron with tlie inten- 
tion of returning to England; but  ir Sidney thrcat,ened t o  
bombard Llsbon if the princw! regent hesitatd ang loager, md 
tbua u v d  on both Icles, lie embarked with hia whole court, 
and sailed for the Brazils on the 29th oof November, a fem 
hom before Junot arrived. 
Lord Strangford's despatcli relating bliia event, altliough 
dated the 29th of November on board the Hiliernia mas 
written tho 19th Demmber in London, and so worded as to 
create a notion that his exertions duríng the 27tb and 28th 
caused the emigration. Tliis wws quite contrary t o  the fact; 
for the prince regeat, yielding to the unitd pressure of tho 
arlmirdk mennm mrl tlie ninnunciation in the Moaiteur, 
emharked on the 27th, before Lord Stmngford ieached Zishon, 
snd tictudly sniled without haring had even an intemiew with 
tliat nobl~mnn, who consequently l i d  no npporhinitg to d ~ m m  
or r e t d  the event in question. Xevertlieless, lord Stmgford 
m i v e d  tlie red riband nntl sir Sidney Smith waa negllectd. 
Tliis celebrrtted emigration was Iieneficial to tlie Brazilw, 
gnve Englnnd grmt cninmercinl adwntngeq and ~Iacetl Porta- 
gt~l ut lier dispocal for the iipproeching conflict; but it waa 
disgrnwful to the prince, insulting to tlie Iiruve peopEe lie 
nbandoned, and impolitic, as forcing men ta inquire how 
~uutjects: wrre hound to n monarcli wiio deserted tliem in tlieir 
needi How the nation could belona to a man wlio dirt not 
belong to tlie nationB It has Iieen observed by politial eeoono- 
mi-, tliat where a gold and papa currency circuIate to~ether, 
if tlie paper he deprwitttei1 it will drag down the gold ~vitli h, 
and deteriorate the wlioIe mess; yet, after a time, t,he rnetd 
revolts from this unnatural state and mserts its intrinsio 
euperiority: ao a priviilged class, corrupted by power and 
luxurv, drap down the national character. There is, honever, 
a point where the people, like the gold, no Iouger suffering 
riuch a degratlation, 611 aeparate themselwes uith violcnm 
from the &es of tlieir eff'iminate .teleni. Until that time 
arri~es, a nation may appear sunk in hopeIess lethargy d e n  
it is caprrlile of p t  and noble exertions: thus it waa with 
the Portupese, who mere at this time unjustly despiaed by 
cncmiea nnd rnistraatcd by friends. 
Y w s ~ i ~ n t  to tIic convintion OS Fontninblcau. the invadcrs 
forn~ed tiiree distinct corps. Tlie central one, con- 
poad of tlse French troopa and the Spanish E;badt* 
auxilia~ics under Cnraff4 penetratd, by the 
Sohreim Fomosa roads to ~brantea, whence Camffa mamhed 
to TIiomsr. Mcantimc thc nght corps undcr Tnrnnco, rn~rch- 
ing lrom Gallicira, established itself at Oporto, wlde tlie marquis 
of Sulnno, with tlie left, entered the Alemtejo, anrl fixed his 
guartem at Setuval. The Spaniarda suffcred no hardsihips. 
The French were so distressetl, tliat three weeks after Junot's 
arrival in Lisbon, only ten thoiisnnd mcn wero witli thc e~gles;  
and the primtione. endured indueecl a violente, giving Ziirth to 
that hatiid so remarkable between the Freneh a& ~ i r t u ~ e s e .  
Young ~oldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will 
of the iahabitanta; it is dificult to muke them underatand that 
a poor pei~snntry 2rsve nutliing to a p r e .  Old midiera Mame 
nobody, Iint knom how t o  extract subsistenee, and in m& 
cases witliont excjting enmity. 
Junot passed the-month- o€ Novmnher in eollecting his 
army, securing the rnilitnry pointa round Gsbon, and iii pre- 
paration~ to supplant tlie power of a council of  regency, to 
whom tlie prince had delepted the aowreign authority. m i l e  
his troops mere scattered on the line o€ march, nnd the fortressea 
ti-ere Iielrl liy Purt,uguese gurrisons, i t  would bnve been dunger- 
ous to provoke the enrnity of tlib council, and its members 
v-ere treated with studious respect. They were howver of the 
eame Ieaven as the court they emmakd from, and Jirnot Boon 
depriveti them of an irnportancc conferred hy the critica1 situa- 
tion of nthira d u r i n ~  the first t h m  wcclrs. Thc Spnnish 
forccs wcre wcll mccivcd in tlie north and in thc Alemtejo, 
bnt Tnncnco died aoon after hisi rtrrivnl nt Oporto, ~ n d  tlio 
Frencli genernl Quesnel was sent to cominani G ~ B  province. 
Junot also toolr nosseasion of Elvas, and detached sixteen 
huntlred men under general Maurin to tbe Al- 
p v e s ;  aud when Solano mas ordereri to Mth- z:"o,h 
draw from hrt i ig~l ,  nine French bttalions and nrmy. 
A ppendix, tlie mmlry under tha cornrmind of Kelleman, E, zs,  
entered &he Alemtejo md occupicd the fortrew of Setuval. 
Ceraffn's division, replnced at Thomnr by a French fome, naa 
then diatributed in the vicinity of Liabon, but diiposed on 
both sides of the Tapa. 
Aa thc trcnty of Fontninblean was unltnown t o  the Portu- 
pese ,  the Spaniards were better received than 
F0y. the French. Indeed, tho trc~ty  was littlc rcgarded 
by Junot, wha soon proved that ho held Podngal m belo@ng 
wtirely t o  France. Whea hia stmgglers had come up, wlien 
tlia troops lid recovered eitrength, nnd hc knew a reinfom- 
mcnt of fivc thausand hd renched Sulamnnca, he rrssumed 
pararnount nuthority. He interfered witli a11 tEie 
mid. s t d e  depmtments, gave Frenchrnen al1 tlia lucra- 
TLiiehult. t i ~ e  oftjces, dcmandcd a loan of tmo hundrcd 
thousnnd pounrlg md mnde his promises antl pro- 
te9titatioria of amity frequent mrI loud in proportion t o  his 
encroacl~ments. At last being created dulre of kbrantm by 
Nnpoleon, be threw off al1 disguise, ~ttppressed t.he council of 
regency* seized the government, and introduwd beneficia1 
reforms, but made tlie nation feel tliat hs w a ~  a conqueror. 
The flag md arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France, 
five tliousarid Portupese soldiers were incorporated with the 
Frencli, arid eight tliousand scnt away nndsr t h ~  marquis of 
Aiorna and Gornee Frere, two noblemen of gmwt reputation 
nmonpt the native oñcers. 'i'herest of tiie troopsweredisbsuded. 
An extraordinary contribution of four millions sterlirg 
wa~l now demanded by Napoleon, under the strange titk 
of ii '8tut.e R a n m !  This mun wa exorbitmt, 8nd Junot 
Fog. prmiled oa tlie empemr t o  reduce it one half. He likewlse, on bis awn authority, sccepted 
tlie forced Iosn, the confiscated English merchanndise, the 
cliurch plate, and the roya1 propatp, in part payrnent; yet 
the peuple were still unable to raise the whole amount, for 
the court hacl carried the greatest part of the clirirch plato 
nnd bullion from the kingdom. It Ziad alao drawn Iarge sums 
of money from the peoplc, under the pretext oF defmidmg tlie 
conntry, and with this treamro departed, lenving the public 
functicnbiries, the army, private creditom, ~ n d  even donestic 
s e m t u ,  unpaid Discontcnt wnd misery predled, yct t h e  
tranquillit~. of Lisbon during the First month ms remrrrkabte. 
Tlie populace were submissive to a police, estalilished mder 
the princc by the count de Wovion, a French ernigrant, nnd 
continnorl hy Junot. No Europem mpital snfcm so miicli aa 
Lisbon From tlie want of n good police, and the French pneml 
conferrcrl an unmixd benefit by ~ i d n g  full effect to Novion*~ 
plans. Y& so deeply rooted is the pre-judice for ~ncient  cus- 
toma, thitt no mt p v e  more offence than cleansing the strects 
and Icilling thc wild d o s  infesting thcm. A Frcnch scrjcant 
wlio rlislilnyed irea1 in dcstroyin:: tliose dispisting, dungerom 
animala, was ~sassinated. 
During March and April, Junot'~ military systeiu was 
mmplcted. The amenal wf Liabon contained Tliisbault. 
nhuntlnnce of naval and rnilitnry ~torefl, nntl 
tliousands of excellent workmei who soon renewed the 
artillery, khe ammunition, the can-iages, rrncl al1 the minop 
quipments of the army. T. line-of-bnttle ships, three 
frigntes, nnd sevcn Figliter vmscls of wnr wcrr! refittml, 
wrmed, antl employed to deferid the entrance of tlie T q u s  
aud to ave thc city. The m y ,  rcinforced and better 
disciylined, well fed and clotlied, had p i n e d  confidcnce from 
success, nutl nFaa become n fine borly of mliust nien. It wna 
re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalrg, 
commanded by the general9 La-bortIe> Loison, Travot, and 
Margmn. General Taviel directed thc artillel ; generiil 
Rellcrmnn mmmnnderl in tlie Alcmtrjo; generilt Quesncl in 
Oporto; neneral Xnurin in tlie Algarves, Junot governed 
from Lisbon. The fortrcsses o£ Faro in Algame, of Almeida, 
of Elva9, La-Lippo, 8t. Lucie> Setuval, Pnlmela, the forts 
betíveen Lishon and the rnontl-i of the Tngiii~, and thosc of 
Ericin nnrI Pcnichc, wcre fiirniriherl sitli Frcnch mrri~ona. 
Estremos, Alden-Gallegos, Bantarem, anrl Alinintns Wcre put 
in the h t  stato tlieir d e c g e d  ramparts KOUM permit. 
Including tlie French workmen and marines attgclied to it, 
the n m y  was above fifty thousnnd strong, nearly 
forty-five thousnnd being fit for dutg; tlint is to 
" ~ w ~ , ,  
say, fifteen thousand five hnnclred Xpaniards, five army. h p -  
thousand Portiiguese, and twenty-four thousand 
four hundred French. O£ these last, s k  thousand 
B ~ X  hundred infantry mere distrihted in Elvas, Almeida, 
Peniche, Abrantea, and Setmal; sixteen hnndred werc in tbe 
Algarveg. Four hundrecl iand Rfty cavalrp werc nt Valencia 
d'Alantara in Spanish Efitremadura, and tliree hundred and 
fifty held posh af communication from Lisbon to Elvas, aand 
from Almeida to Coimbra. Fifteen tbousand of al1 a m  
rernained disposnble. 
Lisbon wntainerl all tlie civil, military, naval, and greatest 
part of t l~e  commercial eatnhliahments, tiie onFy fine hnrbour, 
two-eightlia of the population, and two-thirds of the riclies of 
the wlie!e kingdom. It formed a centre, wliicli was w r d  
by tlie main body of *he Frcnch, while on the cireumference 
strong posts gave support to the operations of tlieir moveaMe 
oolumns, Thc garrison of Penichó ~iecured thc only 1i~rbonr 
between the T a p s  and the Mondep  in ~vliieli a I q e  disem- 
barkation of English troopa couId talre place, and tlie little fort 
of F i q c m ,  hcld by a small prrison, block& the mouth of 
the la& rivcr. The division of Thomar sceurcd $1 tlic p n t  
linea of commnnication to  the north-enst, and in conjunction 
with the pison of Abrantea, commantled Iioth side of tlie 
Zezere. Prom Abmntrs to F,sti.emos7 Elvas, and Setr~val, the 
lines of communication were short, and tliruugb a countq suih 
able for t he  cnvalry, which wnn nll quwtarcd on tlic soutli h.ink 
of the Tagus. Thna, without brcnking up Uic mws uf the 
army, the herl>ours were malea ngninst the Englisli, nnd a 
large rich tract endesed by pos@ ao tbat nny insurrcctioa could 
bo rmclicd by a fcw mnrclicq nntl immdii~tcly cmsticd; tlie 
connexiou betwccn tlie right nnd Icft banks of tlie Tap~fi at 
Lisban wns secured, tlie eiitrnnce tlefcnded liy tlie refittc:d v a -  
wls  of war, nnrl a Iight squndron wns lpiepnrerl to oumrnunicate 
with Soutli America. Nine Russian liile-of-bnttle sliipe and a 
figate, wliicli, under tlie comrnand rif admira1 Sinizvin, lid 
taken refuge some time before h m  tho English fleet, were of 
nemsity engag4 in tlie defence of t1ie linrliour, nnrl formerl 
an unwilliug but not unim-portant auxiliary force. 
Tliese military mangementa were Junot's own, and suitable 
enoagh, iE his army had been unconnected with any other; but 
tliey clashed with tlie general views of Napoleon, who re,ded 
the force inPortuga1 only as a dirisfo? to be rendercd subservient 
t o  the genemi s e b e  of aubjectiug the Iien~nsuh Where- 
fore, in the month of May, he ordained t h t  general ~ l v n l  
shoii1d l c d  thice thousand infantry, fivo hunrlrd mvalry, and 
ten guna, to  co-operate with Dupnt in Andalwia; anil thnt 
Loison 6h0dd mareh on ameida with four thonsand to co- 
operate witli Beasikm in the evmt of an insurmtion tnking 
place in Xpcin, General Thiebault complains of  this order, 
as injurialis t o  Junot, iU-combined, and the resltlt of a 
foolisli mnity, which prornpted tlic empcror to <lirect al1 thc 
armies bimself; yet it wouId be difficult ta show that the 
a r r a p e n t  was iaulty. Avril's division if he htcd not lldted 
at Tawra, for n-hich tliere waa no reason, wouId hwe ensured 
the capture of Seville; and if Diipont'a defeat bad not ren- 
dered the victo7 of Rio Seco uaelcas, Loison'e division would 
have b n  erninently useful to control the otiuntry beliind 
BessiAres, wllen tlie Iatter invadd ChUicia: moreover it was 
well placed to intercept tlie conimunkation between the Gastil- 
linn ~ n d  the Estrcmdumn armics. Thc emperor'c~ combinrt- 
tioii~, if fuIly executerl, would Lape brought seventy tlioussnd 
men to  bear on the rlefc~rcc of Portugal. 
Such was Junot's 1iiilit:rry aittitucle in Map. Hi política1 
sitiiation wns not so firvourablc. Ris nntural cnpaeity wñs 
considmbl~, bnt neithcr enltirged by study nor streugtlierid 
by mental discipline. Of intemperate habi& indo- Nnwl,, , 
Ient in business, prompt and brave in aetion, Las Cms. 
quick to give offcnce, reridy to forget an injury, hha w. 
w a ~  at one moment a great man, the next lielow mediocrity. 
At al1 tima he was unsuited to the task of cenciliating and 
governing a people like the Portuguese, whq witb passions as 
sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or 
insult witli iiicrcdihle tenacity. He had many difficultim ta 
encounter, and his duty towarrls Fmnce wm in some iustances, 
incompatible witli god policy towards Porbugttl. Ee w a ~  no& 
however, withont resourcea for estaldishing a strong French 
interest, if he b d  possessed the abiEi5 and disposition to 
soothe a naiion which had been as it were accidentaily bowed 
to a foreign yoke. 
Both the pride and poverty of the Podngueae, and tha 
infIuenoc d ancient usaps, interfered with Junot's prilicy. 
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The monks. and most o£ the nobility, were inimical, Al1 the 
netivity nf the expelle¿! Rritish factoip, and the secret warfare 
of spics and writers, in the pay of Englsnd, sere dirwted to 
undemine bis plana and render him nnd his niition odious; 
hut he h d  possession of the pvernment and capital, he 11ad a 
fine amy,  he could offer covelty, so dear to the rnultitude, and 
lie liad the mme mid fame of NapoIeon to msist hirn. The 
promiscs of power are always beIieved by tlie many, aad there 
rtere abundance of grievances to remedy and wronga to  redress 
in Portn,d. Arnong the best edumted men, and in the uni- 
versities, tliere existed a strung feeling against tlie Braganm 
family; and mich an enrncst desire Tor reformed institutions 
that steps mew wtually taken to bavc prince 
Fv. E~~gcnc rPecl nrctl king of Portugal : noi ww thia 
spirit cxtinpisl~erl at a much lnter dote. 
Witb tlicse matarinls and the military vnnity of thc Portu- 
griesc fo  n*ork upon, Jirnot miglit hnve rstnblished a powcrful 
Frcncli Intered. An nctivc gocid gnvernment wiiulil soon lat~ve 
reconcilcd tEie pcople to t11c losa of an indcpcntlcncc ~vliicli 
liad no wliolesomc Iirentliing nmidst the compt  dngniitiun of 
tbe drl system. But tlio arrogunce rif la coriquwor, atid tbe 
necw~ities of troopñ wlio wrre to Ile ~ulisiñted and paid hy rtn 
impovrristietl p p l e ,  g w e  rise to oppresxion, private diuses 
followed close upon pulilic nyaeity, antl itisolenee left its sting 
to ranlrle in tlie wounda of the injured. Tlie rna1ignant 
humoara bruke out in quarrcla and assasñinationfi, severa 
punishments enmed, many of them unjust aud barharons, 
creating rnge not terror, for the nation had not tricd its 
strengtli in bnttle and ~ o u l d  not believe it was meak. Mean. 
wliiIc the ports were rigorously blockaderl by tlie Englihh fleet, 
Thiebnnlt. and as the troubles of Spain intermpted the corn 
trafñc, by w11lch Portugd liad been usually sup- 
plilierl, the nnbappy people suffered under the tripIe pressure of 
famine, war-contribntions, and a foreign goke. With al1 ex- 
terna1 nliment thna ciit off, nnd tb hnligry a m y  pnwing nt its 
vitals, tlic nntion muld not remain trmquil ; yet the first five 
montlis of Junot's g~venrnent wcrc, witli t l~e  cxception of a 
diglit tumult at Lisbon when tlic arma of  Portugal were taken 
down, undist~irhcd by mmmotian. Neverthelcss tbe whole 
conntry wm rip for insarrection. 
An abunhnt h w a t  p v e  Junot reIief from bis principal dif- 
6d9, hbut as one danger disappeared anothei presented it self. 
me Spanish insnrrectiort excited the Portupese ; the neigh- 
bouring juntas commnnicakd ñith thc Spanish generala in Por- 
tugd; the capture of tbe Prench flect in C d i z  becamc knawn; 
rihisassinntiana were mnltiplied; antl the pope's nuncio fld un 
board tlie Englisli íi&. English agenta actively promoted thiiri 
epirit, md tlie a p p m c e  of two Englisii squadrons at different 
polnts of the coast linving troopa on board, alamed the Frencb, 
md augmmted the impatimt ficrceness of t h ~  Po'ortuguese, whe 
discovered tileir hntred in various waya. hmongst other moda, 
an egg was exhibited in o church benring an inscription inti- 
mating the speedy coming of  Don Sebnatian, who, like Arthur 
of romantic memory, is mpposed t o  be bidden Ln a secret 
island, some day t o  rsappear and restore hia country's ancient 
glory. The tnck was turned again~it *he oontriverri. Other 
egga prophesied unpatriotically; yet the belief of the Sehon- 
tianists lost nothiig of its zed, Many persons, not of tlia 
aneducated classes, -re often obnemed npan the highest points 
of the hilla, casting earnest lwku towards the ooenn in the 
hopes of deacrying the bland in wLich their long-lo& hero waa 
ddined. 
AT Oporto the h t  aerioue blow waa struck. The Sprtnish 
insurrection became known tliere in Jnne, and BeUestg the 
chief Spnnjsh officer, immediately took an honourable und 
resolute part. He m d e  Queme1 and his staf f  prkonwa, called 
Sogether the Portuguese authorities, dedared thsm free to ach 
as they jndged fitting for thejr oim interests, and tLen marched 
to Gallicia with hia army and captiva The opinions of the 
leading men at Oporto were divided upon the peat  question of 
resistance. me boldest succeeded, and the insurrection, 
altliough at one rnoment queUed by the French parGy, mwas 
finally established in Oporto. It aoon extended dong the 
banlrs of tlie Douro and tlie Minho, and to those parts of Beira 
wllicl~ lie between tila Mondego and the pea-coast. 
Junot now resolved to disarm al1 the Spnish regimentn 
quartered in the neighbourhood of Lishn, not an eaay opera- 
tion, for Garafa'a division waa six thousmd strong, and 
it was dimlt ,  without employing tlie p & m s  o£ the citade1 
md farts of Lisbon, to collect m equal force of French. The 
Spanish rej$ments were suspicious and reluctant to obey the 
Thiebanlt French generals, and one, quartered at Alcacer do M, resisted the oders  of Junot himself. To 
a v ~ i d  s tumnlt was also S p a t  object;, because in Lisbon, 
fifteen thousand GlalIicians were ordinarjly engaged as portera 
and w a t e r d e r s ,  and in a popular movement these men 
wodd naturally abisist their c&tqmea Notwithstandiig 
these dificulties, Junot, having heard of Bellesta's defedion, 
instantl formed hig plan, and tbe next morning the Spaniah 
troops assernbled under varioua pretexta, 1n small numbera, at 
place8 where they conld make no resisbnce, were disarmed and 
plmed on board the hulks Ln the Tagos, with exception of 
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course of twenb-four honrs and with IihtIe bloodshed, s very 
serioua dsnger was averted, This stroke produced m effect, 
but did not prevent tlie kurrection becoming general; al1 
persons carrying orders, or commanding urna11 post* of com- 
municationa, were surldenly cut off; and the Freneh gcnerd, 
rduced from fifty to twenty-elght thousand men, was siiddenly 
thrown upon his personal rcsonrcca for the maintenmee of his' 
conquest, and even for the pr~emnt ian  of his nrrny. f l i e  
Rwsiaa squradron indcsd contained six thousand seamen and 
marines; but tliey oonsumed a p e a t  quantity of provi~ions, 
and could not be jadged usefol allies# unlesa an English fleet 
attempted to force the entrance of the river. 
At 6rst Junot thought of ~cizing hdnjos  t o  hiocnre a retrcnt, 
but. wrss detemcd by the asvcrnbling of zn Estremadnran army 
under general Cralluzzn. Mennwliile, Avril's colnmn returned 
to Eetremos. and ibis arobabl~ never intended to do otherwise. 
Loison ihad been orderid to mar& opon Oporto, and reaehing 
Almeida the Eith of June, one &y previous to Tliiebaalt. Bellata's defectiori, had on the 12th partly by 
menace, partly by permasion, pt p s e s s i o n  of Port Oonoep- 
tion, a strong but ill-placed Bpnish work en that frontier. 
He then nttempted to  penetrate the Entre-Mimho e Donro by 
Amarunte, hut his division was wenk, he fenrd BeIlesta might 
f d  upon lsi~ flank, and advanml timidly. At iifezam Frias 
lis wlts opposatl, and bis baggage was m e n a d  by other insur- 
gents, wbereupon Iie; fell bsck ta  Villa Real, and after ss trifling 
skirmish, crossing thc Douro at Lnmcgo, marched fo Cwtro 
cl'Airo, There, boing haramed by tlie armd pewants, Tie 
turned sud defeated tbern, and then marched upon Coimbra, 
morir the country, when he received une of twenty-five 
deapatchcs sent to  mmll liirn ; thc rwt had been intmeptorl. 
Uniting Iiis columns and placing Iiis sick and weak men in 
almeida, lie augrnentsd the garrison to twelve Lundred md 
fifty, niined Fort Conception, and mmclied by Guarda towards 
Lisbon. 
An insurrectian h d  dso h k e n  out in tlie Algawea. It 
bnpn nenr Faro, and geneml Mnurin, then 1yhg sick in that 
town, waa made prisoner. %me Portupese troops, attached 
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to t he  French force, joined thc inmrgcnts, many Andalusiana 
prepared to mas the Guadiann, rand genemi Spcnccr appeared 
off Ayamonte with five thousand British troop. Colonel 
Marfinsin, who Irnd auccecrlcd Maurin: immcdii~tcly retired to 
Mertola, lenving hia baggnge, militnry cliest, and nbove a 
liundred prisoners, besides lrilled and wouncied, in the hands 
oF the patriots: Spcncm wwld no* lrtnd, and tlic pursirit wcnt 
not beyand tlie Algnrve rnountains, The circla of insurrection 
was now fast closing round Junot. Emissaries from Oporto 
excited tlia pcoplo to rise fnr aR Coinilira, whcre a Frencli 
p o ~ t  ww overpowered md a junta for~ned wliose d c i r t g  
spread the flame to Condeiq  Poinl~al, arid leiria. A stndent 
named ZapIo, mixlng holdneiepe witli acldress, foroed a Portu- 
guese officer with a hundred men t o  surrender the fort of 
Figuerm at  the mouth of the Mondego; Ahrantm was 
tlireatened by tho insurgents of the valley of the Zezere; t11e 
Spaniards, under G;eUuzzu, crossing the Guatliana at Jummenhq 
occupid that plate and campo Mayor, and a peat thougli 
confused body of men menaced Kellerman at Elvas. Avd 
mas unnolested at Estremoa and a smatl gmison kepf Eirora 
tranquil; but tlie Gciiiity of Betuval was in eommotion, the 
popuhce of Lisbon unqtrict, and at that moment, Spencer, 
mliose force report rnwified to ten thousmd men, nppeamd at 
the rnouth of the T p .  
Junot held a council o£ war, and decided on the  folIoming 
Tidebauit. plan: 1'. So collect the sick in such hospitals 
as could be protected by the ships of war. 29 
To secure the Spanish prisoners by mooring fhe hulks in 
mhich they were conened as far aa possible from the &y. 
3'. Ta arm mrl provision the  forts of Lisbon, and remove the 
powder from the mapzines t o  the ahips. 4'. To abandon nll 
Tortrcssca in Portugal, Nave Setncal, hlmeida, Elrras, and 
PenichE, and t o  conecntrute tlie nmy in 'IJisbon Zn the cvcnt 
of bnd fortunc, hc proposed to dcfcnd thc cnpitnl as long ns 
possibIc, and thcn crossing tllc Tngua, movo iipon Elvaa, and 
retreat to hfiulrid, Vfilldolid, or Segown, ns miglit he mpedient. 
Tliis plnn wtis not executed, tlis first aInrm died awny, Epencer 
returncd to Cndix, the inñ~rrect~iirin wns p p p l e d  witli, md 
provcrl to be more noi~y t11an dangerous. 
Kellermm having recaned Naransin from Mertala, wías 
gobg to mnrch on Lisbon, when the inhabibnta of Villn Viciosa 
drove m compnny of  French h o p s  inta aa old cmtle, yet 
when Awil a m e  from E~tremos ta tlieir aid, the Portuquese 
fled, and several m e  E l I d  in $he pursuit. The town of a j a  
follomed the example of Villa Viciosa, but Nmnain mnrching 
from Mcrtola, rtnd making fody milea in oightocn hours, 
sfiddenly defeated the patriots, and pillqed tlia place. He 
had eighty men Lilled or wounded, and Thiebadt writeq that 
an obstinate combnt took place in fhe streets. The pahiob 
however reallp never made bead against a strong body during 
tbewhole insnrrectioa How indeed wasit possibIe for a colIec- 
tion of miserable peustuits, armeed with scyklies, pitcliforks, old 
fowling-pieoes, and a little bad poder ,  nnder the wmmand oI 
some ignormt countryman, or fanatic friar, to rnain*in a 
battle against an efñcient and active; corps of French soldiers l 
Tliere wm m essentinl diffcrcncc beheen tlic SpnnisFi and 
Portupwe i n m e c t i o m  The PqxmiarJs had mmy grcat and 
strong towns, and large provinces in whicb to collect 5nd train 
farces d a dwtance from the innders, whiie in Portugal the 
naked pcitsnnts wcm forccd to  go to bnttlc tha instant even o£ 
assembling. The 105s wIiicL Maramin sushined must have 
been the killing o€ stmgglers mho, in a consecutive march of 
fody milcq, mozild have boca nueiems. 
This blow q11iek.d tho Alemtcjo for tha moment. KcIloman 
cleared Iiis neighbourliood of al1 Spsnish parties, placetl a 
cammandant in LsrLippe, concentmtxd the detachments under 
Bl~xansin md Avril, and prooeeded hirnself towards Lisbon, 
mhere Junot waa in g e a t  perplexib. The intemgcjng of  bia 
courici onrl isolntd officers, nnd the detection o€ a11 liis  pie^, 
had exposed him to every report which tlie fem of liis army 
o i  the ingenuity of the people codd give birth t o  ; and few 
nations cm vie with the Portupese and Spaniards in the 
fnhricntion of plm~ihlo reports. Among &ose c i ~ m n t  wns 
the captivity of Loiaon. Howemr, nothing mm certain, save 
tbt the insurgents of the Mondcp valley were marcbing 
towards Lisbon; wherefore hfargaran wm smt with three 
thougsad rnen and six guns t o  disperse tbcm rtnd open a com- 
rnunimtion with Loison. They retired ta  XRiris, md many 
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T,e,fL dippemed; tlio iemainder were atttpcked the 5th 
Amuralo of Jnly, and ri, scene like thnt at Eeja easued; the 
de. h'cves. Frencli bowted of victorp, tlie Portuguese spok~ 
only of butchery and pilIage. In BU& a combat it is difficnlt 
to say wbere fighting en& and maswre begins. Peasanta 
me obseived Ring and moving from place to  place without 
ortler; when do they ceaae to bscome enemies? Xore d a n g m s  
single *han together, they can hida their ama in an instaut 
and appear peaceable, the soldier passtss and is shot from 
Iieliind. 
This example at Gris did not prevent a rising at Thomar 
and Alcobqa, and Margaron wras thua plmcd bchween two 
freah insurractions at tlie rnomcnt he Iiud quelled onc; EngTish 
quadrons with troops on board wcrt! snid to be hovcring off 
t l ~e  m&; ani1 from tho reports nbout h i s o n  Iiis safcty wns 
despaircd of, when he suddenty firrivcd at Atirantca. Re hrui 
quitted Almeids tlie 21id, nt tlw h e d  of tliree tlioumtl five 
Iiundrcd mcn, nnd moving by Guarcla, S m c h ,  md Srirdoval, 
rewhed Abmntea thc 8th. During t t i iu ropid mar& Iie 
defeated the inaurgentg sevr?mI tinies, noti~lily nt Guerrla, 
whsre it Iias been disurdly nsserted 1ie killed twelve Iiundred; 
as if thrm thougund men witliout cava1ry or artillery couId do 
so midst ruge@ mountains in half an hour, for that was the 
duration of t,lie action. The trutli is, tlie p s a n t s ,  terrjfied a t  
reporte spred by Zoison himself, flecl on al1  idea; and not 
more t.hn two hirndred were killed and waunded durhg his 
whole mar& of nearly two hundred miles. Kellerman had 
meanwhile queUd the people of Alcobqa, and those of 
Thomar were quihd.  At CoimZira, the insurpnts gathered 
strength, and the last of ihe mitive sotrliers descrted tlie Pmch 
colours; a Bpanisli corps, assemliled at Badajos, mas joined by 
the Poduguese fugtives, and under one Moretti, 
Thiebauit. 
menaced tlie Alemtejo, wbich vas in comrnotion, 
parijamen- for a numbw of patriota were in a m s  at Nacer 
tarypnperg do Sal and in cimrnunication with the English 1809. 
fleet. 
Junot, neglecting the northern people, turned upon the 
Akrntejo, as being his line of retreat to Spnin, and the county 
fit for liorsemen; wherefore Loison, crossing the Tagus, marched 
with weven thousand infantv, twclve hundred mvalry, and 
eight gana, to Montemor, and drove some ingwgents ta 
Evom, h i t e ,  a Portugnese genemi, ww in poeitioii there 
with the ni$n body and three or four khonsaiid Spaniards, 
brought tohis aid by~oretti,bnt Loison directing ~ a r & r o n  and 
S o l i p a ~  agaimt the flanks, fe11 n p n  the centre himself, and 
tlie lrattle was ~hort; tho Spaniards bung bmk, tbe Portuguem 
fled; there wss a p t  and confuaed conconme, a strong cavalry 
m a  Iet Iome npon the fugitives; and many mere driven 
into the deserted tom, where in despair thei turned upon 
the French, but the g-reattr prart were slain, and the place 
pilIngcd. The h n c h  lo& two or threc hundrcd, tlie sIaugbter 
of tho vanquishd wna great, and d i s p u h  arising 
Tliisbadt. between the Portupese and Spaniards the latter 
ramged the conntry in t,heir retreat with more AWW 
vioIence than tlie French. After rasthg two No. in. 
d a p  Loison a p i n  a d m c e d  towards Elvns, and dmve amy 
tlie ~ ~ a n i a r d s  who infested thrit fortresa, rand were now 
obnoxioua alike to the Portumese and French. This done he 
was proceeding to form &gazines, whea he Wa8 d l e d  
haskily te the right bank of the Tagus- British m y  bnd 
descended an tlie const, and manly wnrfare md ita lronest 
front amidst the desohting soenea of insnmction. 
lo. hiion's expedition being made to represa insamectlon, 
wtrs a movement of police rather than of m, and hiEi prcrceed- 
ings were necessarilp sevem; but they hsve been falaeIy repre- 
senteu as n series of di8gnating mtassacres. Desi~ng to create 
terror Iie encoumged the propagation of euch rnmours at 
tkte time, and the crednlity of the people wm not easily shocked; 
bence so many medotes of Frcneh barhriq current for two 
years after the mwention of Cintra, and tlie game story being 
related by peraons remote h m  each other ia no argnment for 
itEl tmth 1;oison'~ cnpture on E a  mnrch from- Almeirla wns 
reported to Jnnot through fiftf separate charnela; Thfebult, there were men to declare they saw him bound 
with cords; others t o  te11 how he had been entrapped; fiome 
named the places he had been mi& tlirougli; lila habitual 
expressions were quoted; the h r y  was complete, the detaile 
consistent, p t  totdIy without fmndation. 
2". A11 the Portupese accounts of thh period are angq 
amplificakiona of every m1 OT pretended a& of French bar- 
barity and injustice; the &&S of intlividnals wem workd 
into chargea apinst the whole army. The French accounts 
are more plausible, scarcely safer as anthoritie~, beiag writtea 
for the most pwt by &m in the gcenes thep describe, and 
n a t a d y  concerned to defend their o m  charticters. hfiiihry 
vanity also bad its share in disguising the simple fa& of the 
insurmtion; for fo  enhance the merit of tlie troopa, the 
number of inswpts, the obstinacy of the mmbats, the loss 
of the patriotq are al1 magnifid. English prtj wrikns, 
pedily fixing upon snch relationsi, changed the mme of battle 
Tor rnassacre; and thus prejudice, wnceit, and factious clamoar, 
have combined to violate the d e c o m  of h i s t o ~  ami perpetua& 
mor. 
3'. The French were not monstm, but if wonld be egregious 
emr im suppoae there wm no msc for the ncrimony diaplayerl 
a@t them. Junot, neither cruel nor personnlly obnoxions 
fo t h  Portuguem, waa a sensunl pnssionate per- 
son, ancl extravagant. Such men are alwap 
rapacious as weli as getL8roU; and ae the cha- 
racter of the chief inRuences the manners of hia followtjrs it 
may be mfely assnmed that mmy aped his vlces. Tbe virtuous 
general T m t  ms an undoubted exception, and alone in the 
midst of tumult, he was reqected by &e Portupe,  d i l e  
Loion m scarceIy aafe when surrounrled by troop. me 
execrations poured forth at tbe mere mention of the tcbhody 
Xaneb," m, from the loss of hia  hmd, he wm caIled, prores 
that he committed mmy heiuoas acta; ani? Kellerman waa 
stigmatixed for rnpcity, M much rrs Loison wns for violente, 
It is not just hawevcr t o  revile tbe Frencb for r e p ~ s i n g  the 
hoatility of the psmtzy by m i l i t q  execlitiom : they followd 
the mistom of war, and are not liable to repmof, nnlwii their 
rigour m excessive. An Lnsmection of ormed percanta is a 
militarg anrirchy; they mnnler ptqglerri, tortura prisonerri, 
cleshy hospitals, poison weils, he& down aU m p ~  which 
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soften the enmities of modem nationx, veay no badge of 
hostility, and their devices are secret, their war one of exter- 
minatioa It must be rqirepsed by terrible exampleu, or the 
civilization of modcrn customs maat bo discnrdcd for tlie 
devastating systtrn of tlie ancienta. To refuse quarter to nn 
wmcd pensnntry ancl burn theu irilkes mrry appear barbaroug 
md unjust, wliereas, founded upon necessity, iG is only the 
infliction of parthl edl t o  prevent unbemal caltbmity. Never- 
thelew, no wise rnm aawjl hhastyrccsort to it, or carry it t o  any 
g m t  extent. 
PENINSULA WAR. 
NAPOLEON'S des ip  agabst Portugal waa neither a rmnt nor 
a secret project. In 1806, hfr. Pox hd sent lord Rofislq-4 
Fariiamen- lord St. Vincent, and general Bmcoe, on a politico-. 
tm ~apers, d i t a r y  mission, t o  wam the Lisbon conrt that a 
1809. French invading m y waa asaembling at Rayonne, 
and to offer the aid of a Britisl~ foroe. Thc Portupece c a b i  
affected to diibeiieve the information, Mr. Fox diid duririg thi? 
n~goti~tion, and the wm with Pnissia divcrting ~ a ~ o l e o n ' s  
- - 
atiention to more irnportnnt uhjects, he wi&lidrew liis troops 
fmm Bayonnc. T b e  Tory ndministration, which aoon aftcr 
ovcrturned tlio Grenvillo p r t y ,  thought no furthcr of tbk 
nffair. !!ley, indeed, at a lnter period, aent sir Sydney Smith, 
with ia quadron to Liabon, Srrt tlicir views were wnfined to 
thc crnigration of tlic roya1 familly; and tliey intnisted tlie 
negotiation to lord 8trunsford, n goung man of no influence or 
which the danger of Portugal liad no; excited. It waa sup- 
posed, Russia and EngIand bebg in a state o£ hostiiity, tlie 
presente of these ships would intimidnte the prinoe regent and 
preved him from passing to the BraziEs. Sir CEisrles Cotton, 
an admid of higher rank than air 8ydney Smith, w a  th- 
fore aent out, with instructioea to force the entrance of the 
Tagus md attrsck Siiiavin. Spencer, then on the point of 
sailing with fiw thousnnd men upon a secret expedition, was 
osdered to touch at Libon, aud ten tliousand men, 
Fadiamen- 
t, p,, under  ir John Noore, were wihdram from Sicily 
1809. 
Sir John t o  aid tris enterprise; but before the bstructions 
Jlnorei were even mitten the prince regent waa on his 
"OUm'L1~ voyeige to the Brazils md Junot ruEed in Lisbon. 
f U Y .  
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nothing of sir Sydney Smith, nor oF Bpencer, nnd proceeded 
to Englmd. From thence, after a detcntion of four months 
on sliili-lmad, Iia waa decpatched with hii fine army by the 
minlstm upon that erninently-foolish eapedition to Sweden, 
wliich ended in m& an extraordinary rnanner; and had in 
reality ody the diagracefnl, fattious ohject, of keeping an excel- 
lent general and a sirperb division of troops, at a diatance from 
the only country wliere their semces were rally reqiiid, 
Spencer's armament, long bdied by contmry winds and 
once forced back t o  port, wras finslly dispersed in a storm. A 
part arrived at Qjbraltkr in the latter end of January, 1 808 ; 
but on the 5th of Febrnary, the governor, sir Hew Datrymple, 
believing a Frcnch fleet lid pwscd the Straits and run iip 
the Meditemnenn, sent the fimt eomem on t o  Sioily to 
reinforce that island. Spencer did not amive tintil the 10th 
of March, and, as his instmctions comprised tbe taking of 
Ceutia, ths bnttalions scnt to Sicily wera replnccd from 
Gibrtilhr. Tiie atta& on Ceuta wns judged in a oouncik. of 
war te be impracticrible, and tbe objects of Xpeneer'a expwli- 
tion were manifold. He mas t o  co-operate with Moore xgpinst 
the Russian fleet in thc Tagus; he-- to take tho ~ i e n c l l  
flwE nt Cndiz; lis was ta nssault Ceuta; lis WEIS ta mmake an 
attempt upon the Spanisli fleet st Port Malion. But tho 
wind wliicli broughk Moore to Lisbon blewwi Spencer from 
that port; admira1 Purvis convinced him the French fleet in 
Cadiz was invufrimble ta hia foroe; Ccuta, was tno stmng, 
and it only remained ta sail to Port Mahon, wlien tlie Spnnifili 
in~urrection breaking out, drew him back t o  Cadiz with 
dtered view. In relsting Dupont'a crampaign Spencer's pro- 
ceedinga at Cadis have been noticed ; yet it is neceaaary here 
to enlxrgc on Chose occurrenccs, which forhinntely brouglit 
him to tlie coast of Portugal, at the moment when air Artliur 
Wellesley lnnded in thut country. 
&tanos, as commanding at St. Roque, m s  early an abject 
of interest to Napoleoe, and two French ofñcers were 
privately scnt to sound bim. He h d  aecrdlp 
Sir Hew taken his pnd, and tliinking those oficem wcre nriirumpier 
cnrning trr iirrest h, at fimt resolved to kill them Compi)nd- 
eucs, JId. 
and fly bto aibralbar, but discovering h i ~  mistalre, 
treated thcm civillp and prosectited his original plana. 
Through une Viali, u merchpint of Gibraltar, he opened a 
AMl. clommunication witli sir Hew Ddrymple, and 
the Intkr, who hsd bccn closely watching the pro- 
- p s s  of mcntR, not only proniised assistance, but recommended 
rievcral importnnt memures, sucli ras the irnmedinte seixure of 
tho French ~qntldron ia Gadix, tlie security of tlie Spanish fleet 
at A.Tinorq nnd a qeetly communicntion mtli Xoutli America. 
I a f .  Before Castaños could mature his plans, the insur- 
rection broke out at SwiEle, ancl 110 acknowlerlged 
the autho~ty o€ the junta. Solmo then carne to Cadiz, and wris 
pressed by Epencer and Purvis to attack the Prcnch q d r o n ,  
They o f f e d  to co-operate if he wouId aadmit the Britisb 
troops into the city, but he expre~sed gmt displeacnre at this 
proposal, rmnd refused t o  treat, m event not unexpectd by sir 
Reiv DalrympIe; tine offer was made FP1tIiout EFE ~lnmrrmce, 
for he knew the FJpaniards were distrustful of Spenoer's 
expedition. Tbus a doulde interconme was w i e d  m, one 
confidential betwaen sir H e m  and Chtaiios, the other of a 
c l i m t e r  tu increase Spanish mspicion. And when it is 
considered that Spain and England were nominally at m; 
that the English commanders mere acting mithout the 
authority of their goymment; tbat they mere there, For the 
express purpose of attacking Ceiita, and h d  already taken 
the island of Perexil clone to that fortress, little mrprise can 
he excited by Solnno'a conduct. AS liis dcath, Spipcnccr and 
Purvia renewed tileir ofcrs to Morln. He alao refrised nnd 
June. fonced tlie Frencli squdmn to surrender; yet his 
operntions were so mana@ as to miss doubts of 
bis wirih to succe~l; md he immeilintely commenced a series of 
low intrigues, calculated to secnre lia personal safety, and enable 
him to betray Es canntry if the French proved the strongast. 
Aíter the reduction of tlie enemy's slilps, the m p l e  were 
Sir Hew h1- inclined to dmit  tlie ~ i~ l i s l i ,  ht t ~ l o c ~ l  jnnta, 
rJrmple3a ~ m -  swa y 4  by Norh's iepresentationa, were avem 
'c3wndenccln tu it ; and here, aliile eod- them in this 
Jisposition, he ~ecretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, 
saying, he looked entirely to the Britivh f o m  for the fubute 
defence of Cadie. Thns midealing, he passed with the people 
for an active patriat Faithout preparing for resi&nce, and by 
his doublc fnlschoods prcscrvcd n fair nppcnrance both witti 
tlie junta nnd thc English. Sir Bcw Ddrymple did not 
rnedda, he early cliscovered that Morla wiis an enemy of 
Castaños, and baring more conficlence in the latter, carried 
on the intercourse estnblished between them mithout refer- 
ente to the trmgactions rat Cadiz. He 6iuppZied him with 
ama and with two thousand h d s  of powder, and placing 
one English officer near him as a m i l i t q  corrwpondent, 
sent anotlier in tlie apacity of ai politid ngcnt l o  tlie 
supreme junta at Seville. W i i o s ,  as we have seen, ~fter- 
mrds.wkcd 8pencer ta  oo-opernte, unrl did not nbject, to 113s 
euterinn Cadiz, but proposed a landing at Almeira to mar& 
aa Xeres. Spencer would only occupy Cadiz. Morla, in 
pursuance of his ~ccret dwigns, then said, it wa4 impodant 
to fit out tl~c Spanish flcct, wlicrciipon sir Gmrge Smitli, 
empIoyed by Spencer to negotiate, promi~ed maney to pay tlie 
semen, who mere in a state of mutiny. Neither lord Colling- 
wood nor sir W. D d v p l e  mould confirm this promisc; and 
aa Ilttporit wrrs thcn ndvancing, Morla wis1i;d Spenccr nway, 
~ n d  pcrsunilctl him t o  snil for A yamonte, to prevent Avril 
crossiiig th Guadiana, ttliough he kuew thzt general had no 
intention of doing so. 
hfssansin's fliglit whea the British appertred at Ayamonte 
has been rdatcd, and Shiebmlt snys Spencer might hsve 
struck 3. great blaw. It woulil, bowever, llave been irnpmrlent 
to thow five tliousand infantry, without etluipment, without 
csvalr yt without a phm of arrns, into a conntry where all tbe 
fortrcsses wers possesd  by iin enemy wlio could bring 
twcnty thoiisand mcn into thc ficld. Spcnmr who knew littIe 
of tlm state of the Frsnch merely fe ipsd  a laucling, by which 
he aided the imurrection, and then, having received his 
detachent back from Sicily, returned to Cdiz, from whwce 
he was mlled to  Lisbon in aid of a ncm project ill judged 
nnd fniitk.9~. 
Sir Cliarlm Gotton liad cIoseIg blockadd tlie moutb of ths 
Tags,  hoping to  make the Itussian sqwdron nrr. rmning 
mpitdate frorn want. This was lord Strangford'8 ~~~~~ 
device, and bad no climce oE sucoess; hut it Dec. ltiu?. 
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augmented tlie misery of the people, and Jnnot amonggt 
other expedients to ahste the eril, employed one Watarq a 
Portugese, to make offers to the English adrnk1. Pret~nd- 
ing to come nnknom to Junot, thia man pemuaded Cotton 
only four thoumnd French were in Lisbon, and in thtit error 
he had called Spencer to the attack. ?%e latter, aeting with 
the advice of Dalrpple and lord fhliingw~od, wme, but 
Pnrliamen- 60011 discovered that fifteen tliouatand men were 
tw r i t p a  in, or close to Lisbon, md returned to Cadis. 
1 ~ 0 %  Cssktib then again pscssed bim to coaperate 
mith the Spanish amy, and he conaented ta disembark at 
SIr Hcw M- port St. Mary ; he even v e d  ta sena a detach. 
ryrnples COF ment to Xera ; yet, deceived by RTorIa, mho still 
respondenm. gave him hopes of ftnaIly occupying Cadiz, 
resoI~ed to keep his inajn body cloae to th& city. 
At this period, the insurrection of Andalusia attracted 
the intriguing adventurers in the Meditemnean fowarus 
Gibraltar rind Seville, and the confusion of Agramant's camp 
wonld have beeu rivallcd, if sir Hew Dalrymple had nok 
checked those politial pesta. Arnong the perplexing folljw 
o€ the moment, Óne WRS remarkable, and its fnll explanation 
must be lcft to other historians, who wilI perhap find in it 
and like ~ffairs,  a key to that absurd policy which in iSicily 60 
long sacrjficcd thc ñyeIfare of two nations to  the whima antl 
folliea of n profligate court. To establish the sdiqne lnw h d  
bccn a favoririte project of the Spanish Bonrbons, and had 
h n  promalgated, but mvcr with tlie formnlities necessacy +a 
render it valid : the notlon wm avem to tlie chane. Some 
ol tlie SeviIle junb now siecretly siongl~t to revive this Iitw) 
Sir l7ew M- designing to make the princc of Sicily rcgcnt, 
rympie'e ~ o r .  WI~O woul(1 then, Ferdinnnd and bis brother dying 
" ~ n d e n c c .  ~vithout issue, M it wns aupposed tiley sonld do 
in Fmnce, succeed, to the prejudice of Cfirlott~ of Fortupl. 
In tliis view, Roliertoni, n Ricilinn figcnt, appenred tit Gib- 
raltar, where lie seemecl to act mder the a u q i w  of En",ngmd, 
wliile forwnrdinp tliis desire; liut sir Bew Dalgmple, liming 
accidentaUy discovered tliat the British cabinet disapproved of 
hia nhjoct, sent him n w v .  
Castnlios, deceived by the in triguers, wm incliied to q p o r t  
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the pretensions of the Sicilian pinos to the regenty; he even 
propod  to use Dalrymple'e nsme to g i ~ e  weight to hia. opi- 
nions, whleh wanld have createa great jealousy in Spain, but 
sir Rew promptlp refusecl his sanction. Thc affair then seemed 
t o  droop, yet in the middc of July an Engliih man-of-war 
suddcnly n p p e a d  at Gibraltar, having on board prince Leo- 
pold of Xicily, Hrit11 a court estnlilislimcnt, diambcrlains witb 
keye, mhew with wliite wands; mil the duke of Orleans, who 
carne with the prince, m d e  no secret of their intention to 
negotiate for the regency, and dernanded a reception in G~TBI- 
tar. Sir Hew refused to permit the prince er any of hia 
attendnnfs to land ; aud as the mptnin of tbe ship, w h m  orders 
were m d y  to carry him to Gilirnltm, re.Emed to take liim 
back to  Bieily, hi sitwtion was painfd : to relieve liim, sir 
Rew consented to adrnit liim as a mes4 X he would divest 
himsdf of an.ny public cheracter and sint the duke awap. 
Sir Willinrn Dmmmond, British envoy rit Palermo, Mr. 
Viali, and the duke of Orlean~, were the ostensible contrivers 
of tlis not.able nchenie, by mbich, if it had wcceeded, a amall 
parby in a local junta nonld llave appointd a regency for 
kpain, piiverl tlie wny far nltcring the lnwa of ~ u c c e ~ ~ i o n  In 
that country, established their orvn away over the other juntas, 
mand created interminable jedousy betwean England Portugal 
and Spain. With whom &e plan originated dpes not clertilg 
appear. Dnitnmonu's reprcsentritions induced sir 
Appendtr. AIexander Eall to provide tlie uhip OI war, nomi- K,, 
naIly for the conveyance d t he  duke of  Orleans, 
in xeal ib for prince Leopold, witli whose intended vopge sir 
Alexander doea not appear to h m  been m d e  quainted.  
Tbat. the princc shotild I ~ R V C  dmiircd t o  he regent of Spnin wm 
natural; tliat he shonld b a ~ e  been conveyd t o  Gibraltar in a 
British ship of $he line, mhen the EngIish gu~mment  disap- 
proved of his pretensions, was strange. Drum- 
mond, t.he intimate friend of Mr. Canning, could n i d .  
scarcely h v e  proceded mch lengtlis withaut ~ecret instmc- 
tiom from some memlier of his omn government ; yet lord 
CastEereagh expressed unqualified approbation of sir Hew's 
decisive conduct n p n  the occasion ! Did the ministers act at 
thig period without any confidentid cornmunication with a c h  
other? or was lord Oastlereagh's policy secretly and designediy 
thwarted by one of Es colleaguea? 
I t  M now necessarg t o  retuni to Fortugnl. 
In 0110rto the bisliop wau p l a d  at tlie h e 4  of the insiir. 
rectioniil junta and claimed the assistance of Engl~nd. ' T e  
hope,' said he, ' for an aid of tliree hundred thousand cruzado 
novas, srrnp, antl montrernents, clotli for fosty tliwsand 
infantry and eigllt tliousand cavalry, t l ree thousand barre18 of 
m n o n  powder, some wgoes  of salt fish, and other provisions, 
and an auxiliaq body of ~ i x  thousand men at least, including 
some cavalq,' This extravagant demand would imply that 
an immense force hd been assembled by the prelate; yet he 
m l d  not put h e  thousand orpnixed men in motion agaimt 
+he French, and had probabIp not even thought of my fcasible 
or rathnal mode of employing the succours he demanded. This, 
hii prepostemus rquisition, wag not rejected by the Engliih 
minfsters, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, witli 
powcr to grant mpplics, on the improvident systern adopted 
for Spin :  and they produced precisely tho aama cravils, in- 
trigue#, waste, insuhdinntion, i n o r t h t e  vanity, md ambition 
among thc ignorant i~pstiirt men of thc &y. 
More tlia~i Iialf a yenr liad now elnpacd since Nnpolcon drat 
poilred Iiiu f o m  into the Penimulu. Every moment of tliat 
tinie was mnrked by some extraorrlinaiy eyent, ancl a montli 
had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking tlie 
ansteady structure of diplomncy t o  piecm, 1id Ieft a clear 
space for the shock of ams.  Yet the Bntish cabinet mas stilI 
unacquainted with the real atate of public fwling in the Penin- 
pnr,, pap, suJB, a d  ndt>h the Spanish character; and with a 
"aatl* disposable army o£ eiglity thousmd excellent tmopñ, 
reng1i to sir 
,\. iveiiwier, was totalty umettled in its p l q  and unpreparsd 
for any vigorous effort. Agents mere indeed de- 
~patcbed to every accessibls province, tlie public treasure was 
scattered with H d e s s  profnsion, &e din of prepamtion was 
hesrd in wery deprbment, ; but the bustle of confusion iis 
mily mistaken for the activity of business, and time, removing 
the veil of official mystery oovering those transactions, hari 
exposed all. their duU and rneagre features: the treasure was 
squandered without jutlgment, the troops dispmed without 
meaning. Ten thwsand soldiers exiled to Sñpeden, proved the 
tnith of Oxenatiern's address t o  his son; as many more, Idly 
kept in Sicily, wwere degraded as the griards o£ a vicioua court ; 
Gibrdtrtr was rinnecerrsnrily filler1 with fighting mcn; and 
Spcncer wandered betwreii Ceiita, Lidion, nnd Wig seeking, 
like the knight of La Mancha, fOa a foe to combat. 
A comiderabIe force remained in Englmd, but it ww not 
formcd thc only disposalile army for immediate operations. 
The Grey and arenville administration, ao remarknlile for 
unfertunate militaq enterprises, l id assembIed this limrlful of 
men with a view to permxnent conqaests in Sonth America l 
upon what principie of policy it is not necessary to inqnire, 
Iiut such WM tlie intcntion ; perhnp in imitntion of the Romnn 
genate, wlie sent trwps tte S p i n  wlien Hannibal was at the 
ptes of the city. The Tory administration, relinquishin, this 
sclieme of conqiiest, directed sir Arthur NTellesley to inform 
RZimndrr, thc military ndventurci of the dny, not onlg thnt ha 
niu& cease to expect nssistnnce, but that a11 attempta to sepw- 
mte the colonies of Xpin from tbe pwent s h t e  would be 
discoumged by the English go~ernmnt. Tbus tlie troopa 
asscrnblcd at Cork bmmc avnilnble, ~ n d  sir Artlinr being 
appointed to cornmrrníl tliem, sniled on tlie 1Stli of July, t o  
commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula wbicli 
he ms destined to terminate in wch a glorious rnanner. 
Two small diviaions wcre, soon a f b ,  nsscniblcd for embark- 
ation nt Ramsgnte and Harwidi, untler tlle cnm- 
en- 
mana of generals Anstrutlier md Aclmd; yet tnry F a p m  
a considerable time elapsed befora tlie3- mere "08' 
rehcly t o  sail, nnd a sinplnr uncehinty in the views of the 
ministers nt this pcriod, sulijected la11 tlie militnry o p t i o n s  
to perpetud and mischievoua chmges. Spencer, supposed to 
be at Gibratar, mas directed to repir to C d z  and await sir 
brthur$ orders; tbe Eakter mas permitted to  sail undcr tlw 
impremisiun tliat Spencer WIW wtuiilly mbject to  md, 
lifs command, whilc ohhw iiistructioiis ernpomenetl l ~ o f i  M l e -  
r e ~ g l t  o sir Spencer, at li ig own discretion, to commence h. \ v L . ~ ~ ~ Q ~ ~  
operations in the south, without referente to sir 3*t11 Junc. 
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lbid. lord Collin,gwood'a amival had no geparate com- 
rdra Gaatle- mand, was authorized to undertalre any enterprke 
rciipli tw gen. Ppenc e,., 2atith iu that qunrter, aud wcn t o  control tbe opera- 
nna 90th tions of sir Artliar by czlling for the aid of his 
Jiine. 
h. to  n ~ m ,  troops, tliat general being enjoined ta pay al1 duo 
Puwi*~ obediente to any such rcquisition 1 Yet sir Arthur 
Junc. hímself was informcrl, tliat tlie accounts h m  
Cbdiz wore bad; thnt no di6position to move either there or 
in the n~ig-hbourliood  Gibraltar mns visible, and the cabinet 
were unwilling be ~liould go t n the soutli\~~md, wl~ilst he ~pirit 
of exertion alipearcd to reside more to the nortliward. Sir 
Charles Cotton waa informed tliat Wslleslcy wm to co-perate 
with him in a clesoent at tlie mouth of tlie Tagus; but sir 
Arthur himself l i d  no d d n i t e  oliject given for his o m  
operations, although his instr~tctions poiuted to PortupL 
Thue in fact no officer, naval or rnilitary# lu1m exactty what 
his powers ivere, with the exception of Pumis; who being only 
second in comniand ior Es own service, !vas really authorixed 
to control nlE tlie operations of the Iand forces, provided he 
directed tliem tu that quarter whicli liad been dedared unfa- 
vaurablo for any operatioiis at al1 l These inmnsistent ordas 
were mlculatad to create oonfusion and prevent al1 vigour of 
action. More egregious conduct follewed. 
In recommending Portugd as the fittest field of action, the 
ministeiri were ehieffy guided by tbe advice of the Asturian 
deputiefi, dthough sir 1-IPW Dalrymple's despatches gave more 
, , , wccnt and exkusive information t h  any mp- 
l m a  cr~tle- plied by tl~ose deputies. T h e  latter left Spain at 
mugh í o  @ir 
,vgrl,l,, the commcncement of the inmrrectioa, were ill- 
a*tli Jiitla informed of mhat w%s passing in  their o m  pro- 
vince, ipormt <if the state of other parte of the Peninsuia, 
and of no capacity to advise in momentous dair#, But 
though  ir Arthur Wellesley was so vaguely iinttructed as to 
his mili* operations, he was expressly toId, the intention of 
the government waa to enable Portugal and Spain to throw off 
the French yolíe; and wmple cliirections werc given t o  him aa to 
bis future political conduct in the l'eninsula. Hewas informd 
how t o  dcmeaii himself in anp diapntes arising between the 
insurgent nations, hom ta act with rehtion to the settlement 
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of the Eiupreme authority during the intmrepum. He was 
dirceted to facilitate mmmnnic~tions betmccn thc coloniea and 
the rnothcr coiintqv, and ofcr tto arrangc R R ~  (liff'cr~ncc~ betwcen 
them. The terms upon d i c h  Great Brihin would acquieace 
in my negotiation between Spain and France werc imparted 
to liim; and finally Le was empewered to recommend tbe esta- 
blishment of a pnper system in the  Peninsula, as a good modo 
of rnixing rnoney, nnd nttnd~ing thc 1101 dcrñ of it to tlic nnfionul 
cause ! Tbe Xpaniards were not, Iiowever, mfficiently civilised 
to adopt tliis fine recommendation, md harbarously preferred 
p l d  to credit, at a time when no man's life, or Eaitli, or wealth, 
or power, was worth a weelr'ri pnrchase. 
Sir Eiew wm mmrmntled to furnisli sir Artliur wvitli every 
information which *1it be of we in bl~e opern- 
arl, 
tions; and when the tenour of these instructions, ~ m r d  Cautie- 
and the great Indian iepntation enjoyed bg the ::$,D,l- 
Iatter, are considered, it is not t o  be dotibted he rymple, 
wae desiperl to lead tlie army of England. Yet, 
2Ptli  Jme. 
scarcely had he ~ai led when 11e was superseded. Not by one 
man whoae Fnme and cxperience migllt have justified the a&, 
Eiub with a sweep, beyond mere vacillation, he was retluced to 
the fouLtli rank in that army, for the future governance of 
which he ha4 fifteen days hefore, received the most extended 
instmctiona. Sir Hew m s  now nppointed to the chief cam- 
rnand; unrl sir John Moo% who lid auddenly and unex- 
pded ly  returned from the Baltic, ha~ing by hii fimness and 
nddress saved Iiim~elf and his tniops from the madness of tbe 
Swcdish monarcli, waq, with mnrkeri disrcspect, dircctcd tm 
place himaelf u~irler tFie orders of Bir H q  Rurrard, and pro- 
ceeded ta Portugd. Thue tm men, compt ive ly  unknown 
and unused to the command of amies, superseded the only 
generals in the Uritish aervice wlrose tdents and experience 
wcre inrli~putmble. Tlie ~ecret aprings af t l i i s  proceerling nra 
not tro deep as to Iiafle investigation; but that task scarcely 
belonp to tbls history: it ia suficient t o  ~ h o m  the &ects of 
cnvy, treacliery, and base cunning: withozit tracing those r i c a  
home t o  t h e i ~  possessors. 
Notwithstariding tlrw changes, the uncertainty of tha 
minister'~ plana continued. The same day that sir Hew was 
1 a 
appointed, a despntcli, contitining tlie TolIowing 
Parl. l'~. project of cmpnign, wm sent to sir ArtIiur. ' The 
Lord Cantle- 
rewh to moti~es which have induced the sending so large 
*- 'Yellmrv, a fmw to  that quarter (the cdast of Portugal) are, 16th July. 
1st) to providc effcctnally for an attnek upon the 
Tagua; Zndiy, t o  biave sucli an arlditiond force disposable 
beyond what mny be indispenuably requisitc for that operntion, 
8s mrty d m i t  of a detachmcnt being mnde to tlie soutbward, 
eithcr with a v im to secum Cndix, if it rrhoiild bc thrcntened 
by the French force nnder genera[ Dupont, or to cri-opcrate 
with the Spanish troops in rcducinp tlint corps, if circum- 
atances ~bould favour such an operation, or any otlicr tliat may 
be conccrted. Ria Mnjcsty is plcascd to irircct that the a t t d  
apm EJE@ Tqwa s M ~  be c m ' h e d  as th J%& o6j& to ba 
athded to; and as the whole forcc, of u41icEi n stnkment ja 
encloscd, whcn mscmMcd, will amount t o  not lcss than tliirty 
thousand, it is & u h e ~ J  tl~ai: EiotIh ~micari may E ~ B  pro- 
vnX4 fw am&. TEicprccise distríliution, rts bctmccn Portugl 
and Andalusin, both ns t o  timc nntl proportion of forcc, miist 
depend u p n  circumstnnc~s, t o  be jurlgcd of on tlie upot; snd 
sliould it be deemed wlvisable to fulfil tire assurnnce wliicli 
lientenant-gencral sir Rcw Dnlryrnplc rappcnrs ta Iinvc i v c n  
to tlie mpreme junta ol Sevilte, undei tlic aiitliority nf my 
desy~tch af (no datc), tlmt it wns thc lntcntion of his Mnje&y 
to employ a corpa of ten thouaud mcn to cc-opemte \vitli ths 
Bpnniitrtls in tlint quarber; ti curp  of tliia rnagnitiirle mng, 1 
sliould hope, be detaclierl witliout prejucliw to tlie mdn opera- 
tion appinst tlie Tqp, nnd may be rcinforced, nocording to  
circumstances, &er the Ttbglls has been secured. But if, 
prcvious ta thc nrrivnl of thc f o m  undcr ordcrs fmm Xngland, 
Cdix ~liould bo wriously thrcrttened, it rnuat rest with tlie 
seiiior oficer of tlie Tngu~, ni his discrction t o  detacli, upon 
receiving a rquisition to that cfict, such m amount of f11m 
as muy put that imporhnt place auk o£ thc rendi of h m e -  
diate danger, mm i i m g I ~  it ~ILmdd fw t ? ~  t h  mqmd qwa- 
tiuna qnimt  tb Tqw.' TIie date of this despntch wns the 
Gth of July, but to misled thc pulilic it wae purposelg lcft 
out in the copy laid before Pur'lhment. Tlie incuiisictekit folly 
of the domiment ia however auficiently apparent 
To occupy Ca¿íiliz was a favourite project Gth tbe Cabmet. 
Neithcr Spencda p~ucceaduful effort to gain adrnittance, nor 
thc rcpresentilftnna of sir EIew, who hnd groiind to hclievc the 
attempt would bring rIown tlie m y  uncler Caetaños to  oppose 
it by force, h d  any weight with the ministera. They did not 
see, that in a political viem, such a meacure, pressed as a pre- 
Iiminary, mould give a handIe for misrcpresentation; and that, 
in r~ military view, tlie bmlcn of Cadiz would dog opcrations 
in Fortupl. Adupting nll projects, and weigliing nona, tliey 
di~played the most incredible confusion of ideas; for tLe plan 
of sencling ten tEiousnnd men to Seville, wa3 daid t o  be in 
pursuance of rt promise d e  by @ir Hew to thc junta, 
mhereas tlie dcipri-tch of thnt gcneml, quoW m airthority for 
this promise o€ IleIp, contaiaed notliing of the kind, and waa 
even written hfm m?/ junta m*dd / 
But at tliis period, personal enrnity to Napoleon and violent 
p r t y  pwjudiccs, l i d  so disturbcd thc j~id~mcnts of men rela- 
tive to tliat monarch, tlint any information qealtiiig of 
strength or snc~ess for him, was regardd witli suspicion. Slie 
ministers, as comrnonly Iiappen~ in mch cases, Iiecrame the 
dupes of thcir own prncticw, listcning with cornpliwcncy to 
a11 those talw o€ mutiny aniong liia troope, disaffection oE liis 
generah, and insur&ions in France, which the cunning or 
folly of their agenta transrnitted to tliem. Hence spmng 
sucli projects na tlis onc nbovc, tlie fdsc cnlculntions of ~vhich 
may be expo~ed by a sliort comparativo stahment. The; whole 
Znglish force disposable mas not much abovc tlirty thousand 
men, and was distributed off Cadiz, off the coasf of Portugal, 
on the erastern parts of Engtand, nnd in the Cliannd. She 
French in Spnin nnd Portugnl m-crc nbout n h u n d d  nnd 
twenty thowand men, and they poseessed all tlie Portnguese 
and most af the Spanish forfxcsses. The English army had 
no reme,  no h e d  plan; it was to be divided, and act upon 
a doiihlo lino of opcrntiona. T h e  Frcnch hnd a atmng reseme 
at Bayonne, the grand French army of four hndred thonaand 
d e r a s  mas untouched and ready t o  mccaur tlie trogs in the 
Peninsula i£ they required it. 
Eappily, tliis visionary plnn in no particular followed 
by the generttls entmsted with the exeeution. The mtmtrophe 
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. of BayIen marred the great combinations of the Freneh 
emperor, fortune drew the scattered divisions of the Eiiglilsh 
army together, md the decisive vigonr of sir Arthnr WellesTey, 
smeeping away tl~ese cobweb projed, ohained al1 tlie succem 
the bad amgementg of tlio ministers would permit. XJI the 
next cliapter tlie proceeding of the fimt Briti~h ccampaign in 
tlie Peninsula shall be related; but it mas fitthg first to expme 
the previous preparations and plans of the abinek lest the 
reader, not beiag fully awaIrened to the difficulties cnst in tlie 
way of the English generals by the incapxcfty af the govem- 
ment, shouId, with hwty censure or nig.gnrtl p i s e ,  do the Eormer 
injustice: for as a noble forest hides mzng noisome swamp 
and evil tliings, so the duke of Wellington's actiow have 
covered the innumerable errors of tlie miuisters. 
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Sm Amam WELLECILEY'S exWtion sailed fmm Cork, he 
preceded it to Coruña, md on thc 20th of July , wel- 
oonfcrred with the Gdlicinn junta, who told him ~ I c J ' s  Xar- 
riliiue. 
of the httlc of Rio Scco nfter thc Spnnish mnnner. h o , t  ,f 
It 1 1 4  not cliangd their policg, which wari, in "q&y* 
truth, a ooastant efforb to obtnia money nnd avoid persona1 
inconvenience. Tliey refused tlie aid of troaps, but demanded 
n m s  and gold, and whilr: the cnnfercrice went on, un English 
frig~t.e arr i~ed with two hundred thousnnd pounds; then tliey 
desired to be rid of their guect, and recommended him to 
opsrate in the north o£ Portugal. Tbey p v e  a false statment 
of the number of S p ~ n k h  xnd Portiigueae in m ncor 
Oporto, promised to rcinforce tliem with another xr- 
division, and p v e  still more incorrect informa- Corrc~wnli- 
tion of Junot's atrengtb, and thus persurrded sir 
Arthur not to lmd in Gulli& though it wns nt the mercy 
o.€ Bessibe~, having neitlier mea nor meniis to resist l i ia p~o- 
gresa. 
Mr. Charles Stuart, the British envoy to the junta, carne 
d t h  the general, xsnd quickly penetrating the f l img veil of 
Spnnish entliusinsm, i n f o m ~ l  his government of the tmc Rtnte 
reports of the ~iubedimte civil and rnilitary agents were 
blazoned fortli, eand td~en as sure pides. Sir krtliur pro- 
d c d  t o  Oporto, mhere he fonnd eolonel Brownc, an Fntelli- 
gcnt oficer empluyerl to distribute succoiirs, lvho told him no 
Spanish troops were In the north of Fortupl, and the Porku- 
bmme force wns npon the Nondego, Go the south of which 
river the insurxection had sprcad. Eight tliousmd French 
were supposed t o  be in their front, and some great disaster 
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~ I o n e ~  m fa be cxpcctcd, because, with e e v y  good 
n ~ ~ n ~  wiIl i tlic pcuplc, thcir cxertions wwc so short- 
Cori~cspond. 
ence. livcd, ant? witli so Pittle combiiitition, there wns nb 
Iiopc of thcir being ablc to rcsiat tlic acIvances of 
Wñiamm- 
tnry pnm, tlic cnemy;' in friet, only fivc tlioirsrmd replnrs 
1809. nrid militii~, liiiIf nrmerl nntl nsl;ocit~tect witli ten ar 
twdva thonsiuid pcaqanta Mthout nny nrrnir, ivcrc in tlio field. 
A Iargc i~rm~r wnsi m d e  out upon pnper by tlie 
g+$zk bishop of Qpnrto, d i o  proposeil vmioun pllins uf 
rafii-e. opcration, wliicli sir Artliur wns nut incliiid to 
itdopt. Aftor s m  diricussinn: tlie prelnte n p i ~ ~ l  
that tlie pnper amy ~l iould Iook t o  the deferice of 
the Trns os Montes ngainst RessiFres, and tlie five tliousand 
aoldiers on tha Mondcgo .olioulil bo joincd by the Rritish. 
Thc Rnglish general tlien bn~tened to con~ult sir Glimrles 
Cotton upon the rlcscent nt the mouth of tlic T n p ,  u-hlch Iind 
RO long Iiaunted t11e imaginations of tlie ministem; but ths 
ñtrengtli of thc French, tlie b ~ r  of ttic rivcr, thc dispositinn of 
t11e forts, the dificulty of Inniling in tlre imnieriiiite neigl~bour- 
hood, wlisre a lienvy uurf Ilrolce iti nll tlic undcfenrled creeks 
and bnyfi, eonvinced him mcli nn enkrprise ms rrnntlvimhle, 
if not imprmticnlile. To land nortli of Lisbon far enough to 
avoid a dispntd disembarkation; or, to proceed $ir b. Wel- 
]edeyk N* southwa~d, join spmcer, and nct n3inst  Dupont, 
mtive. 
Cniirt oi remaid.  Sir Artl~ur judged the latter unpm 
~nqliiry. mising wllile Junot held Portugn!, md Bessieres 
. hung an tlie northern frontier. Xpanish jealousy 
m n l e b  would, he foreaaw, produce tcdious negotiations, 
nrid lord M- 
miingwon#s and snste tlie season of action, or the can-paip 
Cor"Op"d- mould be cornmenced witliwt a place of arms. enw. 
To &e the fidd pmanently with E0urt.e~ 
thuusand qainst twenty thousand French strangly posted jn 
the 3forcna, and having mmmunicatlon mith their main bodp 
at Madrid, wonld be folly, unnless asmred of the fighting 
qualities of the Spanish troopj whieh were unknown. A 
momentary advance mould be useless, and in a protracted 
campaign, the h e  of opemtions, ninning p ~ r d l e l  t o  the 
Portugal frontier, would require a oo~ering army on ths 
Guadiriua to watch Junot. 
h r d  Castlereqh'~ double lbe of eperatiom Piolatcd al1 
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amived. Tie had not recaived sir Arthur's orrlers, but with 
ready judgment sded for tho T a p ~  ti18 moment Dupunt 
siirrended, and wns by sir C. Cotton directed to the RIon- 
dego. The two corpg homever, couZd only furnish twelve 
tlioumnd three liundred men, and íb vet eran tnattalion W I ~ B  not 
disambarked, being destined for Gibraltar. 
Wben the tmops were OR ohore, the British general repnired 
to Hontemor Vellie, to confer &h don Bemardim Freire da 
Bndrada, the Portupese conimander-in-chief, mho proposed 
t o  nriite al1 the troops, relinquish the coast, rnarch into the 
lieart of Deira, and comrnence an orensive crtmpaign, Ba 
promised ample stores of proviaioiis, but sir Artliur plnced no 
reliance on I~is promises. ETc Raye Freire five thousand 
stand of arms with ammunitlon, refuxing to separate from his 
ships ; for seeing clearly the inswgents were ninable to give any 
real asistame, Iie resolved to tict with reference to tlie pro- 
' 
hahility of  their cleserting him in dnnger. lrritated at this 
refusal, Freire reluctnatly consented to join the British amy; 
but pressed Air h h u r  to hasten to Leiria, lest ss large nixpzine 
fiiled t is  be &med with provisions for the use of the Ddtish 
army, sliould fa11 into the enemy's liands; whwefore the 
advlincsd gund of the English army quitted the Mondego 
the 9th, taking the road to  Leiria, aud the main body followed 
the next day. 
Sir Arthur's plan embmced tliree principal objects: 
19 To bold on by the coast for ~ h i p  mpplies, tbus xvoiding 
a drain of men to protect magmines on sliom, and covering 
the ltinding of reinforcements from England. 
2'. To keep the troops in mas, t o  strike an imporhnt 
blow. 
3'. To strike that blom as nesr Lisbon as possible, and bring 
the aff& of Portugal to a crisis. 
Posswsing very good m i l i b y  sumeys of tbe ground in thc 
immedkte neighbourhood of Lisbon, he wn9 
Sir A. Wel- 
lmfcy,s Pr'ar- anxious tO operate where he could ami1 himseIf 
rutive. of this resource; but the iaexperience of his com- 
Court of 
zIisuram rnissariat staff and the wnnt uf cavalry, rendered 
hig movements slow and circumspect. The insiir- 
rection was a generous yet feeble efforb, and its prolongntion, 
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rather the resdt of terror than of hope; the blow bad been 
hastily strnck in the rnornent of suflering, and the patriots, 
can~cions of wrrakncac, trembled when tbci  rcflcctd on tlieii 
own temerity. Berna~drn Freire h ~ l  received moeening 
arms and eqnipmenta complete for five tliousand of tiic &urt 
sddiers, y e t  his army at Leiria did not exceed six Ofluqu'ry. 
thousnnd men of all-nrms tit foi aetion; and hesides this force, 
thcrc ~verc, in al1 tlie provinccs nortli of tlie Taps ,  only thres 
thousand infnntry under the oommanci of the mar+ o€ 
Vslladerm, half of wliom were Spariiards : tlit? lofty stylc 
sdopted by ttlie junta o£ Oporto in tlieir communimtions witl~ 
the British miniseera was ridiculoua. 
Upon the other side, Junot, who bad received information 
of tlie &gl;lish descent In the Monrlego, as early as the Znd, 
wns cmlvnrrtlssed by tlio [Iistanco of l i ia  principal 
force, auud tlie hostile disposition of tlte iriliabihnts Thiebauli. 
of Lisbon. He also k n m  of Ilupont's disnster, and exag- 
gerated notions of tlie inaurrection were entertaincd iiy himself 
anrl liis principal oficers. The patriota o€ the Alemtejo and 
Algarves, tassisted by soom Epaniards, and animated by meni- 
festos and promises as4iduously promufgatd from the EngIisG 
fleet, 6ad oncc more assemblcd at AIcnocr do Sal, from whcncs 
tliey threatened the prrimn of St. Ulieti, and tliose Frencli 
poats on t11e south baiilr of the Taps, iinmediatdy opposite to 
tlie capital, whicich was very wiguiet. The anticipation of 
coming freedom wm bsppnrent in  t.he wathful looks and 
atubborn mnnnm of tlic popiilnce, sirperstitiw wrrs at work 
to incresso tiis tiatred and tho Fiopes of tlie multiturle, fin(? 
it wits at thia time the prophetic egg" denouncing death to 
the French, and deliverance to the Portupese, appenred. But 
les  eguhcnl indications of  appruachinp danger were to  be 
d m n  from the hmitations o€ Junot, wlio, wnvcrin~ bctween 
his fear of  an insurrcctiun in Lislion and hia dcsirc to clieclr 
tlie immediate progress of the Rritish army, exhibited a mind 
yielding to the pressure of menta. 
Loiaon was in the neighbourhood of Eatremos with seven or 
eiglit thousand men; twa thausnnd five liundrad men were in 
the fortresses of Elvas aad Aheidtm; a few h d r e d  iiere- at 
Rbrnntes; a thouaand in Smtarem; a thousaud in FenicliB; 
general Thomiereeres, Gt11 ane bripde, was near A l c o b ~ a  T 
main b d y  mas in Lisban and its vicinity, on botli sidm 
the Taps, the right banlr of wliicl~ \vas ~tuiidcd with tlie ~ O X  
of Cucaes, St. Antonio, 8t. JuIian'n, Belem, md the citad 
Between those places smaller wworlcs aontinued thc line of fi 
afinst ships entering by the northern passage, On the 0th 
Iianlr, fod  Bugio, built upoa n Iow saudy point, crossd its 
fire witli S t. Juliad~, at tlie soutli entrance. The 
Thiebnnlt. fort of Pralnicln cro~vned tlie heights of tbat m e ,  
antl Xt. Ubes and Tsaffaaria completal tlie French posts. The 
communic~tion between tlie banke was maintained by the 
mfitted Partugucac sliips of war, tlie llussian squatlron, and 
tlie numerons Iarge bonts of  tlie Tws. 
TJien the Euglish disembterlred, Juaot directed Mson to 
march by Partalegre and Abmntes, and sent Laborde from 
Lisbon the Bth, to mntcIi sir Arthur, nnd cover Loi~on's march. 
Lnborde moved by Itio 3layor and Cmdeiros tu Leiria, wllere 
lie expccted to unite witlr Loison. Junot remaind in Lisbon 
fo awe the citizens by his presente, but he embarked al1 the 
p o d e r  from his mapzincs, tmk additional precautions ' 
guwd his Xpanish priaoners, and pat the citadel and forts in 
a state of siege. Meanmhile, Iieing disquicted by the patrio 
sssembled at Alcacer do Sal, he sent Kellerman with a moa 
abEe ooIumn to disperse them, directing bim to sccur tbe 
country towards Setuval, w j t h h w  tlie prriaon, abanrlon al1 
the F r e d  posts on tlie south of the Tagus except 
mid. Palmela, snd collect Ghe whole in one mass on the 
heights of Almada, where an enttenehed camp had been dredy 
commenccd. Kel.ellecman had scarcely departed, when two 
English regiments, the one from Madeira the other from 
Qibrattar, arrived oK tlie bnr of fisbon, causing new didrac- 
tions, and increasing the turbuIence of the populace, md in this 
perplcxity the duke o€ Abrnntes lingered until tLe lsth, when 
the prOpH6 of air Arthiir forced him t o  aasume the command 
of the ~rmg in the field. 
Loison entered Abrantes the 9tb, and Laborde rarrived at 
Candeirw, from wbich point he coda either move upon Aico- 
baya and Leirfq or form a, junetion with Loi~on npon the side 
of Snntarm The 10th, Loison h d t d  at Abranteg, but hborde 
moved t o  Alcobqa, where he was joined by Thom:eres and the 
g~rrison of Pcniclik. dntl lvhile tlie liostitc bodics ncrc Uius 
iu a state ol attraction, neivs o€ Bessieres' victory ah Rio Seco 
carne to the French army, and of ihe Ering's flight from Madrid 
to the 13ritish amy. Both were exultant. S'ir rwosc drnge 
A~thur's ndvarid p r d ,  howwer, entered Leiria of tile G u r t  
before Laborde, and was joind by Freire, mho "(luiry. 
immcdiately scixed the mngnzines, and gave no filiarc f o tlio 
Britisli. Ou tlie Iltli, sir Artliurk mrh indy arrivsd, and 
next day tlie mhds advanced. Laborde had sought for a 
position in the vicinity of Batalha, but finding tlie ground too 
extensive, Eell bnek in the night of the 12th to Obidwi, a towu 
with e Moorish costle, built on n gcntle emincncc in tlie midrlle 
of a vailey. Occupying this place lvith La piquets, Le posted 
a smalI detaclrmeat at the vivindmill of Brilos, t h e  miles in 
front, and retirerl the 14th to %rica, a v i l las  s i x  miles to the 
~outhivnrd, situi~ted nt tbc intcmeetion of the ronda l ed ing  t o  
TorresVedrns, Nontecliique, ancl Alcoentre, nnd over~ooking tlie 
wlrole vdey of Obidos. In this positioa he preserved his com- 
munication witb Loison, but Peniché whs thereby uncovered. 
Wlierefoio he scnt tlie foudll Bwiss regiment, -4th exception 
of the flanli companies, to regarrison that important point. 
Three hundred men were also cletaclied by hlm ta the right by 
Bombarrd, Cadaval, snd Fcgim, t o obtnin intelligence of Loison. 
For that general, ascertabing, by a mo~emcnt t o w d s  TIiomar 
on tlio l l th,  tliat tho Jlim werc in Lciria, liad fallen beelr tlie 
same dny to Toma Novae, and rmelted Santarern tho 13tIi, 
and Es eshausted troops were unable to renew their rnarch 
h f ~ r e  the 15th Xir drthur's first rnovement had tbns cut 
t l e  line of communimtion between Loison nnd Laborde, cauaed 
a loss of several forced marches to the former, and compelled 
the llater to risk m action witli more than tu*icc Ls uwn 
numbers. 
As the armim approached tlle Portuguese became alarmed; 
for, notwithstanding the laquage of tlieir rnanifestos, and 
bombastic conversrition, a conviction of French invinciliilit,y 
pervacled al1 ranks. The leaclem, lcnowing their own deficiency, 
and incredulws of EngIish courage, dreded a battle, because 
defeat wauld render it hnrd t o  m&e tcrms, wherem, ~vitli dve 
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or siñ tl~onsand men in nrms, tliey couId s m m  a capitulati01 
The O p o ~ o  junta, alrenxly ai- at supreme aukliority, forori 
saw dso? that ewn with victory, it would serve their p~~.rtieult 
views to have an a n y  untouched and dismnnected with 
foreign general. Freiee, well inatnrcted in the s m e t  desigr 
of thia party, resolved not to advnnce beyond hirI% but raa 
mmk demanded pruvisions from the Englisb, choosing t 
forget tbe magazine he had just monopolized, and the bishop 
fornial promise to food the Brititih troops. 
This e~t~raordinary rlemand, tliat an auxilia7 army jur 
landed, should nourisli tbe native soldiers instead of bein 
itself fed by the peoplej was met by sir Arthur Wellesley wit 
a strong remonstrance, He Bad p e n e h a  Freire's secn 
motives, y&, Teding tlie importante of a Portupese forrt 
xting in conjunction with his oim, he first appeaied t o  b 
Iionour and patriotism, dmonishing &m, that he would fork 
al1 pretemion to either if he Iet tlie Eritish fight without 
assistance. The rtppeal did not toucli Bernrardim, and he pre- 
tended a des ip  to act independently by tlie line of tbe 'Eva. 
Sir drtliur tlren changed frum rebule: t o concilitition, a@ng 
him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, bnt keep 
bebind the English and await the result. The dvice waa 
apea.bIe to Freire, ~ n d  colonel Trant, a military agcnt, per- 
mded him t~ place fourteen h u n d d  infantry, with two 
hundred and fifty cavaIry, nndc~  thc English general. Thiti 
defection of the nstive force wss, liowever, a serious enl. It 
shcd an injurious moral iiifluence, and deprived sir Arthur of 
froops whoao mernns of gaining intelligcncc, and local h o w -  
Iedge, migllt have compcnsatcd for his want of crivalry. 
Ncvcrtheleas, continuing hia march, the advanced pard  
entered Ci~lr lr~  the lSth, on whicti dg Junot rcliictmntf 
quitteci Lisbon, 6 t h  n rcserve eoniposed of  two thousan 
infaiitry, six hnndred cavelry, and ten pieces of srtillq: h 
nlso took with Iiim hia p i i d  pnrc of ammunition, and a mili- 
tary chest, containing forty t,houmnd pounrls. 
Trnvot remained at Lisbon witli more tlian sevm thonaand 
Thiebadt. men, includiag two battaliom of stragglera and 
convnlescents. PalmelaJ tlie Bugio fort, and tbe 
heighh af Almarlq absorbed two thansand af these, to oover 


fhe shipping from the inmrgcnh of the Alcmtejo, mho 
rc-nswmbIcd iindcr the Montciro Bfor at Bctri~nF, wl~en Kcl- 
lermnn retired. A tl~ousnnd were pluced in tlie sliips of war 
to p a r d  the powiler, and tlie Spanisli prkoners; twe tliousand 
four hundred ivere in the citadel; one thoussnd Gstributed in 
Belem, St. Julinn'8, Cascaes, and in Ericeia, a fort northward 
of the Rodr of Lisbon, cammanding a mdl harboirr a few 
milea west of Mtbfra: finally, a tliotistind wcre nt h n h r e m ,  to 
giinrtI n I iqe de$t of  storea. Thn~,  if t t e  gltrrisons of Elvag 
I'enicl16, and Almeida be included, nerirIy onahdf of the 
PrencL army wac rendered inactive; those in the field were 
sepmted, witiiaut any sure point of junction in dvance, and 
yet mch too wcnIr singIy to sustdn an action. h n o t  seema 
to h n ~ e  reigned long erioiigh in Pothignl, to forget tlint be wns 
merely the cliief of an aílvancd coqss whosa safety depended 
upon activity and concentration. Tlie Raerve waa transported 
to Villa Fraoca by water, from mhence it wne to marcli to 
Ottri; but tho ropo ferry-liout of Siwci~vem beiiig removed by 
tlie natives, it eost twenty-four houis im tlirow a bridgo across 
tlie creek at that place; and the 17tl1, when t.he troopa were on 
tlicir march, Junot hastily recxllcd them t o  Villa Francq 
I i e m i i ~ n  the Engli~li were suid to liave Iurided near tlie mpital. 
Thk proving false, the reseme resumed the r o d  to Otta under 
the command of general Tliiebault, and Junot in person went 
tn hlcocntre, wherc he fomd Loison, and msumed the personal 
dircction af hia clivision. 
Sir Arthnr wn* pressing hborde. On the 15th he hacl 
attacked his post at Rrilos, and drove his piqnets WpI- 
frorn Obidos, but some companiea of the 95th and lsatey,i! 
60th rifles liad putaued for a distance of three MpntOn 
miles, annd being ciutfltinlced by a superior force, werc only 
sitved by nn opportuae admnce of general Spenoer : two officers 
and tmeuty-seven rnen killetl and wounded ia this skirmisli 
gave a snlutruy check to raslnms without abating confidente. 
Next dny L l ~ o r J c ' ~  position m rccogniscd. Tlie rod pmsed 
tlimugh a valiey, closml to tlie soutliwvnrd by some high table 
lrind, on which stood the village of Roriqa, frem wlience the 
Freneh overlooked the countrp as far as Obidgs. The points 
OE defence in front, and on the hiiis at cnch sidc, were occnpied 
by smdE detachments, xnd ono mile in sehr, a aery strong 
ridge, about three-quarters of a mile long and padlcl +a the 
French position, offered a second defemive line. The r o d  led 
by a stccp ddle over tliis ridge, mhich m cnlled thz height of 
Zamhnigeira or Columbeini, rind beyoud it, lo* monntains, 
stretching from tlie m-eoast fo the Tagm like a wall, filled 
al1 the space betmeen that river and tlie ocean down to the 
&ck of Lisbon. The valley was boundd on the Englisli Ieft 
by a mccession of Lidges rising Iike steps, entil they were lost 
in the great mass of the Sierra de Barapeda, itself a ~hoot 
from the Monte Junto. 
Laborde's sitnation m s  embnmtlssing. Loison wzs at  
Alcoentre, the reserve ab Villa Prima; tliat is, one and two 
marclies diatant from Rorica; hence, if he retired upon Torres 
Vedras, hiliis wmmunimtion with Loison would be lost; if he 
fdl bwk on Montechique, he eñposcd tlie linr? of Torres Teredraa 
md linfra; to unite with hison at Alcoentre was to open tlie 
sliortest road to Lisbon; t o  reman at &rica wris to brave 
three times hTs own force. Nevertheless, e n c o u ~ e d  by the 
local advantages of hia poaition, md jnstly confident in his own 
taleiits, Laborde resolved to ahicle tlie sssa~~lt, with a feeble hope 
thiit Loison mighk arrive during t\ie action. 
&rly in the rnorning of tbe 17tl1, thirteen tliousand four 
Lnndred and eiglity allied infantry, four liundred and seventy 
cavalry, arid eiglitcen p n s ,  issued from Obidos, and soon after- 
wmds broke into three distinct columns of battle. 
The left ,  commanded by general Ferfiuson, waa composed of 
his o m  and Dowes's brigacle of infantry, reinforced by two 
hundred and fiftp rifleinen, forty cavalry, and six p n s ,  ferming 
a total of four thouaátnd nine tiundrcd combahuta He 
marched by the crest~ of the hiIls ndjoining the Sierra de 
38rwedg being dmtiued to turn tlie riglit flank a£ Labrde's 
position, and oppose the eflorts of Loison, i£ t h t  genemi, who 
was supposed to be at Rio Mayor, should appear dui-ing tlie 
act m. 1 
The right, undar Trrint, compoaed of a thousand Portuguesa 
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infantry, rsnd fifty home of fhe snmo nation, mavd hy f i e  
vil1age of St. A m k ,  with the intentioa o£ turning the Ieit 
flank of tbe Fmch. 
The centre, nine thoumnd s h n g  with twelve guiis, com- 
manderl by sir Artliur in peraon, rnnrclied draight agdnst tlie 
enemy by the village o€ Mahrned. It w a ~  wmpmed of Hill'si 
Ni&ingalela, Cktlin Crawfurd's, and Fane's brigdes of Bntish 
infantry, four hundred cavalv, kwo hundred and fifty of w-llich 
were Fortuguese, w m p a n i d  by four hnndred light troopu of 
the- rime niition. A8 this column ndvanced, Fitne'g bbrigde, 
exteding to its left, drove h c k  the Frmch sltirrniahera nnd 
connected Ferguson with the centre, Meanwliile the l d t e ~  
approached tLe elevated plxin upon which Laborde WM po~ted, 
and Hill, moving on the righ.ht of tho rnain road, suppomed by 
the avnlry and ooverd liy the fire of his light troop~i, p~~shecl 
f r r d  rapidly to the attack ; on his left Nightinpie di& 
pIayed a. line of infantry preceded by the fire of nine guna; 
Crawtiird's brigade and al1 tha remaining pieoes of mtillev, 
fermed a m r v e .  Fane's ritlcmen nuw crowncd the ncriseat 
Iiills on the rigl~t flank of tlie French, the Portupese troop 
showed the h e d  of a column beyond St. A mias on the enemp 
Ieft, and Ferguaon was seen deseending from the higher 
grounds in tlie reur of Fane : hbardc'n poaition scemed despe- 
rntg but witli tlie dext~rity of a practised warrior he evaded 
the danger, a d ,  covered by hia cadry, felE back ~KI the helghtg 
of Zambugeira 
To tdialodge him frefih dispositiona were necessary. T& 
mntinuing his march, waa to turn his Ieft; Ferguson and Fane 
nnitd, wero directed throughthe mountnins te turn his right. 
ni11 azid Niglitingale advanced apiinst the front, wliicli W ~ E  
of siwller atrength, rtnd only te  be approitched by nerrow 
paths wbding through deep ravinea. A ~wmm of skirmisherq 
fitwting forward, soon pliinged intu the passes, and rrprdmg 
to the riglit and ieft, won tlieir m y  among the m c k ~  and 
l;anglerE erergreena tlint overeipread the steep ~ c e n t .  Witk 
gceater difficulty the mpporting colurnas Followed ; their 
ranlcs were disordered in tlie confined ~ n d  rug@ passeu, t11e 
Iiotlowa echaed with a continued rol1 of musketry, the shonts 
of h e  advancing soldiem were loadly answered by £he enemp, 
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and the cnrlbg amoIce, brcaIring out from the folinp on 
siile of tbe mountain, mnrlced thc progrcss of the assailo 
and shawed how atoutl y the defcncc wna niraintnind. 
Anxiously watcliing for Loison, hbordc gradiinllp slnckend 
his hold on tlie left, y& clung tenaciously to tlie ripiit, hill 
Iioping to be joind by tlint general, nnd tlie arílour of tlic 
9th and 29th Englisb regimcnts favouml tliis ~kilful conduet, 
It wra intendetl, they sliould talrc tho rigl~trhand path uf t i ro  
l d i n g  up the simc Iiollow, and thus hnvc come in n p n  
Laborde's f l d c  in conjunction wit.li Srant's column; but Zlie 
left path Ied more directly t o  the enemy, the 29th folIowd it, 
tlic 9th WM close behind, anrl both rcgimcnts advanced 80 
vigorously as to m h  the plain abovc beforc the later$ 
movements of Trant and Ferpson wuld shnke the credit of 
the position. The righ of  the 29th arrived first at the top, 
iinder a heavy firc; ere it could fonn coloneI Lake ñ.as kie4 
and some Frencb companies, which had been eut off on the 
right, ga1lmtIy broke through tlie coIurnn, crlying n-i~ith tbem 
a rnxjor and fifty or sixty other prisoners. The head of the 
regiment, thus pressed, fe11 back, but rallied on the leít wing 
beIom the bmw of the hill, and being joined by Zl~e 9th, 
whose mlonel, Stemrb* aiso fe11 in this bitter frght, the whole 
pashed forward again and regained the dangeroua footing 
abovc, 
Lnborde, who b~ought cvcry arm into action nt tlie proper 
time nnd place, endeavoured to destrop th~se rcgirnents lieforc 
they muId be succoured; he failed, yct gainctl timo to rally 
liie l& wing upon his centre and riglit. Now the 5th rcgi- 
rnent, following tlie riglit-hand path, arriverl, the Engli~h 
wem gathering thickly on the beightg, a d  Fcrpson, wbo hd 
at first talren m erroneous dircction towarda the centre, 
recovered the true line and was rapidly pañsing the French 
Bg1;lit. Laboide then retreated by alternate rnmsm, pro-. 
teeting his mov~ments with ahort vigoroue charges of cavalry, 
and at Zimbugira attemphd another dandi but the Englisli 
bom on too 11enviIy nnd be fe11 back dispnting fhe grountl 
ta the Quinta de Bugagliern. There he hnlted nntil Iiia 
dehchmcnta on tha aide of Segura rejoined him, and then 
&ng t o  thtl namw p w  of Runa m h e d  all night to ggi? 
tlie 
inta> 
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the pwition oE Montechique, leavlng three p n s  oa tlie 6eld 
of battla and tho matl to Torreli Vedras open frir the vietors. 
Tha Eoss of the French waa six hnndred killed TIilebiiult. 
and wounded, among the Iritter M o r d e  himelf, 
The Rritisli l l id ttwu lieutemnt-coloncls md nenrly five hun- 
dred men killed, taken, or wounded, and as not 
more than foui tliousznd men were actualIy 
engaged, thk fight m very houourable to both 
nides. 
A little t t f h  four o'clocl~ the firing ceaaerl, nnd sir Arthur, 
hearing Loison'et divjsion was at Bombaral, only five miles 
distant, took a position for tbe night in an oblique line to that 
which he haxl just foroed; his left rested upon a, heigbt near 
tbe 6eld of battle, liis righ-ht covered tlre rnnri tu T~urinhnm 
Belíeving that Loison nnd Laborde liad efected their junction 
at  tho Quinta de Bugagrliera, and thah both w m  retiriog ta 
Monhliique, he resolved to march fhe next rnming t a  
Tomen Veilrm, by wiiicli he wouEd hnve secnred nn entrnnca 
into tlie mountaina Eefore niditfall ha lieard $at Anstm- 
ther's antt Acjand's divisions, accompnied by a large Aeet o€ 
atore sliips, were off the m&, the h p o u a  nature of which 
mndcrrd it noocssnry ta providc for tlicir snfcty hy o, quick 
diaembarkation. Tli i~ cbmged bis plnns, antl he resolved to 
seek some convenient post, which being in advance of bls 
pregent position would likewirie enalile him to 
oover tha lanrling of these reinForcmncnte: thc E:*$,,"- 
vigour of Laborcle'~ defence had aleo i ts infln- Evidcnce. 
ente; before an enemy ao bold md skilfuI no 
precaution eould be neglccted lvitb impunity. 
CBAPTER V. 
W n m ~  the combwt of Rorics was being fonght, some PL.. 
tupese inmrgents took Abrantes, and deetroyd the &man 
garrisoa. Junot felt a btittle was inevitable, and when sir 
Arthur marched to Lonrinham on tlie 18th, he quitted 
Cerca1 with Loison'a diviaion, mmed tlia line of Laborde's 
retmt, and reached Torres Vedras the evening of the &me 
day. The 19th being joind by Laborde, and the 20th by bis 
reserve, he re-orpnized 'his army and prgared for a decisi~e 
action. Sir Arthur had taken a position at Vimiero, a villags 
new the sca-coast, and from thence sent a detachment ta cover 
the march of geneml Anstnitlier's brigada, which wi tli p t  
difficulty and some 108s landed on the morniog of the 19th on 
an open ~andy  beach m1Id Paymyo.  On tha 20tlr the 
French mvdq sconred the country, carried off some women 
from tlie rear of the EnglisL camp, and hemmed the arr 
round so closely that no infomation of Junot's positi 
coulrl be obtained. In the night Aclqd's bngade mas disei 
barked at Xaceira bsfi whereby f,he army m8 increased iu 
sixteen thousand fighting men with eighteen piecm of artil- 
lery, exclusive of Trants Portupese and of tm British rere- 
ments under genem1 Beresford, wtiich wem with the fleet at 
the month of the Tagus. Thw the principal mass of t 
Enfiliah army mas irrevocablp enpged in tFie operatio 
qainst Junot, while tlie mirii8ters mere di11 sa intent up 
Cadiz, that they liad sent either Anstruther or Acland o 
witli an appointment as govmor of that city I 
htimating the French -y at eighteen thoumnd me'$ ! 
Arthur judged thiit Junot conId not bring ma,, 
AF"nd'q thm fourteen thousand into the field; he designe4 h. 9. 
therefore, to strike the bt blav, and follow ii 
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np so aa t o  prevent the enmy from ra1Ipi.g and reneming 
the campaign u p n  the brontier. Before gnitting the Mon- 
dega he had givcn sir Hmy Burrard notice of 11;s intmtions, 
dvising Iiim also t o  lct sir J. hfoore di~embark in th& r i m  
and mmh on S t t a h ~ m ,  ik protsct tlie left of the army, 
block the Iine of tlie Tiips, and manace the French com- 
munication between Ljsbon and Elvasi. This movement he 
judged a safe one, becanse Junot would defend Lisbon againat 
tlie con& armj; md if he wlinquiahcd that capital t o  rctrent 
to Alrncida by Santarcm, Mmrc could on that tttrong 
p u n d  clieck him. Moreover, Val lde i a~  liad thres tliousaud 
Spaniards at Guardg and Freire m s  with five thonatrnd a t  
hiria, and rnight support tlie British at Smtarem 
From Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles. 
Tlie Frene11 cravalry completely diroiided Junot's pasition, but 
it #as kuomi to be strong and dificult of approwh, by 
r e m n  of a long defila tlirough which the armq- must pene- 
trate in arder to rmch the emt of thc moiintnin ; thcre was 
Iinwcvcr s r d  lentling betwmn the sea-eonst nnd, T o m s  
Vedias, wtich tmned. the latter and opened a way to Mafra 
Sir Arthur had an exact miIitarg m e y  of that road, and 
dcsigned liy n forced mrrrch on tlie 21at, ta turn the position 
of Turra  Vdraa and gain Mafm with B strong 
advanced guard, while tlie main bdy, seizing rsJEf$,8we'' 
some dvantirgeons heigiits a few mil- ~hor t  of Evldence. 
that town, would be in a lmsition to intwcept glLg! 
tlie French line of march to Montcchiquc. 
Rcnce the army w&a re-orpnized during the 20th in eiglit 
bripdes of infantry and four squadrona of mvalry, nnd every 
preparatiion was nade for the next day% enterprise; but at 
that critica1 period of tlle campign, the ministerid amnge- 
mcnta which providcd tlireo oornmanderwin&ef b e p n  tb  
work Sir Harry Burtad amived in a frigake off tlie bay of 
Naceira, and sir Arthur, cliecked in tlie midst of his opera- 
tions on tEie eve of a decigive battle, repaired on board t o  
rcprt  tha situntion of affaim. E s  renwcd 1 1 i ~  fomer recom- 
mendatiou relhtive Eo tlie diqosal of  ir John Moore's troopti; 
but Bumrd, having previously resolved to bring the latter 
di)m to MaceUa., forbade any offensive uioyemexit nntil tlie 
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whole m y  should be wncentrated: whereupon &ir Arth 
returned to his camp. 
Altliough :liome\\~hat vagueIp defined aa a position t... 
p u n a  occupid by the amy was strong. Vimimo, situnted 
in a valIey tlirough which tlie Kttle river of hfaoeira flows, 
contained the pnrc and commissariat stores; the cavalry and 
the Portuguese were on a smJI plain behind the dlty 
in front of which was a rugged height with a flat top, mi 
manding al1 the  g m d  to tlie southward and eastwad fos 
considerable distante. Upon tliia heiglit Fane's and Anatru- 
ther's b f a n t ~ ,  mitli dx guna, wero poatcd. Fane's left ftested 
mi a churchyard, blocking a rowd whicli led over the extremity 
of tbe liriglit to Timiero, Anstmtlids troops lmre pitrtly on 
Fane'a riglit, partly in reserve. A monntain, commeneing 
at the coast, mept in a half drcle close behiad tlie riglit of 
the Timiero liill, md comrnanded, at ratlier long artilIery 
mnge, al1 its uppcr surface. The fint, second, third, fourtli, 
an<I eightli lirigades of infantry, with eiglit guns, occupied 
tlhs mountain, mliich rvas terminated an the 3efb by a deep 
m i n e  dividing it from another strong aad nmow mnge of 
heights over wliich the road from Vimiero to Lounnham 
paased, The right of theso last lieighh aIso overtopped the 
liill in frunt of Timiero; but tlie left, Lending suddenly back- 
ward after the form of a craok, returned to the c w t  and 
endd in n lofiy clifl; there was no water upon this ridge, 
wherefora only the fortieth regiment and gome piqueta were 
placed there. 
Ia the night of the 20th, about twelve o'cluck, sir AdEi 
was aroused by a Ctermm officer of drapons, who with aoi 
consteraation reported that dnnat, mming witli twenty thc - 
sand m w  to athck, ww dishnt but one honr'a march. 
Undiaturbed Iiy th intlated report, he merely sent out 
patroles, warned the piquets to be ale*, and before day-break 
had bis troopa, fo1Iowin.g tbe British custom, under arms. 
The mn m and no enemy qipeared; but nt seven o'clock, B 
cloud of dust wns oherved bcyond the nearest hilIs, and at, 
eiglit an advanced gua~d of Iiorse was Been t a  crown the 
heiglits to tbe southwmd, seuding forward scouts on evev 
side, ZScaxcely had this body been descried, wlien a force of 
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infantry, preceded 'by other cavdry, was discovcrd moving 
nlong tlie rod fvom Torros Vorlras to Lonrinliam with a rnpid 
pace, and threatening to turn tlie leEt of the Britisb position. 
Column after colurnn followed in o d e r  of battle. Tha French 
were evidently coming to fight, but the right wing of the 
British was not menaced by thia movernent, m d  the second, 
third, fourth, anrl eidith bñgrtdes were therefore clirected to 
ccoss tlie valley lbehind tlie Bimiero lieiglit aiid talre post 
where tlie fortieth regiment anrl the piquete &d. AFI they 
reached this ground, the mona and third brigades were 
dispsed in two linea perpendicn1ri.r to the front rihown by 
Fane and dnstmthcr, nnd tho foiirth md eiglith w m  to havc 
formcd a thid lino, but ere ths lattcr coald rcach thc mrnmit 
tlie Iiattla had coinmenced. Tliis flank movsment waa not seen 
by the enerny. A l i e  of gkirmishers, tlirown out on the descent 
t o  the right, covered tlle flank of the tmo brigades, tlie mvalry 
wns drnwn up in the plnin on the right of Vimicro, and tlic fifth 
brignrIe ancl Portuguese mere detaclied to the returning ridge 
of the crook, thua co~eriug the extreme left and rear of the 
position. Rill remtcincd with the fiwt brignde on the moun- 
tain which tlie othem l i d  quitted, furnisliing a siipport to the 
centre and a mm ta tlie whole; yet the ground between 
tbe mies was so wooded and brolren, that af ta  the French 
had passed the xidge mhere they had been first d e d e d  no 
P~OTT& vicw of tlicir moverncnts ceuld be obtaincd; wliercfore 
t.Iie Britisli, bsing weak in cavalry, were forced to wait patiently 
until tFia cohmne of athlc were close upon tliem. 
Junot liad quitted Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th 
intending to fa11 on tlie English army at day-break, but tlie 
defile in his front retardcd tbe mreh and fatigued tho troop~. 
ñ e  foitnd the Rrititi11 oder of hattls prcsonting two facea of a 
trimglg the apex, formed by the height in front of Vimiero, 
well furnished; the left face seeningly n&d,  for the pique& 
only could be seen, md tlie marca of the four brigdes across 
thc valley WM hidden from him. Concluding the principal 
foree ta be in the centra, he resolved to form two connected 
attackg the one against the apex8 the 0 t h  hgainat the left, 
mhich be thought an accesaible ridge: but a deep ravine, 
trenched as it were dong the bwe, rendered it dmost impet- 
vions t o  an nttnck, except at thc extwmity, mer which th 
rmci from Turrm Vedrm to Lourinham ~ i m e d .  He had nmly 
fourteen tliousnnd figliting mcn orpnizorl in foar divisions. 
n r e e  were of in fmt~ ,  one of camlry, tliero were twenty- 
tlirec picces of uery ama11 nrtillery, mcli division was oornped 
uf two brigndccs, and at ten o'cluck they commcnced tlio 
ThiebnlL hborde marched with ane hrigade against the 
F O ~ .  centre, Brennier Id anot-hcr ripinst tlie ldt, 
h i s o a  follomed at. a sliort distance. Kellerman moved with a 
merve of grenadiers behind Loison; the c a d r p  ander Mar- 
garon, thirteen hnndred, were, one p& on the right of 
Xrennier another in rear of the reserve; the artillery, diatri- 
Iiuted mong the columna, opened its fire wtierever the pwnd 
was favourable. Laborde's and ErennierH attacks were to have 
been simultmeoua, but tbe latter, coming unexpectedly upon 
the ravine before mentioned as protecting the English left, got 
entangled among the- rocks an(l water-courses; tIins Lahrde 
done engriged Fane and Anstrutber, m d  under a heavy and 
destructi~e fire of artillery which mote hini front and flrink; 
817 A. Wel- fnr the eighth brigadc, then in the act of mounb 
1eJey'a ing the beigbts wliere tlie Ieft was posted, meing 
Uesp~tcb. the advance of the French colamns qainst tlie 
centre, halteil, and opened a battery against thek right. 
Junot perceiying thisi break of com2iination, ordered Loigw 
t o  support Laborde's atta.& with one brigade, and directed 
nnoGher under Solignac to tiirn the mvine in wKch Breiinier 
was entangled, mtnd so fail apon the left extremity of the Eng- 
liah line; but Fane mejng Loison'a adnnce, ancl having disere- 
tioxiary power wer tbe rweme artillery, directed eolonel Robe 
t o  bring it up, thus formiog witli the divisional guns a power- 
ful battey- hisan and Laborde nom fomed one principal 
and two sewndmy colnmns of attack; of the latter, one 
advanced against Anatruthda btigade, the other e n d m u r e d  
t o  penetmie by a raad wliich passed between the m+ne and a 
church on the extreme left of Fane. The main cdumn under 
h l~orde ,  preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounteil tha 
f ~ c e  of the hill with great fury and loud crips, the Rndish 
sl~irmlsliers were forced bmk upon the l i n q  ~ n d  tlie French 
masses r d e d  the summit, but shattered with the terrible fire 
of Robe's artillery, and breirtlileris from their exertions. In  tlik 
state, lieing first atrnck with musketry at the aistmce oE bdf 
pisto1 shot, they were chnrged in fmnt and fiaiik by thc fiftieth 
rcgiment, and ovcrthrown. 
Before this, tlie f i - s econd  and niuety-seventli wiment~, 
of Anstruther's hripde, had repulscd tlie minor attack on tliat 
general's right, nod he had detuched t2ie second hattalion of the 
Forty-tliird to the churchysxcl on Fmds left, wLere it wm when 
Kellemnn reinforcing ita oppncnte witli a eolumn of grena. 
diers, mnt them on at a runnieg pnce. Thoac choice soldiea 
beat back the advanced companiea o l  the forty-tliird, but to 
avoid Robe's artillery which ransacked their left, tliey dipped 
a little intci the ravine on tllc right, and were imrnediately 
tidíen on tlie other fllink Ily t h n  p u s  of the  fourtli nnd 
eighth bripades. Then, mhen tho nnrrowness oE tlie w q  and 
tlic s n y s  of the ronnd sshot waa crusliing and diriwdering 
tlie French mnka, the forty-tliird, rnllying in one mass, ment 
hriously down upon tlie very hend of the wlumn, an(l witli 
a sliort but fierce stru~gle rlrove it back in confusion In 
this figlit thc nritish regiment snffered severeljr, and so close 
wtia tlic cembat, tliat Patrick, sergeant-armonrer of the forty- 
tliird, nnd a Frcncli soldicr, wert! fovnd ded, still graeping 
tlicir muskets witli the bayonets driv~n through each hody 
from Zireiiat t o  back I 
Now tlie French fe11 bnck along the whole front, m d  colonel 
Tqlor, riding out from tlie right of the centra1 hill, Ied the 
fcw horsemcn he commanded into tlie rniclst o€ thc confuwrl 
mrsaee, scnttering and mbreing tliem; bnt then Margaron, 
mming sudilenly clolyn to their support, alew Saylor and cut 
tlie half of lis squadran to piecea, and Kellerman immediately 
threw his reserved grenadien into a pine w d  in adrsnce  to 
covcr tlio rctreat. A11 clso mas diaordcr. Tlie woods and 
liulluws were fillcií witli wounded and atraggling men, seven 
guns were lost, anrl the beaten mrassea retired towarda the 
hurinliam rmd, in a directiou neerly parallel. to the British 
front, lea-ring the r o d  Trom Vimiere to Torres VedraB opea 
Xir Arthnr forbade pursuit, pxrtly because Kelleman's pena- 
diera still held the pine wood flnnking the line of retrcnt, partly 
becanse Xargaron's horsenie~, riding stiffly hetween the two 
m i e s ,  were not ta be liglitly meddled with. In this stnto 
while Brennier was hampered in tlie rri~ine, Solignac, coming 
by the mst of the ridge above, cncountered Ferpson's bripde, 
mhich closed tlie left of the English position. He expected 
to find a weak flank, but encountered a front of battle cin a 
' depth of three linea and prote& by gteep decliritiesi oe 
either side ; a powctrful srtillery mept away Iiis foremost 
mnkq and on his right, the fifkli. bn'gde and tbe I'oituguece 
were seen marching by a distant ridge towarda the hurinham 
mtld, threatenuig Iiis rear. h c e l y  had Iie s h o m  a front, whcn 
Ferpson, taking the Iead vigomusly attacked, and the g-round 
widening as the British ahranced, tlie regiments of the ssecond 
Iine running up in auccession constzntly increased the front,; 
tlien tlie French, falling fast under tbe fire, drew boick Eght- 
ing unti1 they reached tbe fartlicst ddirity of the ridge. 
Tlieir cavalry made ~everal v ~ i n  efforta t o  clieclr tbe d~anciiig 
troops, hut Solipac wau carried from tlje field severely ~wounded, 
and his retiring division, outflanked on its lefk, was cut off from 
tlie line of retreat and thrown into the low graunci &out the 
~iI1ag.e of I'eranza, where aix gunN were captured. Ferguson, 
lea~ing the eighty-second and seventy-first regimen ts to guad 
€liase pieces, continud to press the disoderetl columns, but at 
tliis moment Brennier hnving at lmt clenretl tlie ravine, c m e  
nnexpectedly upon tliose tnro battalioos and retoolr the artil- 
lerp; his mccesswas but rnomentnry; tlie surprised troops ralIied 
upon tho Iiigher p u n d ,  poured in a lienvy fire of muslietry, 
and xeturiiing to the charge ~ 6 t h  tli sliont, overthrew him 
and recoverd the guns. Brennier lilmseIf was wouncled wnd 
made primner, and Ferguson hadng complctelj sepwated the 
Frencli brigades, would also have forced the grcatest prirt of 
Solignac's to surreiider, if m unexpected order haíl not obliged 
him to balt. The discomfited troops then re-fomed under 
tlie pratection of theis cavalry with admirable quickness, and 
making a3  orderly retreat, aere soon unitcct tu the broken 
bripiles falling back Erom the attxclc on the centre. 
Drennicr being Iirought to sir Arthur Wellesleythe moment 
hc mas f nken, e~gcdy dcmnndd if Kellman's rcserve had yet 
cliargwd ; tlie Eiiglish geuertrl quiclrly aaoerhained froru tlie 
otlier prisoners khat it had, and tlius knew tlie enemy's attncks 
were exhausted, tliat no considerable body could be still 
hidden in t11e woda on his h n t  and thnt the battle was mon. 
Tliirteen guns liad h e n  tnkeu; tlie fourtli and eig11:lith brigntles 
had surered very little; tlie fifth and Portuguese brigadas liad 
oot fired a shivt; neitlier had the first, am¡ it ww now two 
miles nearer to Torres Vedras than nny pert of fhe Freneh 
amy, which wns in great confusion. The relative numbers 
licfore .thc nction werc iii fiivour of tlic English, tliut di~parity 
wm increased; a portion of tlie army h d  defeated the euemy 
when' entire, a portion then m l d  effectually follow up the vic- 
b y ;  nnd as it wna onIy twelve o'clock, sir Arthur resolved 
with tlie five brigxdes d tlie left wing to press Junot closely, 
boping to  drive him over Ghe Sierra da Bz~rngeda and form 
liim upon tlie Tiqus, u-hile Hill, Anstrutlier, and Fnne, seiisiog 
the defilo o f  Torres Vedras, should push on to Montecliiqne 
and cuk liim off from Lisbon. 
If tliis decisiv~ opcriition liad bccn exccutcd, Jrinotwould pro- 
b:tlily Lave Iost all. liis artillery and several thousand ntriigglors. 
Tken buffeted and turned at e v q  point, he nould have been 
glad to swk safety under tlie pns of Almeida or Elvm; and 
Eic coiiid not h w e  momplishcJ that if Moorc'si troops had 
I~cen Inntlerl in the M~ntlcge. Rlit sir Hilrry Xurmrrl, mho 
was present during tLa aetion, tliougll prtly from delicncy 
and partly from approving sir Arthur's arrangements he had 
not hitlierto interfe~ed, now msumed the clGef commnntl. 
From him the o d c r  nrrcsting Ferguson's victoriou~ carees liad 
emanntecl, anri furtlier offcnsive opereiions were forbidden, 
for he liad resolved to ri-riit io t t e  pofiitiun of 'tTirnieru uritil 
the sarrivil of sir John Moore. TGe wljubnt-general Clinton, 
and colonel aeorge Murray the quaitcr-master-general, sup- 
porked sir FXm-ry's vieivs, and sir Arthur's earnest represerita. 
tions could not nlter thcir deterrninetion 
Burrartl*~ decision WM certainly erroneoas, yet error is 
common in an ait whicli n t  best is but ni choice oT I'mceedings dificulties. Tlre circumstances ofthe rnomcnt were 
.f 
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French haá failed in the attacks, y& rrtIlied with mrprising 
quicknm under the protcctiun of a strong and gallllitnt 
czvaly. Si  IIurry knew that the artillery mrriqyai wcre so 
shaken as t o  be sctlmly fit for service, tlie draft horses few 
mtnd bad, the commissariat pare in the greateat confusion, and 
the h i id  Portupese carmen making off with tlieir carriqes 
in al1 directiuns, Tlie EngliaFi cavalry was totaIly dastroye& 
and Spencer h d  discovererl a line of frcsh troops on the ridge 
Eichind that ompied  by ttfie Prench army. Weigliing al1 
tliese tlilrigs in liiz mind with ihe caiition nnturnl to age, 
Burmrd refi~sed to hawnl the fodune of tha day npn wbnt 
hc deenid :I periloue tlirow ; und Junot, wha haxl displnyed al1 
thnt recklees coumge to which he originally omed 11ia elcva. 
tinn, sris  enabled by tliis uncxpwtcd cessntion of tlie battle 
to mform liis broken m y .  Twelve hunclred fresh men 
joined hii at the closc o£ the contcst, and tlien, covered by 
liia mvalry, ho rctreiitcd wivith orcler tand wlcrifq until hc 
regned the commnnil of tbe pasa of Tomcs Vedras, and at 
dark tlie relatire position of tlie two m i e s  wm &he snme 8s 
on the e~ening before. 
One general, tliirteen p n s ,  rtnd scverril hnndred prisoners, 
fe11 into the l ianb of the victors, anci the total l&s of tha 
Prench was estimated at threti! thouriand rnen ; nn exaggera- 
tion no doubt, yet it was certsinly above two thoussnd, for 
ttieir cloaed columns were exposed for more than hnlf nn hour 
to sweeping discbarges of p p e  and rnuskctry, and the dead 
la7 thiclrly together. Thlehult reduces tlie number t o  
eighteen hundred, nnd ~é i y~  tlie whoIe French army did not 
much exceed trvelve thousand men; from mliich he deductg 
nearly three thousand for sick, atragglers, and thme other 
petty drains whicli torment a general-in-chief. But this a m y  
T h i e h n l ~  was composed af mcn s e l e c a  and o r p i z e d  in 
provisionary battaltons expressly for tlle occasion; 
me-balf liad only been in tho field for a fortnight, al1 had two 
daya' rest at Torres Vcdraq, it Ls therefom evident the 
absentees bear too peak ra proportion to the combatanta, A 
French ortler of hattIe found upon the field gave a total of 
fourteen thousand rnen present under arms, of which thirteen 
hundred were cavalry; and this amount q p e s  too cloaely 
with otliet estimates, and wjth the observations made rtt the 
'ime, to Icave a y  reaaonaljla hubt of i t s  autlienticity or 
corrcctness. 
Sir Rnrrg Burrnnl's control wns soou over. Enrly on tl~e 
uioniing of the 22nd, sir Eew Dnlryrnple disembntlíed and 
assumed the cliief command, Thua in the short space of 
twenty-four hours, during wliicb a liattIe was fought, the amy 
fe11 sucwasively into tlie han& of tbree men, coming from the 
ocean witli cliffment views, hnbitm, nnd informlition, and 
witliout any previous opportunity vf cemmuning even by 
letter ; and tbey were broiight together at a moment when it 
was more tban probable t h q  mnat al1 tlisagree. For whcn sir 
Hew mas aptppointeri to tlle cornmantl, sir Artlinr waa privately 
recummentlctl to liim by the mini~tcr, m a persoii to be 
employed with more than usual confidente, sud this un- 
equivoca1 hint was backed with wch an overbearing force 
by the previoua reputntion nnd recent expIoits of the latter, 
thnt it conld not fnil to produce some want of oordialitj*. Sir 
Artliur could not Jo otlierwi~e than take 1he lead in discus- 
slng affairs of which he had more than laid tlie foundstion, ~ n d  
sir R m  wouId Eiave forfeited al1 claims to independenoe in 
Iiis mmmrind, if he hed not exercised the right of judging for 
liimself between tlie cenflicting opiniom of Iiis preileceasors. 
Aftm receiving idormation upon tlie most important 
poinh, and taking a basty viem of the sitnation of - 
thr! army,-althoiigh the wounded were still upan y:zey 
ths gruiind, and tlie wnins of the commissnrint Narrativa 
employed to remeve th , - i r  Hew direckd nn 
advance on tlie 23rd. But, with Bmard, he 
thought the matter perilous, requiring the concentratien af 
dE the troops and means, wliereforc be persisted in briiiging 
sir John Tvloore d o m  to Mmira. Sir Artliur oppmd tliis. 
T;ie provisions on shore woitld not, he d d ,  supply more tlirin 
eiglit or nine daya' consumption for the troop alrearly at 
Virniero; the country conld furnish no a s s i d c e ;  nnd tbe 
flcet woa n premrjoiia resonme, beatuse tlie first of t,lic gnlca 
common nt thnt eenñon of ths yeur, would certninly send it 
from the corist, if it did not destrog a great pporLion <)f it. Sir 
Hew however thought the separation of the t r o o p  more 
dansrous than the chance of d i s t m  from mch evcnts, and hia 
Proceedings position was embmrasdng. T h e  bishop of Oporto 
ofthr: Ciiiirt liad failed in Lis promise of assistinz the troops 
O f h q u i r ~ .  , k t h  draft catt~t:-~ indeed he d i  in al1 his 
promises-tbe artillery and commisszriat were ill mpplied 
with mulw and Iiorm; the cavalry was a nullity; and the 
enemy, witli exception of Ilis orhut11 los8 in killed nntl wortndd, 
ltad siiffered notliing from ti. dcfcnt wliich dirl not (leprive liim 
of a singlc position neccssn~y to h i ~  rlefence. 
Whilc migliing t l ~ i ~  ~ t n t e  of nKnirs, lie wm informed thrat 
Kellerman, Iicnring s flag of truce nnd cscortctl by a.stmng 
body of m d r y ,  was nt tlic outposts to dcmnnd a confcrence. 
Thia wiis vcry uncxpcctcd; bnt Junot aftcr rcpining Torres 
Vedras h d  ocmipicd Nnfra, nnri wns ptcparing to fight apin 
when bc receivcd inhlligcnce that Lisbon was on the point 
of jnsurrcdion, whcmupon Iie hastily sent a fnlsc accouut of 
fhe d o n  ta that city, togcthcr mith n minforccmcnt for tkc 
garrison, md thcn consultcd bis gcncrnls ns to forthcr 
measum. It. i s  an 013. nnd sound rrnimk that ( a council of 
war never fights,' and Eellermm's mision  vas tlie result of 
tbe above eonsultation He demanded a ccssatition of m, 
and proposcd tlie basia of a convrntion to evacuate Por- 
tugaL Nothlng cxiuld he morc opportune, and sir Hem readily 
aceepkd thc proposal. He knew, from rtn intcrcepttd plnn 
of open~tions sketched by the chid of the Prench enginecrs 
mlonel Yincent, that Junot posseased several strong posi- 
tions in front of Lisbon; that a f ind  retreat upon Almeida, 
or across the river upon Elvas, was considered a matter of 
caarse m d  asy of execution. Hence the proposed conven- 
tion was an unexpscted advantage offerd in a moment of 
diEculty : the only subject of consideration waa the natm of 
the articlea propossd by Kellerman. Bir Hew, necessarily 
ignorant of many dctala, h d  reconrse to sir A. WellesIey, 
who, taking an eniarged view of the quedon, coincided as to 
the policy o£ a conventian, by which a trtrong French army 
wodd be quictly got out of a muntry it had oornpIcte military 
poeaewion of, a gr& moral effect in favoar of €be general 
cause pmduced, md an actual gain m d e  of men and tima 
fos tke further pnisecution of the war in Spain. He uliserved 
- la. That a kigdom would be liberatea with its Ter- <. 
tresses and aisenala, and tlie excited population of  the Penin- 
d a  might then be puahed fomard in the w e e r  of oppositioa 
to Francc uridcr the most fa~ourablo circumstanc~. 2". The 
Spanisli urrny of Estremdurn, containing the  most eE- 
cient bodg of cavalry in the Peninsula, could be reinforced 
by four o; Bve tliotknd iSpanish soldiers d o  wem prisoners 
on board the vessels in the Tigus; it could then unite with 
the othcr prttriat armics, whcn e v e y  ruldition of form must 
incrcme thc confidcncc and forward thc impulse whiclr the 
victory of Baylen and tEie flight of Josepli had given t o  the 
Gpaniards. 3". Tlie sacrifice o€ liveu to  be expected in 
carrying &he French positions in Portugal, al1 the Pmlnas 
d%culties of reducing the fortresses, and the oftilc court 
danger of Ioriing a cornrnunicntion with thc fleet, '"Tdiw 
woulrl be avoided by tliis messure, tlie mulf of wllich would 
be complctc aa tlia most smguine could expect from tlie long 
a rejection. 
But while ndmitting tlre utiIit,y of the measwro itself, ho 
differcd as tu the mode of proceeding, asnd a long dismssion, 
in which Bnrmrd twk a pwt, followed the opening of Keller- 
man'a rnission. Sir Arthur's first objeetion mti, thnt in r e p d  
of form KdIcrman waa only entitled t o  negotiate a cessa- 
tion of hostilities. sir Hew argued, t h t  the policy and 
utility of tlle convention beiiig recognised, it would be unwise 
to drive tbe French to the wall on a point af ceremony, and 
therefore accepted the proposition. The bwis of  a definitive 
trenty was tlren nmnged, yct suhjcet to the finnl approbrition 
of sir Charles Cotton, without wbose wncumnm it waa not 
to be binding. 
The first four articIea declanerl the fact of the armistice, tlic 
mode of proceeding, the line of d e m ~ d i o n ,  tha pdtions of 
tlie two ami=, including that oof tlie Portuguese t r oop  under 
' Freire. The fifth, declared the Frencli were not to be 
prisonem af war; their persons and propertp, public or private, 
were without any detainer to be transported to Franoe, Si 
Arthur ohjectcd fo this irrticle, as nffording cover for the 
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to be taken in the hir aense of property jiistly obtained, and 
npon tlmt wsurance it waa admittd. 
ArticIe 6tli, guarmteed from political pcrseciitim nll French 
residcnta, al1 subjects of powcm in ~llinnee wi tli Frunce, nll 
Portnguese who had acmed the i n d e r s  or bccome ohno~ious 
for their attachment to them. 
Article Tth, stipulated for the neutrrility of the port of 
Lisbon, as frtr as the Rnwian fleet was concened. At first 
Kdlerman proposed fo llave tlic Russirin Aeet paranteed from 
aptnre with leme to return to tlie Baltic, but this mas 
pcremptorily refused. Indeed, the French negotiator's only 
ubjcct was to entangle tlie Rnsirrns in the French negotiation, 
that the formcr mi& if the armistice shouId be brokm, be 
forced h t o  a wperation. 
Sir Arthar strenuously opposed tliis articfe, Re argned, 
that the intereats of the two nations were not Slended, Tbey 
stood in different relations towarda the British m y ,  and it 
was an irnportant object ta keep them separate, as the Frcnch 
general would, if presd, leave tthe Russians to disir fate. The 
Brltish operations had not beea so rapid and dccisive as to 
enable them to capture thefleet before the question of ncutrality 
mvld be agitated; the riglit of the Itussiana t 3  S U C ~  protdion 
was therefore undoiibted, and it was desirabre to itdmit it; 
because, independent of the dianoes of thsir final capture, they 
woiild be prevented from returning to the BJtic wliich in fa& 
mnstituted their only point of interest ~vhen disengaged from 
the French: viewed as allies of the latter tbey b e m e  of great 
weight. Finally, it was m a&ir concerning the Portupese, 
Russirim, and Britisli, the Frcnch had no right to interfere, 
Sir Hew finding the dismission of this qaestion tedious, nnd 
considerina sir Cliarles Cotton done could finnlly decide, 
admittd tlie articIo as a form, witliout aoquiescing in its pro- 
priety. 
ArticIe 8th pmided, thnt p~ of Frcnch calibre, and tlio 
homps of the cavalry> were to be tranqorted t o  h c e .  
drticle 9t.h stipiilatd, tliat iorty-eight bom' notice should 
be g-i~en uf a rupture. 
Tliis sir A r t h  opposed. He considered it nnnecessq for 
the &rata of the Briti~h muy3 fhvourabla Go the French; if 
Iiostilitiw m m m e n d ,  the lbttter wonld heve fortyeight hours 
to niulce arrnngements FOF tiieir defiice, for tl ie passge of the 
Tagw,for tbe co-operation of tlio Russinn flaet. Sir Hew thoug1,lrt 
it lvns un nhsolute dirautage to gttin time for the preparations 
of t h e  British army, and for the a r r id  of sir John Noore. 
An additional article prorided, that al1 tlie fortresses held 
by the French, which liad not qitulated before tlie 25th o f  
Augiist, should be givcn up h tlia British. Thc bbasis of a 
convention being tllus amngcd, Kellertrian returned t a  IiIs 
cbief, and colonel Murrny cnrried the propused artidw to the 
Enfilisli admiral. 
Iyrcvioua to landing, sir Rew bad r e c e i d  none of  tke Ie t tm 
ddreased t o  him by sir drthur WellesIey, h d  met no person, 
driring his voyage, from whom he couId abtain nuthcntic infur- 
rnatirin; and Iieing nt first occupied by the negotintiom with 
Kelkrman mihs uninfomed of many dehils of imporhnce. 
Thua hc was totally i p o m t  of the existente of Bcrnardim 
Fieire Andrniin nnd Iiis Portnguese army; i~nd wos grently 
aurprised to receive a visit mtid formal remoiistratice against 
the conwntion from that functionary, tht heay after Bellermm's 
departure. It wm difficult to  maringe thia intervien- with pro- 
priety, becamc Andrcadn had pIfiuaiblo olijcctiona ; but Iiis 
rernonstrances were merdy the cemrnencemeut of nn iutrigue 
to be explsined hereafber. 
mhen the articles were shown t o  sir Charles Cotton he 
refuaed to concnr, declaring he would conduct a sepmte trenty 
far the Xu~siim sliip. Wltli tliis answer Murray r~turnecl on 
the 24th haviq first, in reply t o  a question put liy the Frr,nc1:11 
offieer d i o  accompanied him on board the Uiberniq declarecl, 
that nothing had passed b e t ~ ~ e e n  him and tlie admira1 whicli 
ought to predude further aeptizhioa Sir Hew was now 
nrgcd by sir Arthur t o  givc notice ~vitíiout further explanation, 
tliat Iiostilit,ies would i.ecommoiice, leaving it to Junot to 
renew propositions, if he chose to do so sepmtely fmm the 
Ilusslans. Sir Hcw, homever, feIt bound in pmmd inB 
honour by M w q ' s  observation to the Frencli oftiie court 
officer, not t o  talce tha advaatage. He likewise Of T""iv' 
felt diainclincd to rc1inqui~h n nciotintion, whieh, frorn ccrtnin 
circuinstances, Iie deemed upon tlie point of being crowncd witk 
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Ruccexs. Hc thcreforc dcqmtchd 31111~ny to Lishan, to inf 
Junot oF tlie fidmirar~ objection, nnd give nutice of tlie M 
qucnt rupturc of tttic annisticc. Coloncl Mirrray was m 
aver empowercd +,o enter into and concliidc n definitivo tmt]r 
Procedinm r i p n  a ireah basis, and mmnwhilc tlie whole armg 
of thc Coiirt w~hspuslied forwnrd to hmnlhal.  Sir Snlin Noore's 
of Jnrliiiry. troops had landed at lilnceira Bay, yet the order 
to repnir tbere did not readi Bicm iintil sevcml rcgirnents hnd 
been disembarked in t l ~ c  Nondego, and tiic rc-shipping of 
~RFSC, togetlicr with ooiitrary miiirls, muscrl a dclnp of fonr 
days. At hIaceira also, ,mnt difimilty nnd some Ioss rvu 
mstaiaed in getting on shore, an operrition only cffected by 
five days of incessant esertion on tlie pmd of the n a y ;  tlie 
boats mere constantly swñinped by tlie surf, and not more tban 
thirty remained fit for service at tlie concl~ision. 
On tlie 2StIi, information was received from BImay that 
a Tresh trkty ww in ngihtion upon an admissible liasis, and 
next day, the 2YtB, tlic army toolr n new position at Torres 
Vedras. During these events Liisbon was V C ~ C K I E ~ ~ ~ ~  agitated. 
Bope rind fear were maguified hy tlie obscuilty of aifairs, and 
the contradictory news s p d  by tlie French and by the Por- 
ttlgxese excited joy w grief almost to frenzy. Junot made 
every effort to engage Siniavin in tlie negotiation, and the 
htter, necesaarily forced to  put his sliips in a gusded attitude, 
contribnterl powerfulIy to control thc populace, md @ve 
~itrength to an opinion industriously spreatl, tliat he would 
make c o m a n  cause with tlie Frencli. Nevertlieless he gave 
early notioe that he would treat separataly, and the Freiidi 
hing thus left to themselves, brought tlll the machinery of their 
dipl~niatic subtlety into play, witli a Piew to  nmend tlieir posi- 
tion. Thus among otlier ~cherna,  Junot opcned a scparate com- 
munication witli sir Hew Dnlrymple, when Murrrty, invested 
witli fnll powers, wns en,pged in claily conferenccs wvith Keller- 
man; and tbc difimilty of coming to a concltision,  as i n m g d  
by the suspicion and j c a l n i i ~  incirlent to  such a singular trana- 
actioii, where Owo foreign nations wcre seen bargaining, one of 
tliem honestly, for the g o o d ~  and inkwsta of n third, yet scnroelv 
Iiinting evcn at tlie existente of thc latter. Slic Prench bi 
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ad~ranced extrlawartt claims. The Portuguese Eender~, no 
ionpncr fearing a defeat, pprotpsted against the convention, pmsed 
the line of dema~cation, fired on the FrencL patroles and 
menacerl Lirrbon from tIic side of Sntnrcm. Tliis movcinent 
and tlia rattaclr on tIie patroles mere promptly disavowed by 
sir Hew; yet tliey kept suapicion wake, and the misnnder- 
~tandings arose at last to such a beight, that Junot, seeming 
for a moment t o  recover Es natural cnergy, threatened to bum 
tlie piihlic: cstnlilishrnents md mnlce his rdsent gnod nt thc 
expense of the &ty: a mennce wliich nothing could prevent 
him from execiiting. IIo~vcver 8 definitive twatp was finally 
concfudd nt Usbon on the 30th, md soon aftemards ratifid 
in f om.  
Tliiri cdehrnted convcntion, impper ly  cnlld of Cintm, 
consisted of  twenty-two original and three snpplcmen~ry 
artlcles, upon the cxpediency of many of mhich sir Artliur 
Wcllwlcy nnd tho commnnrlcr-in-cliicf d i s n g m l  ; but as tlicir 
disagreement liad reference t o  details, no€ tlie general principie, 
tlie h i s b r i ~ d  importrtnce is niill. An informality on the patt 
oi Junot caused somc dday in the rntifimtion of tlie instru- 
rnant, yet tlic British nrmy marclied to tdre tlie positjon near 
Lialion, aesigned to it by tlm Iltli artide. On the road, sir 
Rew met tivo Russian officem, charged t o  opea a sqaratc 
negatiation for tbe Itussian tnquadron, biit be rcfused to rcccfve 
tlicir mdrintinls, anrl rcfcrrd them tu sir Clinrlcs Cotton. 
'Ilius baffled in an nttempt to carry on n double treaty, for n 
navnl ouc was nlready commenced, Sininvin, whose mnduct 
appears t o  have been weak, mas forced t o  come to a conclusion 
with tlis Rnglisli nrlmirnl. At firat hc ciaimed fho pr~tect~ion 
of a neutral port, but mngly he possessed none of tliat weiglit 
wliich circumstances lid given hini before the conventiun. 
R e  m a  answcrd, thnt tbe British flag waved on the forts 
nt the mouth of the Tagus; nnd t h i ~  wns tme, for the tliinl 
and forty-second regime&, unnder general Bere~ford, hliavin~ 
taken possession of them in virtne of  the eonvention, had 
impmpcrly hoisted the Biitish colonrei. Foilerl by tl~ís pro- 
eecding, tlic jrrstice of wliidi is someivbnt doubtfd, Siniavin 
agreed to aurrender upon tlie following tems. 
14 The Rwsian ships, with their saiIa, ~tores, &e,, were to 
L 3 
be hold by Englnnd, ns IL dcposit, until six montlis nfkr the 
cunclusion of a pcnce betwcen tho two governmcnts of the 
contracting partiea. 
23 The dmirai, officers, and seamen, without my resi 
tion as to their hhre serviceq were t o  be trmsported 
Bussi& at the expense of the BiitisZi govenirnent. 
%a dditional articles were, subsequently t o  tlie ratifimt~on 
of tlie original treaty, proposd by tIic Russians .nsd ndssentd 
to by the Englisli admiral. Tlie first stipulated that tbe 
imperial flag sliould be displriyed even in tlie Uritisll ilibours, 
as long as the Eussian a d m i d  rernained on board. Tlke wcond 
providcd ttiat the ships anrl their stores sliould be deliveretl at 
tlie appointed time in tlie same ritate as wben surrended. 
T ~ B  rights of tlie l'ortupae were not refPrretI Go, 
rarr- "p. but &ir Charle8 Cothn ww justified in thnt poiat 
1609. 
by Iiis iiistructions, ivIiicli niitliorized Iiiin to m k e  
prim of tlie Russian Aeet. Sininvio tlius suirercd al1 tlie 
iiieoiivcniencc of lioatilities hnd tlic sliniiic of strilting his 
coloiirri, withniit liaving violnted in uny rnnnnar tlie relntions 
of amity in zviiicli Iiis natiod ñtooíl witli regard to  Portugal. 
On tlie otlicr EilanJ, for tlic sake of a fcw old tlnd d e q i n g  
ships, thc Britisli rninisters made an injudicious diplny uf 
contempt for ths  intlopcnrlcncc of thcir ally,-for ~{ t l i  singolm 
inconsi~itcncy, they permittcd the officcra nnd crc~va, tlie real 
strcngtli of the aquaddron, to return to t he  Riiltic, althougl~ 
scarccly a yycnr liad clnpsed, sincc tlia nutionnl chnmcter Iind 
bccn dcfild iii thnt qiinrter to supprew a nl iy  
papn inimicril to Grcnt Britain. 'Chis incunsistency 1B09. 
Adrnirnlty bclongcii wlioi~y to tile minist~rs; f ~ r  t h ~  t\r0 
Jnstruc- 
,,,,,,,~, original artidee of tlie treaty only wcre con- 
c. Cotton, firmcd by thern, and tlicy wcre copicd from tlie 
16tti April. 
1608. Adrniralty imtructions dclivered t o   si^ Charlcs 
Ihirl. 
Nr. WaUcs- Cotton fonr months prmious to the trsnsaction. 
ley yole tu Yet tbat officer, by the ver. men wlio had fmmed 
those instmction~i, was with matchIesg eff ronte~ 
IYUB. rebuked for having adoptcd a new principie of 
maritime mnender ! 
On the 2nd of Xeptember head quarters were establiahed at 
Oyeras, the riglit of the a m y  occuliied tlie forts at the mouth 
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of t;lio river, tho Ieft rcskd on tlic hcights of Bcllas. Tbe 
Frencli conmntrated in Lisbon witli pique& and 
,icñnu,t- guaiuls ras if in front of the enernp, and at night 
the sentrim firecl upon whoever npproached their posta; the 
polim rlisbnnderl of tlicir own iiecard, and the city b e m e  a 
istlenc of turbirleilce, annrchy and mime. NoEwitlishn&ng the 
presence of their enemies, the inhabibitants testiíied their jey 
and evinced their vengeful fcelinp in a remñrkable manner. 
Thcy rcfuscd to scll my provisiona, or to dcal in any manner 
witli thc Frcnch; tlicy ailng s o n g  of tniirnph iri their hcrrring, 
and iii t.treir sight fttbricnted thou~ands o£ small lamps for the 
a~owed purpose of illuminating the streets at their departure; 
the duom of many liouses occtipied hy the troops w r e  aarked 
in one night; mcn ivmc obscrvod bearing in tlieir hats llists of 
Portuguasa or Frencliiiisii designed for slnitgliter, and the 
quarters of Loison were threatened with a serious atbck. Yet 
amidst al1 this cliqorder nnd violence, general Travot and some 
othcrs of tlie Frencli nrmy, fcenlcsaly nnrl mfely trnversed the 
atreets, ungiiartrrled save bp the reliutation of their just and 
liberal eondrrct when in power, a fact extremely honourable to 
the Portiigrieac, and conclu~ive of Loirion's mk- ,,, 
conduct. hinot himsclf wn.q mcnaootl by an 
mmssin, but he treated £he arair witt qnanimity, and in 
general he was r e s p t e d  nlthongh :hn a far less dcgree thsn 
Travct. 
Drcd of nn explosion, which would compromiso nt once 
the &ty of his ariny and the city, induced tlie French geneml 
t o  hasten the period when an English diinsion ww to occupy 
%he citarle1 snd take cliarge o€ the public tranquillity. Yean- 
wliile crnissariea from t he  junta of Oporto fomentcd tlie 
dispositiun of tlia pupulnce to mmmit themselres by nri attack 
iipon the French ; tlie conveution was reprobated, ancl endea 
VWrE wene hitlessly macle to turn tlie tide of indignation 
even ngnin~t ht? Fnglish as abettors of LIle invndcrs. Tho 
judge ooi tFie people, an energetio but tiuliulent fdloiv, issued 
an inflsmmatory xddress, ie which, calling for a suspension of 
the t s e n t ~ :  he designated the French tw robbers and insultera 
of religion. The Montciro Mor, hmling a rnlibla dignified 
witli tlie title of m amy, took possessioii of the soutli bnnk 
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of fhe TWs, and issud a protest against the convention, the 
exmtion of which he liad tlie nutlacity to cal1 upon sir Barlea 
Cotton t o  interrupt, but tt ie latter sent his communications to 
sir Hew Dalrpplc, a h o  trented them with tlie contemptuous 
indignntion tltey rnerited. h the m i d ~ t  of this confusion and 
intrigue, Blr John Bope, appointed Englisli eoirirnandant o£ 
Lisbon, toolr posse~ion of Bckm cmtl E the 1 Otli, and of !,he 
citadel the lBtli, and by his firm nnd vigorous conduct abated 
the public eKemescencc, and repressed t,lie disorders, which 
were grent ~ n d  gnve facility Sor flio commissioa of nny villany. 
Junot embarked the 13th. Thi! firsi division o£ Lii army 
sailed the 15&; it mna f.>llo.i~ed by tho second and thirtl 
divisions, and on t11e 30tl1, ir11 t l~e Frcncli, cxcept Ilie garrisons 
of Elvas and Almeida, rvers out of Portu~al. 
51ucli traulilo and contestetion hntl ntteiided the exemition 
of tlie convention. Lord Proby, tlic Eiigliuli comniitrsioner, 
was joined t?g BeresforcI on tiie 5th; but their iinited lalroars 
werc ~cnrcely suficient to acmmplisf~ a taslc, in tlio prosemiion 
of wivliicli ilisputes liourly umsc. Anger, tlie cupidity of indi- 
vidual~, tina oppnrtunity, comlriincd to pusli tlie Prench Iieyond 
tlic bounds of decency ; severa1 grosa utt~nipts wera marle to 
nppropriate propcrty wliicli no interprctntion of tlio ~tipu!n- 
tions cotild sustnin ; the most O I ~ ~ U R  Iieing tlie abstraction of 
rnnnuscripts nnd m e  ~pecimens of ~intui-td liifitory from tlle 
nationul muscum, ntid tlic irivmion of the del~osito puhlico, 
or €untls of muney aw~iiting Icgnl dccision for tlicir finnl npprc- 
1iriation. Tliose dislirinest ntternpts were cliecIcd witli a 
strong limd, ancl nt last, a corrimittee rcpresciiting tlio tliree 
natiaiis was appoinicd by h e  conimissioiir?rs on botli side. 
Tlicir ofice wns to invcstigntc complnints, nnd do jixtice by 
seixing uprin $1 contrnbunil Iinggngc enil~nrlrei1 by tlic French; 
a mensure attended ivitli exeellctit effect. I t  inust howeycr 
be olisemd, tliat the loud cornplnints nnrl vioIenca OS the Por- 
tukmese, and tlie macliinotioiis of tlio bisliop of  Operto, sccm 
to Lave excited tlie smyicions of tlie Bn'tisli and influenoed 
them mora tlizn the real facta mrranted: tlie naiiannl crin- 
m t e r  of tlie Portiigiieñn mas nof, tlieii unrlerstood, nor the 
extent to wliicli tlicy faliricnted falacliciods gencrnlly knom. 
P&y writcra llave not 11een wlaiiting since ta exaggernte 
the gmnnds of cumplaint. Tlie Englisli Lave imputed fraud 
and cvnsions o€ tlic mast diahonourable lcind to the French ; 
t1ie lattcr liavo ratortsd by musations of grintuitoue in~ul t  
and breacli of faitli, iiinsmucli as tlieir soldiera, d e n  on boartl 
tIie DritiaL aliips, were treated with crueltp iu ordei to induce 
tliern to desert. It cannot be aflirmed tliat al1 tlie error was 
on one sidc, yet i t appears cimsonnnt ta Justice tIiat, aa the 
Frencli wcre originnlly nggressom nnd ncting for t h c i ~  own 
interest, iivliiIe tlie British interfered only for tlie prote& 
Cion of the Portuguese, indecoroue z e d  on the prt of tlie 
lattcr was more cxcumhle thsn in their opponents. Tlie 
Rritish commis~ioncrs nquittad Sund of tlny peraonnl impro- 
priety ; und his public ordera, denouncing scvere sir 
liuiUs11rnon ts for sucli mnlpracticw, corrobornted v ~ l e ' s  
h'iirrntive. this testimony; yet Eellerrnsm, in bis communi- a,,t of 
cntiona ~ v i t l i  sir Hcw, ddi not ncruplc to insinuate lnqulv. 
mnttrm to tlie dulrc's disnrlvnntnge. The Rritisli commundcr'~ 
personnl good fnitli zind ~cnipulons ndherence to juatice, have 
howevcr never bcen called in question. 
To define the rights of each sirle, it is proper thnt the ori- 
ginnE rig11tR of tlic French should be mpmlited from those 
ucquhed under tlie convention. 3iucli oE tlie clamour against 
the; authors of the treatp sprung from confonnding those essen- 
tially distinct points. Conquest being the mle foundation of 
the first, dcfcnt if oomplstc extinguislicd them; if incomlilcb, 
iiullified a pnrt only. Junot was not entirely coiiquered, 
and liad lost nono of his riglits of oonq~iest, Eiut agraed t o  
excliange m insemire tenure of the whole for the Becure tenure 
oE a p~rt ,  With rc~pcct o the lattcr, rwkitution of plnnder 
m d e  anterior t o  tlie oonvention was out of t h ~  question. If 
officially marlo, it was part of the r i g t t a  of conquest bargained 
for by tlie convention; if the produce of private rapncity, to 
whlit Gribiinnl could thc innumcrntile dnims for rr~titiition, 
wliich wonIcl follow such ran nrticle, Iie referredf Tlie terma 
o£ the convention mere the rights of ea& partp; there were 
no dber. If an army surrendera nt discretion, the victorfi 
may wiy with Rrenniis, IVoe to  t he  vnnqtiished, hbut a conven- 
tion implies soine weakness and must be weighed in the scalea 
of prudente, not those of justiea 
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B ~ N A R D I M  FREIR~'S lntFMew with sir H. Ddrymple 
tlrnicro lim been n o t i d  as the commencemcnt o,' nn Entrip 
He opposed the armistice tlien, ostensibEy oli general grounds, 
hnt reaHy, as sir Hew tllouglit, bemuse GIie bisliop nnd junta 
of 0110Pto were not natned in the instrurnent; and Ile left one 
Ayres Pinto de Sowa to pmtect Portufiuese intewsts. Soma 
w soon apprised that a definitive conreiition wris b e i n ~  
negotiated, nnd he and Freire were in-r-ited to state their vieivs, 
Neitlier of them replietl, but when tEie trenty waa concliided 
they cIzmoured lourlly. The Driti~li, wlio kere only xuxiliariiiq 
they said, were treating witli tlis Frencli for Por~upese 
interesta, nnd had coiicliicled a convcntioii mhich lirotected 
the enerny Trom tlia puniñliments due tu  izapine md cruelty, 
It wn.5 more ftlvournlile tlinn tlie relntive atrenglli oE tliepnrtieri 
wnm~nkrl; no nciticc wns tr~ken o€ tlie P n r t i i p e ~ e  govern- 
ment, nor of tlie; nntive nrniy in tlie Alei~itcjo; meii obiioxious 
to tlie natiori for niding tlle iaivaderri, were ~ci.cened fmm 
vengcrtnce; nnd thc for trc~s~s  wcrc hnrgnincd fer ns if they 
appertained to tlie Englidi army, w11icIi woiild givc jmlousy t~ 
SpGn os well ns Portugiil, would in,j~iir tlic gcnernl cnuse, nnd 
enutde Freudl emissnrics to crente disuiiion. Tlicy clwelt ~ lso  
upon tl ie irnportance of ttic native foroes, tlic strcngtli of the 
insurrcctirin, nnd insiniintcd tfint scpnrntc opcrntions we 
likcly to be carricd on notwitlistnncling tlic trcnty. 
NoWe wods often covcr pitifrrl dcetls. Tliis rcmonstr~nc 
appwrentiy apringing from the feelings of n patriot -.hose h a  
W ~ S  ulceratcd by the wrongs of his country, was but a d d  
for misembIe intereatcd intrigues. Tlie bishop of Oporh, 8 
medrlling nrnbitioiis piiest, had early conceived the projcct of 
placing l~imseif at the head of the insurrcetional autlloritieg 
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Oporto. TIe expectd great opposition, and theuglit bq- in- 
vcigling theEnglisIi commirndersto couatenance his pretensioris, 
EIC miglit, mith the aid of Preire's force and his own influencq 
si~occed. With tliic vicw hc wrote to sir Cliarlas Cottrin, tho 
4th of Augs t ,  iu wlvllicli was enclosed, Iiis letter describsd 
it, ' Tlie form of govcrnment witli wliich they, tlie junta of 
Oprto,  meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisboa 
should be free from tlie French.' This missive and i t s  enclo- 
mire wcre hy sir Art1iii.r plnc~rl ~ 6 t h  other pubIic clomrnents 
jn tiie liranils o€ sir Hew wlieu tlie Intter h a t  lnrided nt 
Maceira. TLe document itself declared that ' The borly of 
government hed talren tlie glorious rwolution of restoring the 
Portupese monarchy in all itti extent, and of recovering the 
crown of Port11g1bI for i t ~  lawft~l fiovcreign, Juan VI., thcir 
prince.' But tliis glorious resoIution wws burdened with 
rnany forms and restrictions; rintl, altlioug21 the junta profwsetl 
an intention t o  re-establish a regency, they dtclnred, t h t  if 
tliis ncw rcgcncy rilioi~lrl be intcrruptcd by u new invnsion of 
tlie Frendi, or by m?/ ollm Il~ing, tlie juii tn wouId immediately 
take the governrnent on itself, and exercise the aiithority and 
jiirisrliction mhich it had done ever since its institution.' 
'I'hirs prcprtrd for Borne cnbal, sir WCIV replicd to Fseire's 
remonstranoe, ' Tl~nt if t l io  goveriiment af  Portugd had not 
Zieen mentioned in tlie treuty, ncither h d  tlint of Englan J nor 
thnt of France,-the convcntion wlis purely militar5 antl for 
the present concerned unly tlie eommenrlcm in tfie ficld. Witli 
rcgnd to tlie furtressea, and to tlio Britisli nrrny lieing nn 
iiuxiliary force, thn first was a measuro oC niilitarj. precutrtion, 
ancl the Iatter in no ~ ~ n y  rendercd donbtful by aany nct which 
llnd been committed. He nas inst,mcted by his govcrnment to 
&id in restoring the prince regent of Port.uugd t o  hia l~lvful 
rights witliriut sccret OL interested motives ; tlie Portuguwa 
general hd been invited to agsist in the negotiations, and if 
Iie had not done so, the Mame rested with Limself.' To thia 
miglih hnve been justly xdded, that Freire by withdmwing his 
troops nt the most critica1 rnomcnt of thc cnrnpnign, h d  [lis- 
entitlerl himself tn nñaiimc a high tono townrrls tliorio hc Iinti 
so disgacefully deserted in tlie hour of danger. He ~ ? t . a ~  
siIenced by this ansiver; bu* tlie Engfish general wa8 soon 
taught that the bichop and liis condjutors, liuwever inmpnhlo 
of great daira, were aubtle pIutters. 
I n  Lis firfit interview witli Ybriiardim, sir Fiew l i d  finid, 'no 
govemment laivfiilty relireseutilig t,lie pririee regeut existetl in 
Portugal.' Tliis was true* for iIn iiidcliendent juiitii, was l ike  
>vise eot~blislierl i r i  AlglisvE; iiiiil tlie rcgeiicy, investd  by tlie 
princ~ with supmnlc niitliority, .ri.iw dispcrserl antl pnrtiy in tlie 
powcr u£ Junot. This observntiori, so i~rlvcrs~ to tlie lirelntds 
views, wus trunsmittcd to bim by Freire, tgctlicr with n c o p ~  
oC tlie armistice; and tbe tiishop knew tliut dwumcnt liad 
hmn rendered aull by sir C. Cottoii, nncl a definitire convention 
diífcring materjally from It, ~ns being concludd; biit keeping 
silent on that matter, he fnrwa~ded a copy of the arinistice t o  
Da Soura, Porti~pese minister in London, accornpanied 16th 
invectiveq and misrepresentations. Souza placed tlie copy and 
tlie bishop's Ietter Liefore thc secmt,wy of stritc, $Ir. Cnnning, 
and deli~ered an offieinl note, in wliich, adopting the ideas of 
the prelnte and junta, be apoke oP tliern as tlie representatives 
oT his swereign, and tlie pupreme poiver in Portugal. Dut 
the intriguing efforts of the party were not confined to  formd 
communicrttions with the mlnisters. The daily press teerned 
mith invectives against t l ie  English general, rind EX-parte stats 
rnents, foundcd on the prorisions of nn armistice never 
concluded, were palmed upon a pulilic ailways Iiast,y iin judo* 
of such matters ; tlius a prejudice against the con~vention w 
raisetl before eitlier tlie t e m  or the events whicii l d  to it, 
were known. For sir IIew liad neglected te  transmit informa- 
tion t o  bis govemment unti1 fifteen d g a  after the cornmence 
ment af the treaty, and th ministers, nnalsle ta  contmdict or 
exphin any af Souza's assertions, were p1,laced in a mortifying 
sitvation which dispesed them to tnlre a discontented vim of 
tlie renl treaty. Tliei liishop pretended to knoiv notliing of ths 
convention, Iience tlie silelice of Freira during the neptiation; 
Iiut once concliide(1, a dnmour m s  rnised in Pnstugal similar 
to tliiit exciterl in Engliind, nnd botli nr~tions appcnrcd ta he 
eqmlly indignnnt nt tlie mnrluct of tlie general wlicn in fnct 
h i ~  proceeding wcre unlmawn to eitlier. 
Tlicre wcrc othci thsn Portirpieñe conrljiitom. The Linron 
Ton Declcen, a Hanwerixn oflicer employed as a r n i l i t q  
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ngent at Oporto, wm stibjcct to sir Hew Dalrpmpl~'a 'aders; 
but he wrrs nlso to communicnte directly witli tlie secr~titry of 
atate in England. XXe arrived at Oporto the 17th hugs f ; ,  
and tlie =me evening, in concert with the bisliop, concocted a 
project adrnimbly dripted to fomrard tlie newiof  thc latter. 
Tlicy npecrl thnt the prclntc m.9 thc fittcst Iiend of tlic govcrn- 
nient, and nR he cvuld not, lie mi11, quit Dporto, tliiit tlie seat 
cles to this arrangement were foreseen. lo. The prince regeiit 
had nominnted a regency, nnd Peft full instructiona for tlie 
filling up of vacnncics nrising from dczth or otlicr cíaiiscn. 
2'. The peopla of Lisbon and tlie soutliern provinces ~vouIcI 
aertaiuly resist any chango in tho smt of governrncnt. To 
obvinte these difficulties, Pon Deckcn wrote largely in com- 
rneiidation of the proyosed arrangernent, villifyini t1ie conduct 
of tlie rcgcncy, anrl urginng sir llcw to sa~ict~ion A F ~ ~ , , ~ ~ ,  
tlie arnbitious prqject, and emyiloy tlie Rritisli 11. 
troops to oontr'l t l~e people of ~ i s l i on  should they oppose tlic 
bishop'~ ppbns. To conciliate tlie memliem of the i-egency it 
-7 proposcd to admit mrnc in tlie ncw pvcrnmcnt, nnd 
Fmnciacu Noronlia, Francisco da Cunhs, tlie Monteiro Xor, 
aud tbc principal Cstro, were mmed as $Le only men fiiitliful 
to their sovereign. Tlie last bad bcen minister of worsliip 
under the Frencli, nntl wns thercforc unfuitlifiil; but lic rrny 
liulf-lirother t.a tlie hidinp, Cnstro teing legitimritdy lioni. 
Under pretext of sparing tlie feelings of tlie peorle of Ilisbon, 
it was fartller proposed, to appoint a Fortupuese commandant 
#ubj& ta the British governor, yet with a native foi-cc u d e r  
liis orrlers to contiuct ull rnnttcrs of police; nnd the bisliop toolí 
tlie occnsion to recommend a particular geueral for thnt office. 
Civil clissension and al1 its ;vila were ioretold as the certtlin 
conseuenccs oT rejecting this plan; but sir Hew's a m e r  
wns pcremptory ond deciuive. 110 reprirnnndcd Ton Declren, 
and put eii end to the bihiel>'s hopo# of support from the 
Britisli army. This second repulse completed tlie mortifiatlon 
of the pi~llñte and his junta, and they set no bounds to their 
riolcnce. Efforts were mnde t o  stimulnte tlie populace of 
Lisbon to nttack lioth French and Englisli, in the liope. tlint 
the terrible sceiie woulll eventudly pre-i-ent the re-estnlilisli- 
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ment of the old regency, and render the transfer of fpvcrninent 
to Oportci an easy tmk. Hence tlle outrageous conduct of  the 
M~ntriro Nor and O€ thc judge of the peoplc, and the former's 
insolent letter calling upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the 
execntion of the convcntioa Tbe peolile at large, however, took 
little interest in these factions, for on tlie 3rd of September, sir 
Hewrcccived instnictions from Iiome, relative to tFie formation 
of a new regency, entirelg at vari~nce with the plan arranged 
bctwecn tlie bishop and Von Dccken, and no difficulty attended 
tlie execution. But here, a5 in tEie case of  tlie SiciIian prince, 
Tve are arrcstetl by the sinplarity of tlie transaction. Gcncrxl 
Charles Stemart, brother af lord CwtIcrcagh, was tlie henrer 
of Ton Dedren's first letter; he wriuld not línowiiigly bwe 
Ient liirnself to m intrigue subvcrsivc of lris brother'g viem 
ns explained in the oficial instructions oent to sir Rew; 
neitlier is it lilíely Ton Decken slion'td plunge intn sncb a 
deIicate and irtipodant. affxir in one honr after his a r r i d  at  
Oporto, if he liad not Iieen secretly iiuthorized by some member 
of the Enghli mbinct. Are we then to ~ e e k  for a duc to 
tliese. myateries, in that shamcful Nicliinvelinn policp d i &  
goon afterwards forced lord Castlcreagh to defend his public 
measures by a duel 'l 
The usual fate of plans laid by mcn more cunning than mke, 
attcnded the hishop of Oportok pmjects; for s rnoment he 
rendered the  convcntion of Cintra odioua to the Portugucse, 
biit tlint pcople soon aclrnow~cclgcd witli gTntitudc tEie rcnl ser- 
vicw of thc RngIish nrrny, annd exultcd in n trcnty which freed 
Appendix, their country from tlie invaden Wcll might 
"0- 22. thcy exult to acc twenty-fivc tliownnd bold and 
slrilful soldiers, reluctantly qnitting' thc stmngholds of tlic 
kingdom, and rnnintaining thc liniiglity air of an army capnble 
on thc sliglitcst provomtion, of aqain seeking thc decision of 
battle. Tlie Portug~eiesc people were contented, btit fhe Spanish 
gencrn1 GalIuzzo nppcnra to havc favonred the viam of tlie 
Oporto fnction. DctuchmenC of his troops, and of Portnpcae 
mfugceri, principally from thc northmn provinces and com- 
mandcd by iy Spaniarcl, wcre acting in wnjunction with the 
!nmrgenta of thc Alcmtcjo, but rlisputcs arose hctwccn tIie two 
niltions ; for the Spmiards trrcnting Portiigal as n conquered 
country, dcnied tlie authority of gencrd Leite, wha WEN not 
o€ tlm llj~hop's pniaty, anrI lnsultcd hira ~~crsonally : tliey eveii 
seixctl bi rnilitary cllest at Campo Mayor, and in *-dix, 
al1 t l i i i i ~  a c t d  with the utmosb v5olence XHh 39- 
rapacity. 
Gnlluzzo himself was rcquircd by his own government ta  
join tlie Spaniah armies mnaentrnting on tlie Ebm. Iilstend 
of olieying, bo collccted Iiis fvrces nenr E l ~ m ,  nnd whcn 11c 
heard of tlre coiiventiou inve~ted Lalippe nild denid  its vliliditj* 
as affecting that fort. Girirod dc Novillard commanded the 
French prrison, antl he hnd compelled the iiihabitsnts of Elvas 
to shut tiieir gates against tha Spnniards and supply him daily 
mith provisions; Galluzzo's promcdings were tliercfore mmi- 
fcstly abwd, and his nttackei wcrc coni5iiccl to a triflirig 
tiombardment, tlie utmost darnw sushined being tlie knoclring- 
away the cornices and chimneys of the pvernor's house, the 
only pnrt not protected by boinb proofri of ths finest masonry. 
Lord Burghersli, alipointed to communicate witli thc Spanisli 
troopa in Portugal, g w o  Wlwzo, early jn Scpternlier, IL cupy 
o l  the convention, aud told liim the troopa of liis nation, con- 
fined on board the hulks at Lisbon, were by tliat treaty 
released, anti would be cIotIied, nrmed, and sent to Ctbtalonia. 
Sir IXcw also wrotc t o  Elim on tlio 6th of Scptcmhcr, rcpenting 
this íntclligcncc, nnd requesting liim t.o witliilmw liis men 
from tlie Alemtejo where they \vere Iiving at the expense of 
tlie people, QaUuzzo took no notice of either eommunication. 
Pretending he h d  opened his fire n p i n s t  Lalippe hefore tlic 
dabe of the convention, and no third p r t j  liad a right to 
inkfcre, lio wouEd p t  no t m  ta tlre garricon, nor pcr- 
mit any but Portuguem to enter tlie fort. Yet ttt this moment 
the Spanish armies on the Ebro were 1mpislJng for cavalry 
which he done possessed; and Qirotl, despising Lis effork, 
avowed an intention, íf tlie $ate o€ tlie French arrny at Libon 
should render ~iuch n s t q ~  advisn.U1c, t o  blow up tlie works and 
rntrrcli upenly througli tlio mirlst of Giillun7xi's troopa. 
CoIonel Roas was finally dstaclied with the 20tli regiment 
to  receive ihe fort from Girod, and tu  esmrt the gamison to 
Lirrbon under the terms of tlie convention. He sent a flag of 
tmcc by rn~jor Coltiorne, mlio m s  slso furnislied rrihli an 

Biitisli service. Girod complaincd of tliis ns I brcnch of fnith, 
nnd it was an equivocnl wt, yct onc cDmmon to nll arrnim, s,nd 
if done simpIy by w u a s i o n ,  excusable. 
Almeida nom surrendered, and tlie French marclicd to Oporto, 
and w r e  going ta embnrk, ~vhen the liopulace would have 
glain them i f  grmt exei%ions liad not Leen m d e  by the Britisli 
offiwm tn prcvcnt that detestable cruelty ; tlie English e~cor t  
wm wrnk, pet rcfiolute to uustnin i t ~  hnnonr, nnrl woiild hnve 
fired upon the multitude if the circumstanceu liad becoma 
desperate. Ne~ertlieless, several French soldien werc assna- 
sinated, and in spite oC apposition tlieir baggage wns landetl 
and pillaged, the ercuge being, that churcli plate wos ta be 
founrI amongst it, an nccusntion ertsily mndc, dificuIt B be 
cliaprovetl to the sntisf~i~tion o€ n ncilent moli, ltnd lilwly 
enougli to be true. Tliis tnmult stiaws with what facility man 
adapt thernselres to circumstances, rind regulate their most 
fiirioua pnssions by t.be ~ciile of self-interest. I n  Oporto tlie 
si~ffc~ing from thc invnsion was trifling, compnred t e  tho 
inisery enrlui~d at Lisbon, y& the inliabitants of tlie former 
*vere much more outrageous. In Lisbon the peiaons who 
liad inflicted the worst evile upon thc people were dzily 
cxposcd, morc or less, to violenoe, find siiticretl nonc. In 
Oporto, men uiitil that moment unseen of the miiltiturle were 
l i d l y  rescrred from its frnntic revenge. In  botli m e s  fenr 
regulated tlie degree of h~tred shown, and hence we mar con- 
dude that national ineurrections will never mccessfully resist 
an orgnnized force, unless the rnechanicar coumge of discipline 
bc grnfkcrl upon tlie first enthusinsrn. 
Thi le  tlie vexatioua corrmpondence with GaEluzzo TI= 
going on, sir Eew Daivrnple renewcd his intercourse witb 
Castnfios nnd prepared ta prosecute the war in Xpain. l'lie 
Spanish prisonem, four tbousmd in nzimber, liad been sent 
tu Cutalonia, and thc Rritish nnny wag cuntoncd in the 
dlemt~jo along the r o d  te Rndajoo; some s t d  oíiicee~ wcm 
despatched to examine the roads through &ira, vith a view 
tri a movement on that line also, and genera1 Anstmtlier was 
sent t o  Almeida to srrange a pssnge for the army, iif it should 
enter Spnin tbnt  wny. Lord W-il Iiam 13entinck employed 
at &I&irl, to c~nmunicnte with tlie Spnnisli gencids ai id  tlie 
dntml junta? and to arrnnge the bestlinc of mmah the w d e  of 
providing magazine6 and the plan of mmpaign. But in the 
niidst of thwe rtffaira, and before; the garrison of Elvas arrivetl 
at Lisbon, sir Bew Ilalrpple was mlled home to answer 
for Iiis conrluct relativa to the conventiori. Tlie commaiid 
then devolved upon sir H a q  Barrard, liut he nlso, nfter hold- 
ing it a sliort time, \vns recalled to  abide the fury of tlie most 
oiitrageous wd disgraceful pii1ilic clnmour ever excited liy 
thc fiilselioods of venal politiwl writers. Sir John hfoore 
remained in command. 
The editoa of the English daiiily press, adopting al1 the 
rnisrcprcsentations of the Portugueea rniniater, liad judged the 
ailence of goremment to be the consequcnce of its disantisfm- 
tion at thc convention, and broke fortli with such a torrcnt of 
rabid mnlcvol~ncc, thnt righk nnd justice mcre overborne, and 
the voim of tmth stiffed by their olistrcpemas cry. Mñiny of 
tlie piiblic p p c r ~  W C ~  printed with mourning lines around 
tlie texb which relatcd to Portugucse nífairs; al1 callcd for 
punialiinent; somc tnlkcrl of dctsth to the pi1t.y bcforc it wtia 
~~ossible to know if any crime hnd been committed ; the infamy 
of the conventioii wm t h e  universal subjcct of convcrsation; 
a generd madnm prevnilcd, and, like tbc Athenirtns rtftcr tbe 
sea-figh;ht of krginus~e, thc English people, if tlicir lnm Iind 
pcrmittcd, wonld havo cnpitally eondcmned thcir victorioua 
generals. To satisfy tbc @ng multitude n, court af inpuiry 
urou directed t o  assenible at CheIses and inve.stignte tho trnnsr 
actions rdnting to tho nrmisticc and tlic dsfinitivc convcntion. 
Sir Arthur WelIcsIcy, air Hmy Bnmrtl, air Bew Datrymple, 
nnd most of the other genemls engngerl at Vimicro, wem 
callod beforc it ; a, minrrtc investigntion of  itll the cjrciimstancm 
took plilace, and a, detailed report terminnt~l witli a declxnttion, 
that no furthcr judicial nleasures seemed to be d l e d  for. 
Tliis wna not sntisfwtory t o  thc govcrnment. The membem 
of the coud were required to &ate rieprirately, mhether they 
appmved or disapproved of Ilia armistior! and conventioii. FOUF 
spproverl, tiiroe disapproved of the convention; und among 
tlie Fat.ter m lord Woirra, who furnislied s criticiam, Irahured, 
but no€ touching tlie pith of ths question. Tbe prnceedings 
of tho board wcre dispmsionute nrid imprbial ,  Iiut the repor* 
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was not luminous; a t l~ing to be regretted, kmuse tlie r ~ n k  
rind ~zpuhdion of tlie rnembers were suEciently great to secure 
beui from the revenge of party, ancl tliey were favournbly 
placed for giving a severe md just rebuke to popular injustiee. 
'fiw ended thc last nct of the cclebrntcd convention of 
Cintra, tlie very narne of wliicli will always be a signal record 
of the ignoraut and ridimilous vehememe of public feeliug. 
Z'he mist ice ,  the negotiations, the convention, the execution 
of its provjsions, were commenced, condncted, concluded, at 
the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with wbich place they 
had not tlie slightest mnnexioa, politicnl, militrtry, or loml. 
Yet lord Byron Iias sung, that the corivention was signerl in 
the maquis of Marialds house at Cintra; and the author of 
ths 'Diary of an Invalidi improving upon the poet's di@- 
eovery, cletcctcd the ataina oE ink ~ p i l t  by Junot upon tha 
occasion 1 
19 General Thiebmult say8, the smttmcl stnte of the h n c h  
ermy in tlie beginning of August, rendered its situation 
despemte, bnt the slomness of air Arthur Wellesley mved it : 
otliers have accused him of rashnesa Jnnot's troopa were 
disseminated, yet tta bcat an nmy in dctail, a gened must be 
acqnainted with tha country, welf informeti of bis adversas's 
movements, and rapid in his owa But mpidity in war dependa 
as much upon the experience of the troops as the energy of 
the ehlef. The EngIi~h m y  was mw, the stdT end com- 
missnrilit novices, tlie nrtillery smntily and bdly horsed, fcw 
bagpge or draft anaaim were to be obtained iu  the country, 
and there were only a hundred and eiglity mvaiq rnonnted. 
Such impediments are not to be removed in a rnamerit, and 
therein líes the di fference betwixt theory and prradioe, beiwecn 
eriticism nnd execution. 
2'. To clisembark the army without waiting: for reinfo~ce- 
ments, wss a bold, not a rash measure. Sir b h u r  h e w  tlie 
French trogs  were scattered, although he was not aware of 
the exect sitwtion of ench &vision; the bishop af OOporto hnd 
promiried him good miatance, and the Portuguese wonld have 
been discouraged if he had not landed. Weighing them cir- 
VOL. f. 
102 PENTNS~JLA WAR. [iaoa 
mrnstanca he disernbmked, and the event proved he wa 
right. He had full time to prepare hia army, his march~e 
were methodical, he was aupenor in numhm t o  bis cncmy in 
eacli battIa E s  plana, characterized by n due mixtiire of 
entesrise and caution, were not bej-ond liia force, md yet 
capalile of b e i n ~  enlarged without inconveniente. 
3*. In tlie action of ltori? tbere was sometliing to cenpure. 
The movement against Laborde's first pmition waa weil ex& 
cnted; the wibsequent attack against the heights of Zambu. 
pira m8 faulty : the march of Ferpson" and Trant's divisioni 
wonld have dlslodged Laborde from that strong ridge witbout 
any attack on tbe front. It is isaid sir Arthur so desipd,  
but some mistake caneed Ferguson to dter the direction of his 
mrrch from tlie hnk t o  the centre, This, if tme, doea 
excuse the error, tbe commander-in-chief being p r ~ e n t  at 
attack in front, might have restrained it until P e p c i n  
rpcovered the right direction; it is more probnblc sir Ad 
expected no vigorous resjstance, and wisliing to press 
French in thcir retreat, pushed on tbe nction too frist. 
4O.  Towards; the close of the dap, the line of Loison'a mi 
wag in the power of the English general. If he bad wnt two 
thousand men to watch Lnlborde, Icft one thonannd to protect 
the deld of battle, a-nd moved the remaining ten thousmd 
ag~inst Loison, then at Cercal, eight miles distant, it is pru- 
babIe the latter would have been surprisd ancl totally dcfeatcd: 
at nll events he could only havc anvcd himself by a hticty 
rctrmt, which wouId have broken Junot's combiniitions and 
~icattercd h i ~  amy in all dircctfona. 
5". Sir hrtliur Wellesley rnarcheJ t o  Lonrlnhnm to mver 
the imrncdiate Innding of l ~ i a  reinforcmcnt and staics, becnuse 
o south-west wEnd would, in one night, have sent half the fleet 
on sliom in a ~ u r f  uneqnalled for fury; mch indeed was tlie 
difficulty of n diseinbarlrntion, thüt a detnchment fmm the 
gnrrisan of Penich6 woulti Iiave au&cd to frustrate it. m' - 
existente of a French reserve, reported to be four thaus 
rnen, ivas kuown, its situation \vas unknom, ond it miglit t 
been ou tlie mas6 line ; bmce great danger to Anatrittlier i 
~ttempted a landing withnut beiiig coverecl, grwkr atill if Iie 







lead : l id he been successfd agninqt tlie left, there woiild h ~ v c  
been no mtrcat for thc Briti~li amy. Thc extent of thc posi- 
tion, dthough conaiderabla for n small amy, wavlis no cause o€ 
werakneag, tlie Iinc o f  communicntion from riglit to lcft 
shorter and ertsier for the British dcfcnco tliim it wm for 
Fwncli attack, and the rno-v-cmcnt woa covercd by thc ee 
mhich was vcry strong. Tlic only real defcct m 8  having llu 
h e  of retreat. 
9'. The prajed of seixing Torres Vedm and Nafm at the 
done of the batt.le, m oon of tliosr! conceptiona vihich digtin- 
guish p t  geneials, iind it i a  h m h  t o  bIame sir Harry 
Burrard for nat adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and 
had he not been eonfirmed in bis view by the arlnce of his staff, 
there nas in the rtetnaI situation of affaim ample scope for 
doubt : the facaciIity of executing sir Arthnr'g plan wria not m 
~ p p n t  on thc ficld oT Mtle as it maybe in the filmet. Tbi 
French cavalry mas numerow, unharmed, fulZ of rrpirit; nnnn 
the dishnt heights tiehind Junot, a fresh body of infantry 
been discovered by Spencer, and the natture of the con 
pmented any acmrate jud,ment of its strength beingfom 
the English gnn-carriages w m  much shaken, and ao liadly and 
icantily h o d ,  that It was doubth1 if thep could keep up 
with the infanty in a long marcb; the comrnissariat was in 
g e a t  confuuion, the native drivers were flying with the muntry 
tranqod ; t b  Portupese troops gave no promise of utiLty, 
and the Eeglish ca~alry wm destruyed. To overcome obstaelel 
in the pnrsnit of a great atbject is the proof of a lofty pnius: 
but Nurray's and Clinton's ohjections ta the a t h p t ,  exone- 
rates sir Harry and places &he vigour of sir hrtliur Wellesley 
in a strong light. It WBB doubtless ill-jndged of B m r d ,  con- 
sidering tlie ephemeral nature of his comrnand, to interfer 
al1 witli the dispositions of a general wbo wm in tbe fa11 ca 
of victoy, and whosc snperior talenb and experience 1 
well l~nown. But it excites indignation to find s brave 
hoaouraide v&wm borne to the earth as a criminal, md 
msailed by the most pnerile, shallow writer~~ merely becaufie 
his mind was not of the higheat c h .  Sir Arthar was ths 
first to declare before the wurt of inquiry that ajr Harry hd 











109 DoiibFe Iinea of operation are generally dianih%ntageons 
nod opposed to sountl principies, brlt tlio eñpdiency of lunding 
Moorck troop at thc moutli of thc hfonclcpo 8nd puiishing tlicm 
to Snnhrm mas unqaestionable; snd theprobnliIe consquencs 
of wcli a movcmcnt m u ~ t  be considered ere sir Arthur 
Weilesley's foresight can be justly appreciated. 
Lisbon, situated near the end of a tongue of land 1j-in.g 
between the sea-eoast nnd tlze Tag us, is defended t o  the north- 
m d  by vast mountains, which rising in mccessive and nearly 
pamllel ranges, end abruptly on a line extending from Torres 
Vedrnv to Allinndrn on tlie T R ~ .  T h q  cnn only be p n m d  
at ccertuin pointe by an m y ,  anrl the intersections of tlie dif- 
fercnt roads f o r m  so many strong positions. Moreover the 
grent mass of the Monte Junto, wEch appeara to lead perpen- 
diculndy on to the centre of the firat ridgc, stop short ak a fcw 
milca distnncc, nnd sendn a. niggcd shoot, cnllcd thc S i v m  da 
Barrapxla, in a slanting direction towardg Torres Vedras, 
from rvliich it is onIy didderl by a deep defile. From thihi con- 
formation it resdb, tlixt an m y  mmhing from the mouth 
of the  Mondrgo to Lisbon, must citlicr pnw enatmnrd of ths 
Monte Junto rtnd follow tlie line of  the Ta,w, or keep west- 
ward and come npon the position of  Torres Srednis. 
If  ir Arthur had adopted the firsf of these I i e q  his sub- 
nisknco must bnva becn drawn by convoys from the Mondcgo; 
tho eneiny's numerous mvalry wmld then have cnt Iiis 
communicntions, and he would have had to retreat, or force 
tke positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and Luminr, or Bellas, where 
the ríght is covered by the Saccavem creelr, the ldt by the 
impasrinlile Sierro dos Infiernos. O n  the' othcr line, Torres 
Vedras was tu be carried, and then Mafm or Montechique, 
follomkg the direction of Junot's retreat. V Mafm waa 
forced, and it eould not welI be turned, a line of march, by 
CasIiim and Quelw, upon Lisbon, mould have heen opened to 
tha vidorrr, l3ut thnt wap, longer tlian the muta through 
Monteciiiqua and Lourea, would, while it led the Englisli amj- 
equally away from the fleet, have entangled it among the 
fortresses of Ereceira, Xt. Antonio, C~caes, S€. Julian's, and 
Relem. Supposing the Iiioritehique to bc forccd, tlie position 
uf Lriminr offcrcrl a third line of defcnec, md lastIy, ths 
citadd and forts of Lislma would have suifioetl to cover tlia 
passiige of tris Tapa,  a d  a retreat upon Elvns would have 
been sccurc. 
Scrious dificultics thercforc nwaitcd R singlc lino of opcra- 
tions, and thc doublc line was strietly scientific. For if sir 
Jdin Noore, disembarking at thc Mondego, hetl marclied first 
ta Sanhrem and tlien t o  Eaccavem, lie would liave tiirned 
Torres V e d w  and 31ontechique; and sir Artliur, on thc 0 t h  
pide, nould have turned the ZSierrx dos Infiernos by tbe road 
of Quelus. The French central sitnation would not have 
availed, because the distance betwecn the Ríitish lines of 
movement m l d  at first be more tlian a das's march, and 
tlieir near approach to Lisboii would llave caused fin insurrecs 
tion of the populace. Jimot must have abandoued the 
cnpitaI aad fallen viprously upon Moore witb a vicw t a  @ver- 
wlielm Km and gain AImeida or EL-; or hxve concentrated 
liis forces, rrnd been prepared to cross the Tagus if lie lost a 
battle in front of Lisbon. J.n ttlie first case, tlie strength of 
tlie country afforded Moore every facility for rcsistance, and 
sir ht1iurYs corps would h a ~ e  qiiickly arrived npon tlie rear 
of tlie Frenclii. In tlie semnd case, Junot would have had to 
fight mperior nurnbm, witli an inveterato populace in his rear, 
and if, fearing t,he result of such an encounter, be liad crossed 
tFie T a p s  and pualied for Eivaa, Moore could likewiso have 
crossed that river, and liarassed his retreat. It fullows that 
ta re-emberk Moords army after it had landcd a t  tlie Ilond~rrn 
md bnng it down to Mtlccirn Bay was an orrnr wlli, 
convention intervening, rnight liave provee: 
Cnytain Pul- 
nial+ to the succesa of tIie carnpnign. And i 
cO?m" hu* rendered more importnnt by tlie dnnger incurrsd 
ot Jnquiry. from tlia pnsmp-, for thc trnnsprts wcre not scn- 
worthy, amd the grct~teut pnrt would have pcrislied had a galo 
of winrl mmc oii from tlie soutli-wcst. 
11". The projcct of seieing Mnfrn by a q i d  mnrcli on the 
morning of the Zlat, if suoces~fiil, mould hnve forced Junot to 
a hurriad wtrent by Enxera dos Cavelleiros upnn 3fontechiqug 
at thn risk of being ~ttacked during hb rnarch; if he h d  
 nov ved bp thc longei ronte of Ruña nnd SobraI, t h e  Brithh 
army wodd h v e  reached Liibon before him. But w~aa it 
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possi1,le to  getin ten miles in a march of sixtecnl was it 
poñ~ible ta evade fin expetienced general, who, beiiig onIy six 
miles uK, possessed a furmidalile cni,alry whicli cauld iieither 
be checkcd nor interrupkd by the amall escort of Iiorse iu 
hhe Biitisli camp3 was it possible to avoid a defeat, during a 
Annk marcli on a road intenected hy a river and deep p l i e s ,  
thc Gedu af  torrcrrh'l Tlie rigid ndh~rer to  rules ~vorild say 
no, l iut sir Artliur nffirrneil afkrwttrds tlish certuin circum- 
shnces oE ground would lave reiidered tlie operakion su+ 
C ~ S E ~ U ~ .  
A ni@ mar& is an obvious mode of effecting ~ u c h  m 
entevrise, not ~ lways  thc best whrre expcclition is requiml. 
Greaiot pncrals hhve usuaUy preferrcd the &y-tirne, trustiiig 
to tlieii slcill in deeeiving t11e enemy, whiIe tlleir arrny made a 
fered march to gain tlie ab6j!ject in view ; thns, Tureune at 
Lnndsbcq, deceived the archduke Lcopold in brortd day-liglt ; 
Crcser, 3n rt more rcmarlrlrabla manncr, ovcrrmlicrl Afraiiiua 
and Petrieus near Lerida, and Pompey at Asl>amgium. Nor 
mere the circumstances at Virniero unfmourable to sir Artliur 
Wellesley. He might have pnslied some light froops, bis 
cavulry, the mnrines of  tlio flcet, tho Portug~giiwo mxílinrica, 
and a fm field pieces, t o  the entrance of tli6 defiIs oT Torree 
Yedras before day-break, with orders to engnge the French 
ontposts and make dernonsttations as for a general attack. 
This would have uocupied the enemy while the mnin body, 
pmfiting from thc woodn and lrollows throiig1,li whicli the by- 
ronrE tu Mafra led, migit, have pinsd such a start as would 
h~~e insured sucowa. 
But suppose Junot, instnicted by his ~pics and p&,trole~i, 
m divining the iatention of the Britisb p e r a l ,  beld tlie 
mtlsking division in clieck with a smnll Force, wliile lie movcd 
by the Puente (le RoZ1, or some &er cross rond, and tliere 
were several, against the flink of the English entangled 
among hollows and torrents. What would have been tlie 
result? Hiatory points to Cona& and the battle of Senef. 
It mrild howevcr Le no oiulinary gcncr:ral wiio conoeiveil such 
a pijcct. Succcas wouId limo rnnkal g i r  Artliiir nmong tlie 
eniinent coinmanders of the u+orld, tliougll 11e liad uever 
prfarrned any otlier exploit. ' The statue of Hercules, mt 
168 PENINSULA WAR. 1180s. 
by Lysippus, was only a foot high; yct,' . v a  Pliny, it 
exyressed the museles nnd bones o€ tha hero more granrily 
tliaii tlie oolossa: figures of otlier arbists.' 
120. So many circums~rtnow smy tlio j u d p e n t  of nn officer 
in tlie field, which do not afteraasds npliear of weighi, tliat 
craution ~liould guido etiimudvcrsion ort an unfortunate 
commander; ncvertliclc~, Junut's fuuIts during tliis cnrnpnig ' 
werc Goo glaring ta bc mishken. Hc lingcrcd too Iong ab 
Usbon; be was nndecidecl; he clivided h:s armp unneces- 
sarily; he discovered no skiil on the field of battle. The 
lnnding of the Englirih was  rr crisis, and he b d  onIy tmo 
points to consider. Coald the Frencli forces under his com- 
mand riefencl Portugal ~vithout assistance P If not, how could 
it bcst aid Nqolcon's genemi plaw qpinst the Pcninsuls? 
TLie first point could not be ascertaiued witliout a battle; the 
second requid t.he army to kecp ccinocntratcd to preserve 
a &re& on Spain, Ieaving for the Britiah troops the sieges of 
Elvas rrnd Almeida. If tEie two plans bad been incompatible, 
the lagt was p r e f e d e  to fighting in a country universdIy 
hostile: but they were not inmmpatible. 
Junot's pivot of movements wm Lisbon. HO Bad to fd 
upon the Ibglish amy, without resigning that capital to the 
Portugese insurgents. He could nok do the first without 
using the ,pat mass of fhis forces, nor avoid tho last without 
skilful wnagement and great mpidiQ. The citadel and forts 
about Lisbon enabld a mal1  force to control the popnlrtce, 
and resist the insurgonts of the Alemtejo for a few d y ; the 
Russlan admid,  altliough not hostile to t.he Portuguese, m 
forced by liis fea7 of the English to preserPe a parded atti- , 
tude, and did materially contribute to  awe the multiturle, who 
looked apon &ni as as enemy. Tl~e sliips of mar fitted out 
by Junot, were flmting fortressea reqniring acarcely anp pr- 
risona, yet efficient instruments to  control the city mthuut 
ceasing to be recepfadas for tlie Spanish prisonem and maga- 
ebies for powder and arms, whicti rnight othemifie have fallen 
into tlie powcr of tha populm. XnsGead of delnying so long 
in tlie mpitnl, trouliling liimself aliout the assemlilnge at 
Alcacer do Sal, and detiwliing Lalionle witlt e weal; division 
to cover the mar& of Loison, Juilot sliouid hhave talren the 
most ~Egnruua rc~olutiona in rcspcct to Lislion. Ahnrloning 
tlie left bnuk of tlie Tags, ivitli exception of Palmeltl and the 
Bugio, necesmry to tlie safety of liis siiipping, he should have 
seized upon the principd families of t l~e  capital ns hostqes, 
thmtened to bombard tFie citg if iefractory ; and leaving only 
the gnrrisons of the citadel, forts, snd ship,  behind him, 
Iie sliould ltnve procccdell, nnt to Leiria w11ir.h wns too near 
the enemp to be a secure point of  junction with Loison, but 
to Santarem, mhere both corps mighb have unitoct witiiout 
danger or fatigue, 
Gencral Tliomiercq meantime, putting ti mal1 prrieon ia 
Penicli6, could have wtclied the movement of the Eritisli 
genernl, nnd thus fiom eightem to twenty thousand men would 
have been nssemblecl at Santarem by the 1 3th ut farthest. From 
thence two easy marches would have brought the wliole to 
Bntntlia, near wliich place the lot of battle might have been 
drnwn witlioitt tremliling. If i h  proravcd unffivaurablo to tlia 
Frencli, tlie ulterior object of rencwing the campaign on tlie 
frontier wtis in reperve. The number of  large boats at Lisboa 
could bave tramported the amy over the T a p a ,  in n fem 
bour~, if the utorcs had Iiecn embnrked bcforc Jiinot moved 
townrds Bnhlolhn. Once in tlie Alemteje, witli a good prrison 
in rkbrrtntes, It could not have been followed until the forts at 
the moukh of the Tagus were r e d u d  and the fleet slieltered 
in the siver; and Iong before the Britisl~ ccould have menaced 
the Alemtejo EIvw ~1-oiild have been provisioned from the 
rnqnainos  cnIlccted by Loison aftcr the battle of Evora; the 
cttiripaip could then liam been prolongd until tlia grent 
Frericli arniy coming fram Germany cruslid a11 opposition. 
Tl~rrt Junot would attempt something of thls natiire formed 
the basia of sir Artliur'a plans, itnd coIonel Vinccnt's inter- 
cqted memoir trcated i t as a settled operation. But Jiinot'a 
dmponding mood, though his threat to biirn Lisbon during tlie 
ncgotitltion sliolved tliat he knew liia rcsnirrccs, i~w oliserved 
by al1 aronnd Itirn; and jt is curious that Battaro, his Portu- 
guese apent, being for some purpse in the British camp, told 
sir Arthur, before the battle, thnt Sunot would lvillingly eva- 
ciinte Portngal on tema. 
139 Wlicn the Prcnch, fourtccn tliousnnd in niimber, occu- 

1808.] BOOK 16-CIIAP. 6. 171 
W O U S ~ ~ ~ ,  ths cries aml groana of the latter, ancl the mhistling 
of  csnnon-sliota n.9 611ey tcnr open tlie ranlcs, produce disodcr, 
capeciiill y in the cenEre of mttnclcing coluirins, wliicli, Gl inderi 
by srnolte, uristeadfrist of fwting, be\vildered by wortls of coin- 
. mmd coming from a multitude of oficers crowded together, 
tan neitlier see what is taking place, nor advance nor retreat, 
mithout increasing the eonfusion. No exnmlile of c o i q e  can 
be usefril, no moral &kct prudnced I?y tiie spirit oE individuala, 
except upon tlie benJ, wliicli i n  oftcn fim nnil even victoriow 
wEien tlie rem is flying in terror. Nevertbeless, columns are 
thc soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in 
them also is gafetpto be found a h r  a defeat. She secret con- 
~ists  in knorving ~vhcn and wliere to  extentl tlie front. 
16". It is siirpriaing, tli~t Junot Iinvitig rcgnined Torrea 
Vednis, occupied Mttfra, zntl olitained nn armistice, did not 
profit by the tenns of tEe lutter to prepare for crossing 
the Tagus and mkablish the lvar cin the frontiers. ICal- 
Ierrnrtn ascerttiined during thc neptiation tliat AIoorc wns 
not arriwd, a ~ d  without hirn tlio liosition of Montecliique 
cou1d neitlier be attaclred nar turned. Tliere was notliing in 
the armisticc, or thc wvay it hacl been agreed to, nIiicli ren- 
dcrcd it diahonournble to k k c  s~~c l i  nn advniitngc ; and t l i ~  
opening thns Icft for Junot wns t3r Arthur's priiici1ial objection 
to tliat preliminarg. 
I So. Altl~ougl~ parts of the convention mere objectionable 
in point of fom, pnrts irnprudently mordcd, ttalcen ns a wliolc 
it wrts fmglit with pnirlcnce. Siippnm sir Artliur, ~inini- 
~]e,rlcd. by sir Hilrry R u r r n d ,  1it~íI pursued Iiis own lilm ; tliat 
Junot, cut if fi+oni J;ishon anJ. t l~e  half of his force~, liad bcen 
driven npon the upper Tagus. He mas still rnnster of fiying 
to Almeida or E l w ;  and tbe thousxnd men in tjniitmctn 
could Iinve joincd Iiim on citlicr linc. Tlicn thc ndvnntragcs of 
B convention ~vould lime lisen apprcciuterl. Tlie artny, exclu- 
~ i ~ o  of Muom's division, liad neitber provisions, nor mems of 
transporting provisions, for more than ten days ; the fleet sas 
tlie only aolid resouxce, but a p i e  from my p i n t  bet~een 
south and nortli-west would hive driven the sliips zmy or cnst 
tliem on a Zee-sliore. It wns tliercfore indispensalile t o  sccuro 
the mouth of tlie Tugus for the safety of tlie fleet; and 
thia could ody be done by occupying Cascae~~ Bugio, and R. 
Julian's, the last of wliicli would done have requird ten daps 
open trenches, and a battering train wliich niust have been 
clqged by men over tlie mountaine; for the artillery horses 
were scarcely alile to draw the field guns, and no 
M e d i n R s  country animala were to be found, In tlie mean 
of tIie {Akirt 
oflntlulry, time, the Prencli troops in Lisbon, n p n  the 
lieight~ of Almadg m1 in the men-of-war, rctiring 
trnnrluilly tlirough tlie Alemtqjo, would tliere llave uniied with 
Jueot; QT? if he fe11 bsclc upeii Almeida, they could have 
retired npon Elvas and La-Lippe. Meanwhile, Xiniavin must 
11ri.vo surrendered liis squadron in ri. disgmcefd mauner, or 
joined tlie French with Iiis six tliousnnd men; and it may 
here be oIiñewerl, tlint even nftcr tlie arrivd of 
Appcndix, 
Na m. ilfwre, only tweilty-iive tliriasand Briiisli iiifuntry 
wew fit for duty. 
Let it 'tie uiip~iofied tlie forts wcre tnltcn, tbc Rnglisli flcet in 
tlie Mver, tEic wsourcm af Lisboii orgnniírcd, tlic Ziattcring p n a  
and nmmunition n e c e s s q  frir tlie uiege o í  Mvns trniiqiorted 
to Abmtca  by watcr. Scventy miIca of lnnd rcmnined to  
tmverse, nlid tlien tlime montfis of ariluous 01)criitiona ia the 
siclily senson of tlie most pestilent of situntions, would liave 
bcen tlie ccdnin conseqncnccs of rtny nttcmpt to redrice thae 
fortresa. Did thc dificii1t.y cnd thcre l Amcida remained, 
nnd in tlic tlien state of thc ronds of Porti~gaI, U i n g  iiito con- 
sideriitian only thc ltnown and formecn olistnclca, it js ccrtnin 
t.11rtt six months merc wo~ild Iinm becn wnstcd bcfore tlic 
country could h v e  been eiitirely fneed fron the invarlers; but 
long beforc thnt pcriod Napdeon'a engles mould hnve soarel1 
wer  Lisbon again ! Tñe concltision is inevitable. Tbe con- 
vention was a grmt anrl soIid advantnge for tbe allies, s blunder 
on tlie part of thc Trench. 
Witli the momcntary exception of Junotas threat t o  burn 
Lisbon, we look in vain for that vigour wliich vrgcd the march 
from Alcantara; and wonder to see tlie man, wlio in tlie facc. 
of an English flcet, in contempt of fourken thousaiid Portu- 
p e s e  troops, nnd s populatian of three hundred tlionsand 
soiils, dared ~vitli a fciv Iinndrecl tired grendiers to seize upon 
Ysbon, so sudi in energS; tkbt  ~ i t h  twenty-five thriusand good 
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~oldiers he declined a manly effort, and resorted to s, convm- 
tion t o  snve sn a m y  wh.idi was in very littIe drtnger. Bnt 
sucli is tlie human mina, tha momcniwry slave of evcry ~ttraci- 
tion, thoiigh ultirnzitely true to setf-interent. Wlien Junot 
entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, even a throne IVM 
within h i ~  view. Vhen he proposed the wnwntion the gor- 
p n s  appmition was gene ; toil and dnnger were at han., 
fame flitted at a dihrtnce, and he en.qily permaded himseIf tIixt 
prudence and vigonr conld not be yokcd togcthcr. h saying 
attributcd t e  Napoleon perf~ctly describes tlie couvention in R 
few worda. ' 1 1% going to send Juiiot before n cenncil of 
war. d e n  fortnnately t he  English tLied tlieir generals md 
ñaved me the pain o£ punishing an old friend 1' 
CHAPTER 1. 
TEE i:onvention of Cinkn, followed by the est~1iIisliment O£ a 
rcgeiicy at Zislion, discuncerted bli~ plans of clie bisliop and 
~ I I U ~ B  of Ollurtol al111 re~toretl Portugal to compnrntive trnnquil- 
lity. Vie ~iiinplr: minrled pcnyilc woiild not Iiccd tlie pernicious 
counsels of tlie fxctiouri prclate aiid Ii ix  miwlii~vous coiuljutow, 
snd wlint may be callcd 111~ convul~ivc strugglc of tlie war 
termin~ted, At fimt a i.ernnrknlile ñimilar.ity of  fccling itnd 
mode oi nctiiig hettiiyed tlie coinriion origin cif tlie Spiiniads 
and Portugursc; it wilrl impatieacc o l  forcign nggrcssion, ex- 
t r n v ~ p n t  pride, r-tiin bonsting, ~inssionntc: rrcklres resentment, 
were cominon t o  lintli. Boon, I i o w e v ~ r ~  tlie fiiier mnrks of 
natianitl cl:liiiructr?r i~tipressed by tlieir difcrcnt poaitions in t l~e  
pliticnl worlrl liccnme visilila. Epain, Iioliling from time im- 
memorial i~ Iiigli mnk iimong the p e i i t  Iiowers, inare oftcn nn 
oppres"" tllim 01ipresaed, Iiai~glitily rqjcctetl 1111 itrlvice; iiiicon- 
scious of lrer nctiiul weukne~s and ignurant~, niid ivnnemliering 
only Iier fonner dignity, &e añsumerl tin attitude wIiich would 
smrcely linve ~ ~ i k d  the dnys of tlie emperor Cliarlarl~s V.; 
whereaa Portugal, alwaya fearing tlie ainhition of lier powerful 
neighliour, niid rc1yi11g for safety na mucli upon lier ullinncxs 
a8 u p n  Iier own intrinsic ~trengtli, rcndily mihniittctl tn the 
direction of Englrind. Tlie turbulence of tlie fimt led t o  defeat 
nnd disaster; tlie doci1itg nnd patience of the sccond wsre 
prmlrictive of tlie m o ~ t  l~eneficinl resultñ. 
Tlie nntioiiiil diffcrence was not immeilintely perceptitle. 
At tliis pcriorI tlie Turtiiguese wcre despisad, wiiile a splendid 
triiimplr mns antici1)ntd for tlie Spnninr~ls. It nTm nfirmed 
and hdiwcd, tlint, froni cvery qunrter entliiisiastic multitudea 
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of a battied and dispirited enemy ; tha vigour, the courqc, the 
anmatched ~pring of Spanisli patriotism was in ewry man'a 
moutb, Napoleon's power and energy seerned weak in apposi- 
tion. Few persom douGted tIie trutli of mch tolea, nud yet 
nothing couIrl be more unsound, more erninent.1~ fallacioux, 
tlm t11e generally entertaiued opinion of F~ench wenkness and 
Spanisli strength. The resourees of the former were un- 
boundd, ralrnost nntoiiched; those of tlie iatkr rvere toa 
slcnder oven to mipport the wriglit of victorg ; in Spnin the 
whole structure of ~ociety was sliaken to pieces by tlio violence 
o£ an effort which merely awakened tbe alumbering strength 
of Fmnw 
Fortsight, prornptitirdc, arrangement nwked tbe proceed- 
i n g  of  N~tpolcon; wliile witith thc Spnniards pmdcncc W89 
punielied as trensan, anrl p~xonal  i n t e r~ñ t s  everywlicre upring- 
ing up with increditile force wcstIed against the piiblic good. 
At a di-ce tlie hsurrectioa appeored of towering propor- 
tione antl miglit,y strength, whcn in tnith it was a fantastic 
object, Btained witli hiood, and tottering Srom wealrnsss. Tte 
lielping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its 
support, al1 other assistance was dcnierl; for t I ~ e  continental 
powers, altliough notrriFihing accrct Iiopes af profit from the 
atrnggie, wih1;li mlciilating potiq turned culdly from t l ~ o  pntriotd 
cause. Shei Englisli csbinet was indeed sanguine, and yet ths 
ministem, wliile auticipñting suecess in a preposterous manner, 
disp1ri-j-mi little industv and less judgment in their prepmir 
tions for the ritruggle; nor does it appcar that the freedom of 
tlie PenimuEa un.4 ~ U C ~ I  considcred in their councih. Thep 
conternplated ttis astonis1iing insurrecticin as a mcre militnry 
openjng, through wliich NapoIeon might be assailed, and they 
neglected, or ratlier feared, to Iook towards the great moral 
consquences of such a stupendous event,-consequcncce wvliicli 
were i n d e d  abovc their rerach of polioy - they were neitlicr 
able nur wiIling tu seize such a singularly propitious oocaaion 
for conferring a, benefit upon mankind. 
Tlifs opportunity for restoring the civil st,rengbh of a 10% 
degrlarlcd peoplc by a dircct rcciirrence t o  first princililt~, m s ,  
howcver, siidi ns Iins sddom bscn gnntcd  to n ~inking nntion 
Entliwinsm \vas arousd without hhe witliering currie uf filction; 
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of rninor cirmrnstnnces of liGtle importante if vicwed ~epnrntelfi 
but showing, wiicn conaliined, tlie complicated nature o f  the 
dismse which destmped tha e n e i g  of Spain. For the 
dvantage of clenrnesq therefore, it mil1 be necessary to sacri- 
fice ehronological ortler ; and as frcquent referenec must be 
mndc to thc proceedinga of a clnss of mcn whost! interfercncc 
l id  a rlw!iiled, and in manbny cases a very dmstrouct iniluence 
upon the affaitri of that period, a bhef account &al1 be given 
of the Eiiglish agenb, u n h  which denomination both civil 
and military men were employed: the diitinctiun m only 
nominal, For, gciiernlly spcnking, ench person assumed tlic right 
of acting in bo th cralincities. 
Xr- CIiarles Btuart, as envoy, wna the rhief of the civil 
agents, aud the persona subordinate to him ivere, Mr. Hunter, 
YF. Duff. and otliers, oonsul~ and vice-consuls, He remained 
at fimt at Coruñt~ 
>fr. Hiinter was stationed at Gihan in the Aaturiss. Mr. 
Duff prmeded to CaJiq and the otliersi wme, in like manner, 
employed at different porta. They were al1 empowered ta 
distribute money, ams, sucmuw of clotbing rtnd emrnunition; 
nnd t,he wont of ~ y s t e m  nnd forettiought in thc mhinet wes 
proved by thc injuditious aeal a£ their inferior agents, ewh of 
whom conceived hirnself competent to direct the whole of the 
political and military tranaactions : hlr. Stunrt even hnd some 
trot~tile to egtnblish Iiis right of control. 
Tte rnilitary ugenks aere of two d a s s ~ ~ .  TEioze aent from 
England by the goverament, and those employed by tha 
general3 abrod.  
Sir Thomas Dpw, wassisted by major Roclie and captain 
Pntrick, proceded to t he  Asturiw. Tlie last uficer remltined 
at Oviedo, nwir the junta of tliat proviuce; Jloclle went to tha 
hed-qultttere d Cuesta. Dyer, after wllecting some informa 
tion, returned to Endand. 
Colonel Charles Uoyle organized thc Spnnitih prisonm at  
Porkrnouth, and sniled with tlicm to C o r u t i ~  Be. WaBuccorn- 
pniiied by captain Carro1 and mptain Kmedy, and during 
tlie prtssage a angular instarice of turbiiIeiit irnpatiencs 
occurrcd. The prisonera, who had been released, arnied and 
clothed by England, were as enthusiastic in thek exprmsioris 
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of pt6otism m the most eungoine could ilaire, but ~t wa 
tliey mutinied, mrried the transporta into diiTcrent purts of 
tlie Peninsula, disembai-ked, and proceeded ench to Lia own 
liom e. 
Colme1 Browne WLV de~patclied to Oporto, major G m  to 
Catnloriia 
Sir Hcw Dnlryrnple harl hcfom sent captain Whittinpbam 
to'nttend, general Ca~tufios, and placorl miljor Cox nenr the 
aupreme junta of Beville. Thc former accompnnitxl ths hcad- 
qimrters of tlie AnrleTusian nrmy until tlie hnttle of Tudela 
put an end to b i ~  functions. The lutter wstraierl tlie supreme 
junta's p~oceedings, advising and rcrnonstrating, when necw 
sary, in a rnnnncr cxtrcmely jiidicious nnd prniseworthy. 
Al1 tlie nliove-namcd gentlcmcn were in full nctivity pw 
vio113 to thr commcncemcnt of the carnpnip in Portugal; but 
Sir II. Dnl- wlicn the oonvent.ion of Cintrn opened a way for 
ryrnpih operntions in Bpaiiz, sir Rcw Dalrymple sent lord 
Papc"p'r". Willium Rcntinck ta Madrid, tlint hc might 
arrange a plan of co-opemtion with the Spaniñh generals, nnd 
tranarnit. cxact informrition of the statc of nffnirs. Such a 
missínn wns bccome indispen~nblc. Up to thi~t period the 
rnilitary intellig~nce received l i d  lieen vcry unsritidnctory. 
The letters from the wnts oontained abundante of common- 
plnoe exprwaiona rclativc to thc entliusiasm mil patrii 
risible in Spnin; vast pliins were sud to be under consi 
tion, mmo in p r o p m  uf excciition, and coinplcte RuoeeG 
confidently predicted. Nevcrthelcs~, cvery project pi 
ahrtive or disiistrous, witliout lowering tlie confidente o 
prognostimtom, or cheeking tlie rnniiiii. for grand opera1 
wliicli seerned ta be t l~e  disease of the moment. 
Lord Willinm Rcntinclrls miesion was confirmetl 
English rninihrs, and the ~ p t e r n  of thc militra~y %en$ 
regulnted by marlring out certain districts and appointi 
gcncrnl officw to srrpeFintend ench. Mnjor-general Rroderick 
waa sent to Gal1iCia; major-genera1 Leitli, with n lnrge ~taff, 
p m d e d  to tlie Asturim; Biscriy, Cmtllle, Leon, and even 
Cntalonia, WCM inducled in Iiis mission, and sccminglp he waa 
to prepare for landing an Engliñh army on the coast of Biscay. 





suborrlinates, especidly on those who mcepted Spanish mnk; 
hit, neither lord Willian Bentinck nor MI. Stuart 
S"'art's could procure tlie axloption of a henaficial measure, Lettrrr. 31s. 
Lord w. oreven estal~lish tlie ordinary intercoursa of officinl 
Beritiiick's 
Lcttern, 31Q, business. Tbe lending nien w i s l ~ d  to  create a 
Apl~n[lix. fulsairnpremi,sion of afftiirñ, and RO secure tha Engiisli 
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supplies witliout being fettored in the applicatian 
of them; tlie iiiferior agents answered thia purpoae, and, 
eatisficd wilth tlieir docility, the genernl~ were displeswl if 
more tlinn one ngent mine to tlieir rqiective rampa. Captsin 
Birch, an htalligsnt engincer, writing from Blake'a quartem, 
saya, ' Gencrnl Ríotlerick is  expected liere; brit 1 
Sir John 
aroow<ii mr- liave untleiritood tlio nppcnrnnce of n Britiah 
rwpndmcep gcncriil iit tlicsc Iicntl-quurtcru miglit g¡ve jwlouy. 
11s. General Rldte is not wmmnniatire, yet cuyitnin 
Carro1 appcnm to be on tlic liest footing witIi liim ,atd his 
officerri; nnil citptain CamZ tclh me he informe Iiim of mora 
tliun Iie Jues any of Fiia gcncrnle.' 8oan tliis, genecd 
Lettcrtu Yr. Bruderiplc Jid nrrivc, tind cornplnin~l, tlilit 'geiieral 
Stuart. N$. Rliilrda rescrvc wns suck, Iic could anly get niiswm 
fic~it t o  tlie rnnst direct and ~isrticulor qiiestions, Iiut 
by no rncnns cnndirI nnd expticit mp?ies to general inquiries.' 
This sniitletp wiis suc~sfi~fiil. Widcly difldrent werc Sp~nish 
affnin judged by tlie rn i l ihq  ngcnts' reports, and Spmish 
afitirrr brought So tlis test of h t t l e ;  yet the fnult was lesa 
witli tlie figentB t1im with tlie ininiaters. It wns difficiilt for 
tlie fomer to nct nriglit. Living witli mllitttry chief~ in tire 
field, 'holding mnlr in thcir armicq dcpendcnt on Ghem for 
every wnvenience, tlley were forcorl l o  xee os tlie genere1 saw, 
and report as he wi~lied : a simple AII y wmld llave lieen more 
efimcious! Sir Johu htoore recdled u11 the iui'erior agents 
under hk control, and u g d  on tlis ministers that only one 
channel of communieation between the Spanish authorities iuid 
the British army sliould exist. He observerl, that each inilitary 
agent ~Iiougllt tlle eventa under liis o l m  peculiar copizauce tlie 
only rnutters of i n i p o r t a n ~ ~  Some of t l io~e pemns trenterl sir 
H. Ddrymple snd himself as having an auxiliary f ~ r m  to be 
moved, divided, and aplilied at their requisition, and thouglit 
the mili* dores of Engltwid were entkely nt their disposal.. 
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Mr. Enntw demanded cawlry and h o m  artille ry fo act with 
the Spaniards in the Astnnun pldns; infantry te garrison 
tlieir scapart towne. Dycr wm c o n v i l i d  thc horscmcn nnd 
p n s  sliou'td have been at Itio Seco, and that, nidd  witli tm 
tliomand Bpitish cavslry and twenty piecea of artillery, the 
Spaninrds would, in aix weelrs, hnve al1 the French troop ' in 
a stnte of siep.' General Leith says : Whtwer John 
mny he tlie plm o£ operatio~i~, alid whiltever t1ie ncmi~+. 
rcsult, I b ~ g  !leave, in tl~e atrongest rnanner, t o  ''P". 
recommenrl to your mnsidemtion, the greak advantage a: 
odering al1 tlie dispoaablo force, of horsc or car artilley, and 
lig11:lit infantry, mounted on hoiorsea or mules of the country, 
without A moment's dday to move on Falencia, where the 
culttmn or columna will rmivc sucl~ intclligeiice as mny cnuble 
tlicm to @ve tlie most eil'ectual co-operatiuri.' Whittingl~am, 
at the same perind, mentioning tlie wish of general Castalios 
that some British cawtlry sliould join Iiim, writc$ ' I cnnnot 
quit tliis sulijmt withoiit once more reptiting, thnt tElo eflorts 
of the eavalry will decirle tlie £ate of the mmprtig. Should it 
be pos i'jle for your excellency to send one thousand o r  fifteen 
hundred liorm, tlie advantqcs tliat would result are incal- 
culable.' And wliile tliem pressing recornmenrlntions mmc tlie 
one from OvEala, tlie ofJicr fscim Tudelu, Doyle, writing frvm 
Madrid thus expmses himself: ' Certain it is, that if your 
a r q  were here, the F m c h  u~ould evacuate Sp~liain before you 
got  w:t.hin a weekg march of them ; indeed, even tlie ligl~t 
cavdry and two tliouxniid 1igl:lit troops, mnt on wrs tu kecp iip 
with the wvalry, to ehow our friends the naturo cif outlimt 
duty, would, I think, decide the question.-'A respecttcble 
corps of Eritisli troops, landed in CataIonia, would so i~npose~ 
tliat 1 liave no doubt of the good cW~ets.' Tliis last proposi- 
tion rclntivc :c? Cahlonia wna afavouritc plan of nll tlic lending 
men at Madrid; so certain mere tliey o f  sucoess on tlie Ebro, 
thrat finding no British force was Iikely to be granted, they 
witlidrew eiglit or nine thoitsand men from tlie army near 
Tudela, annd c l i m d  tliem upon LeriJa. 
Anring tlius cxplaincd tlic systcm of military agcntq tlia 
rearler wilI rpcopisc tliem again in the wtlens, uow to be 
xm-ated, of tlie armiea wlUch they joiiied. 
OPEBATIOK3 OF TW SPANISR ARHtES IMXKüIhTELT 
AFIER THE BATTLE OF 5AYLES. 
ITl~en tliat victory drovc .Tosepli from Mtirlrici, the pntriatic 
troops, guided by tlis cstpricc of tlie geucritls, moved in varioua 
directiouq without B fixcd o&cct, and witliout concert; al1 
persiins seemed tu imagii~e tlie wsr ericlerl, i ~ n d  tlint rejoicirig 
and triumpli sllliould occirpy good Spnniards. Tlie 3furcian 
and Valencian army separnterl. Gencrnl Llamn~, wjth twelre 
tlroussnd Miircian jnfti~iti-y atid a few ciwal.y, ment tn Xarlrid 
St. Murc, a FIemEng 'Eiy Liirtli, misely rnarclird ivith his VaIen 
citina to sucoour Znmgnze. On tlie rond lie joined forces witb 
the hron de Vcrsage, and 1hi3 united troop, sixtsen tliousand 
~trong, entered Zurnpza tlie 16tIi, Yerdicr arid Lef~bre having 
mised tlie sirge tlie Jqv Iicfore, lewing tlieir lieavy p n s  und 
dores Iieliind them, Tliey ivere pursued by the Vdencians 
and Aragonese, but on tlio 19th tlieir caviilry turned and 
defeated t l ~ e  Spünisli nrlvanced &marJ. On tlie 20tli Lefelire 
took a position at bIilagro. On tlio Slst, St. 3hrc and Treersage 
occiipied Turlda, ancl t2ie peasantry of tlrc valleys, aa~ernbling 
on tlie Ieft flmlc of tlie F m c l i B  tk,reatened tlieir commanica- 
tions. Meanwliile Fnlafox, engaged in rejoicing, did not liegin 
to repair the defen cm of Zwagoaa until tlie cnd of the mantli. 
IIe also nssumed ñiiprmo autliority, anrl in various 
Gavdlem. 
ways discovercd inordinate prcsnmptition, decree- 
ing, nmong otlier acts, that no Arrqoncsa shodd tlicreafter be 
liable to t,l~e punishment of dcatli. fur any crime. 
&shños' srmy was the most eficient in spain. It conhained 
thirty t~iausand rcgular troops, provided with a good t r i n  of 
COXZP COF artillery and fluslied mitli recent vjcbory; yet it 
n>wridence. was constrnined to mmaia idle by tlie junh of 
MY S. Sedle,  wlio detained it t o  secure a s u p m a c y  
over t2ie othcr junta9 of Andnlusin, sbnd even recslled a part 
fer an ostentatious triumpli in that ccity, It was a month 
dker the capitulrttion of Dupont, before Cnstafioa entered tha 
capitd, at the head of a single division of seven 
Whltttn#- 
ham.a CVF- fl~ousand men; anotber of tlie same force was ld'k 
reamdence, at Toledo, aniI the rest o£ his arnrp vas qurirtered 
M&%. in the Sierra Morena. 1 
The Estremadumn iiifmtry at fimt wmpnsed oí new Tei~iea, 
mas afterimrds strengthened by some battdions of the Walloon 
and Boyal Guards, md equipped by sir Hew Dalrymple. Fol- 
lowing a treaty betmeen tbe juntas of Badajos and Seville, the 
Estremnilurnn mvnlry, four thousand stroiig was to be given 
to Cmhfios, and, Cuesta cxwpted, no othcr gcncrnl hnd horac- 
men. Tliey wew useless in Esbremndu~ yet ordern and 
entretias, and the interference of sir llew Dalrymple, alike 
GleG to mal~e  Qalluzzo send them eitlier to Cashiios or Blake ; 
nor would he, as we Lave seen, desist from his pretended siege 
of LaLippe, although it delayed the evamiation of Portugal. 
Meanivliilc tlie Spanish +ves released by tlie 
convention of Cintra, wcre clothed, wmcd, and rymyiirxs 
sent to Caidonin, in Britisli tiamports, whicll PnpR' 
also mrried ten thousand muslcets with arnmunition f ~ r  tha 
Cntalans. 
It bu been before atated, that fiftcn hninndred Ppniards, 
ammanded by Valladeras, co-operated with the Portugess 
duriiig the campnign of Vimiero, Ttiey never penetmted beyond 
Guanln, M-ere deatitute of money, nnd in gieat distress; 
they conld neither subsist on the spt  nor march 
away : sir Rew reIieved tliem by a tirnelr advance 
of ten thouaand dollarg and they joined Blake in the 
mountnins behilid Astorp Rlnlre's rcservo division b d  not 
been enmcd at &o Seco; he wns tlierefure alde, %y~esfl 
witli tlie resources of tlie province and guccours h t t u s -  
from England, h forni a new army of tIiirty thousand iiifiintry. 
l h e n  Ressiexes retired, Blake oocupierl Leon, AJtorga, and 
the pass of Wanmnal; he dared not enter tbe plnins withont 
cxvalry, antl the junta of Wtille and h n ,  tlien at Ponte- 
fcr rdn,  ordered Cuesta, who b d  one thoasand dragoons at 
Amnlo, to tranñfer thcm t o  thc Gllician nrioy. Tnstend of 
olieying, the arbitntry old nlan, exnsperated by Iiis defeat, and 
qurtrrel with Rlake, retired to &lamanca, collected 
stilafi,a 
and armed ten thousand peasants, annulled the Cor~espo~d- 
prmdings of the junta, and menaccd tlie mem- 
bera with puiiishmenh for resisting his nuthority as criptdn- 
general; Rlnke pratected tliem; and wliilc tlie gericnils dis- 
putd, thousand Frencli cavalry Jeacended the Duuro, 
scourd the piains, and raised contributions in face of botb 
their armiea. Blrtke fintrlly guitted Ibis canbnnients in B p  
temhcr, and, ~kirting the pInins on the north-east, carried b i ~  
army by forced marches to the Xoñtanlc St. Ander, a rugged 
firt distritt dividing Biscay from the Asturiits. The 
htw* junta o€ the lat-ter prot-ince had receieed enormoua 
8 U C ~ U r e i  fmm Englwnd, but made no answerabla exeitions, 
TZieir district wss strong, and eiglitpen thousand men were said 
t e  be in arms, but only ten thoumnd were promised to Blake, 
md only eight tliousand joined him. 
Catalonia had 1ittIe direct connexion with the main armies, 
and at this period little influence on tlie general plan of cam- 
paign. Thus it erppears, t,hat one month aftcr tlie cel>itulation 
uf Dupont, only nineteen thousand infmtry witbont cavalry, 
and under more thnn one indepentlent general, were collected 
nt Mndrid; thnt onEy sixteen thonsnnd mcn wsrc in linc upon 
tlie Ebra; thnt thc othcr Spanish mies ,  aclusive of that  in 
Cntalonia computcd at eleven thoueand mcn, wcrn many daya' 
marcli from tlie enemy md from one nnotlim; tliat tlie cl~iefs, 
quarrelling with their respective juntm and amongthemselvec, 
wcre innctire, or, a8 in tl~c a s e  of Galluzxo, doing miscliief. 
Thcae feeble snd dilatory operations wcm pnrtly owing t o  the 
Innptitiide of the gcncrals, principally to  Uic unbounded vnnity, 
amopce, and aelfishnesa of tlie l a d  governmentct, arnoug 
whim tlie juntas of Gitllicia and SsviIle wcre most remarkable 
f3r ambition. Instead of concding mcans t o  piish thc8uccers 
oi 13aylen, they were devisirig scheines t o  insum tlie prmn- 
ncng of thcir own pewer, using tho rnoncy of botlli England 
and Spain for t1iis pernicious oliject. In every part a q i r i h  of 
i n k s t e d  violerice pr'waild, patriotisrn was cliilled, aod the 
efforts of sensibls men N~BIB nuptory or caused their awn 
dcdruction. Tliis a t a k  of nffiirs condcmns Joaeph'~ retieat. 
Witliout drafting a man from tlie g&sons of Fampeluna and 
~ ~ , , d r i l .  Bt. Sebastian; witliout interfering witli tlie troapa 
EO. 8. eniployed on the communications of Bisay and 
Navm,  tlint monarch dren togetlier fifty tbousand good 
troops in twenty daye &ter he had abmdoned bis capitaL At 
the l i d  of mdi a force, or even of two-thirds of Et, he rnlght 
h r e  bid deftance to the inacti~e, hdf-organixed, md scattci'cd 
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bling ncar Tadclri. Iid nt Uic same time incnaced tlic cncmy'~ 
left flitiilc. Ir1 evcry point of vicw it wns nn important evcut, 
nud tlie Biscnyan irnliuticnee slioiild linvc Iieen restmined ; Iiut 
Tnfantndo, Doylr, anrl otlicrt; at Mudrid, limtend tlie expIosion, 
and tlic rnsh mimncr in wliidi they proceeded is ~ h o w n  in the 
fu1Ioiv.J. cxbmts from Doylc's despiitcliea :- 
1: jiropowd to gci1cr111 Rlake tlint Iic ~lioulil ~ e n d  &cera 
to Bisci~y to stir up tlie lieaple tliere, and into tlie Astunas to  
h c ~  tlr~d, nf their 15,000 mcn, 8,000 miglit be pu~lied into 
Eismy to Bilbao, ta msist tlie peolilc, ivho were nll redy, and 
orily ivaiteti for nrms antl ammunition, for lioth of wliich I 
wnite ta  Nr. Hunter st Giliou, and learnd from liim tbat he 
liad sent a largo supply of botli, and some inoney to  Bilbm, 
wliere aIwarly 14,OUO men liad ertrnlled theniselve~i. The 
remttind~r ol the Asturians 1 Iiegged miglit instantly ompy  
tlie Iiasses from Castille into tlie Asturias and Biscay, thnt k 
to sny, from Iiqnoaa in tlie direction of Bilbao.' b m e  & y ~  
nfkr lie ~ y s ,  'Ny measures in Biacay nnd AB~U&S have 
perfectly sucoeedd; tlie reinforcements of arnis, ammunition 
and men (5,000 stannd of arms, and ammunition in propor- 
tion,) Iiavc reached Bilbao in safety, and tiie Asturians bave 
tzken possession of tlie paixes 1 liointed out, so tliat we m 
al1 safe in tliat part of thc ~rorld.' 
In tliis funcied state of security afñairs rornained unti1 the 
16th of dups t ,  wlien BIalce, Iieing still in the mountaine of 
Gallicia, tlie English snliply arrived In tlie port of Bilbao, md 
tlie explosion took place; Gcneral blerlin, with three thon- 
santl grendiem, immediately carne clown on tlie unfortunate 
Bimyans, Bilbao was tltken, and to use the g h m y  expres- 
sion of king Josepli, 't3ie fire of iiílsurrection was quenched 
vritli tlie blood of twelve hundred mcri.' Eartuuately, thlie 
titorea were urit landed, and tlie vessds eacapcd from the river, 
but by tIiis blow, one of the principal mources which Hlrike 
liad a n'g11,lit to cnlcnlate uppo iin hiiis future operations 
w ~ s  destroyed; and, altliough the number admitted by the 
Spniards to hnvo fallen wns less tlian the abovc quotation 
iinplics, tlie spkit of resistmce wns scvcrely clieclrcd. Tlie 
evil mm nnmixed nnd deploralde, yct crented no scnriation 
beyond die iiurnedinte Bccne of tlie catastroplie; triumplis and 
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r e j o i c h ~  ooecupied €he people of Madrid and ZIIM~O~A; and it 
ia difici~lt to -my how Iang the war wonld have becn nog- 
lectcd, if Pnlibfiix h d  not hceii r o i r d  by thc re-nppcamce 
of ra Frcnch cnrps, which retoolr T~idcla, nnd puslied on te 
tlre í~icinity o i  Z a r ~ o z a  itself. Tllia took place 
immdintely after tlie experlition a,nainst Bilbao; edh 
it m= intenJed to ñuliprew the inswrection of 
the vidleys, and fa clear the left Aank of tbe French amy. 
Palafox thus rongl~ly aroused, wmte intempe- 
ratelg to the muncil of Castille, ordered all the hny$lcthi& 
Milb*. troops in the capital to come to the Ebo, and 
rneniced the m t i t e r s  personally for previoua ddny. Bcing 
wi tliont wcight o€ chaGactcr, wd hia iemonstrnnc~ FotterIpil 
on his o m  dnnger nntl not supportctl by nny clenr ~ i e w  of 
affairs, his prosun1ptu0~9 tons *ve general offence. Ro 
chiefly aiined a t  Gnstaños, wlto ñlm ako menaced with the 
stoppage of pay cnd subsistente for his armp by tlie junta of 
8evilIe if i t  quitted the capital beFore a, central governmcnt 
wna cstahlishcd; but irt the mmc time that junte mlt~ng'. 
WMI ~trenu~u81y titri,nuing t o  prevent sucli esta- Z L t m  
blishmmt. 
A council of al1 the general8 comrnanding arrnia was 
held at Mdrid the 5th of September. Gas- 
3lr. 8tuart'o 
taños, Llamas, Cuesta, Irúantado, and some others ~,tt,, 
asscmblcd; Blakc g m c  his proxy tu Inft~ntado; 
Piilnfex was rr.p.prcasntcd by a coIoncl of bis own 
staK Cuesta proposed t.Lat n oominandar-in-cliief should be 
oppriinted; tlie otLem were too jeaIous tu ndript tliis step, yet 
ageed to move ta the Ebro. Uamas, with tlie Murcians, 
was to oceupy Taranzona, Agreda, rtnd Borja,-La-Peña, with 
two Atddusistn dinsiuns, then in Madrid, wns to march to 
Lo,gmiía xnd Najerq-tlie other divisiora were ta follow in due 
time, and wlien La-Peiia shouId reach Logronn, Llamas m t e  
enter Cnscnnte, CorelIq snd Calahora. 
Thin united force las ta be cltlled the ~ r m y  af the centre; 
nnd once in its porritians, Palnfox, under wliose command 
Xt. hli~rck rlivision ncted, wns to piish fonvnnl t o  X n n p c ~ s a  
by Uie left bnnk of tlie Elim, and turn tlie enemy en the 
Arapn rirer. It was hoped BIlilre would arrive at Palenciti 
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and form a timely junction with the Asturiana, and Cuesta 
promised tli m a d i  ulion Burgo dd Osnia, t o  fill up the q a e e  
between BIake and the army of the centre. Tlie head of 
La-Peña's cxilurnn was to lre at Soria on the 15th of Xelitern- 
ber, and it was confidcntly expected tht this vkious plan, 
. .. 
in: which every niilitary principie was vioIated, and the 
enemy's traopx considered, with reprd to psition, ris a fixed 
immovable mas, wouId cause the total destruction of the 
French army : the only fear \vas, tliat a liasty fligl~t into 
Aance would aave it from Spj~ianisIi vengeance! TVhittingham, 
echoing the sentiments of tlie Spanisli general6 with xeference 
to this plan, ~rrites, 'As far aas rny poor judgment leada me, 
1 am ~atisfied if the Frencb percist in maintaining their 
present position, we dial! ia less ilian a i x  weeks have ásccond 
editEon of tbe baktle of Baylcn !' 
To move La-Pefia and Uarnns, money mm rquired, none 
co~ilrl be got af Madrid, rind tlie maritime provinces inter- 
Kr Kewnii- ccptod all tlie English snppliw. In this difficnlty 
v m ~ l e ' s  Cor- Doyle drew bills iipon tlie English treasury, and 
wspnidence. 
upon tlie government of Seville, nialring the 
brlt is  luttcr payablc out of two millions of do1la1-a juat 
JRlkbm. transmitted to tlw junh tlirougli Mr. Dliff. Tliese 
bills ~ o u l d  Iiavc bccn clislionourcd if, jnst bcforr tlicy acre 
,.,x,sLetters. j)rcsented, ninjor Cux tind not rernuristrntcd 
strongly iipon tlie destitiitc conclition of tlie army; 
and J l i ~  r~preof:i~£$t~~on~, nt fimt hti~glltily and evmively received, 
hecnnie ed'ectunl wlien t l i ~  junta clismr~ern(1 t11nt n plot ngainst 
live~i, supposetl to 1invo been concoctcd nk hfndrid, was 
- - 
ori tlie eve of execution. Tliey linrl Iircrime lirrteful from 
tlieir dominwring insalenoe nnd selfisline~; public feeling was 
mgriinst tliem, and alametl for tlie consequtrr~w@i, tliey ~ e n t  off 
200,000 dolIars t o  Madrid, and piililished a maiiifcsto, in 
wliicli tliey inserted a letter, pretentletl to have been ~iddressed 
ta Ciicitmlos on the 8tl1, giring liim fdul powers to nct Eur the 
public goad. The object was to pncify the peoplc, and 
Lave their dignity by ap-paring to llave acted voluntarily ; 
but Castaiios publislied tlie letter in Rlarlrid witli ita tme 
date of tlie lltli, showing tliat to Cox's remomtrance and not 
This supply embled the troops to move, anri 40,000 fiesh 
Ievies were enrolled; yet Napoleoa's fomight in disarming 
tlie people had been so effectual, only 3,200 fise1ocI~s codd 
be procured. A singular expedient klien presented itself to 
the imnginntion of Infanbdo and otber Icding peraons In 
Madrid: IJoyle, at their desire, moto  tp, sir Hew Diilrppla 
in the unme of thc slipremo council, to have tIse  ES of 
J ~ m t ' s  mmy, ami t h  ai-~QP of $ 7 ~  PmCugw.~ pmplc, for- 
wnded to tlie fruntier, mil from thenee crtrried by post to tlie 
crapih11 Tliis novel proposition m marle wlien Eugland liad 
a l d y  transmitted to  Ilipain 160,000 mnskets, a suppIy 
considerabIy exceecling GIie whole numba of men hr,iRmen- 
~rgunized tliroupliout theFcauntry. Fifty thousand tury P E ~  
bad gane to Seville, whcrc tlie junta shut tliem "'O' 
up in the arsenals, md left the armiea defenceless; for to 
neglcct red rcsources, und fnsten upon the most extravagant 
prnjccts, ie  p~ciiliurly Xpnnish. No otlier people oould hnro 
tliought of asking Eor n, neigbbonring nation's arms at such 
P conjuncture. No other tlian Spanish d e m  could bave 
imagined thc absurdity of suppIying their levies, momentarily 
expecting t o  fight upon tbe Ebro, with the arms of a French 
army still. irnconqucred in Portugal l But thia ~iroject wm 
only one among many prooh nforded at tlie timo, 8iat Cer- 
vantes was as profound m oberver, ns lie w a ~  a ivitty rcpmver 
of tho ertravibpance of bii cowihynien. 
$IIORT as thc period wm, hetwcen the first breaking fortli. of 
tlie insiirrcction and the amival of Rlr, Stu~rt at 
mr. ;9taart1s 
+ Coniñs. it suiñccrl to mente disunion of the wo& 
hrl irmcn-  kintf. Thc juntas of hon,  o€ the Astnriiis, rind 
tUly Papera. 
of Gimllicin, were at opcn discord ; nnd mcli provincc 
waa qi i t  into pnrtieq hating encli otlier ~vitli n8 mnch vitnlmce 
as if t l i y  1iwF bcen of a Iiundrcd ycara' growtk The Englislisk 
supplics werc considcrcd, by tlie authonties i n to  ivhoae hands 
tliey fcll, as a pcculinr ílonotion t o tliernaclves, and nppro~iriuted 
accordingly; onc j u n t ~  wonld not asaist nnother with ams 
whcn tlicre waa a surplus; nor permit tlieir trrrops to miircli 
agninst the eneniy, teyond tlie particular provintre in wliicli 
tliey w r e  orgniiiacd. The provincial nobility antl gentry, 
who hnd scieerl power, wcre rnen of mntriicteil views, lirourl, 
a r r o p b t n s  extreme ignorante uiiddenly ~lotlicd witii aublio- 
rity will dways be-and generally dispoeied to pmvide for 
relntiona nnd rlepcndaats at tlie expenae of the common 
aum, whlcti with tliem waa mborclinate t o  locd intermts. 
Jealousy of titeir neighboars wgulated tlie pioceedings of al1 
tIie juntas, and their prriject~ for incrensing their own, or 
depressing a rival gwernment's influcnca, were cliarncterized 
hy abpiirdity and want of pfinciple. 
TQ isolate Galficig and aeemingly riñth design to unite it 
with Portugal, wau tbe object of its junte They 
Mr. Staarl '~ 
T,m, contrsctetl an independent alliance with the junta 
of Oporto, oomplained t ha t  tlie Estremadura 
amy obeyed tbe junta of &ville, aent troops nnder Valb- 
deras to uid the Portupese, and yet refused t o  unite for 
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m signed and mtified l Their seIfishneaa and incapncity 
gnve so much di~gUqt, tbafi plots l e r e  fornred to overtlirow 
tlieir mthority. Tlie bishop o i  Ureme nnd the arcliliisliop of 
Si. Jiigo were tlieir declnrcd encmiea T l i e  ln8$ m i ~ i t r i ~ i i n g  
priest, secretly sndeiavoured to draw Blakds a m y  into Iiis 
views, lie even nrged tliat gene& to marcli apinst ths junta, 
but bis Jetters beiq intercepted be was arrested; yet neitlier 
ths stabiiity, nor the personal safety of the junta was securad, 
for many persons applied to Mr. &art to aid in changing 
tlie form of government by foroe. The Asturiana were worso 
thxn the Crallicians. T h g  refuscd t o  assist Blake wbcn his 
army wns suffcring, aIthough tlie stores rerluirerl by Iiim, nnd 
supplieíl by Engllind, wcre rotting wliere they were first 
lrinded; monsy also, ~ e n t  out in tlic Pliito Fripte for the uuc 
of Leon, \vas dctaind at Gihou, and h n  itself never A s e d  
a single ~oldier fos the cause. Thns, only two months after 
t?he Erst burst of the imrrection, comption, intrigue, and 
friction even to the verge of civil wnr, were tzlging in thc 
nortliern parh of Spin.  
Like ~rissioons wcrc nt work In the south, where tho jiinta 
of Seville mado no secret o l  tlieir ambitiorm vicws. Tliey 
stifled dl loal  ptibliciitions, gupprmed a manifcsto . 
o f  Florida Blanm, who as preairlmt of the Xurciun $ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~  jnnta h d  rpcommended tha formation of a, sirpreme 
central go~crnmcnt ; they m t c d  their time in frivoloua di+ 
pnta, neglected everytl~ing of importnncc, sncrificed tlie 
general welhrc, ta privnte interese, gnve militasy proniotion 
without regara to pulilic opinion or merit, represseil ptltrioti~m, 
and rewarded tlieir tools with place8 of emoluments of  whicli 
they had not the legal patronap. TLey usurped t he  royd 
prerogative af appoiiiting canons in tbe church, and their 
eupidity equalld their ambition; they intercepted 
Sir H. DaJ. thc moncy requircd by the troops, complainetl ,,, 
tlist h hfanclitn and bfadrid, in whose rlcfcncs I.npers. 
COK'# cm* tliey síhidl t h e i ~  troops were sacrificing themselves, , ~ ~ f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  
did not sub& the fom under Castaños, And 
under pretext of disciplining thirty thousand levim as a 
reaerve, tlwy rehined five battiilions nt Seville aa a guard, 
weakened tlie armp in the field, antl never raised a man 
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Tlie canonries fillell rrp by them had been m n t  for years, 
and tlie siilaries appropriiLter1 to tlie public servioe by &doy; 
the junta npplied tlie money t o  tlieir own nnd tlieir creaturna' 
emolument, a1111 even oonhniplated n division of tl ie f u n d ~  
received from Englmd tu  support the war atmungst them- 
selvcri. Agninñt tliis flqikiou~ junta also, the public indipation 
m rice, nnd a plot WM formed to rissassinnte the membem; 
the rniiiiicilial aathorities renionstrnted mitli thern, tlie arcb- 
bisliop iif Toledo ~wotestetl agninst tlieir conrluct, the jiinta of 
Grnnarla refused to acltnowledge tlieir suprem.y; but so 
great was tlieir arrogante, so unyirjnciplcd their ambition, that 
the decirlec1 and re~olute opposition of Castaiios 
&,:;Ed* alme p~evented them from cornmncing s civil 
Pntj~m. war, by inarching the victoniius army of I3aylen 
Cns'5 C m  
iw!.onl!cncc. againat the rsfrackory k n a d a n s .  Siich ivas tlie 
A;)i!eiirnx* real atate of Spain, such tlie piitiioti~m of tha 
au. la, g 6. junt,as, s l io  were nt Iliiu time filling Kurope with 
tIie souncl of their own praise. 
Tn tlie northern parte, llr. Stunrt endeavourd to rerlnce 
thc c11iias of folly and wicketlness, nnd produce that nnity o€ 
deñigii snd action ~ i thout  wliich it was impofisihle to aesist 
tlie miglity dversary threatening tlie Penin$da. To rihb 
tlie oonilicting passions of tlia moment, Iie j u d p l  a siipreme 
authority, upon wliicli tlie inff uence of Gre& Britain could be 
brouglrt to bear with full force, indisppnsable; and tu con- 
voke the ancient cortes of the realm, tlie most certain and 
natural mode of drawiiig the strwgth and cnergy of the 
nation into one cornptrct mas.  Eut Napoleon's first distriliu- 
tinn oC the French force6 wliich intercepted direct comniuniw 
tion between the pmvinces iiiterfered; Bwieres, Dupunt, and 
Monwy, at that time occupied FL cirde ronnd Madrid, and 
would have pmvented the local goveniments of the nortb 
fiam nniting with tliose of the nouth if they had been m 
inclined. A union of deputies from the nearest 
~ $ ~ , ~ ~  provinceg to be eulled the nartliern cortes, s a e  
p*ri:aillcn- therefcire urged %y Mr. Skuart as a prcliminay 
b r y  I'uptm. 
step to ensure tlie wnvocation ,of i generd 
w~ernblg, when such a measure sliould beeome prncticalile. 
It was however in riiin he reprcsentcd tlie b g e r  of ansrcliy 
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mhen mch violent paasionti were excited, and auch an enemp 
in the country; in vain he pointed out the embarrassment to 
the Bfitish cabinet, whích codd not enter h t o  separate 
relations with every provincial junta : the Spanizrds fin- 
no mpplies withheld, and their repntation not lomered in 
England by their infamous ~et ions;  finding, in short, the 
Britinh caliinet; r c d y  to gorge thcir cupidity, flatter their 
wanity, respeet tlieir folly acd aliplaurl tlieir ivickedness, 
assentd t o  Mr. StuwtJs reasoning hut ndopted nono of bis 
prol~oriition~1. 
Disood in the northern provinces IW not even qnelIed by 
danger; the disaskr itt Rio Sew inílamed the violence of 
bction; and Bessikres, if he had nok been h p p e d  by Dupont's 
capitiifntion, had Uld Castille and OalIicirr at his mercy. The 
enthusiasm of those provinces never m e  high, he wm prepared 
to usc ncldress ns wcll ns forcc, and would hnvc found partizans. 
Nnpoleon's slrilI wouId then hnve hti appnr~nt; for while 
13essikres Ziefd Gzlliciu, and Dopont vas on the southern fron- 
tier of Portugal, Junot could have pafcly concentraid his 
wliole m p ,  nnd rendered an Engiisli descent nearly imprac- 
ticnble. Shese pcat  combinations wcre mined by Dupont and 
Joscpli, nnd n grenkr impulse wns giveu to tlie insurrection; 
Iiut, iinfortunateIy for S~Aiin, o, wider Rcnpe Jvaq also given for 
personal ambitim, fiction, antl follies, wliich stifled the virtue 
of the muntry, md protlud ruin. 
Dupont's mpitulation wm made known t o  the council o§ 
Castille before Joseph s a s  infomed of it, and the coiuicil, fore- 
8eeing al1 the consequences of such an event, refused, as nlready 
related, t e  prornnlg~te officially hia acoession t o  the tlirone. 
Thc king pcrmittcd thls ract o€ disoliedience to pnss witlioiit 
much noticc; hc wna natumlly avcme to violenoe, Aaallaa 
and neitlier he mr liis hrother Napoleon dirl at; O'Fnnit. 
any ~ieriod of tlie contest for lXpain constrain a "Iem. 
Wpaniard to accept or retain oace nnder the intrusive govem- 
ment. Joseph now ment further. He released his rniniaters 
from tlieir voluntary oatb of allegiance to himself, Iciiving 
them free t o  chooso thcir 1mty once morc, and noa Pedro 
Ce~rt1lo.i nilc1 tlic Marquia of Pinuelo ~leixed thc oociision to 
change wititli what appemd t o  them changing fortune. Tlie 
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0 t h ~ ~ ~  rcmnined stcnrlfañt, preferring nn firncliornted govern. 
incnt untlcr n fureigii lirince, to w11nt tliey lielicved n Iioplcss 
stnigglc, lii~t wlvliidi, if succcssfiil, tliey lrncw must cnd in s 
degrdiiig ~iutivi, rlcspotism : perlinps nlso n little swnyd by 
Uicir rlislilce to Englniid, and l y  tlie impossibility of olitnining 
tlint influcncc among tlirir cnnntrymcn, diicli  iindcr other cir- 
mitnstnnccs tlieir tdcnts unrl chnrud,cra wtiuld hnve c n ñ u ~ ,  
Tlic couricil uf Cwtille lvns not pliblicly dinstisetl by tha 
jntruding monnrch, yct sccrctly tic iiunisliorl the memhm hy 
a (lcxtciriirs s t r ~ f i e  rif pnlicy. Grrilicliy ~urote  tjo Cestnños 
thnt circiirnot;t~ncca rcqriircrl tlic prcscncc ti€ tlie Frencli tmnps 
in ~noGIier quartcr, md invit~rl Iiim to hice immcdiah posses- 
Rion o1 hIa11rirl for tlie preservntion .rif liuhlic tmquillity. 
Tkis ras cnnstrued to rnertn tlic cntiia evncnation of Spaiin, 
nnrl beiag agrcetll~le to tliewnity of tlic Spaninrtls sas pe~diTy 
receiv~d; it contrifiuted to tlre ~uli~equent fiupinencss of the 
natian in prcparing for its dcfcucc, and Jmpll, by appcding 
to Castafios and tre~tiirg tlie council ns a nullit~, Eielperl ita 
enernies to msli  it. A11 tlic juntas indeed drearlcd tlie council. 
T1iat uf Gallicia would not even cnmmunicate with it, dccIdng 
tlmt personrilly tlie members were attached to tlie French, mri 
collectively l id been tlie most active instnimnt of the umrper's 
pvernment, TIie junta of Scvillc endcavoured to destroy 
thc nut,liority of t l ~ e  existing mcniben, and annul the liotly u 
e, trihnril of tlic stntc. Notwitlistmcling tliis proscription, 
the council did nof besitate t o  p e i a  the riins of government 
wlien the Frencli departed, xnd by tlie innintcnance of publie 
H. tmnquiuity and stnet rcprcssion of renction pro- 
r ~ m p i c . ~  s c ~ t c d  a strilring aontrast to the conduct of tbe 
hparr .  
cuxgs Cm provincial juntns, iindcr ~vlioae sawqe smy evcy 
mpondcnca lrind of  exccss wm encr>uragcd. 
To mcct tllis hostility the council lost no t.jme in Torming 
cs party. Don Arin.9 Mon y Vclarde, dcnn or prmidcnt for the 
time being, mote a circular letter to tlic Iocd juntns, pointing 
out tlie naccssity uf cstnhlishinp H, centml nnd siipremc power, 
aiid proposing thnt  ~lcpntics t'rorn ciidi jirovinrq rir nntion. ns 
tliey were ~oti~atiii~cs called, sliould conccrt witli tlia oouricil 
how to effwt, that object. Confcsscclly tlie iirst pLl i c  body, 
aud acqmiliterl with tlie forma of business, tthe muncil sould 
Iiwc liad a prepondernting infiuence in the assembfg of dele- 
gatce ; mcl it w0.4 so retnsonnlilc it ~hould tnlre the Icod, when 
cututtiority wnr; ivanted to llirect tlic viulence of tlie people 
beforo tlio inomeni of safcty ~ac  passed, that dl the juntaa 
trernbled, Tlie minor ones submitted; t l ie stronjier nnd more 
amliitioua felt tliat subtlety wodd avaiI better t h  open opposi- 
tion to the project. 
Foliowing 1111 thia blow, +Sic council ~ ~ u b l i ~ l i e d  e mranifwto, 
contniniog tili ~ ~ C C W I L ~ G  detaii oof tlie events uf tlie revoliltiun, 
defending tlie parlrt taken by its memhers, and cltiiming a re- 
newal of the confidente formerly repused in tlieni by thc nntion. 
It sss so aLIy ivritten, that a lnrge party, eepe- 
Mr, St iinfl,s 
c.iaally at V,alladoliil, was formd in fuvoui of its c u r n a p d -  
iiutliors ; i~nd tlic juiitn o£ Scville wcrc so sensible e"m+ 
OS tlieir iufllience that they i~terceyilcrl a copy ol tlia muifesto 
. sddrcsscd tu sir IIew Ddryinyile, snrl ~uppmserl 
Cox'a Cor- 
al1 n-ritinp favouralile to tlie forniation of a su- ,,n,, 
prcmc central nuthority. It was no longer posaible NEfEP;";. 
to resist tlie currciit, irhicli Iind set strongly in 
fiivour ol su& u ameure; tlie juntas oppused, but. ouuld not 
openIy deny the propriety, md in every province Mrn 8tuartk 
persons of consideration callcd for a charrge in tbat Compond. 
Bydra polity whicli opprcssed the country, and was e"CC' 
iiictRcicnt qaiiist tlie cncmy. A11 tlie British fuuctions-ries in 
oommnnimtiuii witIi tIie Spiiriinnls nlso urged tlie neccs&y of 
miieeutralilig the executive powcr. 
Universdly odious were tlie juntas. A few St,,irrt% 
genemIs wlio had riscn undcr thek rule dhered bre*poiid- 
to them : Iiut Palafox wm independent as a snc- 
cessful cnlitain-general; CnstC~oli declared he m l d  no longer 
SCPVC uiirlcr tlicm; Cucstn wns rcady to put them down b.y 
. - 
fome uf firiiim, nnd re-estiiltlisli tIic nncient royril iiudieomti niid 
captaius-g~nerul. Wlieu l3essii.r~' tetreat opened tlie wm- 
niunicatiun m-itb tlie south, and removed al1 excuse Ear procras- 
tinatiun, the juntas of Gallicia, Leon, and tlie Asturias yielrledto 
>fr. Stuart's incrensing efforts, and npecd to meet in cortes, 
r~t Lugu : Oiilliciim, howcvcr, firh insisting on ri formal ratifica- 
tiun of tlint trc~ty witli Qmtille nlrwriy ineiitioncd. 
Wlieu tIie t i m e  fur asscniMing i~rrived, tlie briturians refused 
o a 
PEEJTNSTTL,Z W AR. ~ATGUST, 189. 
to come, and thc rcrnaining juntrrs held the session without 
thern. The bishop of  Orense atld the jnnts of Craliicia, weie 
preparec1 to ~BBert the supremney of  tlint provinck over the 
others. The Beily VaIdee uf Castille, an able anci disinterested 
mm, being choccn presirlent of the convocation, proposed 
on *.he first day of assembly, that deputrea sliouId be np- 
pointcd to represcnt tFie tlwce pro~inces in a suprcms junta, 
ms~rnb1e.d in some central. plmq to eonr~olre tlic ancicnt corte% 
of the whole kingdom, accorrling to tlie old foniis, and to 
scttlc the dministmtion of t11c intcrior rtnd future euccemion 
t o  Uic thronc. 17iis proposition wnr carried by thc supeiior 
numlwr of tlic íhqtillinris niir1 Loncsc; thc bidiop of Ormse 
protcskrl agaiinst it, anrI thc Gnllicim mcmlicrs dtonglp op- 
poserl i t ns plncing tlieir provinco on tlic Anme footFng ns 
.othcrs, n glnring injusticc, tlicy ~sairl, if tlie numliem of the 
GalIicinn n m y  werc takcn iiito considcrrition: tliey wem 
nriswer~d tliat t,lie Gxllician n m y  WM pnir?, nrrnd, and clothed 
by Englnnd, nnd fed by Cnlitille and Zeon. 
Mcailwl~ilo tlie i~illueiice ef tlie council of CastilIe increnserl, 
Mr. Staart's md tha junta of Seville cuilningly tooIr the lead 
cot.respona- in directing what tliey could not prevent. She; 
cncc. conwicati~n of tlie córtes they knew wuld be 
fabl ta their own existente. Wherefore, in a public lettex, 
addressed to thc junta of Wlicin snd dxtcd one day previo~a 
to the circular of don Arias Mon, but evidently witten afta 
the rcceipt of tlie Iattcr, tliep opposed the wernbLing of thc 
cortes on tha gronnd that it wns "he preroptivo of tlie king 
to eon~oke that body; and iT it was cdled togetlier by any 
other authority tlie provinces would not oliey ;"-' t i m e  would 
be no unanimity.' But tlie question was one nat of fom but 
expediency. Zf tIie nztion aas in favour of such a step, and 
aftw eventa sliowed tbe people were not oppowd to it, the 
same necessity ivliich constituted the riglit of the junta tu 
declare mar winst the Freneli, another preroptive of tbe 
monarcls would have snficed to Iegalize the convmtion of 
tbe national assembly, Their object was to  preserve tlieir own 
power, and tbey maintained that tlie juntas, being cbosen by 
tlie nation, ivere the only legitimnte depoaitories of nuthority, 
anrl to members of tliose bodies only, could fhat aunthatitp bs 
delested. Then ndopting the siiggestion contnined in tbe 
Ictter of Arias Moti, tlicy proposed tliut two deputies from 
each junta sliould repair, not ta  Xadrid, bnt to Ciudad Real. 
or  alma,^, md at the moment of meeting be, in fa&, cansti- 
locnl govemments were, rvith ílue su'oordination to t;hk central 
juntn, to rctnin nnd cxrrciso in tlieir own proviricos al1 t.he 
authoritS. Mtli wliich they had d r d y  hvested themse1ves. 
!klius they liad only to chooso snbsei-viont deputies and tlieir 
power would be more fimly fixed than M r e ;  and this 
rcsrnngement would have been adopted by the junta of Gallicia, 
had not thc mpidity mith which Vnlden crirried his proposition 
prevcntd thnt WIISC of discord bcing ddcd to thc niimcroua 
existiog disputes. 
Nr. Btuart proceeded t o  hfdrid, and wherever 1ie passed 
found the same violene of local p r t y  feeling, the same dis- 
gust at the conduct of the oligarchicxl provincial governrnents : 
pridc, vnnity, corruption, nnil irnpravidenec, ivcre cverywhero 
obtrusively visible. Tlie rlispute betwecn Blnlie antl Cucstg 
mging rit the period of the Iiattle of Rio Beco when rlivision 
was most hurtful to the dli tary opernrtions, was now alIayed 
betmeen the general8 ; bnt their politiea1 pnstizans waged war 
with more hitterness tlinn wci, eontiniiing tho 
Np- SiUd@ 
feiicl nniong the civil iirnnches wlien union was comspond- 
most desirable. On the one riide wras the X l y  CnCCn 
Yaldez, deputy t o  the aupreme junta. On tlic other Cuesth 
s man h i i ~ i ~ h t ~ ,  incredib¡y obstinate, and not to be offended 
ivitli impunity when he bad pomer to punish. He had 
bcen prwident of tlle oonncii of Castille, ~ n d  he wrae mptain- + 
general of Cn~tille and h o n  wlien the insurrection first broke 
out. Hating al1 revolutionary movemeuts, altliougli as ininii- 
cal Go a foreign domination as any of Es oountrpmen, he 
cn~leavouretl t o  repress tlie public efferverioence, and maintain 
franquuillity at the risk of losing Iii~ iife as tt traitor. 
Cuccts Iioncat as betwwn Epanirrh mxid Frcnch intcrcsts; 
bctrvcen E~is coiintry's cnuw nnr1 liis own pnmions Iie was not 
honest, E e  tlidifced tlie locnl juntas, nnrl consifitentiy wishd 
to preseme tlio i~utliority of tha enphiniiis-general and the royal 
audierizaq botli o~crtlirown by ktliose pettygoverrimente. 13uf 
mlullcn nrid fcrocious of tcrnper, he emyiloycd auiutliority 4 t h  
dcapotic scvcrity; nncl m prcpwd, if opportunity offcred, 
AW,,~~X,  t o  exercise milittuy infliicnc.~ ovcr tlie wprcme, 
x*. 13, 4 G. aq wc11 l l ~  olrcr ttle subordiilnte juntas, He hd 
nppointed onc for Lean nnd Cnstillc n9 n sort of conncil, wb 
orclinute to the nuthonty of t l~c nptsin-gencrnl; but Rfter the 
bnttle of liio Seca tlie members fled, ns lieforc related, to 
Ponteferrada, ascumecl the sitprmne autliority, clnimcd Blakc's 
protcetion, and comrnandccl Ciicste to dclivcr liis cnvnl~  to 
tlint general. Cuesta annuiletl tlicir prooeeclings nt Ponte- 
femda; and now dcclaring t lw clcction of Ynlde~  anrl hii 
mlleagiics void, ns coiitrnry to cxisting Inm, di redd  t h c  
asscmbling of other juntas ronformdilc t o  nsrig. 
His rnnnindatc wns disrcgarrlcd. Vnlilcz imd tke otber 
deputica ~rocecded to form n ccntrnl suprcmc govmnient. 
Ciicstn hshntly abnntloned tlie ficld epcrntions, mhich in the 
lfrulrid counril hc Iind just promiacd to aid, fcll back with 
t~-elve tliousnnd mn, xixcrl tlie dcputica, rand shirt up Pnldex 
In tlie to~\*cr of Sgovin, menncing h i n  6 t h  militay cxccution, 
Thc disordcrs of tlic timcs furnishcd nrprncnta for this act d 
stnIillorn víolence. Tbo juntn of Cri~tille anr1 Lton hail heen 
fomcd illegtill y ; sevcriil districts werc omittcd in the repre- 
~entation; sevemI dcp~ities chosen by tlie eity of Leon done; 
'ZTaldeu: w s  ~nurle pr~sident, nltlioiigh ndtlier a niitlve nora 
proprietor, nnd thereforors joeligihk! to Iic cven n deliuty; hw 
had appointccl reprcsentntivcs for tlic CastiIlian diotricts ocm- 
pied Iiy tlic Frencli, nnd when they r e t i d  h b i i l e  in vuin 
demanrled an eqaitablo arrangernent. 
Aruidst this confilsion and violenm, ttho desira for a centra1 
~o~ernment  xpmd over tlie kingdom. Seville, Catdoniu, 
Aranon, llurcia, Valencia7 nnd t he  A&urias, ~ e n t  deputiq 
snd tliougli fres11 disputes aroso EM i,o the place of m~ernblp, it
wvas finally a O d  to meet at Aranjuee. Tfiis roya1 resiilence 
\ ras cl~~iosen u p i n s t  tlie wisfies of  rnnny, and nohl~ly of Jorel- 
lanos, an eloquent pemn anrl rif  p a t  rspuhtion but perti- 
nacious. I1e nrged t h t  the capitd m a  tlie meetest spot, hat 
was answerd th& tlie twbulent irhaliitants of Yadrid monid 
lmpede the government, m d  $he .ies;lrn e olsj ection muld exint 
quinat any other l a g e  t o n  Anrl this argument was held 
in Sprtin, when the pcople vcre, in al1 the oRcid xnd liuFiIic 
pal~eru, rc~iresented rwi entliu.rinsticnlly nnitwl in iina common 
~acred pursiiit, und werc in tlie Britisli parliament deaomi- 
nated tlie universal Slianisli natioii?' 
To sceIr protectian in a comer, instcad of courting pubIicitp, 
augwwc? ill for thc intentions of tlie goveruors. nor was tlie 
augiiry belied. Tlie junta of Scvillc, nfter reviling the couneil 
of Cwtille for its partial sulimission to the usiiser, c,, c, 
cliose don Vincent Rorc, a knomn toa1 o f  Godoy, -pon"W. 
and Giisrnnn de Tilly ivho mxs rinder n judicial sentencc for rob- 
bery, for their dcputies. Hore declind t l~c appintment, Silly, 
breving piiblic dis~tllst, r c p a i d  to ~ h n j i i e z ,  annd Miñiano, an- 
otlicr ~nenibcr of tliejuntit,toolc Iiis plwcwitFinn enormous ~nlarg 
m civil rmidciit at thc liead-quarters of the dnddx~siau wmy, 
TIis dcputies were instracterl to confino tlieir deliberations 
to sncli suhj eets as their cwatitrients slioiild furnish; a fraudu- 
lcnt policy, in wliicli Scville took tlie lcnrl, and mhen public 
inJi~wrttiun forcerl tlimt junta und tlie Vdenrian one usteiisilily 
to give way, they substituted secret ordcrs of a like tcnour. 
Tlie greater number of thc deputics a*crc tools of tlic jiintas, 
ancl anxiow only to avoid publicitp ontil they could consoli- 
date tlieir pomcr: hencc th i r  dislikc o f  Inrgc: towns, nnd thcir 
choicc of Aranjiiex. Floriílit Rlrtncn, {lcmqirl frnm ngo, Jvna 
clioseii first president in rotatioii for tliree niontbs, and 
tlie formatiun of an indcpendent evecutive WM smuted ; for 
diei i  Jovellnnoa proposcd a regeiicg aelectetl from tlieir own 
bady, iG mas repliod tliat the deputies cou'd not delegxtc tlieir 
powcrs : in finc, thc juntttg, instad of rnccting t l ~ c  pncml dcsirpl 
for wutrul govcrnmeut, were rcsolvctl t o  rctitin iiiitliority. 
Tlie assembly, being comtitukd, immediatcly ~um~noned 
Cuesta to release yaldez and relizir himsclf to Appeiidix, 
Aranjnez, mliere be W ~ S  Jenounced by the junta of l n b  5 
Castille and Leon as a tmitor. Florida Wanca and Castafíos 
urgcd Iiim to aubmit, nnd tlioiigh a6 first Iic Iinuglitily rcpellcrI 
tlietii, he findIy yioldetl, mil, aftcr n ~liiiry mn.espodence with 
Rlr. Sturart, who sErove to  invigomte the central jrt.. xtuafi 
power, Iie relensed Yaldes and carne to Aranjuez. corrcsma- 
30 formal p r o c d i n p  werc lid, but after miitunI E4Ci;ralim'a 
recrimhation Vuldez ivas dmitted to the eser- dltto. 
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cisa of Iiis functfona, ~ n d  Cuesta m d e h i n d  ~t the ~ent of 
gavernment, R s tnt~  prisoner ah lurgg iintil snbsequent events 
once more p I d  hirn at the heatl o[ an m y .  
Lord Williani Eentinck now joined Mr. Stunrt at Madrid. 
With coincident opinions tIiey wgetl upon tlie central junk 
the neoeeqity of militmy preprations; but the folly eirbibitd . 
in tlie provinces was bere displayed in more glaring colonrs. 
The lesser tribunale acknowIedged tlie autliority of tlie assem- 
Med deputies; tho council of Castillc, reluctmt fo mbmit pt 
ton wealcto resist, enrleavoured ta mke terms, but vas forced 
M, St,,., t o  nnoonditionnl si~bmission. Mamgement af the 
Cor?er*onrl- revenue, rt cKief for tlie amy, and tlie total sug- 
ence. pressioii of tlie provincial juntas, were tlis threa 
next objects of pablic nnñiety. CastRiios was by the pubIie 
designatea as mmmanrlcr-in-chief; bis services entitled him to 
tlie office, mIiiIe Es nioderation snd conciliating manners fitted 
him for it, when so muclt jealousy sas to  be soothed, and m 
many interests recunciled. An account o t  tlie past expendi- 
tvre of English money m also Ioudly required of 1IIr. Stnnrt's 
corrtqonfi- tlic local juntas, and a surrender of the residne 
eilcc. demanderl. Brrt the central government dividing 
itself into sections, answcring to  t l ~ e  departments of state 
un& tlie king's nile, dmlared those sections equal suprenie and 
independent, antl appointd secretaries, not cliosen fmm their 
a m  body, to toch. 
Fiorida Blanca agnred Mr. Shnrt and lord William that 
Castniios ~vodcl bc named gencmlissimo, and invited tliem to 
confer witb him upon the operatioiis ~f the Erithh troops then 
coming under lfoure from I'ortiipl to the aid of BprJn. Tbe 
neccssity for a siiigle chief wns ~itlmittcd by al1 pcrsons, bnt so 
stiibliorn wcre tlie tools o€ tha pravincial juntaa in the aaaem- 
b!y. tlint in despite of the British agent's efforts and the infla* 
ence of the Britisii cabinet, t h e  generals were al1 confirmed in 
separate and independent commnnds. The miserable ggstem 
JIr. Cxnnine 
of the Dritcli depitties mith Xarlborough, aad tlie 
Justmctioiis revolutionarg commiasarics of France, were par- 
to Mr. lhff~ tinll y revived, and the English government was IISS. 
disregnded, though :hit liad then supglied Spain 
with ~ W O  liundrcd tbouaand muslrctrg clothing, ammunition, 
mnnwed ~vaulil hrrve murar1 unlimitad inffuence; but the 
gifts were rnade through one ~ e t  of agents the demands 
throirgh anotlier; wl~erefore; the first mere tdren as of r i ~ h t ,  
tlw unheeded. The resources of England were t h s  wktcd 
witliout materiaU~ benefiting Spain ; for thongh Appri ix ,  
t he nrmiw wcrc destitutc, thc central. government N". 13, 
l i d  contrncted a lar@ dsbt and was witliout crcdit. Assum- 
ing however tlie insolenm of conquerors dictating termci, 
rather than the lanpage of grateful aIlies sk*ing further 
nasistrtnce, it required from Englmd an instant gift of ten 
milliws of  dollnrs, witli stores auficIent t o  snpply a wdl- 
prerned army for years, 
Al1 the provincial juntas stdI retnined full power aitliin 
their respective districta. The central govemment m. stnartus 
fewetl tliem, but decreed, lo. T h t  their own per- 2:d"pond- 
aans were inviolable. 2". Tliat their president Lord m.  en- 
sl~ould, ivith thc title of Iiigl~ness, re~eive 2U,OQO d'tw. 
crowna byear. 3 9  Tlrat &L deputy t&ing tlie tit,le of eeitcl- 
lency 8hould h a ~ e  s. salzry of 5000 m s .  4'. That the 
colIective liody should be ~ldrefiscd as majesty. Then think- 
ing thcm~dvrnr aiifieicnt1y confirmed thcy resolved t o  m&e a 
I"ublic cntry t o  Mdrid, nnd to concilicto-thc populriw, declare 
a general amnesty, lomer the duties on t o b o ,  tind fling money 
to the crowd during the procmsion. Amidst ihis pomp and 
wlnity the encmy mas ~cnrcely remembered, and ~~d w . ~ ~ .  
publi-e business t 0 h 1 1 ~  negleeted Tbis last eR1 
extended ta the low& brnnches of adminiskration: Appendix, 
sclf-interest protlud nblinrlnnce of activity, bnt ho: ' " 5  
torpor when tlio public welfar~ m at stake, m d  withd, 8n 
aritoni~hing presumption was eommon to the highest md tbe 
lomest. 
In&eteacl of a genemlissimo, a board of generals wns trt firat 
projcctorl, on mhosc rcpork thc jiintn &M to repllate the 
nilitnry opcrations ; Cnshñoa n-w to prcsido, bnt LdW. Bm- 
finally the plan was defemd with the cliarncterktic ibck% Cor- 
remark, ' thcst w7.m t7w eraemy was d r i w  ths respondence. 
* m ,  Gast&s m l d  l& hkm to &.A ?a& ~mtl'  The 
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idea of failure neyer occurrcd, thc government was wntent if 
tbe people believd its dUly falsehoods ahoiit the French; and 
tlle rublic, equally presumptuous, vas content to be eo dmived. 
The soldiers wcra destitute even to iiakednesr;s, ond their con- 
~tancy cruelly abuserl. Tliey were mitliout ams or Iiread; the 
liiglicr nrdcm c1ispl;ryed cupitlity, incnpncity, nnd disunion; . 
tlie patriotic anlour was visihly alw~ting ivitl~ tlis lowcr clwses; 
tlie mlcr;i were grnqing, imliriivideut, uiitr~itli~ul, and IimL 
ing; tlic cncmy pouwrful ; tlir ~wvernmcnt, ci~mlirous nnd osten- 
tatious, wwiis, tri use Rfr. Stulart'e wods, ueither mlculated ta 
inspire oournge nor increase eiitliusinsm.' 
This picture m11 he recognised by men d o  are yet Hving, 
nnd wliosi? exertiuw were ns inccssatit as unnwiling t o  remedy 
tlie evjls at the time; it 411 he rccopiqed by tha friends of 
tbat great nian, sir Jolin Moore, tlie drst victim to the folIy 
riud liase intrigies of tlia dcly; it \vil1 be remgnised Iiy that 
general md army, nT1'110 afterwartls won their m y  tlirough 
Spnin, d foiind tliat to trust Spnniards in war wns to lem 
against a Ziroken reed To ottiers it may i i p p r  exagfimted) 
for mithout baving scen it k difficult to beiieve the disorders 
whicli pa~dyzed the enthuqiasm of a ~ h o l e  peoplc. 
At 5rst tliese wcre confined to Englund, Sicily, and Por- 
tugal; tlio rmt of Europe wm under tLe smay or iníliienca of 
Napoleon. With tlie Brmils, Iiowever, rclations were ~ t a b  
lislied by tlie junta) wTvhicli afterwtlrdq under the cortes,produoed 
serious cmbamsmt.iitc to thc British rnilihitarp opemtions, 
Th ultra-ma~ne possessions of Spain were objects of intercd 
to both sides; but tlie crnperor's activc policy bnlanced the 
natural prgonderance of the motl~lier-country. No effort TVW 
mnde to confim thc adherente of tlie coloniea, or scmire their 
BIr. Stnnrt'a great  resources until Iong after tlie ingurrectioa 
co-lwnri- broke out, znd tlien only because lfr. 8tnart> in 
encc. 31 J. 
nd. the nortli, ünd sir Hcw Dalqmple and lord ( 3 1 -  
rymyifcx linpoorf in the aouth, uyed  tLe despatch o€ 
P,tpc.n. 
vesscls to Americn. Spin's hold of tliosc possea- 
sions ww i n d d  siistit, for her Iiarsli restrictive systcm 1id 
long before wcakened tlie colonists' nttachmcnt, and Miranda's 
expcdition, though unsuccessful, liad kindlcd a hc not to he 
, 
extinpislied; al1 foreign statesmen 11ad foreseen tht  Spain 
miist relinquish her nrhitrzry government or Iose her coloiiiea. 
Tlie iiisurrcctinn x t  homc renrlcrcd this murc ccrtnin. El-cry 
a v ~ m c n t ,  cvcry mnnifcsto put forkli in Europc to nnirnntc tho 
Bpniiinr[lri, told agaitisf tlicin iii America, "Yeb Sor B tiiiic tlie 
protluce of tIie niines mns remittetl, many Spanisli ~imericaiis 
served in the Spanish amies, and tlie emperor, tliougli he 
d e r e d  the &e-royalty of lrIexico to Cucsta, Elakc, md 
Gstaños, and probably to  some of the natives, failcd to crente 
a French pnrty of consequcnct;. Tl~e  Ilmericltns wcrc un- 
wiüing to pliingr! into c i d  ~trifc, ~rintil the arrcigmcc and 
injii~ticc of 01i1 Spnin, inercnsing undcr tlio insiirrcctional 
pvcrnment, forced tEicm to a relicllion iidiicli es tablisl~ed tlie 
intfelienrlciicc of tlie fairest portion of the globe, d proved 
hom little an abstrnct love of freedom infinenceil Spain tu 
resist Nnpoleon. 
Witli tlie FngTish cabinct, Spnnisli inhrcriurse, hithcrto con- 
ducted hy tlic provincial deputirs who fimt urrivd, vas now 
placed oa a reglar footing. Tho deputies were reodled at 
the desire of BTr. Cannin~;  Admira1 A p o d a  mas appointed 
minister phipotentinry for ; ami Mr. John Houklinm 
Frere wns accredited ivith the same tit,Et: to the central junta. 
Mi. Stusrt, whose trhility and energp l i d  contrjbiited so much 
to  thc forrnntion of IL C C ~ ~ P I ~  gevcrnmcnt, 1%-ns ~uperfictlcd by 
tliis injudieious nppointiiient, and the politial tiimliine wtis 
left with every wliecl iu violcut action to ~iroceed wit,Lout eon- 
troiiing lsowr or guiding infiuence. &Ir. Stuart lid, on bis 
own responslbility, repired to  Madrid, and tnnsmitted emct 
information of what  vas passing, yet remained for tliree 
montlis withont reeciving a l i e  frvn Nr. C~nning, to approvc, 
t o  disiipl~rovc, or t o  direct his procccdings: a rcrriíwricss in- 
dimting tlir. Iimvildered Rttbt;e af tho cobinct, whidi ~lrrivly and 
mitli diffiliculty followed ivlicn it 6liould have lieen prepmed to 
lenrl. Mr. Canning's tarrly, ~iliortive mcasui.es, demoilstratcd 
tlie difference betmeen a sophist md a statesman, showing 
liom d~ngerous is that public feeling, wliich, insatiable of 
mords, disregzrh tlre actions of uien, and esteems more the 
inhrest.eil cIoquence of an orator Lke Dematleq tlian the simple 
integrity, aounci jutigment, rind great evploits of n general like 
Phocion. 
bcing tlie s h t e  of spain in Beptemiier nnd O c t ~ b ~ ,  it 
would bc instructi~e to contmt the exertioirs of the rathu- 
siastic Spnninds' during tIiree months of insurrection afkF 
Baylea, witli tlio efforts of ' discontcnted Fmnce' h the hun. 
drcrI days of NapoIeon's second reip.  Thc juntaa were 
hawcvcr not dovoid of nmiiitlon, 13efore the linttlc of. Ba711en, 
til~.t oí Seville M-a ocmpied mith a project for anncxing the 
A l ~ l g ~ ~ s  to Spain, and t l ~ e  treab-y of Font aineblcan was far 
from being conrridercd twi a dead letter. 
NAPOLECIN mas chagrinecl but not &iayed xt a resisbce he 
h d  almo& anticipitted IIc mesured the efforts of Spiin, 
calculated the porver of foreign interference, and ilid nítt mis- 
judge tlie mluc of Englidi ~u~ililies. Re fureanw the duager 
o€ auKiiig an insurrcctian of peasaiits to attnin a regular 
form, to become diseiptined troopq md to lertgue with power- 
ful nations. To defeat the rnw levies was ewy; but it was 
necessnry fo cmsh tliern, that dred  of hie invincible force 
r n i ~ l ~ t  still pervaxle the world, and tbe influence of his geniua 
remnin nnaliatcd. He lrncw the constitntion of Bayonne 
wvoiilr? coiitriist well with tlrose cliaotia governrnents, rieither 
uionarctiical, nor popular, nar zristocratic, nor federal, tlirown 
up by tlie Xpanisli rwolution; but, before thxt could @ve him 
moral mources, it mas asential t o  devclop his military 
strength. 
~ m k i n e n t  was the misis. WatcIied by nations whoce pride 
hc h d  sbocked withont destroying their strength, if he ben t 
al1 I i is force npinst tlic Peninsuln Englmd might excite tlie 
continent to arinB, md Bussia anrl Austria midit unito tu raisc 
fallen Pnissia The designs o i  Auñtria were covered, not 
bidden, by tlie usud artiñces of her cunning rapacious d i n e t .  
Subdued Prnssia coald not be snpposed quiescent, and tlie 
Tugcnliunde, G-pnasiasts, and otlier secret societies werc b+ 
ginuing to diaclose tl~emselves. Bnce persemtcd TiaKin F~iuni 
by tlieir govcmmcnts, they sere tlim enwuraged. Cnmpdgn, 
lJaron dc Noetix, Stein tlic Pirtssinn coitndlor o'? 1818. 
stnte, gencruls SFinrnhogt nntl Gnekeiinir, nnd colond Scliill, 
mcre the contrivers, nnd tlieiib p 1 1 ~  was cltarmteri~tic of 
(lernixns, who, plodding even to a proverb in nction, possesR 
extramgant imqinotions nnd delight in mystery. Facial 
regeneration wus t l i e  object, Iiut, aa a first step, tliey designe3 
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CHAPTER Ill.
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va u aginilti lI y. So
ti a lC b s h ed
to d r i v ~  tlie Frencli ncrow tlic Rliine; nnd thcy creratcd fesr 
bccnriie thc crítcnt of tlicir intliicncc wm Zhcn iinbna~vn. 
Ruñsin, more ~iomerful licrlirilrs from Iter defeuh becnnm 
more cnliglitcned as to tlie ca~isc, p v o  Nu~iolcon nlost nnxicty, 
FFc Iriicw it would tnx nll Iiis means to iiiret tlie liostility oE 
thnt grcnt cmpire, wliicli ivnuld render liiu op~rntions in Spain 
unsuitulile to Iiis filme. Btit witli a Ioiipiglitcd policy h~ h d  
propod an iiitervie~v 4 t h  tlie czar, intent to secure tlie frien& 
ship of that monzrcli, and not unsuccessfulIy rlid he strive at 
first. Indeed at tliis tinie he supported the weight of %he 
pol i t id  world, snd e v e q  inorement of his produed a convul- 
sion. Eis strenfiltli wna now t tnx~l ,  yet mnfident in bis un- 
rnatclid genius, hc sought only a moment of time, certriin to 
make it victorp. Xeanivliilc, suddcn and ~ t rong  oE action m 
tlie dash of a cahmct,  he made one of those efforts wliicli have 
stnmped liis age with the grentness o£ antiquity. 
His m i e s  were scsttercd over Eiirope, In Italy, in Dal. 
matis, an the Rhine, the Danube, tbe Elbe, in Pmsaia, Denmark, 
Polniid, hia lcgions wcrc to  bc found; over that vast extenb 
f i ~ e  I~uxldred thoumnd Jtsci~ilincd men maintained tlie aupre. 
macy of Fruncc. Frum &ose bantls lie drcw thc imperial 
girnrds, tlic ~ ~ I c c t  ~oldicrñ of  tlic mnrlilcc nntion Iie guvernd, 
tlic terror of ti11 otl~cr continental troops ; thcs~  anrl tlic vckmnt; 
of Sena, Austerlita, and Fricdland, rcduced in nnmlicr but of 
confimcrl lirardiliootl, wcrc mrtrched townrds Spnin A hoat 
üf cnvdry, unctjuullcJ for ciitcrlirise aiirl kuowlad~w of war, 
mns rdso dircctctl ngniiist tlint dcvot~l: land, nnd a Ion: trnin 
of gzllant solilicrs SulTowed, until two liundrcd tIioumnt1 men, 
accustomed to battle, lid penctrtited tlie gloomy fnstnesses of 
tlie wcstcrn Pyr~neea ; idlile Corty tlioiisaiid of iufcrior reputa- 
tion, drawn from tlie interior of Fmnce, from Naptes, Tnscany, 
md Ficdmont, wsemhled on tlic mtern ridges of t1iose gigantic 
bills. Tlie mnrcti of this multitude wns incessant, and as bis 
soldiers pnssed t l ie cnpital, Nupoleon, ncglectfiil of nothing 
which cwld excite tlieir wurnge md me11 their military 
pricle, addressed t o  thcm one of liis nervous orations. In the 
tra~iqulility of peace it may scem inflated, but on the eve of 
bnttle a general sliould so speak. 
' hldiers ! after triumybiiig on tlie h n k s  of the VistuI~ nnd 
tlie Danube, you hnve prtsseíl witIi rapid step~ through Ger- 
rnany. This day, without a moment of repose, 1 commnnd 
you to traverse Pra~ice. Soldiers! 1 llave need of you. The 
bideous presence of  the I e o p d  contminates the peninsula of 
Spain and P o r h p l  : jn terror he must .By bcforo you. Let us 
licnr our triumplial mgles to the pillars of Hercules; there 
a l s ~  n*e have injuries t o  avenge. Soldiera ! you have surpassed 
tlic renown of modcrn nrmiw, but lilive yott yct equuullcd the 
glory ot tliocc Xomnns, who in onc and t;ho srame cmpnign 
werc victorious u~iuii  ttic Rliine nnd tlir! Euphrntes, iu IEyrin, 
nnd upon tlic TtqmsP A long pcace, a lnsting ~irorrpe* ahdl 
be tlie rcmurrl uf your laliours, but n real Frencliman coiild 
not, otiglit not to rest until the seas are free and open to all. 
hldiers I al1 tlint you have done, di that you will (lo for tho 
Iiayiliiiiess of the Frrncli people and for my glory, shall be 
etcriid in my lieart !' 
Tliis sairl, he sent his army townrrls the frontiere of Spain, 
niitl Iiimsclf bnstencd to meet tlie emperor AIexnndsr at 
Cdurtli. Tbeir confcrence prodncerl a treaty of allianw, offen- 
sive and defeusive. Spain was  by the one, ri'itli d m  indif- 
ference, oliancloned ta tlie injustice of tlie other; but tlie wes -  
mon of atrcngth \\-hicli tlie trcaty and tlie personal pmtiality of 
Alexander, gavc thc Frcndi cmpcror, lerl both to tliink the 
Englisli cn'3inet mould, if fiiir occusion offrrcd, cntcr into liego- 
tintions fur n pnernl  pertce, nnd in a joint, Ietkr tiicy tliiis 
xrldrwced tlio Biug of E~yIand,-'Tlie circum3taiiccs af Eiiropo 
Emi Eironght tliem togetlier; tlieir first tliought was to yield 
to the wish md tlie wants of every people, and to seek in a 
speedy pacifimtion the most efficacious remedy for the miseries 
wliich oppwssed al1 nat,ioions. Tlie long and bIoody war whrch 
hnd to rn  the contilient wnq ah an end, without the possibility 
of licing rmcmcd. If many chnngm has bkcn pplncc in 
Eiirope, i r  iii:iny ~ t i 1 t . 1 ~  liad bccn ovcrtliromn, tlic cniisc wits to 
Iic foiind in tlie s h t s  of ngitatiou and misery in whicli tIia 
stsgatioa of rnaritime commerco h t l  placeci tlie greakst 
nntions; still greater cliuiges mifit yeG talce place, rtnd al1 of 
tliem contnry t o  the policy of tlie English nation. Peace, 
then, 5irss tlie interegt o f  tllr peopIc of tlie contincnt, as it wwas 
~e intcrest of the people of Great Britain. We entrent your 
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Majmtj-,' thcg concludcd, ' mc unitc to Entrcnt yotir Waty 
t o  listen t o  tlie voiar! of humariity: to ~iilence that of the p- 
sions, to ~eek,  wimi thc intcntion o€ nrriving n t  thnt objecl, to 
concilinte nli jntcredq, nnd tlius prcsenirig nll powera which 
exist, enmre thc Iiappiiicss of Eiiropc, wid of this generntion, 
at the head of wliiel~ Frovidenec 11m plncetl us.' 
Mr. Canning in rcply nildrcsssd lPttew to  t1ic French md 
Rumiar; rninisterri, endosing to r ~ c h  an oficial note. In tht 
aridr~s~ed htlis Itussinn, iie sdd,-' However desirous the king 
might be to replg personalIy t a  the empmr, Iie was prevsntatl 
by tha unasual m d e  of communic~tion adofled, wliicli h d  
deprived it nf a private mil pmonal elinracter. It  as impm- 
sible to  p y  that marlí of respect to the emperor, n-itllout at 
thc sarne time ackno~vldging titIes wliicli lie had never 
aclcnowledged. Tlie propocition for peam w<iuId be commn- 
iiimtcd to Swedcn and to the existing government of Spaio, 
and it was neeesmry IYs rniijestj- sliould reccive an immediate 
assurancc, thnt Frznce acknowlcdged the go~~ernmcnt of Spin 
as n party to the negotisttion. Tliat such \vas thc intention of 
the emperor coiiIrl not be doulitd, when dile lively i n t e r ~ t  
manifested by Lis imperial majesty for the welfiire and dipity 
of tlic SlmnisIi monnrchy wm recollcetcd. No other assurmcc 
wns waintcd, tliat thc cmpcror could not linvc bmn induced tri 
sanditiori by hiu concurrcnce, or np~irolintion, u~urpntionu, the 
principlcs of \vIvliicli were not 1ms unjiist ttlinn tlicir exnm1ilf 
~ r i s  clungerous t o  dl legitininte sovereigus.' 
Tlie Ietter addressed t o  the Frcnch minister merely 
dernandcd that Evcden wnd Spain should be laíhitted aa 
parties to the negotiation. The oficial note comrnenced by 
stating the king's desirc for pcace, on terma consistent 6ith 
liia honour, his fidelitj. to his enpgcments, annd thc pcrrnanent 
repose of Europe. ' The miserable condition of the mntinent, 
the convdsions it hnd cxperienced and those lvith which it 
wns thretitened, were not imputable to Iiis m8,jcst.y. If tht 
cause oE so mucli miscq was to bc found in the ~trignation of 
ccimmercinl intcrmnrsc, nltlioupli liis mnjc~ty could mt b 
mpxi%d to 71.m witlb ~ngw~l t&I vegret, tf itit tlie a@em devised 
for tlic dcñtrurtion of  tlic: coinmerce iii I~is oul~ject~ liad recoiled 
upon its uuthors or its instrunients; yet, no it wns ueitlier tlie 
disposition of h i ~  mnjcsty, nor in thc cliametcr of the peoplc 
ovei ~vliorn he rcigned, t o  rejíiicc in tlie privationri and unliulli- 
piness even o€ nationa whicli wwe combined apinst him, he 
ansiously desired the terminat.ion of the suferings of the con- 
tinent.' Tben stliting that the progress of the war had imposed 
iiew obligations upon Gient Britain, the note clnimed for 
Sicily, Portugal, Smeden and Xpnin, a participation in the 
negotfations. t'J!rc~tics cxisted with thc thrce fimt which 
bountl them and Engl~nd in pcwe finc1 m r ;  with Spain, 
indoerl, no fomnl inutrument hnd yet lieen executwJ but tlie 
t ies of lionour wwe h the king of England as strong as the 
rnrist E O ~ ~ U  h a t i e s .  It was therefore ahiñumed, that tlic 
central junta, or go:-ernment of Spain, waa underritocd to be a 
pzrty to any negotiation in which his majtjesty was ínvited to 
enpgc.' 
J'crcmptory waa the rejoinder of Rt~ssia. Tlrc dnims of 
swereigna, nllica of Grcnt Rritnin, ñlic would admit; tlic insiir- 
gents o€ Bptain alie wouIrl not aclcnowledge a.9 fin independent 
poww, The Rufiskns, England could recollect orie particular 
instante, haii almnys been trut! to thia principie; moreorer, tZie 
eniperor had acknowledged Josepli Buonaparte ns king of 
Spnin, and wua unitcd ta the Frendi cmpcror for p c m  antl 
for mar; he wris resolved not to scparnte hia intercsts from 
thnsc of Nnpulcon. Some fiirtlics argumsnts touching the 
question were acivnnced, onrl tire note conclnded witli an offcr 
to trezt upon the basis o f  tIie 'uti possidetis' nnd the respective 
power af tlie lielligerent parties; or npon any h>, for tlie 
conclusion of an honourablc, just nnd equa1 peace. me insult- 
ing tone of Mr. Canning'g communimtion was retaliated by 
tlie Prench niiniqtcr, wlio nlso finislied by proposing tlie ' uti 
possidetis' as a bnsis for treating, expressing s bope, that, ~yith- 
out losing aigl~t cif tlie inevihblc resuIta of thc force o€ stntcq 
it \vonld h i  rememl,erd, that between great powers tliera 
could he no riolid penco hut that which wns equnl and honour- 
able for both parties. Upon the receipt of these Citnning 
broke off the nqotiafions, and al1 chance of pace vnnished; 
biit previous to the oonclusion of this remarhble compond-  
ence NapoIeon had returned fo Pans. 
Wiat his real views in propsing ta  treat were, it i8  ditfi- 
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cuEt to determine. Re cotil(1 not hove expectcd Gmt 
Britain to sbandon Spnin ; Iic must thercfor hn7.e bea 
prepmed witli some arsurigement, unless tlie wliole ~iniceedinz 
wns nn arkifico to snw flistri~st among h i ~  enerniw. Tlic 
Eiiglish mini~tera assertd tlint it wns so; y& wlint enemi~ 
were tliey among whom he could crcah tbis nnmsy feelinp? 
Sworlen, Sicily, Purtupl! tlie notion a ~ ;  aplilied to them vas 
absnrd; it is more probable he ñ-as sincere. Be 
owmm 
j-oi, rrm snid so at St. Relena, and tlie circumsbnces of 
st.lrekna, the period warrant a belief in tliat assertion. Vol. ii. Tbe menacing aspect of Austria, tlie recent loss of 
Portugal, the hitlierto stiocessful insurrection of Spnin, the 
scmet sacieties of Germany, tlie desire of consolidating bis 
Polish dominions eis w barrier against RUS&, tlie b r e d  
mnde jn hia continental systcm, tIie commereiul distressen of 
Eiiropc, were al1 cogent Tensons for a pcacc : they rnight. well 
?&use liim to 310 suspicious of tiic futiirc, and render km 
ranxious for an cxmise to abnndon nn unjnst, ancertaiu, onerons 
contcst in the Peninsula. Tlie nllinnce of Euscia onlydis- 
cntanglcd a part uf tlic Gorrlian lrnot; to ciit tlic rcmninder 
with liis sword níts, at this conjuncture, a tnsk whicli even he 
rnidit shrink from. 
The mmch of his amies toivarrls spnin proves notliing to 
the contray of fhis suppnsition. Timo ww of the utmost 
consequence. Bis negotiations prti~ing aliortive, it ñodd 
have been tao late to bave reinforced bis froops on t l e  Ebro, 
iwid the event evinced the prudmce of his measures in tbat 
rcspect. Rejecting Spaiii as w psrty t o  t1ie conferences for 
pmce is searcely more eonclusire; it would llave bcm to 
resign his meapon before he entered the lists. Eqland could 
not absndon the Spaniards, but that -S not a necesmry 
consequence of continuing the negotiations. mere was a bar 
pnt tu the dmission of a Spanisli diplomatist, no bar wss 
fhereb- ~ u t  to tlie discussion of Bpanish interests, The 
corsqiondcnce of tlie English minister would not of neoessity 
comprnmisc Xpnish indepenrlenoe; it need not have relard 
hostility, nor retarded succours. dnd when NapoIeoiia 
pniver, militlety, nnd forco of gcnius, anrl his good fortune in 
war, and tha dditiond ~treiigtli gniued by the Rustiian di- 
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ame,  re contmted with tbe scanty means of SpaEn and the 
confusion into which she maa plunged, i t does appem as if hher 
welfare ivould haw baen better forlparded by m appeal to 
ncgotiation thnn ta battle. It is true Austria w~ arming, 
yet Austria Eind bcen BO often conquered, wwns so sure to 
ahnndon the cause oC the patriots nnd every otlier cause wlien 
pressed. EO certain to sncrifice faith and honour t o  self- 
interest, that the indepenclence of Bpain through the medinm 
of wm, couId only be reg-arded as of uncertain h q e ;  a p i z a  
to be pi~id, if gained at all, by w - d i n ~  tlirough tomnb of 
blood, ancl every misery tliat hmine and tlie iury oE devastat- 
ing amies could inflict. To ayoid such dreadful evils by 
negotiation ww wortli trial: jiistioe, nrged by the ministe~ of 
a great  nrition, is ditlicult to witlistand; no pwer, no mbi- 
tion can resist it and be safe. 
This view w u  not in accord With the irhifts and subkñnges 
charmteriaing the policy of tlie day. It mas thonght wise to 
dqrntfe arich a oorrwpondcnce by ti ridiculous dcninl of 
Napoleon'a titlaa; prnisewortliy to mako a atnte pnper, in 
mhicli srich serioas interesta were d i s c u ~ ~ d ,  offcnsive and 
menn by miserable sarctism evincing tlie pride of an author 
rather than tIie gravity of a statesman, Tliere is grourid also 
for believing, tthat hope, derived from a silly intrigue camed 
on thro~tgh the princesfi of Tour and Taxis witli Talleyrand 
anci riome otliers, ~ r h o  were even then ready t o  betray Rapo- 
lcon, wns the rcnE cause of tlie nrgotiation Iiuving bccn Iirolicn 
off by &fr. Canning. Mi. rmi i tb rd  dedared in tlie House 
o€ Gommons, he EKIW no reason for refusing to trcnt with 
Franco, nnd though public cliarnour induced him to explain 
away this expression, he needed not to be ashamed of it. 
For if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferahle 
to the jnstest war, was ever worthy of attention, it WM so at 
this period, when tbe auccess of Spain waa doubtful, her 
miaery ce&in, her sal~ation only to be obtained through the 
bnptism o€ Eilood 
Upon t.he 18th of Octobcr Napoloon retumed to  Paria, 
accure ot  the preaent friendehip nnd nllinnce of Ruasin, 
but uncertain of the moment wlien ths atimulus of Rnglish 
subsidim would quiclcen the hostiiitj of Austria into He. 
P 2 
Ria peril wns p t ,  Iiis prcpmtions enomons. He 
out tmo conscriptiona. l'hc fid trilccn fmm tlic cIusscs of 
1806, 7, 8, and 9, fiirnislicd rigl~ty thoiisand men mi\ped at 
mrituritp; these were destine:! to rcpIacc the 
Imperial Pecme, vetcran~ rlirectd against Sp~iin. Tlie scwnd, 
l l t l i  Sept. taken from tlie cIags of 1510, also ~iroduced eighty 
lbUd. 
tlousand, wwliicli were disposcd of ns rmerPcs in 
the dépats of Fr:ince. Tlie French troops left in Germany 
were concentrntd on tlic sidc o€ Auatria; Denmsrk ww 
evmated, and onc lrundretl tlio~isantl soldicrs were witlidmm 
from the Pmsuian statcs. Tbe nrmy of Ita14; pon-erfullp 
reinforccd, wtu pplecerl utidcr priiice Eugcne, assisted by 
Massena. Mur$ WIIO l~ad succccded Joscpli in tlie IUiigdom 
of h'aples, was directetl to assemlilc a Seapolitan nrmy on 
tlie shows of Calahria anrl tlircuten Sicily. In fine, no 
measure of prutlcnce \vas iieglected by tliis wonderful m n ,  to 
wlion~ tlie time y u i r e d  by Austria for tlle preparation of a 
csrnpaign, sccmcd suflicient for tlic subjcction of the whole 
Peniilsula. 
Tlie French legislative body wns opened the 24th of 
Octobcr. Tlic emperor, after giviiig a concise sketch d tbe 
political siti~ation of Eiirolie, touched upon Spain. 'IR tt few 
days 1 gol' szid he, ' t o  put myself nt the Iiend of rny ami@, 
and witli tlie nirl of God fa crolm the king of Spain in 
Madrid! to plant my englea on the towers of Lisbon!' Tben 
quitting Paris he vent to Bayonne, but tlie lnboun of bis 
ministers continud, Tlieir speecbes and reports, more 
eIaborate1y explkit thnn usual, exposed the vast resourm of 
France, and were calculakd t o  shon- tlic danger of provoking 
the enmity of such a powerful nation. From tliose documents 
X-B do it appearcd, tliat the expenses of the year, indnd- 
, ing tlic intcrest of the nationd debt, were under 
IPDB. thirty rnillions shiterlbg, and compIeteEy covered 
by existing tmes drawn fmm a metallic cumncy-that no 
fresll burthens would be laid upon the nation-that n u m e m  
pubEic works were in progreas-that interna1 t d e  and Iand 
comrnerce were ffourishing, and nearly one millioe of men 
were in arms 1 
%fr. Canning's redinesrr to reject. nepotiation, anci de@ thi 
stupendous power, mould lead to thc supposition, that on the 
side of Spin  at least he was preparerl for the encouater ; get 
no tince of a mratirrcrl plnn is to Le founrl in tlie instruckions 
to tiio piiernls commaiiding in Portugal previous to ttie 25th 
of Septcrnber; nor ms tlie project then adopted, one wliicli 
discovcml any adequata k n o w l ~ d ~ p  oof the forcc of t l~e  cnemp, 
or of ttic atntc of nffnirs: the conduct of the Engli.ili cabineb 
relotivc to tlie Peninr;iila ivns sctnrccly s~~pcrior tn tlmt of tho 
central junta. Vague projects, or rntlier ~peculntion~, were 
communicnted to t l ~ e  genemlls in Portugal, h t  in none was 
tIie strenghli oC tbe enemy alluded to, in none w3s there a. 
s~ttlcd plan of operations: a, stmnge dclusion rclntjive to 
h*oleon7s power and intentions guidcd the En~Iish rninisters. 
T t  was tlie Gth of Octahcr b~fore  a dmpatcli, 
Lord Cmtl* 
contaiuing the first determinate plan of campaign .n,,zhb 
arrivcd at Lisbon. l'hirty thousnnd infrintry zrid i;iy~ape~ 
five thonssnd aivalry were tu be employed in tho 
north of Spain. Of these ten thousand werc t o  be embar1wd 
at the Eiigrlish pwts, the remainder t o  be composed of 
rcgimenta drnfted from the nrmy thcn in Portiipl. Sir Jolin 
Moore wm to commiind, nnd wns antliorized to  unite tha 
wliole by a voyage round the coast, or by a mnrch througll 
tlie intcxior. He chose tlie I~tter, 1: hcmuse a voyage at 
that tesenson of tho year would Iinve bcen tedious and p r e  
corious; So. becairse tlic intention of sir Rcw Dalryniple: Liad 
Eiccn to enter Spnin by Almcidn, nntl bhc nrrrangcmcnts wliicli 
t11at gcneml llad rnade wero for sucli a march ; 3'. because ha 
wm infornicd the provine of  adlicis vo~ilrl be smreely &le 
to equili tlie forca corniq from England untler the command 
of sir Diivid Enird. Bc W ~ S  howevcr to tnke tlie field immc- 
dintely, nutl fix upon some plncc, citlicr in Gnllicia or on tIie 
bordcm of Leon, for cancentrntiii,rr tlle wliolo n m y ;  the 
specific plan o£ opsrntion~ ta be oonaerted aftermads with the 
Spanish gencrnls. This vitw a aliallow project. Ths Ebro 
wtw to be tlie thextre of war, and the head of the grant fiench 
lioqt mrning from Gerrnnny tvag nlrcdy in the pacses of the 
Pywnees; the loca1 dificuIties impeding tlie EngIi~li genemi 
wcre of a m~tiire t o  render thab wliich was ill begua end 
worse, and that wliicli R- well arrangcd fail. To'be Rrsb in 
tlie ficld is a grcnt and dccidcil. ndvnntage, yet Iicm thc plan 
o€ opmtiona wns not cvcn arrangcd wlicn tlia cncmy's fimt 
liloms rvere daccnding. 
Sir Jolin Moorc lind to orgnnixc an nrmy of raw soIdie~; 
Str Jolrn md in n poor, unsett!ed country, jiist relieved from 
i r o o r ~ . ~  the pressrire of a Iixmh md gipin; enemy, be w a  
I'spcrs. to procure the trmsport nccwsnry for his stores, 
mmunition, and even the oficers' lagpge. Witli monq, 
and nn expciienced shff, siich o3istncles do not much embnrrnss 
a good gcnernl; but here, few of flie suliar(linnte oficcrs M 
served a campaign, and the administrntivc deparhments, tbongh 
aealous aod ivilling, were new to  a scrvicc vihere no energ 
can prevent tlie effocts of Incxpericncc from Lieing sererely 
Appcndix, felt  Tlie roads mere very bxd, the rniiiy seasoa 
NO. I J ,  so baleful t o  troops, was at Iiand, it was essential 
l and 8. t o  be quiek, and goId nliicli turneth the wheels 
of war was wantiiig. Ana tliis, at  al1 times a grcat evii, 
wns liere most gricvously felt; for tlie Portupese, ama- 
tomsrl to fraud on tlie part of tlicir o m  governmcnt and 
l o  forced contribntions by the French, could not readilybe 
persuatIerl tbat an m n y  of foreigners, pqing witli promise5 
only, migbt be tmsted. Nor \vas t l i i ~  nnti~ral suspiGionallayed 
by observing; tbnt  while the general and his troops WerB 
witl~out money, the ~irborrlinatc agcnts diversed throughout 
the coulitrq. were amply supplied. Sir David Baird, who WM 
t.o land at Coniim nnd equlp bis troolis in a counti-y exhaustd 
by BIalce, was likemise encompassed with difficulties: from 
Avpendix, Coruña t o  the nearest point wlicre ha could dect 
~ o .  :s  p r. a junction with the forces rnarcliing from Lisbon 
was ti70 hundred miles, nnd lla also wm witliout money. 
Ro general-in-chief was appoiilted to oornmand tl~e Spmisb 
armics, nor mas hfoore refcri.etl t.o sny pcrson with whom he 
could comnicn te  at di, mucli l e s  conoert a plan of opera- 
nppenfixs tions. He wtw ?inacqualnted witll the views vsf 
13. 9. the Spauish government, md was aIike uninfomed 
of tlie numbers, compmitian, aud situation of tlie urrnies with 
wEiicli he was to act, and those with which he was to  contend. 
His o m  genius and tmcnty-five thousand ponnds in tlq 
miiitary chest, constituted his resources for a campaign vhich 
wns to lend liim fitr fram tke coast and al1 its mmns of aupply. 
IIe was to unite hia forces by a winter mar& of tliree hundred 
miles; another three bundred were to be p n e d  before he 
reticlied thc Ebro; be was to concert a plan of opemt~ons Mth 
gcrieruls, jeriloue qumelaorne m d  indqicntlent, their positioiis 
extended fmm tlie nortliern sea-wast tu Zttri~goza, ttlieir inen 
insubordinate, differing in customs, discipline, lzngutige, and 
rcligion from tlie English, annd despising all foreigncrs: and 
a11 this ~ i . 3 a  ta be axxomplisbed in time to dcfmt an eneiny 
nlrcnrly in tlic ficld, nceuutoincd to grcat niovcmciits, nnrl con- 
ductarl by tlic ~nost  rapid nnd decided af mcn. Tlia iriiriistem' 
vielva ncre equally vnsb and inmnsidcrnte, and tlieir misdcu- 
lutions are the mvre remarkatil~~ as thcre wss not \$rmting a 
m m  in tlie Iiighest military situntion, t o  condemn thcir plan at  
tlic time and propocio a bettcr. 
Tlic diilcc of York, in a formal minuts dmiva uyi for thc 
isiftirmrttion of the government, observed, that tlie Spanisli 
armiea being unconnected ascl occnpying a grmt extent of 
grountl werc weak; that tlie Frendi, cc~nccntrated nnd cerlain 
of reinforocmcnts, were strong; thah tlrere could be no ques- 
tion of tlie rdative vi~luc of Sli~nidi md Frcucli aolrliers, and 
consquently the allies might be bezten before tho Qritish 
could arrivc a t  the scene of action: t l~e  Iatter would then, 
uiiaided, have t o  meet tlie French army, and it m s  c~scntid 
to provide a sttlficicnt number of troops for tliab cmcrgcncy. 
Lcsa tJinn sixty tliousnnd woultI not suflice, und 
he sl~liowed in aehil liow tliey cciuEd tie ~iruviiled &. 2+- 
without detriment to any otier semice: h i ~  adviea wns 
miiceded. 
At Gis period also, the eff~cts of thaf increclible folly and 
waakiieas, wliich marlrd ull tlie proocerlin~i9 uf thc ccntral 
jur~ta, were felt tlirougliout Spain In  m y  otlier country its 
conduc~ would have been attributed tci insanity. So apathetic 
~vitli respect te the enemy as to be cuntemptible, ao active ia 
pnrsriit uf sclf-interest m ta focame batefui; continually 
dct-i-isiiig how tu render itself nt once despritic and popular, 
Iiow to excite eutliusiasm und check freedum oE expreasion ; 
liom te enjoy the lumry of power ~vithout its wr+striafla 
hbuur, kow to aoquire g e a t  reputatiun withciut Lcrnrh 11% 

dislionestly f a i l d  in bis contmct, and 80 embarrag~ed tho 
operations, tlint tlie geneml rere~igned nll liope o€ licing nble to 
move witli more than tlie Iiglit Iiixsgage, the smmnnition neces- 
rtary for immetliate use, aníl a scanty mpfily of rnedicinm : his 
rnagazines at Almeida were also retarded, and the subsistente 
of the troops t h r o m  on a raw cornmissarint unprovided with 
money. Ncverthclesn Moore, rrlpng upon its increasing 
expericnce, nnd the activity of lord William Bentinelr anrl Mr. 
Stunrt, did not delay I l i ~  rnnrcli. Eo  ueut ng-eiita tu  Madrid 
nnd other places to mnke mntracts and raise noney; for the 
ministers, with a atrtcngc policy, gave tlic Bpaniards al1 their 
gold and left tlie Englisli army to get it back in loans. 
Many regiments were in movement, whcn an tmexpected 
dificulty ferccd the ndoption of freah dispositions. The 
native oBiwrs and tlic country people now declared tlie ~ontls 
nortb o€ tl~e Tagus impracticable for artillery; coIonel Lopez, 
sent by the Spanisli gcvernment to facilitate the marcli, 
confimed this inforrnation; captain Delnnce~, an htelligent 
entcrprising officcr emyIoyed to exmine t h e  linss of mvve- 
ment, corriilioriitcrF thr: genernl opinion. Junot liad intleed 
Iiroug1:lit his gune nlung tliose ronds, Iiut liis cnrriages had been 
lirolren, I i i ~  liritferies mntlererl iinuervic~.nl)le tliercTiy. Tlicre 
w~ no reme+, aiid Yooro reluctantly ordered his artillery 
and cavalry to inow by Talavera, Naval Grneiro, the Escu- 
\ riai, the Guatlarania, Ecpinw, hevalo, and Salamancit. He 
wouId llave followed with the whole army if tlie state of the 
nortliem rontls liad becn rarlim known; biit the snppliw 
wcrc al1 dimctetl tojarrfs Almeida, most of  tlie rrgitnents 
wcre in m~ircli nnd it ivns toti lntc to clinnge. 
Tliis sepamiion of tlie ~rtiIIerg violated the rnaxim which 
reqnires the point o€ concentrntion t a  be out of the enerny's 
reach, but it nas forced upon Moare; and tlie Spaniarda hnd 
evcn recominended Rergos and ITalladoTid os places for maga- 
zincfi. Tlie cncmy \vas declard unable to maintrun hia dcfcn- 
sive positions, nntl tlie Engliah gencml couId not auppoac 
Sulomaucu too advauced for his concentration wliile covered 
by the strang Spanin11 aarmies said to bo overbesring ti10 
Frencli on tlie Ebro. One battery lie retained t o  prove tlie 
mails, thc reiiiaiiiing twcnty-four pieces, the caraZry, a tliou- 
sand ritrong, and tho parc o£ many hundred crrrriages eseorted 
by t h e e  tlioumd infantry tuolr the Talarera road mder sir 
J. Hope, whose mpacity and firmncss qualified Iiim f ~ r  tlre 
most impodant com~nands. The rest ol tho troops moved 
by Alcantara, Curia, Abranies, md Coimbra, upon Ciudad 
Itodrigo. Alid witii such eiiergy did the general overcome 
ol-istacles that liis head qiiarters guitted Lislron the 26th Octo- 
h r ,  just tm-enty d a p  after receiving tlie chef command; a 
mrprising iaskance of diligeuce and darlng, for to use liis o m  
~vonls, 'The army m Jie risk of fiiiding itself in front of 
the enemy with no more amniunition $han the men carrtrried in 
tbeir poiiches : but bad X wited until everything ivas for- 
warded, tlie troops ivould nut have bcen in Sp~pain until the 
apring, mLnd 1 trust t h e  enemy will not find out our wanb 80 
eoon as fllicy will fecl Glic cfi'cck of wlizt wc h~vc.' 
Expccting cvcrybody to f y exccpt. tliemsclvcs, tlie Spniards 
tliougtit Iiiin ñlolv, and from evcry qunrter Idterci nrrivod, 
prcvving liirn t c k  ~ l h n c e .  Lord Willi;ini BcntiricEc ttnd Mr. 
Btuurt, witriessing tIio sluggislt incupacity of tlie guverurnent, 
jndged liis siipport ar;sentI:rl to susttiin the reeling strengtli of 
Spaia TIie central junta lid hitliei-to contemnerl the enemy, 
and tlie generds md people m h o d  its boa&; but an inter- 
cepted letter sddresseii by the governor of hyonne to marslia! 
Jourclnn, awolce tlieir fears. I t  stxtorl tliiit sixty thousand 
infantry and seven t h o u m d  m~alry mould ieinforce the 
Freiich between tlie 16th Octolier and tlie 16th of Novemhr: 
and tlien, wjth t l ~ e  impnticncc usiinlly nttcndiug impruvidencc, 
tlie junta so slow itsclf rcqnircd otlicru to be supcrnntuirilly 
quick. NennwIiile  ir Dnvict Ri~irrl rcuclied the port of Guruña 
Atli his nrmy, and lord Willixn Bentinck liai notified hia 
appromli, m¿i the junta assured him every faclity ~ ~ o u l d  be 
~ivenfor disembarkation and sapply. No ordcrs were howemr 
Gnpt. Ken- i~sued~no preparlbtions made; wbcrdorc the Coruña 
na~iy*& Lalter. junta to z ~ o i d  trouble, and lioping to  rlrive Baird 
.".'awrrk t o  another port, would not let him land without 
un mswer muld be olitnincd iTorn a goveriment wfich was 
daily reprriiwl~irig sir Jolin JIuare for btrdincsu? 
Sir David Riiird I d  no money. 11u~re wuld only give 
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him XS000, a mm to  be mistaken for a private loan, 
í£ tlie fnct of i t ~  beiug piiblic priropefy werr: Appntlix, 
not expressly meutioned. Yet nt  this time %Ir, ~ : ~ ~ ; ~  1. 
lprere arrrrived at Comña, with tmo millfons of >IOO,.~ 
doilnra intended far the use of the Spnniards; k'::,ML1e- 
and d i l e  auch largc sums, contrary to Be 2i i i1  ~c iobw.  
m c s t  rrceomrncntl.?trons of Alr. Stunrt nrid miijrir 
Cox, mrc lavid~cd in thit qunrter, Hnird's pcnury $8 a siid e. 
f u m d  Li~n to liomow from t l i ~  funils in RTr, Frcri:'s hnnds. 
The troops then moved, but wanting al1 the equiprnents 
essentirtl thcy only marched by Iialf battalions, conveying 
thcir stores on country cars hirtld from day t o  &y: nor was 
that meAgre acsistance obtained but at grent expense, snd 
by coompliance with a vlilgar mmcenary spirit predominant 
among tlie niiGliorities cif Gallicin; for thc jiintn promiscd to 
procure cnrringea yet did not until tlie aornrnisvarics offmd 
exorbitant remunemtion, wliereupon m s  were prodiiced: 
the procrastination of the government being co~icerted to rob 
the military chest. I n  fine, tlie local rulers were unfriendly, 
crafty, fraudulent; the peasantry suspicious, fenrful, mde, &S- 
inclineri townrtl strnngcrs, and indiffcrcnf t o  publie nffnirs: o 
fciv sliots only wcrc rcquircrl: to rcndcr tlicirfi ti IzostiEc inshad 
of n frientlly gre~tiiig. 
witli Mi-. Prere mine a flec4 cnnr~cying f i  Spnnisit force 
under the marquis of &)mann. Wien tlie iiicur- ncw na,- 
rcction first broke forth, thak ttublemtrn com- ryrnpieus CIIP 
mantled fourteen or fiftscn tliou~and troops serving "YPUU"n'!n"" 
with tlie Frencli armim. Castailos, tfirottgli sir l.. Dalryrnple, 
desired the Britiali government to apprise Romana thlint Spaiil 
wnR in mms, md extricate bis nrrnv, m(1 Ni. M'Keiizic wns 
ñelccted by tho ministcrs to condilct. ilic cntcrprisc. Tlio 
Sl~aniarrds were in Holstein, Slesruig, Sutliinrl, niid the jslnnds 
of Funeri, Zenlmd, and Langeland. II'Kenzic, tlirough the 
nication mth Romana, and neitlier genrrd nor soldiers hesi- 
tatd. Sir Richard Keents then ~ p p e n r d  aff NjtLiorg in tlie 
islanci of Funen, with a sqnxdron detaclied from tIie Ex2tic ffeet, 
snd x majority oC +,he Spanish regiments qiiartered in Sleswig 
immedhtely seimrl al1 tlie crdt in thc harbours, md pushed 

TiicieEa~ud the Amgooese were moving by Sor upon Ronc* 
irtllw, to fnll on tlie French renr wliile Cnstahos nssnilcd tIieir 
laft. Muorc, forweciug tliece niovements would bring on a 
bnt.tle, becnine uneasy for liis nrtillery ; and Iiis concerii ir-as 
n u ~ e n t e d  by finding tlie p i s  iniglit have marclied witli tlie 
colnmns, 'If anytlimg adverse liappcns, 1 have nat,' Iie wntes 
t o  ZIope, 'necerraity to  plead; the r o d  we are nom tnivellingj 
tltnt by Villa Ycllia and Guarda, is practicublc for artillery; 
tlin hrigmls under Wilrnot lirw: drenrly retlclied Gunrtln, and m 
far 1 Iinve aIresdy seen, the road pregents feiv obstnclcs, and 
those easily surmounted; this knowletlgc was liawever only 
acquired by our own oficers ; d e n  tlie brigde was at Ca.sttelIo 
Brxnco it was not cert~in it eould pmceed.' Tlius tnught, he 
t olcl Hope no longer to tmst reports, but seelr a eihortcr lim 
by Placcntin, ncross the moiintnins tm hlamnncn 
Up t c ~  ttiia period al1 comrnuiiimtiow pulilic and private, 
from the Englisli and Xpmiah g-overnrnents, and the qcnta, 
coincided upon one subject. ' I ' lae Spn<w& were a* ent1~w-L 
118126, (t A& peopk, a a& of mpa~dded mmyy ? th& 
amk~ e w e  Brme, tJmj w e  n u m w ,  t f ~ v  WWE c o ? t ~ t /  
am J~.udrod a& @ I Q ~  tho'aowand m m  w m  a c t d l y  ir, l im of 
fiaQk, e x t m d i n y ~ ~ o n a  I ~ M  ~ e a . a ~ t  qf B&ca~y to Zfiragoza; 1Je 
FrrnI~ m d u d  to  o f m B b  of this wvmtw 'U.W coged up ia 
a. m, s h r i d h y  f m  an m o u M e r ;  they mere dwerted hy 
t h  m p s r w ,  tlmy w e  &dlinq, t h q  wwe q ~ i d k ~ s ! '  Never- 
tlielcss Moorc wnq iliñtrustful. Hc dctccted tlie elcmcnh of 
rlisn~tcr in tlic divitletl commrands nntl Icngthcncd lines o€ tlra 
CSpaniards; aiid early in Octolier predicted miscliief. A s  long 
aa tlie French remrtin upon tlie defensive,' Iie obsewed, 'it 
mil1 not be much felt, but tlie moment an xttack is m d e  some 
great d a m i t y  must ensue.' Yet he mas not witfiout faith in 
tlie multitude anrl e n e r g  of the patriots wlien he considered 
tlie pw~tness. of thcir cnuac. 
C~tiiiíos w w  now, by tlic! centra1 juntn, nnmed t e  cnnc~rt  
the plan of campiiign. hfoore, conclurling it wns o, prelirninary 
stcp townrtls Iicing gcncrnlissimo, wrote to Iiim in n stylc to 
ensure cortlial co-operation; and tLinlcing tliis a climge of 
system formed better Iiopea; tliey were. ~ o t m  dsI1d asirle. 
Castafios was supemeded even in hia auhrrlinate command, 
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the wliole absurdity ol the Spanish cliaracter broke forth, aad 
confuaion foilowed, At that rnoment also, cIouda arose ip 
a quarter hitherto ajl mnshine. As the crisis 
A ~ n a i G  approach4 the milita7 agmts lomercd £heir 
x-o. 12. g 7. 
sanguine tone, and no Ionger dweIt upon the 
entliusiasn of the armies; tliey iadmitted, that the confidcnce 
of the troops wa3 mnking, and merc even in nurnbcm infcrior 
to tlie French. In tnith it mm full time t o  clian,?, for the 
rcal state o£ afluir8 could no langcr bc conccalctI, a p t  
mtzstrophc was at hand. Rut wlint of wildnm in thcir pro- 
jects, or of rikiU in the enemy's, w h t  of ignornnce, vuiiity nnd 
~imsum~itinn i tlic g c n c d q  wliah of fmr nmnng the soldiers 
and ol fortime in tlie cvcnts, comhin erl to Iiusten the ruin oE 
tlie Spauiards, and liow that niin ivas effected, slinlI now be 
re1ah.L 
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CHAPTER IV, 
ZN the preceding chnptera it hirs been aliotvn that the bd 
pnssions and sordid vicws of the 8panish junta8 were nounshed 
by the unrviae prodigalify of England. Tlieir full hoaqt and 
meape performance Lave been dissected, thc bones and sinetm 
of tlie insurmction loid bme, rind compured with the stronxly 
lrnitted fmmo and lnrgc propndions of  the cnemy. Tlie 
inevitable result of a struggle bctween such ill-matched forma 
must be anticipated. And now the sudden antl terrible manner 
in which the Bpaniarda were overtlirown by the tempestuous 
mnrfnre of the Fsench emperor ahnll be hld,  tlie oper~tions of 
thc nrmies immcdintdp aftcr JosepKs rctrmt hring first 
reIuted, for, like u jeating proIope ta a desp trapdy, they 
usliered in the grent atastrophe. 
CAMPAIQN OF TIIE FRWCH AYD SPhh75ñ A R X m  BEFORE 
TnlC IIiRIVAL OF TIIR EMPEnOR. 
When Cuesta w a ~  removed from command, and tl~e juiita 
of %ville forced to di~orjie so mnch of the English mbsidy xa 
aufficed for the immediate relief of the troops in Madrid, dl the 
Spnish nrmies closed upon the Ebro. 
Blake, reinfored by eeight thousand AstuSans, eshblished 
hb  blase o f  operationa at Itcynesa, opened a com- Ocncwl 
munication with thc Fnglish vcssels off the port dpricii3 c o ~  
of St. Andero, and rlirected his views to~wds 
13iscay. 
The Cantillian army, conducted by Pi,pateteUj, resmed it(i 
mar& npon B u r p  del Osma nnd ZogroGa. 
Tmo divisions of Antlalusiana under Lapeña, and the Xur- 
cian divisioa of Llama, admced to Taranzona and c,fi. Irnit. 
TudeIa Unghntn 
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Pnlnfox, ii?tlt tlie Arngonese nnd St. Xanh 
Col. Doyle. Vnlcncian division, operukd from tlie side of 
Znrngozn towards the nortli. 
Tlie condo dc Rclvirlcrc, B mcnk youth scnrce tmen* y m  
o€ age, mnrdierl with fifteen tlinuñnnd Estremc- 
r-Wtnñost 
riridication. diirilns niion Logroííg to juin Cutailos, but soon 
roceived anotlisr riestination. 
Retwmn tll~se nrmics waR neither cnncert nrir connexion, 
tIieir morementrr were regulnted by some pr th l  vi~iew, or tlie 
caprico of gencds  ignorant of eacti otfier's pIans nnd3ittIe 
solicitous to combine opcrations. T l ~ e  feeble chsractem and 
intr&es and initeil nnqualified pcrsons to interfere in the 
direction of ntifiirs, TLus we finJ. Doyle priding himseif 
for pemacling Palnfox to detach seven thousand mee to 
Ssnguma; and Whittinglmm, unknorring of Dqle's inter- 
ference, emrnestly dissnnding tlie Epjpxniard from that enter- 
pria~. The first a h i n g  the rnovement would 'turn the 
enemy's lcrt ff ank, tlireriten his rear, and have the appearwnce 
of mtting off liis retreat.' TIic m n d  argiiing that hnguessa 
being sc~-e.enty milea from 7mgozn, antl onIy a fem leapes 
from Pampeluna, the cletaclimmt wouFd itseIf he ait off. 
Doyle sairl it mould dmw tlie Frcnch from Caparom and 
Milagro,-cxpose tliosc plnccs to Llamns nnd LrirPcfin,-fom 
the enerny to m 1 1  minforcemcnts known tn  be marchina 
agninst Blalre,-enu11Ie tliat geiieral to jriin tlie Askurinns, and 
with forty tliousirnd men aeise the Pyrenees, wliicli would ent 
off fhe Frencli, estirnated at t l~irt~it ive  thousmd, and f a  
tlicm to fly; or Blake miglit move on 3liriinda dcl Ebro, 0nd 
sweep Biscihy and Castillc. Pdafox, plemed with tliis plan, 
sent Wiittingham GP inform Llamas and Id-l'eñn that OO',Veil 
- 
with six tliousand men would entcr Sawessa tbe 15th of 
Uhltting- Scpternber. They thooglit the rnovernent dan- 
i i~n l+s  COT- gcrous, prtmnture, nnrl at wriancc witli tllc gmcrnl 
r''pO"dcnw' p l i ~ ~ i  wttleii at Madrid; nevertfieless Pnl afox smt 
O'Ncil to h ~ i p c s s a ,  from wbence be waa imrndiiitdy tlriven 
acrnRs the Alnpn.  
Thia was a ~ample of the profound iporance of war wliich 
d~aracterizetl al1 tLeir projecb, yet victory wasmore confidently 
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anticipatd than if mnsummate skiU had presiW over the 
amnsmenta; and Ihis vain-glalanous feelimg waa by the 
niilitary agcnf.9' despatches propagated in Englanrl, whem 
the forc-hoiisting m nearly loiid and as absurd as in the 
Peninsuln. Tiie delusion w a ~  universal. Even lord ~ o t d  w. m- 
Willinm Bentinclc anrl &fr. Stuart, demived by tinek'e Cor- respvndenoe. 
the curious comistency sf the ffiIseIselioods, douhed Ir s. 
Doyle'a Car- if tiie French amy I.nuld maintain its position, ,,,,,,fi,,,, 
md believed the Spaniarda hd obtained a morai I I d f i .  
ascendancy in the fieid Dnrnk with vanity and folly, de- 
spising tlie ' remnanta,' snch mna their exprasion, of the French 
amp on tlie Ebro, which they pstimated at from t h i - f i v e  to 
forhy ~I~ousand m, tlie Spanisli gorernment proposed, that 
tlie Britirih nrmy should go to Critalonia ; and when this m s  
dwlclined, they withdrew ten thonmnd men from the 3Surcian 
di6sioa; mdeent thcm to h r i d n  nt the moment the French 
m y  wns nugmented on the upper Ebro. 
Tlieir innate pride msnd arropnce were a l ~ o  notwiahed by tha 
timid operationa of Joscph. Twenty d q s  after the evmation 
of Madrid, ha liad abom fifiy thouaand fighting hpp,at, 
men, cxclusi~e of e;&t thoitsnnd empIoyed t o  NO- 6. 
mainttin the cornrniiñicatione, and f-ish t be  gtrrnsons of 
Pampeluua, Toloaa, h n ,  St. Sehastiun, md Rilbno; exclusive 
also o£ t11e htalonisn army, which mris seventeen tlionsand 
strong, and distinct from hi command. A strong reserve, 
asembld at %yonne under genera1 DKiuet, supplied rejn- 
forcements, and was itself supported by drafts h m  the interior 
of Frnncc; six thousnnd men, org~nixcd asrnovenhlc columns, 
wntclietl the openings of the Pyrenees from Ilt. Jolin Pied de 
Port ta Bomillon, guarding the frontier aginat Spanish i n m -  
sions ; anda second reserve, composerl of Neapolitiana, tus can^? 
and Piedmontcse, wm cumrnenced at ~ e l g a r d e ,  with a, Gew of 
mpporting Duhesme in Catalonia. How the king puelled the 
nascent inñurrcction at Bilbao, and diqersed the insurgents o0 
the valleya in Arragort, has boen relnted. T h e  FrencEi nrmy 
but made no rnovement. ~ a i i k r e s  comrnsnded tlie riglit 
wing, Monoey the Ieft, and Ney, wming from Pmk, took 
the centr& The reserve, chiefly oomposed af detackmenta 
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whose sagacity embled him, although at a distante, to d e M ,  
through the glare of the insurrection, al1 its i n a f i c i e n ~ .  He 
dreaded the moral efect produced by ita rnomentary suacesrr, 
and was preparing to cmsh t h ~  ririing hopes o€ his enernies : 
bnt dc-~pising the Spatiiards ns soldicq Josoph'~ retrañt and 
suhqusnt position displeased him, arid he desiced ta have the 
eailtation of the patriots rebuked by a bold and we1E-con- 
sidered plan, of which he sent him an ontline, ePincing his 
abolute niñstery of the art of war. 
' It mas too la&,' lie said, ' to dhws~ & puedbn, wíseth- 
M & s h u ~  hme bem retained or ab ffindwed; d l e  to wwioler 
if o p & h  coeidng IIie *e of Z ~ a g o z a  migkt raat h 6e.m 
fd; W&SS ¡% E W E ~ W  the 1~7l-3 0f th ~ , W O  Appendix 
wm not bsiter thm that of t h  l e h  f i  $ 1 ~  P~mch 5. 
m y .  TI# Iine of I ~ M  2%-O waa fakm u& vami 6s bpt; $0 
advam J T ~  that &ver zcithoect a $m? o$& tomecld crmte 
hihi&n, thk w d  b&rq the t r q s  h k  ngai'la, ami? producai 
m injllriw m& @t. Bzst w7y abandm Fu&h? why 
dimqukh Burgo8 3 f lwsa tmms wwe of n o 8  m d  ~qmErat.imt. 
f l b ~  ya08 ~rwi~d &33t!&?l~&, U d  RWTUZ ~ O T C B  ~ 0 ~ f i h ! % d  tW0- 
fl~ird# of tlx s f m q t h  of amk.  TwZ& and Dwpos ?mi 
(o relative impwtamx ; dhejr~t, possesGng a stona bl.edge, m 
O?b th? a ~ ? ¡ k ? ? & ~ ? Z ? k ~ h  0 f ~ ~ ? l l $ ~ 7 a a  a7ad xad4 c o ~ n ~ ~  
th m d  of Za~aqoza, m t h e  cv'&Z of a &nce. W k  
ih Wi%?J Q- o~&?&vB Opma%?l~, t h 3 ~ 8 t  ~ntWpTh3 W d d  
be tlie siege of Zwagozm; from t f d  l o  FwEela th land 
c w r i q e  m thtx day~ ,  t 7 ~  uxmtrn. m m k y e  WLW d y  fmdm 
I w a ;  vabefore .ei /m b&ging ~ B T ~ U ~ J  d s b r ~ a  
& TZl'ltdgs W C ~ S  tite a ~ n m  as to he 11m at Z q o m  If dta 
X p m h r &  got posssssa'm of th fhmw, d A7amwe Q'OUT~ be 
{m o ata& of ~nmmcttm md Pampdm exposd .  TdEa 
zuas af pimt i q w t a n q  Udayro af m, i t  m am 
oBama placp, w i W  a b d g e ,  .wmmmraded m aonaaunkth, 
mm wit!mt in~med~ d h i y  1 Id fo m17bimg l d 
rinw,' snid thiz greot  comrnander, ' aa lmp aa tJw Via¿da aná 
ms + ras ti@ Dan& a( da t a t l b  is mtGq updh thwe 
m gmd p'nta of plas8age md a ?M& quid ZP take t 7 ~  o f .  
&ve; b l ~ e  Ebro is lass t 7 m  wthing, a mera Iinc, M&p-o w 
weLwI t h  m y  rqtact it, k at E&&, dp> 
Q 2 
Tohsa b e j b  nny pwparatkn m l d  be made to wceive Ria: 
he rn.;SI~t come from X v h J  frona Logmno, m f-rom Zaragoza. 
BUT~M tia capital of a ~ ' m ,  the cmlre q.f many 
conant'1cnkations, a toauiz of pcdjf~m, a& of ~ e l d i v e  W ~ W  to 
tJle Prencl~ amy ; to o m p y  it im jorce a d  ofmsivety, woulii 
tJ~reaik  P a h k ,  FaZlado lid, A rada, and m Madrid I! i$ 
wiwmy to Aave mude war a Zoray tim lo &w tlh; el 29 
wcewmy haga mtade a mu&r $ offmsive e n t a p i s e s ~  ib hom 
how m a d b  #?le m l l e s t  & m am indkathw, mcourya, w 
d b r a e s ,  and daides h adqtion of m enkrpriw insted 
Of W??.O~~W!-' I?Z d d ,  af' ¡?he OW'X??/ M C U ~ 9  h T p ,  Lo@o, 
ancl Twhb, tlie F~enc1~ umy &E be in a pitifd posidion Id 
aB mt klaoama $ hs Itm l e 3  A l a d d ;  i t  & a& kmum w/& has 
S m  of t ? ~  GaUician m y ,  t Ime is w o n  t o  susjaect <t m y  
h v e  hm d i r e d  upm Portugd; in sud a #late, io taloe ep, 
{mtead of a 6o.M mmacing umd hmowmble p d i m  lile 
Burqo8, a c o n ,  ~ J w f i Z  m Iike TrBvin4 kB to aay to IL 
m y ,  you h e  mtJ~ing to fw, go e h w J w e I  w ?mw d e  
owr d k p i t i o m  to go f d h w  k k ;  QT w h a  clw~en 
g r m d  toJ;sht, m m  i 7 m  .eoithozlt fw of bdng &tdd m 
pOUT ~ L C V & ,  BM wibat d ¡!!M f ~ m 7 6  g d  O?O e*f 8h m 
m a a h  t7se nat &y upm BZG~JOS ? TIJ2Z he ld tld citadal of 
tlaat t m  h tden by six t J l m u d  i ~ g e i a t s  B th.9 P r d  
h a  le) a gamkm in & cm* Im cnn fm wfie BU&& 
mm wtiw in r a I ~  a w& plain? Prm W time d i i  gone; 
if memo, maglers t ? ~  cz'taclel, it mmat be r&Jcm. a m 
th watrmy, m a M  puu~rd t7ae cittadel, we m8 &w ha&#, 
bcmmw ii m t  hoid out more &m three &ys; oclad vw~ m 
i% fq7d PO?LY d d d  dmdm $h pund w h e  w 
wi87~ tofcflIbt, 
'%e d i s p i o h  ~~ 6adhj d m d ;  w h  the e m y  
s ld l  w c L R  OUT tmop d l  m& with d m imdt m- di 
c h m i d z Z e  tB&, %f tJwe m mdg i w y e n t e  m- T@ht t r q s  
c t d v a w * ~  agrsZnst thm y$flrn t7wuad imwqrn& m& 
& W ~ O S ~  ~ & m h  t b & ~  & ib4 fOW?2 d OCüUpJ th.9 ~ ~ 1 1 4  
id dE be wmaay to calczGlate a w c h  of mmak dws so 
&le +M ta pod w~dz1e8 time a& q-etde t h  tozula, wI&h 
-m& 6e EEmas w-tlmt aonac &mtsne%; $ dw&$ thB 
time, the d a ~ l d  Ps wpm Zopcño w PmipeEum, mm8haa  
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h m& mdmdes 202'tJm~t m, d f a t i g d  t b  m y .  
If m hFd ii &R. cmaiky &y, L it not to my, w do mt 
i n h d  atapping, aad inde  t h a  m y  to some t lwe8  .7t ia t h  
JSrsd time m mmy 1 .  quitfed aJl ita qffrnahe p d b m  h t& 
up m Iiad &fmh E&, amd a&t to elmw 2s jWd of battke, 
wJm t J~e  t h m d  m c d d o ~  whi& m+ht dake 
p.km amd t l ~  distame of tlm mmy did mt lmw a pmWiI.ity 
of b e i y  ra6b t o f m m  if t h  batlle wodd .&& p h e  at ?'&, 
be- T ' ~ I E &  arad IJaunpe.Zwm, b d w m  So& and IJL& Ebro, 
w b e h  BWIJOS amd ~T f i ramh  dal Ebro.' 
Then followed m observation whicli may be atudied with 
admntage by thosa authow who, irnaoquiiintd ~ 5 t h  the 
simplest rudiments of militmy science, and in profound igno- 
xance of nwnbew, positions and resonrces, point out the 
ammte mode of  executing the most delicnte and dificult 
opemtiona o€ war. The rebnke of  firciine, who frankly 
acknowlcdgcd t a  huvais  thnt hc eould paris the Rhine at a 
particular aapot, if tbe latter's 6 n ~ e r  were a, bridge: Iim been 
lo& upon auch men, and the more recen6 opinion of NapoIeon 
may be disregarded. 9 u t  it is not permitted,' says that 
consummte general, ' it is  mt pmmPt&, at ctI~e. d i s t m  of 
t h  M r a d  leagua, a& evLtíwut &en a atate of tiae situad& 
Qfbh a m y ,  to  dirmt whut alwukd be done P 
Bnving tbus avoided tlie cl~nrgo of pmmption,  the empe- 
ror recoinmended certain dispositions for defending the Ebro, 
and giving a short analy~is of Dupont's campaips, declured 
that ' thmfy-fiwe h n d  Pench, in n,a good p* wmld 
R~J$M tO beat aEl t 7 ~  Spumkh a m k  mi&?.3'-'Let F&: 
he said, ' b e  r&mM, .ifpoesz%b; ai Út & a s  venlrcupeed ifi 
fwce, and of.kwty i d s  d~cqom. Let t l ~  g ~ a l  c m  
m* tJme, couffit prruinkh m d? &, 8m.m IIx b&, 
&l7~ a &m 6 f d u ~ e  opmalbnw w h ~  f l ~  t&jm-ts si& 
a&q tand maktain J¿h c m m i c a t k  &71 Lop60 by títe 
dgld aarak if ?LS c m ,  h t  certa,idy By $?M left; led: hM cmps h 
m m ' d a d  m me of ds&. If a b d p  of iru-umpta vníy 
iqp-004 he m~ 3gJ1t h, OP keep I I m  cm8htl ly  m t h  
drferwi'ud by hia mv-h q&m6 t/&r line m ag&at gura- 
gom; gf rqdm kmp d h k  h h  and JM Oa f o r d  UCTW tJia 
Ebro, Id Aim d*& UZe grmd ¿o P m .  m t G  t l ~  
gmmdin-chy hus mgde hia dGpmitZ0na for th main hdy  : 
i x  thk m a n m  m p m p t  naovmmt  upon Edella and Tohu 
cun t& p k m  And tib merp of o f ~ h  witl hve  m& 
fu..IIcd t d .  
' Ld nunrshd Bmeikes, dlk h b  whle cwp & n f d  8y 
th Zght cavalrg of th m y ,  m m p  .e92 th wood mar B u T ~ ;  
let th C h l E e l  be zaen o* th h ~ . l G s l ,  t?e &@S, maa d 
w & a w  S& evw the Bbw; L him hq in sa dhh 
i!o act, be undm m mwy &y d t 7m o'clo J in the m i y j  
a r w k m a h  wdZ dh ~ d u m  of hb p&oIes; Jle a l d d  &o 
dprtk l o  a gwut &e&, las fw m i3.m hys' m d ~ .  
#E 9 s  of t h  centre ba plnced at Mim& &t Ebro d 
R&&ca, a& ihe e n m h m e a  l M e  s e d  WI~SB tha Ebro 
6ehp:nd V i h h ;  bhh c m p  a h d d  he wmder m mmj miwri, 
Onyj nnck arnGd@rob i5y t ? ~  road of S& wad wJm-m [ha 
enmy muy be q e c t e d :  ib mwE not 6s h t  &Id of; Il~ab 
rtoo c q s ,  b & p  to 6e una& a M d  k conmkd m Zittle as 
plosai6le Logroño, a& considw t h ~  IBft wing cas a c q s  
detditd, d,mkg G I i ~ e  of qpa&iolas.'up PampeÉuw d a 
st.plurate pa& so m£: Tw& pw& m a p t  
to ths lim. Be mfl m t f ~  &fm*ve, in slwrt, d e  wurl thicst 
ii ta sw, get i m f o m a t b  fiom Lb aloaldes, d e  mates, CRe 
p k ,  #@ c&fs nf cm&, amd tia @n&pl gropielors, pi 
mili t7m h ppBrfly i n f t d .  % pa f roh  dmuld d-8 bs 
c l i v ~ e d  q m  ti@ g i i  cf SOTia, d qf Bwgoa, apcm Pa&mkI 
arad w p m  IhB &de of Aramch; t h y  cmld tl~w fm t1m 
po& of infmcqtion, a d  smd EJww reporta of afiested, 
wJw sltwld b e v e r  6s W wdl a~cl  dimissed ajer tw 
hd &ve??. the b f o r n i a a h  &.&red of tJm, Jet I?M mmy &en 
m: m can un& di mwfm-m, iáide mi- wde-s f r m  Riq 
d f d  wpm Jtk &nk at € 1 ~  mmmnt Re & meditating an 
o~&-~.&zv waovma' 
Tliith regnrrl to tlie minor act-aits, the crnperor thus wrote:- 
r~90mh & &y two dwri m I m  t h  pbA&n of th 
m y ,  and il las coraslamdy u& agknat m; m qcdiditim mi 
thme i% d b m  e£, io &e I J L Z T E ~  qf the p=iwcip"l inag.& m 
h t a p I  m d  to p&m mwld ?mve a good gmt.  It 
w d d  be mefd to o- S ~ m d m ;  i t  wiil h of&antirge ba 
m by t h  dimt mad if 3übm h Xmtamder. It d k 
r n ~ s q ~  to  o c w  m d  rkbm Bhcay artd Xa- Wevamana 
me, ami? emy S p M  fdm ia m t h  ni=ay ~ n g  
dm& he dwt. I ' lse mmt+faclor%es of mm at ~ ~ E ~ ~ ~ ,  
P I m ' a  W be m&d, f.o hi& h f m n  of deibnce, 
eoarking fm tFBe &A. fl~eport 0 f P d 0  BW 
68 rwri%ecZ d fartw with $r& aetiwdy; M a ~ ~ l " u  
Ghe civitiana, 4 "ag& af pm* Q!?d m d t b  d,f,,U 
al& be phmd tlw6 hws &um& w Z y  Jdf 
way &m d 4 d d  B a y m ,  m inkmw 
dhte post fol. tile m y ,  amd a @a of mOf f i r  m q ~  
cpmdi7ag GdZkLz. Xhe intmest af th mmy k i% 
m k  I& fm; &Y h z i y  & point of &tack, L q w a t ~ a  
so, t 7 d  lJag h l m  b mam ta &i~& BW idkated in a 
p k t i i e  way, m d  t h  opposiy general c m  &y p m a  it &y a 
b M 8  o$ hk m po- aad of lh m& 
b wlkkh 114 & ofm'w qfs&?n. act t v p o b t  h& d g k u  
%y#- 
' W e h v e m  a o n i b o f  w W t I k m , y  G&t, & Ze RUS 
.nO W 8  h Ohk'b~d, aS i!hk CUñe &TC%Wdh&y kl 
m a w r l / , m ~ q Z e a w m ~ ; ~ h e y m m E  d o h S p a h m  
&y do i m  ol7m p ~ m .  8md p w t k  o&. &d d m  carry o& 
m m d i ~  t h  @.&, 8 d ~  ~ J H  dcabde, tha &&f qf a c m  
m&, aJ1B mas& af tb pt or 7~i-3 dqmty, amd abm d #LE 
ktdwa. P%d tísesepr8m.s U& m~1 thy a p i d ;  qw- 
& th ~5&2? i d b  &y, W h ? ~  thenaM ? W S ~ ;  & ~ g d  
t o s e t l d f o o ~ w q e r ~  andtogetmm. ~ w ? ~  lww 
to IaL nwmm of .;Sw d fm 42 Ba 8 [ 8 8 ~  tO get im&gILi- 
g~lacg All tlb8 p d 8 ,  all t7w ~ W B  m& b~ ihtercspkd; IIM 
s+le m u t h  of po&mg &at&@erm d be ko 
~ 7 m - h  ra d e t a c l d  of fw w &e hd mm, &El 
$0 id0 6 m, & t?k? km8 fm i ! h  P H ,  S& 
&t &W, W r  &ws, pqvms, g&w, &. It k- b q o d  
&u&, th5t mert im thu FW1i  Iiw, th i * t m  we al 
k$lW?Wd 0f w J U ~  pObBB@g, 0f CülW8d & 0f J ~ ? Z B  t 1 ~ ~  kTWW 
m e ;  wlmt thm s I d d  pmmt ym fi-m smking 
~ n c 2 p Z  
L& t l m  be m t  &a& agah &dmt  behq  ilAtmated, 
I.t&afact,trsat&o'hmmmlaotima&~ i% h apeopZd 
coumtry, $f t h  g w d  ia mt w & m &  {Z & b e m m  JM i~ 
ignorad qf ¡% &ade. 2% mvim whzcfB i!h Fdia8lm 
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  en& fa m mmy'8 ge?aerd mn3 neum ghe?z ~$€elO, 
TUZQ mm .b get m q y ;  th M masfImd to daaa'n i9i.m ia 6y 
mfepmrda a d  prohIZma to p e 8 m  CísBip. Eivq ¿J& g d ,  
tJ& toum.s, w t7&r mmmt&l' 
doseph seem t o  have had no portion of his brii.Ber'~l martiai 
genius. The operations recommended by the latter did nat 
appear to the king applicable to the atate of affoira; he prc- 
posed others, in discussing which, he thus defended the pdicy 
of bis retreat from Nadrid, 
' W h  th defection of hnmtp-tZao t ? m m d m  ( & $ d 8 )  
Appeadg, d t& PmcF, to pit tha mpitd, th d*& 
NO. B. t ~ m p  mmaining m di& ia time wp, 
namIy l  th &q'a wsha2 J3essi&edl', and g d  Ver&'$ 
t h  bt&&q Zmagoza; but t h 8  b o d b  m ~ p e a d  mer a 
A w M  l e a w  ofpumd, cvrad &t?b I a ~ t  d A e  &wg I d  1dh 
m m w n n d  His &a€ m m t  was to mas tha tm 
fm a4 atwi-goa, a:fWw@rd& to era* i d o  c o h d k  d h  
t?be thbd, and U m  tb 1 h  of dBfm m tiw X b o  wm taclqd; 
m oprat im d&&d by m u ~ d  rmm, 68ol~ecse w?w tJse d 
of AnchZmia fmeboded GG wg&~ GXUJ m-ou8 w, p& 
did mt pma't  a ~ e e  om*ps, the stmnget of whkh wm &y 
9ighlem thowand mem, ta qwda tb a greate~ d h t m  &m 
& days' m&, 2m t l ~  m a t  of .&ven dlim of p p &  ha ffi 
8lak of hmtility. fifiy t h s a a d  &mch c d  Lkfd 
d h  bntms a ?%?as of &rty leapm, and cwld pard  t?e ho 
grmd c m m h h  of Bwgos and FwEab qaimt enenak, 
mho M mt up to p&EE Eim able ia camj to e i t h p i n t  
above tzv&y$we thoPi.scad m In b l ~ i s  m o d e j !  tiwwmd 
FrmcJP d d  Ze a w i t d  upm d7m thom wdd.' 
Diamtisfied withNnpdeon's plans,Joseph, stiü lioldingBi!bao, 
distributed the fifty thousand men remainig tu follows. The 
right wing cwxupied Bnrgos, Pmcorbo, and Puente Lma. The ' 
centre WN posted betwsenHaro mdLogroiio. The ldt extended 
from Loagro50 to Tudelg and tlia latter town wap not occupied 1 
He contended, that tEs arrangement, at once offenaive and 
defensive, migbt be continued if the great army directed upoa 
Spain arrived in Septemhr, since it tended to refit ths troop, 
and rnenaced the enemy; but it conld not be prolongcd until ' 
November, b u s e  in three moilth the Spaniurds iuust m k e  
p t  pro-> and would be in o, stnte t o  take the offensive 
witb grand organized eorpq obediezit t o  e cmtral administra- 
tion formcd in Madrid. Everjvthing annound, he mid, tlint 
the month of Ochber moulrl be a decisivo epoch, giving tha 
party who knew hom to profit, the priority of movementa and 
a snocese the propss  of which it was dilñcult fo  a l d a t e .  
In tbis view of afairs, the merits of s i x  projects were to be 
disrnissed. 
14 Ta remah in the nctnnl position. T h i ~  maa unsus- 
tninable. The enemy codd attack t h  left witli forty tliou- 
smd, the centrc with forby thoumnd, the rig11t with as rnnny. 
TutEeIa and Navmre, as far as L o p ñ o ,  required twenty-five 
thousand men. Burps could only be defended by an amy 
able to resist the nnited forces of Bhke and Cuesta, eighty 
thmand men; it waa doubtful If the twenty thousand 
hyoncta oppos~d to them mn1d completely beat t h m ;  if 
not, the. French would bc hmrassed by thc insnrgcnts of Bicrap, 
Navarre, and Guipuscon, whn would interposei Iietween tlie 
left wing and Fmnce. 
' 2 9  To carry the cent.re and resme by Tudela towade 
Zampa o~ Albazan. United with the Ieft they wonld arnount 
to thirtp thowand men, mho might seek and defeat the eaemy 
on tliat sidc. Mcantimes the right wíng, lenving garrisons in 
tlie citade1 of Eurgos and the fust of Pancorbo, conla occupy 
tbe enemy and vratch the Xontaiia de Santander, and the 
disembarkations wliich migbt take place. Bnt thia t& was 
dificutt, because Pancorbo m not tbe onPy defile aecmsible 
to artillery ; three I w p e ~  from thence, anotlier road led upon 
Miranda, and thew wea a third passage over the point of tho 
diain wliich stretched between Hitro arid Mirandn. 
" 39 Z e a ~ e  the defence o!? Navarre to tlie left wing. Carry 
tbe centre, the reserve, and right ming to Burgos, tlnd beat 
the enemy More he conld unitc; an essy tnsk as t h  French 
wou1d be thirty thousand stmng. 31eanwbiIe Monoey would 
check the Spaniards near !lhdela, or, faiiiig to do so, cr>uld 
mnrch up tlic Ebro, by hongroña and Brivlcsca, and join the 
mnin body: the cornmunicntion with France woutd be lost, 
but tbe m y  might mainhain itself until the s r r i d  of the 
emperor. da a modification of tbzs project, Moncey, retiring 
to the entrenched camp of Pampelunq could there await either 
the arrivd of tlie emperor, or tlie resnIt of the operations 
tomrds Burgos. 
' 4'. Pass the Ebro in retreat, and k m p t  the enemy to fi@t 
in tlie plain between that river and Wtoria. 
( 69 Retire, supporting tlie left npon PamgeInna, the right 
npon Montdragon. 
" 6'. h v c  gnrrísons, with tlie means of s six weeks' defence, 
in Psmpelnna, Xt. Sebstian, Pancorlio, md Burgos. Unite 
tlie reat of the army, attack the enemy wherever he waa fomd, 
and tten wnit near Xadrid, or in that eonnty wbere the 
pursuit of the Spankds or the facility of limng abouId dmw 
the m y .  This plan relinquinhed the communicatiom witith 
France, but t.he grand army mould reopen them; and the 
troopu already in Spain would defy tlie enemg's efforts, and 
mait in a noble attitude the general impulseto be &-en by tbe 
arrival of tho cmperor.' 
Of these projects, the king xccommendcd the lmt st o€ the. 
most likclihood; Ncy ancl Jourdan inho approvd oí? it; but 
Napolcon hnd toa Iittle confirEcnm in his brotlier'e milihry 
tnlent to entrust so g e a t  a matter im his guidance. 
19 Some sympathy of geniua is neceasary where om man 
exeeiitea nnother's conceptions in m; without mch hafrnony 
of thought,accidentnl eventa will cmbarmsa the exeBitor; while, 
airning to rmncile the plan with his own viewp he will 
gcnemlilly reel in his course and foil, The reaaon seems to he 
tlmt inveterate attention must be h e d  on lending prjnciples 
to enable a general to disregard creases wbich wodd othermise 
break down his seIfIfpmsespion. Joseph oould not comprehmd 
Napoieon. 
2". The king's original memoir npon has six projmts h too 
much interIincd and blotted to be taken as a matured pm 
duction ; but tha pervnding  error^ m, fhe adogting of mnjec- 
turd da@ withoiit any infomtion aa to  the Spanish forces, 
views, or interior pliey. Re wumed tht the centrd junta 
wm able and provident, the Spaniarde united, the armierr 

JOSEPH'B offensivs project being ovemled by b i ~  brothcr, b 
ditributed his centre nnd right wing in a better 
Jmrnal o f  
tht mmner, liut atill neglected to occupy Tudoln, 
Qpmnliom* and kept his left belrind th0 Amgon. On the 
118. 18th of September the French aere disposed 
folIows :- 
Three divisione of infanty In 
Rigiit wing; Nmhd front of Paiicorbo, at U r i v i e q  üaiita Mariq and Liilia; Lgh~ 
mdry  behind Burgo& 
M i h p ,  M o s s ,  Caparoex, asid 
Wt Mambd Moncey 16,630 1 p ~ ~ M , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ~ ~  (, co-d. 
R o a o m  of tho k h g  
General Snlig.iiy . 5,418 
lm&aY g u d .  
General Dmsenne 2,423 Mirandq Haro, and Puentelam, 
Total - 7,833 
RIovcsble columns 1,984 
Stationmy . 20,005 Iisj.onne, and wakhing the val. 
T O ~ I ,  cornmanded by - leya of the E'pema opening 
Geneisl Drouet . \  intn Navarre. 
Total 90,289 present under arrns, exclusive of the t.mops in 
Cntnlenin; and when the cornmunications werc aea~red, tbe 
fortresses garrisoned, and 81e fort of Pancorbo amed, tliera 
remained ahow fifty thausrtnd snbres and bayoneta clisposable 
on a line o€ battle extending from Bilbao to Afmo. 
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CHAPTER V.
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Under Arm"IThree divWona of infant")' in
'lt' M ha.lllesa'c 1559" frontofPancorbo,a.tBrivie<l<'ll,
le: L WIflg,' "'1'\1 I res J:l Santa n.., a Cuba; ligh;
~val c u llulb"Vll.
Centre, YMlbll1 Ney. • . 13,756 I>ogrono, !'o~a.ldll, and Nnjcrn.










GarrillOlIS. • • •
. ~nernl MonthiQu •
I ira. da., lIllor d, te L .?,E
6,004 Parnpclun:l.
1,500 Bilboo.
lCmnPO$ed of "",an gal'1'UoDe andGeneml La Grang" • Ci 979 mov~'able C(J]umus, gu...-ding, the ~'OJ.llUlUlli""ti","e ",f Hi"""y,Ahva, and Guipuaool'.
Gralld reee:rve.
i\lovO<loloJe COJUffill8 , I .Sta.tiQllary . . 20,005 '&)'Onlle, and v;"u,hmg the ,?,'
ntaJ, o m "", o 1__ 21,989 !C{" f t lyrenee8 e log;
eneral rouet . lnoo N:lV:U"re.
llil m l s. rooP!
fl.talonia Ol lli uti s e sccured, Il
ess i u cI th llllCOr u.rme h e
i bove lfl. llOusll SllL n c s dis s le
f tl utendillg lfar .
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To oppose this fome the Spanish troops were divided into 
tLree principal mmses, denorninated the armies of the rigl~t, 
centre, and left. 
The fimt, cmnpoxed of the divi- 
uFon~ of St. M ~ T C  and WIieii, 
niimhered ahout . . . . 
The seconrl. compased of tlie di- 
~ i i o n s  of  La-Peña, Llamas, 
md Cam . . . . . . . 
The thi* rxmsisting entimlgr of 
Zfalliciana, &out . . . . 
bond Gne. 
In the itrcondline theCaatilliam 
wereat@oviam . . . . 12,000 
The Eatremduransi at Tnlaverz 13,000 - - 
Two ~inddusian divisions wora 
- -1 6'1,000 in La hiuncha, . . . . . 14,000 - - The hsturiun~n~ poatd nt Llana c n l l ~ d  . . . . . . 18,004 
Tlii~i e~tirnhte, founrled upon n numhr of c o n ~ o r a r y  
. . 
returns and other docurnents, proves tha rnonstrous exnggera- 
tions pt forth at tbe time to deceive tlle Spaaisl~ people and 
tlic Engliih gavement. It was pretended that one lizindrcd 
and forty thousand entliudastic weE1 provided soldicrs wem 
threaten& the French positions on t h e  Ebm, whereas Ews 
thm seveity-six tliousnnd wcrc in lmc, ill-nrmcd rsnd pro- 
vi(1ed. TJie right, undcr IPalnfox, wm between Zaragoza md 
Sanguessa on tlie Arwon rivcr; tlie centre, under Castaños, 
occupiod Rorja, Taranzona, and Agreda; the lefb, under 
Blake, rcas posted at Reposa near the s o u m  of the Ebro. 
TEiese pmiGona were ~4th referente to the enerny very dis- 
advantageous. From the riglit to the left of their line, thRt 
b, from Reposa to Zaragoza, wow twice thc diataricc betwecn 
Raycinne and Titoria, nnrl the ronds morc diffieult; thc merve 
under Drouet was oonsequentIy in closer militnry communica- 
tion with Josepli klmn tlie sPnish w i n p  were with ewli 
other; and &he Iritter were acting, witlout cwcert, npon 
donlile exkrnnl lines, against an enemy superior in numbers 
nnd evgr rnilitary qualification. The fiench base rested on 
thrcc grcat fortressas,-hyonnc, St Sehadian, and Fampc- 
,luna; in three c lnp J o q h  -could conmntmta Eiis entre .md 
reserves m eitlier flank, thus uniting thirty thousand men 
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arithout dmwing from his prritrons. T'he Spnniards hwl only 
one fortreq Zaragoza. They WCTI: under different gencdti 
bavbg eqaal authority, could makc no combined cfforts with 
rapiclity, nor concentrate more than forhy thousand in any 
case ot a given p in t .  
Blnke Iinving six divisions, cach fivo fhau~nnd stmrig 
Corrwpomd- arlvanccd the 17th. One division menaccd B u r p  
mcp o f  clip to cover tlic! rnniri Iiody, wliicli tlircu{lilirig tlie ralley 
tain Carrol. 
~ l i id .  of Villnrcago turne11 Ikssi8res' riglit anrI reocfied 
ü e n e d  tlie'Rliro, occupying Trnspadena, Frins, and Oñn, 
Uroderick. Metlina nnrl Ermii, nnd one diviaioii \vas left at 
ViIlarenyo to prrñcrvc thc communici~tian l~it l i  hynos& On 
tlie le'& of t h i ~  army general Acevorlo n d v a n d  50 h t a n d e r  
with eight thoussnil Asturiniis. Gcnernl Rrod~rick now 
reached Blake's cnmp, and was iiistnntly importuned for 
money; wlien supplied he wm t w t e d  with co~riness anci 
was denied a11 informntion as to the militwy opaations, 
Eng1:lisli vessds atill liovered off the coast t o  supply arms and 
arnmunition for tlia Biscaynns, and Blalra thinking to revive 
the insurrection and extend it t o  Giiipnscoq dekded &e 
h e p o n &  
rnnrquia of Portnzgo with a divjsioa and five guns 
~ C C  orgcnc- to attaclr gcneral Nonthion at Bilbao. f i e  king 
* Lei'Ln ordcred a brigade to fa11 on Portazgo's flank by 
the d l e y  of Orduña, sent Merlin by the vdley of Duranp, 
fo reinforce Bilbao, and ordered Bmi+res t o  make a demon- 
Jmrnnl of atration an the side of Fritas. He wtw too late. 
the kingnR Operatiuns. Portmgo entered Bilbao. Monthion retired, and 
MS. Bessi$ren after injuring tha dcfenem o£ Burg~s, 
MI back to IIirmda, Hnro, m d  Puente Lnra, on the Ebro. 
Then the king took post at Vitoria, and Ney marched with 
his whole wnps upon Bilbao, miving there the 26th. XerIe's 
division executed a, combined mo~ement at GLe same time 
írom Miranda dcl Ebro npon Oma and BarbacFñ~ Portazgo 
thua menaced, o q i c d  the heights above Bilbao until nighb 
fdl and thcn rdreated to Valmaceda, where he found the 
Correqond- third division: for BIeke now ocmipied Frirts 
erice ofgeae- with bis right, Quincaes with his centre, and 
rdhi*'+ Vrrlmda with his Idt: thus tho second effort to 
robe B i y  frtiicd, 
Menntime UNA, who had been beaten from Sanguessa 
with Ioss of two guas, took post in the moun- J m a l  ui taim facicing that city, and the Gmtillim army the I t i n s  
appmached the Ebro by hbe Eorix roads; La-Peña i$-tim* 
occupied Lopño,  Naldo, and Najem; LInmas 
and Caro were in Carella Camaate and Calaliorra. The 
armed pewntry of the valleys assembld, the country between 
Zaragoza and the A-on river appeared t o  be crowJed with 
troops, md Moncey withhwing from the Ebro, plnced his 
left at the psa of Banguesga, his centre a* Falcw, his right at 
EJtella Ney left Medin with three thousand men at Bilbao 
and ret.urzied to the Ebro, but finding Logroiio strongly 
occupied by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia in obaervation. 
The king and Bmibra Lad on t.he 4th Ied two divisions by 
Osma to  feeI for Blake toma& Frias md Medina, but he ww 
then at Palmaceda, rind Joseph believing he waa moving 
a,pinst Bflbao pushed t o  hdio ,  dcaigning t o  attack hini in 
march. At Lodio he discovered bie error, and being unewy 
for Moncey rcturned to Murqnia, left. Merle there tu cover 
the mr of tlie trtiops in Bilbao, and tben continuad hia mar& 
to Miranda Th 22th, Blake, lwving a division 
J0nmsl of 
at Orduiia attacked Bilbao with eighteen thou- ,1, k;lis"s 
sand men, and Mer2in retired 6ghting up tlie $""tioq 
valley of D m n p  .oras far as Zomsrs where he 
waa joind by Verdicr with aix b~bhdiom and checked the 
purauit. But the lcading coIumns of thc grcnt French nrmy 
hd now passed the frontier. Laval's division entered 
Durango, Sebastiani having six thousand men relie~ed h'ierln 
at RLurquia, tlie lathr repaired to Niranda, Tertlier iaeturnetl 
to Tjbrih md Lefebre, h i c e  of Danteic, assumed commmd 
at Dnrango. 
Un tlic Spani~h side Romana's troops had disembarked at 
Sanhnrler, and the infnntry, elght thousand, wcre slowlg 
ap'pm~ching RFako'~ camp ; tlio Astiirinns remnined in Trillar- 
cayo, but the cande de Belvedere WSB udvancing ~vitli t l ~ s  
Eatremadurans, the Castillians had amived on the Ebro, two 
more AndaIusian divisions Tvere coming through Th Nancha, 
and Castaños xeached Tudela. The crisis WM approaching, 
yet so apathetic was the mpreme junta, so entirely dcficient, 
that al1 the be& friend~ nf the mime wislieil for a defext to 
excite tlie nationaE energy; and many even tliouglit that 
s h q  xemedy would be insuflicient. Rfornentary =citatian 
was inded m w d  by tlie intercepted letter to Jourdm before 
spolrsn of, tho troops in the ~ccond lino were t l i ~ n  ordercd 
to proceed to t t e  Eliro by forced mmches, letters were 
written t o  press the admnce of tlia Briti~h army, and 
Cmtalios WQS m j o i d  t o  drive the memy without delay 
beyonrl the frontier. But this wdden fury of action ended 
witli tliose ordem. &ird"s mrps m detained in E:", tlie transports at Corulw waiting for pmiaion 
t o  land; no assistmce was afforrled to  Moore; 
and thon~h ttlie subsidiea aImdy paid by England amounted 
t o  ten rnillions of Jollm, thougll Madrid waa rich and willing 
to contribute to the exigencieg of tl ie moment, tbe central 
junta, while complarning of the want of moneg, 
mnd'cE'm wodd not l~ at tlie troubIe of collecting patnotic 
of C&añw, 
~ f k ,  and left tLe armies ta al1 the liorrom of 
famine, n&&ess. and misery. The natural coasequerice 
emued, the people ceased to  be enthusiastic, the nokdiem 
Nor were the generala lens absurd. Bl&e had m r n e n d  
the campign without Tmg&~in@s, or plan, save that of &ing 
~the provincea of Biscay aad Guipuscoh. With blmd mfidence 
He pressed fomard, Ignorant of the f o m  or ~ituation of his 
advcrswiq never drenming o£ defeat, and so little scquainted 
mth tlie dctaiI of command, thnt. be cnleulated npon tlie 
qtinntity of proVj~ion~ which conlrl be spaied from Qeneral B m  
deiekg m Euglish frigake, tliea crui&ng off tlie coast, as s 
m t c r .  rmonrce for his amy3 i f tlie oountry ehould fail to  Parl. Pap. 
supply him with ~ubsistence. His art i l lq  had 
ody seventy rounds a p, his men were witliont greatrcoats, 
many without ahoeq and the snow WRB b e e n g  
Rirch's 
,,t, to fa11 ia the mountains. Thrat he waa nble t c  
h i t h .  make anp impression E ~ O W S  hom little Jmeph poti 
N Y .  
aessed o£ militarp talent, T h e  French, from their 
babitude of war, were indeed able to M e  Blake witbout 
difficnlty, hbat the stFategic irnportance of t h e  valley of Orduñe 
they did not appreciate or he would have been destroyed: the 


lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser in the 
vnlley o€ the Rrents, might have been repeatea under more 
fnvourable circurnstanws nt Ordnña and Durango. Gcnius 
was sdccp witli the Frencli, dead with the Spnniards. Pniile 
Rhke rernrained betiveen W~as  anrl y~lruaceda Ire waa toler- 
abIy secui.e7 because tlie Montafia of santander is exceedingly 
nigged and a retreat by Villarayo open; but he was ill 
p l a d  for offenñive movernents, the only operatians he thought 
of. Insted of occupying Burgos nnd rcpairing tha citarlel, 
he dcsccndcd on Bilbao, whcic. several great vallcys mct, tthe 
iipI'er pnrts being p ~ s e m ~ 1  hy the Freiicii; tie waa cxposml to 
nttmlr a l~o  from Orrluiim, nntl his line o€ retreat wnn in Ressifires' 
power. To meet these clefects o€ position, Le d e t a c l ~ d  largely, 
mealcened bis main body, and made slom movements and 
Leble attacks, dkplafing temerity witliont deciaien or enter- 
prise. 
On the Spanish centre and right afairg rrere not better 
condnctcd. Cbtnños amived nt Tudcla t be  17tb, and the 20th 
confsrrerl witli PnInfox nt Y~rngoria. Their forces irid not 
mcecd forty-five thoustbnrl mcn, two to  three thousaud wcro 
cavalry, and ~ixty  pieces of artillery followed the 
Appendi~, divisiong whicli were postcd in the following yo, 27* 
manner :- 
A m  OF THE CEXTRE 27,000.-Ten thousrind CastiIlian 
infantryI fifteen l i u n d d  cava13 and fourteen guns were xt 
Logroño, under PigutellL Five thousand llndalusians 11,ndcr 
Grimnret w e r ~  at Lodoria. Ln-PcTia hnd fivc tjl~ousnnd nt  
Calitliom Tlie pnrc of nrt.illcry ws i~  guard~d by four thoii- 
mnd rit Centruenigo, the remainder were at Tudela. 
ARWP OF ARAQON 18,000.-Q'Xcil held Bnr, Lumbar, and 
Sangnessa, mith seven thonsand five hundred nien; X t ,  Marc 
ooeupied Exca, tliirt.7 miles in Tear of O'Neil, with h e  tliou- 
sand five huudred. Palafox remsiined in Zaragoza 6 t h  five 
tliousnnd. 
Between tlio nrmics rollcd t h ~  El~ro, nnd thcy omupied two 
sidm of m irregular triangle, Turlcla Iieing the apex, Sanguiuessn 
md Ln,miio tlie extreme points oE the base. The Ebro mil 
the Amgon, meeting at 3ijlagr0, farmed by their doable murse 
m nrc, the convex being opposed to the Spniards. The Egg 
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the Ark? and tlie Zidasco, desmrling from the Pyrenees 
in pnrallcl strerimn cut, the cbord of this rrrc at nelirly equal 
distancea, fnlling, the two fir~t into Che Ebro, thc last into ths 
Arngon, nnd al1 tlie mnds leoding from Fmnpeluna .to the 
Ebro fdowed tIic conrse of tlio~e torrents. Monc~y's rigbt 
wna nt Xstclle on thc Ega; hiu centre at Falce# antl Tefalla, od 
the A r p  and tlie Zidiisco; his left in fmnt of Sanguessa on 
the A-on; tlis bririrlges of Olite and Peraltn were secured by 
detncliments in ndvnnce ; but Caparosa, w l i m  there was anothtr 
liridge, was occupied in force. Be couId thus opwate between 
the tomnts, cornmnnded the roads Ieding to the Wro, and 
codd from Caparosa attttack the Gpaeish centre. From Tudela 
t o  Xanguessa is fifby miles, from Tudela to  LopoBo gixty 
miles, but from Tutlela te Caparosa only twelve miles of good 
road; wherefore the eñtremities of the Spanish line were 
above one hundred miles, or slr days' rnnreli from each other, 
ivhile a single day sauld bave aufficed to  u& the Fmch 
within twe hond  march of the centre, 
If Palafox, crossing fhe Aragon at Sanguesaa, n d w d  
fowards Pampcluna, Moncey menaced his left flauk rind resr; 
if he turned against Moncey tlie ganison of Yampeluna: 
memced his r igk l f  Cnstaiios, fe favour Palafox, m m e d  
+he Ebro at haigriiiio, Ncy, posted nt  Guardia, could hke him 
in flank; if thc two wings cndcwourcd to nnitc, thcir line af 
march could be inhccpted at Tudela by Moncey, and Caetaiios 
couId be nttnclíetl in renr by Ney pnssing the Ebro at Lopiio 
or Lodosa. If tliey rcmaind shtionary tlioy miglit bo h t e n  
in detnil, 
Cilstnñoa and Palafox, iporant and franquil, mre wm~~girng 
Sir Johi affensive operatiom sinplarIy absurd. The former, 
Noore's letlvin~ a diGaion at h d o s s  and Calahorra, ws 
Eri:i by B flank mamh to  place hia army on the rlrqon, 
ilarn.4 Corre- tlie left at Tudela the riglit at, Stingueaut; thas 
spondence. 
occupying bPwitli twenty tliousand men fifty mils 
of country close t o  a wncentrated enerny, Palafex, crossiug 
the Bragon at Sangiiessa, ww to take rtn oblique 
Ibld. 
cl.imei line bu-ards Roncavalles, covering the valleya of 
h y ' e ' e  Talay) Esay, and Roncal with hie centritre, ~d 
feapondeiice. 
augmenting hia force with hqurgent petrsrtnta. 
Blake was invited to m-operete by Guipnoeon, io pnss in rcnr 
of the FrencEt, unjte with Palnfox, nud cut off $1 nltreat to 
Fmnce ! TLE grana movement wm to oommsnce the 2 7th ; 
but on the 2la t  Grimsirest had pushed detiachments over tlie 
Ebro h Xendmivig Andosilla, Sesmq and Carcur, ai~d over 
the Ega, t o  the Le&--the Catstillian outpanta were at Viana 
on the left of the Ebro,-the Aragonese elosing on Sanguessn, 
and tbe p a n t s  crowding up to get arms and ammunition. 
hfonccy, dcccived by mich a conmiirno, eatimated the forcc in 
Sanguessa et twenty tliousand regulm wlien tbers were on?y 
eiglit thousand; and l i i ~  report, coupled with tlie simultaneous 
movements at both extremities, d e  the kiog apprehend a 
triple attack frvm Lopíío, hdosa,  and bnpessa.  Joumni oC Ile immetliately reinfomd Rey, dire~ting him tci 
~ I I C  king.8 
dmr the left bank of thc Ebro while Bomet 
dexcncld t.hc right bank from Hxro to Brionm. A 
divisinn , stationed at Este114 remived orders to follom tlie course 
of thc F:p and socond Ncyb operntionq and a part of  tlie gar- 
rison of Pampeluna m d e  a demonstrntion against iSenguesm 
Then  Castaííos reaclieil Logroüo tliese operritiona were in 
fulI aetit-ity; Ney had driven back al1 the outposta and waa 
an the heightei opposite that town the 25th cannondiq the 
8pmiards; next day he renewed his fire, and 
Whittiar- Casfañoa givieg fiqatelli ordera to deferid his 1,,,~, corre- 
post unlesa turnotl hy the right bnnk of  the  Ebro, ~ : ~ a ~ ~ ~  
pmcedcrl Lodosn nnd Culrahom Mmnwhile 
the Frene11 from Estella, drove tlis ISprtnish prtrties out of 
Mendavin, Andosilla, Carcur, onrl Sesma; nnd Grirnincst 
retired from hdosa t o  IA Torre with such preci- Gra- pftathn, that be lea colonel b, a vduabIe harn's corre- 
officer, witli a light httaiioa and some volunteera vol  den* 
& Leriin, wIiere they were taken a creditable 
resistance. Piptelli, reprdlem of Castaños' ordcrs, rctired 
frorn Lopi ío ,  nbnndond his p s  at the foot of thc Sicrra di? 
Ndd% only a few mileu from tha enemy, crossed the moun- 
tains, and reached Centruenigo in auch disorder that hi meii 
conti~med to arriPe fola twenty-four houw come- coionci Gria- 
mti~ely. Un the Rghf, O'Yeil ~kirmishing with ~~~~~~~" 
thc 'amkon of Pampeluna loat s k  rnen killed m. 
~2 
and ciglit wonndcd, hut annoiinced, tliat aftcr a Iiard &ion 
of many hours tLe encmy was completely overthrown. Cw 
taEos dismi~sed Fignatclli, incoorporatd his t.roops with the 
Andalusian divisions, antl sent fifteen liruidred mcn back to 
NaltIa undcr Urbinn, condc dc  Cnrtonjd, wlio recovered tho 
lost p n s  nnd bronght tliem safc to Ccntnienigo. 
Cissensions followcd tlicse rcvcrscfi. Palafox arrognntly 
ccnwrcd Cnqtnrlos, and a cnl~nl, of which Coupigny apply 
tlic principal mover, mas formcd sgninst tl~c Iiittcr. Tne 
ccntral junta, u n p y  tlini Cnstañoñ Iinil not driven tlie etiemp 
Iieyoiirl tlic frotitier, cncoumgcd liis trntlucem nnd circulated 
~Ianderons nccusations, as if liis innction done 1iti.d enlibld the 
Frendi t o  remnin iii Slinin. They sent Fmcisco Palafox, 
Iirotler of tlie caphin-general nntl R mcmber of the supreme 
junta, to  Iicdquarters, avowedly to facilitate, really to ccontml 
tlie military aperations. Be arrived at Alfaro ths 20th 
accompanied by Coupipy md tlie conde de Xontijo, the ltlst 
a turIiulcnt fwtious man, ~linllaw, vain, dwigning 
G~hGos'  and unprincipled. Castaños immediately mited 
'Vindicution. 
on hi i ,  the otlier Palafox also carne up from 
Zaragom, mri a councll af w a ~  waa held at Tudela when, the 
recent checks being disregarded, tFic pmject of surrounding 
the Frencli wns q a i n  dopted, tbougb it waa lrnown h t y  
thousand fresh men hnd joined tlie latter. Deem- 
Colmiel Gra- 
hamas arrc. ing it, liomcver, fitting tlint BIake shoiild nct the 
a~nliacnoE. first, it wns rcsol~cd to  anvait his tirnc, rind ns nn 31s. intcrincdintc operntion, tlic nnny of tlie centre, 
l c ~ v i n g  aix t,JiousnnrI mcn nt Ciilaliorm and tl g~rrison at 
TudeIu, was to crass tlie Ebro arid a t k k  Capa- 
Whitting- 
i,nm.s Curw rosa. F m c I i  parties hd hanever pwlied to 
~ p ~ n d ~ ~ l  Taltierra, ond in the skirmishcs whieh ensned tbe 
1UB. 
conduct of tlis Castillim battalions w u  dis- 
meditable: Joseph PaIafox tlien returned to Zaragoza and 
the deputy geparated liimself fiom Bstaños. 
Much loss hnd been sustained by descrtion and in the oom- 
hats, liut some hfurcian levies and a part of tlie frmt and third 
Andalu%itan divisions had joined tlie arrny of the centre, whicb 
now mustered twentpsix thousmd infaatry, three tlionsand 
cavnlry, and dfty or 8ixt.y pieces of artiliery. Tbe pasition~ 
extendcd from hlahorm by Raro t o  Tudcla. La-Pcfia hcld 
the fimt witli five tfiouaand men; Grimarest and &o com- 
manded eight thousmd Ltt the crecond; Gastaiio~ remniued 
with thirteen thoumnd five hundred in the last; Crartonjal 
held the Sierra de Nalde wIth eleven hundred, and a battalion 
wss at Ansejo. From tlime points, in pursrinnce of  the plnn 
arranged, tlie troops were actudly in movement to e r m  the 
Eliro, wllen dc~pntchc~ f ~ 0 m  Blnlíc nnnclnnced a disimter, klie 
extent of wliicli Eie (lid not commnniciitc. 711is ~irrmteil the 
athlc,  nnd tlie prepnsterous transxctions wliicli ensuod resern- 
bled the fraks of Caliguh more than red war. 
Tlie army was to abandon Tudcla and form two lines, tlilie 
fust between Calahorra and Amedo, the $~coTltf Gm,,nm,8 
htween klfrtro md Fitero ; and Francisco J.'~Jafox corrcsirnnd- 
cticc, HS. 
ordered O'Niel tc~ ocmipy the latter place: lie . 
refusetl to stir mithnnt urdem fmm Joscph Pnliifox, nnd next 
d q  tlie plm wm rlinngcd. Frnncisco Pnlafox proposed tlint 
@Niel sliould descentl tlis riglit of tlie A w o n  and attncl; 
Caparosa in mar, whlle a hrce from TudeIrm assailed it in front, 
and other troopa made a demonstration of passing the Ebro in 
hats a t  Milagro. Cwtaiios wlio was  at Ccntrucnigo asaented, 
and tlle troops mere in motion ngainst Gaparo~a, mhcn t h ~  
mhimsical depnty odcred tlicm to  mnrdi on Lodoslt, forty 
miles liighcr up the Ebrn,and nttnclr thehridge thcrc; Grirnnrcxt 
being rit the same tiina dimcted to  cross in boats at Calal~orra, 
aseend t 1 1 ~  lcfb bank sud hlnlto Lodosn in reverse. mlafios* 
The Spanfsh generaIs of division, confoiindcd by wUdicition- 
tliis cliangc, wrote to htnñori, and this was the first intima- 
tion he, lying siek 3 Centruenigo, received of the cliauges 
rnade. He direckd bis lieutenant t o  oliey, bat, provoked 
Iicyond cndurr~ncc, i i ~ u t e  to tlie junta to know who was to 
comntmd. Ana nftar al1 tliis iriñolcncc nnd vllpoiiring no 
operation took place. Tlie deputy dcclnritig 110 GmliamlR 
only desised a demunstration, ordered tlia truops COPTUS~OIUJ- 
to their forrner qumters, and mítliout assigning a '". 
r e w n  p f e  LtkPeña'~ division to Cartonjal. 
It was at this time air dohn Moore's Irtter reached Cahaos,  
bnt, no longer masBr uf his own operntionx, Iic coiild ill con- 
cert a plm oE campign with tlie general of a n o f h  rirmy; 
he could not even te11 what troops were to be nt bis nominal 
disposal; for the Estremaduran farce had bcen diroctod by the 
junta upn Burgos, ancl prt uf hia first anrl tliird divisiona 
detained in Mdrid. E8 enenilw, especially Montijo, were 
activo in spreading reports t o  bis disarlvantqe, the drriertm 
smttcrjng over the munt.ry eiaid al1 tlie generala were traitora; 
m d t c a ~ w  and tbs people excited by false m o u m ,  respected 
~c~~~ neither justice nor government, and committed 
the most scandaloua exwses. Nor was Blake's sitnation more 
prosperona 
From Dayonne to Vitoria the  raad was enmimbered with 
the advancing columns of the great French -y. An imperial 
decree, issued in Aeptember, liicarporated the troop a l d y  in 
Xpain with those coming from Orrmany. Tbe united forceri 
were to compose eight divisions, caUed ' Corps d'Am&' an 
institution analogous to the Roman legion; becltuse ewh corps, 
ndapted to act a9 s, component part of a lwge army, was dso 
provided with light cavalry, a parc, and train of artilley, 
engineers, sappers and miners, and a complete civil administra- 
tion to enable it t o take the field as an independent force. The 
imperhl pmds bad s constitution of tbeir own; and at thia 
time all the h e q  cavdry and mcwe artillery fomcd onc large 
mass. ha the troops arrived, they were Jisposed mnfombly 
to the following arganization :- 
MxishaT Victor, duke of Bellnno . . . Fimt Corpa 
MarshslBe~giEreg dukeofTstria . . . Gecond Corps. 
Mamhal Y oncey, duke of Curnegliano . Tbud Corps. 
bla-ahd Lefebre, dukeof D a n b i ~  . . . Faurth Corpg 
Mniahal Martier, duke uf Tren90 . . . WIth Corps. 
Mnrshd Ney, duke of Elehinpn . . . Sixth 
O a n d  SE Cyr . . . . . . . . . S m t h  Corpa 
G e n d  dunot, duke of A b n h  . . , Eghth Corps. 
Tbe seventh corpe wari entirely appropriated fa Catdonis; 
the other mrga were in the latter end of October assembled or 
ssembling ia Navame and Biscap. h e r a l  Merlin, holding 
Zornosa vith a division, obaeived Blake ; two divisions of the 
fourth mrps occupied Dnrango and the neighbourlng v i l l a p ;  
one dividon and the light cava1 ry af the h t  corps were nt 


Pitoria; a second division af the same oorps S. 
guaded thc bridge at bfurguia on the river hp, 
tlie Joat.nai kinfa of 
wmmanding thc entrance to the vnlley of Orduñri. 1,,,,,,, 
Rnro, Puente Larii, Miranda and Pnncorbo, were 3%. 
held by tlie kin$a body p a r a  and the seooud mrps, tlie liglit 
cav* of tEie htter covering the plains up to Briviesca; the 
reinforcements were crowding up to Yitarig but the Zring, . 
restrlcted by the emperor to a rigorous defence, left B U e  in 
qniet possession of Bilbao. The Iutter mistook this inactivity 
for timidity. He knew that reinforcementa in number qua l  
to his wholo army had joined tha enemy, yet with wonderful 
rachnas sesohed to nttempt the junction with Palafox in 
rear of the French position. 
Romana's infantry wora now approaching Bilbao, and tbe 
Estremadurans were in mmch for Rurgoa; biit the country 
was nmly exhausted of pmvisiona, both m i e s  felt tte 
scmcity, riesertion prevaild arnong tlia Spaniards, and the 
Biscayms, h i c e  abandoaed, were fearful of a, thd insurrec- 
tion. Prudmce dictated a retreat towarda Burgos, 
but Blake, posting b v e d o  with the Asturiana gpr(:$zL 
and tbe ~eeond division a€ Orduña, and a battalion 
rat MiraveIles to preaerve the oommnnieation with Bilbao, 
marched on the 24th with aeventeen thoueand fighting men 
to attack Zornosa His right ascended the vdley of Dumngo 
by Chlrlacano; Iiis centre by Laml~ezua; hia IeR by Rigoytiti. 
Acevedo penetrated fram Orduña t h g h  tlie morintsin~ of 
Gorbm, by Oxoco and Villam! with a aiew to adze Manara 
and St, Antonia d'lJrquitiola, deaigning to interpone between 
Xirandit del Ebro and D m g o ,  to intercept Ney'ei retreat and 
force him to surrender. Xlake imqjned he had only to deal 
mith tm corps, one andsr the king at Duranpo d Mont 
Dmgon, the other under Ney at  Mirtinda, whereas Ney w~ 
then beatiug Pignntelli nt Logroño. 
Jrílicn Elnkc approached Zornosa MerIin abandoned it for 
some heiglits in re=, nnd furtlicr opcmtiona were atopped by 
bad wentlter md want of provisions until tlie wening of the 
2Bth, when the division at Rigoytia rittempted to tum tbe 
hglit flank of tlie French, and at the uamc time Blake marchd 
+et the centre and left, wherevpon M d i n  fe11 back t o  
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S, Durango. The dulce of Dantzic, darrned by 
Journal thege movements, cciacentrated Seba~tiani's and 
the kings 
opersricins. Laval's divisions and a Dutcli brjgade of infmtry 
HS. at Durango; his tliird division waa not come ep, 
but the kiig reihrced himwith Villatte% divkion of the 6rst 
corps, and ordered the men of Aferlin's force, wliich m com- 
posed of d~hclirnents, to join thcir respective xegiment~. 
At daybreak the 31st, tlie Spanirarcls presented a chequered 
Ibid.  order of b t t l e  across the Durnngo road, f i o  
miles beyond Zornosa and close t o  the French 
position, The duke of Dantzie, apprised by tlie previous 
xuovemenh that he was ping  to be attecked, beame impatient; 
and thvugh a dark atmosplierc liid tlie Sprinisli order of m m h  
and force, he, bnowing t h ~ t  fifty thousrand men might be united, 
concluded they \vere Iicfore him, miri resol~eti to anticipate 
the íattack. Io truth, the Spanisli generals knew so little of 
war, tliat before tlieir incapacity wras uiiderstood, their m r s ,  
too gross for bdief, contributed to tbeir sefety. Elake had 
commenced thia great movement, intending to beat the troops 
in liis front and capture Ney's corps of sixteen tliousand men; 
yet in six days, althoiigli unopposed, he odvanccd les8 than 
fifteen mile~i, and with tliirty-six thousand m m  
CaerOI's he only preaentcd scvcntccn thoiisand aithoüt 
tespondmice. 
nrtillcry, to an ndvcnnry w3io wns now dcscending 
tlie mourittin ~vitl i  twcnty-fin? ttliousnnd of all arma. 
A thiclr fog co~ered tlie mount xin and filled the valley, md 
onlp a fcw random sliots indicated Bie presencc of hostilo 
armiea, when sudilcnly 'ViHatte's division, cominp cIose to tho  
Spnniah vranguartl, witli a brisk onscf f o r e d  it  brtclr iipon tho 
thirtl dit-iaiun , Scliustiuni'8 nntI Lnvnl's followcd jn succession; 
o fire of nrtitlery, to wliicli Rlal<o codd 1n:ike no reply, opened 
nlong tlia rmd, tlie dny deared, antl tlio 8p1inish nrmy, hcnped 
in c~infused mnsses, wns, notwithstnnrling the perconal cournge 
of Blake and tlie natuml stren$h of tlie country, driven from 
one position to anbnotlicr. At niitl-dny it wm 11eyonrI Zornosq 
and at ithree o'clock in full flight for Bilbao, w h e  it a r r i ~ d  
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in grePrt confusioa during tlie night. Twelm 8. 
vessds laden with Eql ish  storea in the river ~ c ~ ~ Y ,  
escape& and the next day Blake cressing tho ws. 
Salcedon took a position nt Nravs, L c f c h  pur- ~ ~ ~ r l ~ ~ ,  
sncd ns far as Gucñe~, and thcn Ica\,ing seven 
thousiind mcn undor Villattc to obscrve the Spmiartls, 
returned to Biflim). 
Joseph, displemed with ttis precipilnte attrtck, orderd e 
division of tho [ i d  corps, sstaioned at Murpia, to descciid 
tlie valley of Orduñn as fw m Amurio; at the snme time 
Xouton's division was dehchad from tlie socond corps tomrds 
Earbareiía, from whence it was, according ta circumstances, 
either t o  join tlie troops in tlie valley of  Orrluña, or to watch 
Medina and Quincocs and prcss Blnlie if Eie retired by Villar- 
cnyo. Tlio Frcncli knciv nothing of Aecvcdo's listrtrilins, w l o  
were nt Irilliiro during the nction, nntl wcrc nom strivirig to 
mjoin Blnke by Valuuteetli~; tliey reaclied Jlirtivalles tlie Srd, 
just as tlie French coming from 3lurpia appemerl, ancl tbe 
- latter thinking it wac Blnlrek amy retired to Orduñat. Are- 
vedo tben pushcd for the SaIce(lon, but llillatte getting notice 
of hia march, postd  his troops at Orantia on the road lcading 
from Mirnvelles t o  Nava, tind on the road to  Vnlmaccda, tlius 
intcrcepting tlie line of retreat. Blakke hearing 
of Accvcdo'a danger, promptly rcpmscrl tFie brirlgc Journal or 
of Nave in tlie niglit, rneaniiig tu clmr tlint :/im~mga 
rnwl ; nn(l tht: Frcncli nwnrt: of I i i ~  mnrcli tlireiv Cwtain 
a f m e  iiito tlie GorrFujuelti deiile to cover Bilbao '""O'. 
nnd rejoinccl Villatte on the Valmaceda r o d .  Kve Gnllicinn 
divisions, rcinhrced by some of nomana's troopq were now 
at Orantia. Elake left two in reseme, detached one ngninst 
the GorrIujiieln defile, and drove TTillatte across the Sa ldon;  
thc action mri5 renewed on the left bank, liut just tlien 
Acevcdo nlipenrcd, rsnd scnding two bnttnlions to gain thc 
Frcnch rcnr joinctl in the fight. Villntte Iirolto througli tliose 
battalions anrl reuclied Gueíies, yeh witli losa of mcn, one gun, 
u d  part of l i s  hggnge. Tliis terminated tlie ~peratious. 
[NOY. isoa 
1". Mamhal hfebre's hasty attack at Durango, fmnded on 
false data, mas inconsistent with the general plan of campnign, 
ill-coiniid, and feelily followcd up. It 1 s  a friult t o  leavo 
Villatte without support cloae to  tin army whicli wns five 
timm bis ~itrcngth. Tl~e Miirgruia rlivision was too easily 
checkd at MimvnUcs, and for fivc d a y ~  Accvedo \viindcrcrl 
with ciglit thonwnd men unmolevtcd in tlio midst of the 
Frencli columns, and findfy eacapd without rany sxtraordinary 
effurt . 
3'. From tlie 24th Octübcr t o  tlic 4th Novcmber Rlake 
onlittctl no c m r  posGl11o to commit, witli oxccption of bis 
niglit ~narcfi iiCrQ89 tlie lirirlge af Nnvti, 1ln11 then as if asl~nmerl 
of tliat judicious movement ha did not profit by it. When 
part of R o m a ' s  infiintry ]Id urrived and the remainder were 
in the vicinity of XamI tlie wliole Spanish army wras, contrq 
to al1 reasoaable expectation, concentrated to the numher of 
thirty thousand fighting men, harassed, but not much di- 
murqed; nnd tlie conde de Be1vede1-l: was, witth twelve thou- 
sand infantry twelrc Iiundred caviilrg and thirty piem o€ 
artillery close to B q o s .  IE Blake liad understood war he 
would, nfter defeating IriDatte, bave marched by Espinosa a d  
Villarcayo to tlie upper Ebro; Erom thence he could have 
gained Bnrgos, brouglit up liis artillcry from Reposa, d 
uniting Belvedere's troops to his o w q  have opcnd a com- 
rnunicution with the English amy. In that position, having 
a plentiful coiintry Iicliind him, Iiis retreat opcn, and hing 
welI provided witii Lome, he mig1:t linl-c commenced n regulnr 
system of wurfme; but with iiicredib1e abstinncy nntl want of 
judbment, he now determinerl to attnck Billiao ngain, and 
renew tlie rificulous attempt to aurround tlie Frencli m y  md 
unite with Pdafox at t l i ~  foot of the Pyrenws. 
Sucb were the comrnanders, the armies, tlie rnlers, upon 
wliose exertions the Briti~li csbiiet rel id for the securirity of 
sir John Mooie'a troogs during tLeir double inarch from Lisboa 
md Comña ! It m in suclr a shte of &ira that the Eng- 
lish ministcrs, snticipating the speeily destniction of tlie 
Frcnch in Spuin, were sounding tlie trumpct for m in~asion 
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mnce! Of F ~ ~ c o ,  defended by a milIion cif ~ v e t e ~  
Elddiem a d  govcrned by the migliticst genins of L ~ w ,  
t ~ o  thousant1 yews! AB if tlic ~ a s t  military t i n c v ~  CW- 
Wxl>ondenc& power of tliat warlike natian had surlrlenly bccome A ppndix.  
extinct, AB if BilyIca were a aecoud Zama ~ n d  XO. 13% § 8- 
Hanniha1 flyiv to Adrumetuni & t ~ d  of prisaing the Berus 1 
j3ut NapoIeon, vith RI axecution more rapid than other menqs 
thoughh, alrctrdy at Vitoria, and his liov~ring mglm 
g gloomy sliadow ovcr Spoin. 
PENTNSULA WAR 
BQOR TITE FOURTH. 
CHAPTER 1. 
N,mo~~on  rcached ~ I B O R ~ ~  the 3rd of Nuvember. He wished 
to augrnent tlie Bpaniards' prcresumlition by a strict defensive 
systern, nntil he could strilie with dl liis force; lience the 
attack at Z o m s a  dispieacetl liim ; nor mas he satiitisfed with the 
S. subsequent operat ions, tliinking hIoutonls division 
aToumal Of entlrangered between Elnlce and Belvedere. To tlic Ling's 
O p c r u t i u ~ ~ ,  olivinte tliis, he directed &ssicrw npon Biirgos, 
11s. Yictor by Amurio on 'C'slrnnceda, nnd ordcrod 
Lefebre to renew his attaek on tiie sirle of Bilbao, Thus 
while B l ~ k e  ans Imding liis btarassed shrving troops back 
t o  Bilbao, fifty thousand French wcrc in fulI mnrch to mact 
him, wvliile XcssiSres had alrcady tuncd  Ms right flnnk and 
was on bia rcar. 
Cnptain Cnrc 'I'liinking only fiftccn Iiundred mcn were in 
m1.s corre- (Tumies, Rluke ori tlie 7th liad ilirectwl two divi- 
@ponden*. 
~ i o l u  by t he  roads of Abellnnn nnd fhpoerte to 
gain tlie bridjie oi Sodrrlx, in rear of Guciies, wllile two 0 t h  
divisions atttaclred in front; tlie rernainder of tlie army fol- 
l o w ~ l ;  Gut tlie wliole admnced p a r d  of tlie 4th Frencli corps 
was in Gueñes, annd the Spaniarcls, ~ A c r  an action of two Iiours, 
were only savecl by niglit from a tot;il rout. SIie same d g  one 
of tlteir AmIcing divisions was heaten uear ZSopoertc, md the 
General otlier, intermpted on tlie side of Aliellanq i ~ a s  
h i t l i g a  COF forced t o  rntike for llortagalcte on tlie aeiirccast, 
resporidence. and from thenca to St. Andero- Blnke was DOW 
alarmed and rpsolved to retire upon Espinosa de los Montera, 
a rnountain position two mrclies distnnt, wliere he desiped b 
rest his troops nnd dniw supplics from his magazines at 
Sdynosa FaIling bnck to  V a l d a  in the ni$t bs p ined  
EYpinosa the 9th, and as the last of R.omana'~ troopa joiiied 
~iirñ oo tiie rnarch, his ivhole army, the men mt off nt Abcllann 
exoepted, was concentrntcil ñ t  tlie intersection of tlie raads 
Gam 8t. Andcro, VilInrcnyo, nnd R e p o w ~  
Bapolcon, nccompun icd by h i l  t nn 11 Lnsnes, quittcd Bnyonne 
tlie morning of tlic 8th and reacbed Vituria in tho eveiiing. 
He wm met by tlie civil nnd mili* chiefs at tlie antes of tlia 
town, but refusing tlieir reception, jumped off his liorse, 
entercd tlie first small inn lie sam, callclled for hia maps, aud 
proceecled to amnge tlie plan of ampaiga  
The 6rst and fourth corps had rnet rtt VaImaceda bnt 
separated agaiin a-t Neaw on tLe Ith, Tictor was thereforr? pur- 
suing ths  track of Blakc, and Lefebre >vas marching upon 
Villnrcnyo by Modinn. Tlio ñccond corps was concentrntinp 
at Briviesce Tlia thircl corps oocupirii Tafrtlln, Pcrnlteri, 
Caposo, nntl ErrtelL. Tlie sixtli curp, tlie guarda, nnd the 
reserve, wsro distributed fmm Vitoria to Miraiida de2 Ebru, 
La Grange'e clivision ms at Guardia, connectivg tho poaitions 
of the third m d  sixth corps. The fifth wrps was still beliind 
the frontier. The eiglith, composed o€ tlie troops removed 
from Portugal by the convention of Cintrn, mas marching from 
the French set~ports wliere it had disemliarkett. On tlie 
811ani8h side, ~ i ~ v e d e r e  was nt Burgos, and CastaiZos nnd 
h l ~ f o x  were ~ti l l  plsiining to out off the French amy; Blalre 
m fying to 32spinosa, and thc Rngliali nrmy wna scnttered 
from Comño te Tdnvern dc In Rcyria. Dn tlicsc fnctc, tho 
omperor in two hours arrrlnged hia iilnus. 
M o n q  mas t o  leave a division nmr Pampduna, in ol~serva- 
tion ol the Spaniards on tlie Aragon, to concentrate tlie re- 
mainder of the third corps at Lodosa aiid rernaia on the 
defensi~e nntil fnrthec orders. La G1anarrc, reinforced hy 
Colbert's light cavalry from the ~ k t h  mrps, waa directed upon 
Logdio. The first and fourth corps wcre to precs Blake 
ivitliout intcmisaion The aixth to march towarrIs Arando 
(le Dncro, Sault wibs t o  tnlcc comrnnnil oC tlio 8e 
2nd e o r p  nnd fa11 Iiesrllong upon Belvetlere, and Bfaraiial 
Sni i l t '~ Jonp tIie emperor followed tliis mor~ment with the im- ,i ,fo, 
periril gunrtis and the reserve. tiuus. 
These instructions bcing iscned the enomous mags waa pnt 
in mutioa mtli ta eelerity thst marked the vigour oF Napoleon'~ 
cornmanil. Soult, depnrting on thc in~tant for B r i v i ~ ,  
arrived nt dny-break on tlte 9th, received tlie sewnd cap 
from Ressiha, and Ln a few Iiours was in full mercli for the  
tcmce of Monaeterio wliich ov~rloolíñ tFie plaina of Burgos; 
he remnind tliere during tlie niglit, liut scnt Fmceschi's liglit 
cavnlry by Znldueño to Arlmzon, ivith orders to cross tlie 
rirer of tlint ntinie, cTeseenrl tlie left lianlr, cut tlie communica- 
tiun witli Mwlrid, and prevent tlie Spauiarkq mllying at the 
convcnt of tlic Gllsrtreuse, if defeated nenr Burgos. 
At four o'clock on tlie rnornhg of the 10th, 6oult mas apin 
in m& fmm Monasterio, nnrI at siir o'clock h s d l e ' ~  crtvaLg 
reached Villa Fria. Belvedere wae at Gamonal, and with 
fonr thousand infantry eight gunn and tbs whole of hii 
c a d r y  fell upon Lnss~lle; the latter follodng his ordm 
retired slomly to Rio Bena; but at eight o'clock the h c h  
infantq, which bad advanced by two roads, was reunited n t  
this town and immediately pushed forward on Villa Fria: 
Belvedere wm thna dxlven baclr npon Gamonal, and bis army 
WM discovered in line of battle, Tbe right was in a w ~ r l ,  
leaving a apace anoccupied between it nnd the river Arlanzon ; 
thc lcft in the wdled park of  Vellimer, Thirt;y pieces of 
artillcry covered the front, and %ven or eiglit thonsand amed 
pqants  w m  on the heighh behind thc regular troop ; tbe 
lntter, more thnn eleven tliouannd infrtntry an(nd eleven hundred 
camlry, wwcra tlic bcst troops thcn in sPain, cornpriring the 
Walloon and Spanisli guilrtls, the r e s rnen t~  of 3 l a y o q  Zafm, 
nnd Valencia de Alcantara, the hufisars of Talentia, the roya1 
carbineers, and some volunteers of gmd familieri. Tliey were 
eompletely eqnipped and armed, prrncipally from 
S. 
J-.I op Englisl~ dores, yet tbeir resiiistance was even more 
O~+mümb feeble than that m d e  by the lialf.farnished peasants 
1 5 .  
of I3lake's fome. 
hssalle, lediog down h r n  the French leít, fiIled the plain 
htween the river and the wood, and the 8panish artillerp 
hmediately opcned dong the whole h e ;  bnt Hoi~tan's 
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infnntry, al1 old ~oldiers, broke into tha wood tco mpidly, t h t  
Bonnett'a division, though followlng closdy, had not time to 
fire R shot before the Spauish right fled in disorder j their left 
followed this exampIe witliout being attackerl, aad the whole 
mass, victors and vanquished, rushed into Burgos with 
tumuItuous vidence. BessiPires, who retained the commnnd 
of the henv~r cnvnlr~r, now p n a d  nt full gollop tow~irrls tlie 
Madrid rond aliere it crosses the: Arlnnzon, ~tlbring the €u$- 
tives and taking the guns wKch :liad escnpd Mouton, wbile, 
on the other side of the river, Francesclii was seen to cut in 
pieces some Catalonian light troops stationed tbere, and thus 
liarred sI1 bopes of flig.ht. Never was defeat more instanb 
neous. Two thousand five hundied Spaniads were said to 
be Billetl; tmnty gnns, thirty mmunition wragpnfl, s k  pair 
ofcoloum, and nina hnndred mcn w m  taken on the field; 
four tliousand muskets were fotind nnbroken, nnd thc fugitivcs 
dispersed. Belvedere rettched Lcrma in flight, wliere meeting 
some volunteer battalious coming to join liia army, he marclied 
them in the niglit to  Aranda de Duero, but first 
wrotc a despatch, sayng thc French, repulsed 
in two cleapemte aetacke, h d  &r tliirteen h o d  
hard fighting succeded. 
Al1 the Spanish storw were captured in Biirgoa, and Sodt, 
dill riding the post. horse he htrd taken at Britiwm, puraucd 
hia victory. He h d  come fram hyonne gained B decisive 
buttlc und takcn Rurgos within fifty houn; un11 now witliout a 
hnlt sent one coliimn towarrds Lerma, anotlicr towards Palencia, 
and marched with a tKrd upon I leposg  where Iie cami.ai a p -  
hoped to intercept Wnke. Thnt generaI, as we bave mpn"l'"- 
seen, reaclied Espiuoaa the 9th witli aix divisiora snd six guiis ; 
his nrtillerp parc guarded by two thousand infsntry wns eti1l 
at Apilar del Campo behind Reposa, and desertion and 
lomes had retluced his force below twenty-five t h o u s d .  Ais 
position was strong. His left composed of Asturians arid his 
uwn fimt (IiYision occrrpied heigbta covering tiic Santanricr 
d; his centre: composerl of a division and tIie rescwe wm 
formed armm the &posa xood which led througli Espinnsra 
directly in his rear. One divi~ion occapied n commanding 
heig1)t a Tittle to the right oT Espinosa, ancl Romana's troups 
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mere in a wood two miles in advance: Iiis pns and onr 
division wem io resen-e lidiind tlie centre. In 
G"pPCO" thig posikion he thouglit to  rest a few dap, but 
respuirdcncc. 
tha 10th Victor carne up and commencd 
At tmo dclock a Frcnch coIumn dmvc baelr Romtina'a 
tmops and scixcrl the wood; tllcy ncrc reinftrrced frem the 
centre nnd renewcd the figlit, but n sccond Frcnch column 
tlien nttacked the centre thus wcalrencd, and some Eght 
troops nscending thc hcigbt on fbe Spnnish left m c n n d  thiit 
f l d i .  On tlie right thc mntcst wns vigorous; the Spaninrda 
nupportcd by the frrc of thcir six giins hnd cvcn gaincd 
gr~rriund whcn niglit pub an cnd to tlic combnt, lcnvjng thc 
Frciidi in posscbsion of tlic woud n~id n ridge papitllel ts, and 
linlf cnnnon shot, from Rlnlcds ccntrc. TEic Spunigh gcnmls 
8nn Romnrt nntl RirliiirlmF wcre niortnlly ~~poi~ndtrl. 
Viotnr rdieved liis left witli fr~slili tronps in tlie niglih nnd 
o t  dnylight general 3ftiison thmlving a crowd oE ~kirinislien 
upon tiie Spnni~h centre and left attackeil tlie hturians. 
Dlake dehlied a wlumn oE greiiaxliers t o  tlieir aid, and in 
person souflt with tliree refimenta t o  tnke blaison in fiank; 
he WAS e00 Tnte; tliree h~turinn general8 fe11 at tthe first fire, 
tlieir troops fld, anrl were followcd by Bliilre's first division 
wliich was next tliern. Maison colitinuing his movement 
interceptd the Banfander and Espinosa ronds. Neantirnt, 
tlic Prench posted on tlie paralle1 ndgs had fallen on the 
Spmish centre, those in the wood also dvanced, rind Blake's 
wliole army gave ivny in tcrriblc eonfusion. Growding heavily 
towads tlie river Truebn, which mept with a bend round the 
mr, tlie mea endcnvourccl ta csmpe, some by the fords, 
mme Iiy tlie towa, mme by tlie hills on t hc  right; but the 
weittlicr ww bad, tFio rond steep, tlic ovcrtlirow fatal: thwe 
wliom tlie mortl missed, clispcrsed ta cnrry dismny into tha 
remotest pports of Gnllicia, L o n ,  Cnstillc, nrirl tlie ARturios. 
B71~lie reac!ied Reynosa Uie 13t.11, lmt could only rullg sevea 
tltotiñanrl frigitivcs, withoiit artillery, witllouc arms, without 
gpirit, acd witliout Iiope. 
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It lias been aaid, Romana's solrliers died Spahn-Iike, to a 
man, in their m k a ;  yet in 1812, captrtin Hill of the royd 
nravy, bejng at  Cronstadt to receive Spnniards taken by the 
Russians diiring Nnpolcon's retrcnt, found the venter porkion 
werc Itarnrtnn'~ meri cqitured tit Espinosa: tlicy hatl ~ e w e d  
Napoleon for four yeiim, pnñierl tlie unleel of tIie Moscow 
retreat, and wera still abovo four ttousmd strolig! 
A retreat to Apilar del Campo, where ths artillery 
remained, being stili open to Blnke, he tliougl~t to rcoganize 
his troops at Bynoea znd retire upon Bnird's 'mops, the 
Iiead of which was theo near dstorga. His ignorance n g a i ~  
rnisled him. He loolccd only to the side of Espinosa for 
memiw, and nFrcatly SouIt'g mvnlry m s  upon his 
s. 
'ine of retrent,, nud kfcbre'n 1 v n ~  arlmncing on s o u m a i ~  
Reposa by Villarcnyo. On tho 13th lia sus 1 f ~ t i o n a .  
sssailed by SwuIt's vnnprird, and bsing now utterly 
confounded, fled with five thoucand men througii the valley oot 
Caburniegs to Amedo, i i l  tiie lieart of the Asturian mountains. 
Lefebre lialtcd a few daya, and then took tlie road to Valla- 
dolid. Soult acised bntandcr, crtpt~red tlie Rnglísh si ip 
plia tliere, and sprcniling liis coIuinns omr tlir: Moritefin, 
filled al1 pliices witli alarin. Ercrytliing rnilitaiy being thua 
lri~en over &he snawy barrier of the Asturian billa, a Freuch 
letachment occupied San Tincente da l3itrqueira. 
kult  toolc t1ic town of Potes, scoured tlie h n k a  niid. 
~f tbe Deba, and overnin Leon wit.h his cavalry as far a4 
U a p n  and Saldanha. %ctor quitting Espinosa, joined tbe 
emperor who nt  Burgos, 
Tlicm battles of Eqiinosn and Gamonal nnd tl~c subsquent 
operntions 1nid tlie nortli of Slliain prostmte; thc oonxt from 
St. Sdmtinn to the frontier cif thc Asti ir jr i~ wns won, nnri 
soon smnll gairisons and inoveable columns fcttered tlie pro- 
h c e a  of Guipuscoa, Navaw, Discay, the Montafía md tlie 
Baston de L a d o ,  and protectotl the communication with 
France; the widc plains of Old Cnstille and Leon were thus 
thrown open to t l ~ a  Brench, nnd forbidden to  tlie sepnratd 
diviaions o€ tlic Britkh amy. Thesc great ridvantages, tliu 
result of Nnpolcon's ~rh i rnb l e  oomhinntions, obtninerl RO 
easily yet 80 decisiw of tlrs ftike of tlie cumpaign, exposeJ. 
vol,. 1. S 
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the foolisli syrrtcm of the Spanish nnd Eritiah govcrnmcntq if 
that can bo calied a systcm wherc no onc gencrnl knew what 
anotlier hnd done, was doing, or intcndcri to do. 
Burgos, instcntl of Yitoria, Tvas now bccomc the pi~ot 
of Frencli opcmtions, nnrl tlie einpcror prcpnrctl t a  chnnge bis 
front nnd bcnr doum witli similnr irnpctiiosity ngninst Ciis- 
M~us niid Pr~lnfux; but it w m  n c c e s n q  first to ascerhin ha 
exlid situntiriri o€ tlie Rriti~Ei farce. Nnpcilcuii believed it to 
be coiiccntriitcrl ~t Vdladol id, niid tletaclicd tliree divisions of 
caviilry witli twenty-four pieces uf twtillery by Lertne and 
Puleiicia, ti) cross tlie Duero, turn tlic fln~ik of tEie Englisli, 
tlireaten tlieir comrnunimtioiis with Port~igal, md force tliem 
to retire. I t  wns horvcver soon discovered tliat the heads of 
tlieir columna not pcnetraratotl bcyoiid 8alamanctb and 
Aslorgq and that many daya must e l a p  ere they could mt 
offensively. Tlien the emperor let lovsc his three divisions of 
mnlry, and eiglit thousand liorsemen swept ovcr the plains 
of h n  and Castille; the captain-general Pignatclli, shame- 
fully fi ed, al1 tlie autliorities slinink fiiom the tempest, the 
people dispIayed no ent21usiasm, were disconcerkd by tlie 
mpid movements of the Frencli, and spread a thousand con- 
fused and contradictory reports. l'hese inc~irsiona extended 
to the neighbourhood of  Astorga, to Benevente, Zamom, TOM, 
$ir .Tohn Todesilla, and evento the viaiiity of Salamanca; 
~ o m c ' e  thirhy drngoong ware su$iciant to raiw contribu- 
~'RYL'IB. tiona at the gates of tlie largcst bwns  before the 
wcrthrow of Espinom was knou-n; aftcr thd, ten tniopers 
wuld safcly trnvcrse the country in nny direction. 
Napuleon" frront being non- cliangcd, Soi~lt, hiiherto lead- 
ing tlie iattads, \rraa left in ohscrviition to cover tlie riglit fln~ik 
ancl protect Burgos. 'Cictor'~ troepa tlic guriril~ nnd pnrt of the 
reserve were at Burgos. Ney ivaa at Arantla de Dueru; he had 
rnarcld from tIie Ebro t o  intercept tlie Estremridurana on the 
side of Nadrid, tlieir ktruction at Gamoiial r~udered t b  
unnecerissry, yct Le w s  equally wdl placeil to cut &S?$@ 
off from tlie capital. Lagp~ige :ri at LogroEo, Nonoey witb 
tliree divisions of infmtq and one of cavairy at Lodosa, and 
thus Castaños was turned, menaced, and excked from Jfadid 
before he was aware that the crimpaign had commenoed 
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folly of tlie dcputy h d  increased rather than abated. The 
h n k s  of Francisco Palafox and tlicir ridiculous tcrrninntioii 
havc bccn nlrmdy rclrttcd; ~chcmcs cqunlly nhsunl and more 
dnngcrom werc ailopicd ns tlie m i s i s  approached, anil thifi time 
Castaños took tho Icatl. He knew upon tlie 10tli tliat Refve- 
dere was at Uurgos nnci tlic Frcnclm rnnrcliirig oii tliat hivn j 
mRf,* from tlmt rnoment, tlt-s~iiriring ol tlie junction of 
V l ~ l d i " a ~ ~  thc R~itish arrriy, a ~ d  lilreivise of liis o m  h t  
anrl tliird divisions wliicli liar1 Iieen lsft in Mailrid, he scnt 
odem to Bdvdere to uuite liinisell ~ v i t l i  Blrike, lmt tlie ootint 
TW defcated tieforc they were wriltrn. Cnsti~fios then feeling 
his dqerous position, conccivcd a p l ~ i  ilifficult to crsdit npon 
any authority but Lis owri. He prrq~uned to cuny his amy, 
rerluced in iiumhw anrl ill-discipli~ierl, liy tlie Condia tle 
Ilare and Soria townds Burgm to fnlF i i l ion tlie emperork 
rmr guard; and as a prcliminary s t g  h beat tlie nrmy in his 
Eront ; but Palxfux liad also s ~ ~ l n n  for attacking Moncey on 
tlie side of Xanpessa, wnd the fir~b tliing wus to coinbine t h ~ e  
doubIe opertttions. It %-as afirecd tlierefore tlirtt Caparosa 
should bo garrisoned by four thousa~d infantry, the bridge 
b e d  at that place fortified, and O'Neil reinforced 
Coloncl 
Gpaiismb at ganguessa by ipetdiments from the centre up 
"Omspm" to nineteen thousand il~hiitry ailr? twelve huntlred 
en&, 31 SS. 
cavalry. He was tlien ta break tlie bridge, place 
parda  ah the passRges on thc Aragon, come down to Capamri, 
crosa ths river and threaten Peraltea anrl Olite o& the 17th; 
but ou the 18th, he was to turn sudrlenl y to  the lcft ami get 
in rear of  lo dos^, while La-I'eñn nnd Coupigny, marclibg Em 
Ccntruenigo, sliould attnck hfoncey in front. 
This movcmcnt mns openly tnlkcd of a* the Iicad-qnarterq 
for several rlnjs bcfore its execution; nnd these cxtraordiruiy 
co1nmnntlcr~, ignorant of Xlrilrc'a dim&crs, announeorl theii 
intcntion of aftcm*nnls mnreliing tomnrds Vitorix ta  l i g h h  
the prcssure on tliut officcr, if hc sliould be in dificulty; if 
succcssf~l, ns his desptchcs of the Mli assured them, to job 
in Q geiicrid liumiiit. CnstaEos lioivc\-cr concciilcd liis project 
of nioviiig hy tlie Condin rle Wirra to~vnrrls Burgos. Boats to , 
lay a bridge ovcr tlic El~ro nt Alfnrti couirl not be olitained, 
, 
aiid O'Heil's reiiiforc~.iiients liad to move by Tudeln nnd lost 
three or four days; however, on the 14th O'NeiI amived at 
bparosa dter breaking the bridge of S a n p s a ,  and on the 
16th the reinforcements joined him. Tlis lSth, Captaños 
kncw af bis o\m Jismissnl, yct pcrserered in lija projcct. L a  
Peñn and Coupigny were put in rnoticin t.o pnse tlie liririges of 
Logrwñe antl Lorlosn nnd the fords lietween them; liut Q'Neil 
firsj mfused t o  stir without nn order from Joseph c~~~~~~~ 
Paiafox wlio wota Zaragoza, and then changing V i l ~ J 1 ~ t j 0 n .  
hia plea complained tbat he wns without breatl. Castaíios 
besought lilm to move upon the 18th, q i n g  the danger of 
delay; b ~ i t  the deputy Palafox, who had hitherto appruved of 
the projcet, middenly went to Capnrosn, and in concert with 
Q'Neil dcmnndd s fnrtlicr reinforccmcnt of six thousand 
infiintry and morc cnvnlry frorn thc central nrmy, witliouh 
wIlich, they ailinned, it u~ould be dunprous tci pttsu tlie Amgon, 
Castafios invited t l ~ e  deputy to return to the right bank of the 
Ebro, md opposed tlie demand for inore troops; but now 
Joseph Palafox, agreeing with neither side, proposed a new 
plan, and it js difficult to say Iiom long these strange disputes 
would have continued if nn urnpire had not interpoaed, ivl~ose 
awmd wnri too strenglp cnforccrl to bo disregnrded. 
C~stniios wns pmscnt witli tlie divisiunv of Coupigny nnd 
XRcPeí í~ ,  at thc towm o€ Crilaliorrn ou tlie 19th, wlien he 
first receivd iiiformntioa tlmt a h n c l i  corps w s  aclvancing 
upon LOgrofh. Tbis mas Lmnes, witli. Zwan~e's and Col- 
hert'a troops, yet the Xpaniard ooncluded it to he Key, for 
he wm ignorant of the changes lvhich had taken pIace since 
the 8th of the month. It was lilrewise reported, tliat &Ioncey, 
whose force he estimated nt faelve thousnnd when it \w 
really abovc tmcnty thoiisand, had conccntraM 3 Lodosa; 
nnrl tho bidiop o€ Osmn, announccd that Dcmolles ivns mtlrcliing 
from tilo sido of Aranrla de Duero with twclve 
Cnmtnños' 
thonsand mea On tlia 2 lst, it wm Lnom Des- 
 AL*,,,,,^ ,f 
soIles hscl p s e d  Almaxan, and Muncey's moi7e- tl'e MRt"e 
of 'i'wieln. 
mcnt was confirmed. Castaños then reliiquisliing 
his offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it >vas full time; 
for Key, who left Aranda on tlie IDth, bad passed Alrnaxan 
on the 20tb, dispersed several srnnlI bmdg of insurgents rand 
entered h r i a  on the Z l d ;  hcticc when Cnstaños detemined 
t o  fa11 baclr, hia flank was alrmdy turned and his retreat upon 
hldrid in tlie enemy's pomer. 1n the night of tbe 
Castaños' 
oficitil 21st he retired to some heights extendiug fiom 
mC0untof Tudda t o  Cnscante and Taranzontr, leaving bu 
tlie Ilnttle 
of +rutici*. artillery nt Centrueni~o, nnd a larm detachmmt 
witli 0 ' ~ e i l .  Xcxt niirninE h s n &  was descried 
in march upon Calahom, and at tbis t ime tlie tirst mipplg of 
money the j u n h  liad get tmsmitted rertclied Tudela 
OTei l  rcfused to stir without Josepli Pdafox's order; bnt 
tlie Iatter mived at Sudcle, nnd ngrced mith Castaños to  dww 
tlie h g o n e s e  over the Ebro and occupy tlie Iieights abow 
the to\rn, while tlie rest of the troops extended on the left to 
Taranaonn. Ne\~crtliclcss, iii defiance af ordcrs, entreaties, 
and re~oniag,  USeil reniained in an olive-mod on tke 
right bank of thc rivr?r durilig tlie niglit of tlie 22nd, lea.&g 
tlie key of tlie position open to tlie cncmy. 
castañwg A council of wur Fieing lield, the discugsion was 
oficie1 
aocount nf 
turbulent. Pzlafox iuisted on tlie defence of 
tiie 1qatticnf A ~ ~ o I I ,  be wanted thc wholo army to ps the 
Ond Ebro m1 continc its operations to the protection his V i i i d i c ~  
tioii. of Zmgoza,-a proposal dcmonstrating liis inm- 
pacity. CastafEoa oppoaed tliis sbsurdity, jmportmt momenk 
pastssed in usclms dkputntion, rinrl the gencrals carne to no con- 
cliision. Losncs, bringing mitli liim Dlaiirice Mntliieu's divi- 
sion af thc ñixtli coqc,  just rirrivcd from Frnncc, liad m m -  
while conceritmtcd tliirty tlioiisrrnd infnntry, fotii w five 
thousanrl cnvnlry, nntl aixt y yieccs of nrtillcry, and, murching 
l y Alfuro, t~lipeatred at siglit o'clock i n  thc rnoning of tha 
1ilrtl ili friirit of Tuilcln, juxt ns tlic Arngoiicse werc passingtlie 
bridge to mcend tlie position. 
Forty-five thuusand Spaninrris werc in line, mith fiftp p n s ,  
They occupied an ernsy range of bills, rxtending from Tutlela 
by Cascnnte to Taramona, more tban ten miles. The Ara- 
gonese Leld tlie riglit, Cnstri5os occtipied Cascante witb one 
diviaion, Y'atwnzon witli three. No otlier divisiow wem 
betweeu Cascftnte and Tudela, and these m w e s  werc unconA 
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ncct~d, wlien Lwnes 11m.qtenerl t,o nttnclc. RlorloR division 
nss~ited tlie Iieighb of Tudela ; ~~i~ui-ioe Mi~tl~ieu, supported liy 
Lefebrs Desnouettes' mvalry, fcll oii tlie divisions betwcen the 
riglit and Gtascante, and tli& place was athclíed by Lagrauge. 
The Aragoncse piinhed Morlot bacIc Mtli vigonr; but Maurice 
Mathieu gaining an olive-woori and small ridge leading to the 
position on tlieir left, pierced thc line, ruid t1icn Lcfclire 
Firenlring in witb liia hornrnicn, wlieeletl oii tlis Spnnisli rigiit, 
put it to  fliglit., nnd followed t,lie ftigitives to tlie hridgp. uf 
Tudda. La-Pea  desceildin~ Smm Cnscnnt,e drove in La- 
pannc's cavalry; but d e n  encountered rit a cliarging pace 
by tlie i n f a n l  wns beaten et-en t o  Tararnon% wliere tliree 
divisions rernained passiw during tlie battle. Pdaiox had 
the right md two divisiona of the centre to thnt &y, sixty 
miles, with SUCIL u p d  t,lmt Borne fii$tives h ~ e d  tbere the 
anmo cvcning. 
W h n  La-Peña remhed Tarmsnno tlie Spnnisli Ieft com- 
menced nn orrlerly retreat towards Bnrjm; hit soma of Nefs 
ca\*alry comhg from the side of Soria put it in disorder, a 
magmiile expldcd, cries of tremon arose, tlie ccilumn dis- 
solved, and tlie road to Bnrja wns mowcled with a disorganized 
mob. Thus cnded the Iiattle of Tiidcla, in wliich forty-fiva 
thousantl men were dispersed by an attack neitlier very 
vigoroiis nor wcll nishincd, and thcrcfom demen~trating thc 
utkr incnpncity of Rpnnisli ge~icrnls and tlie vcry ,mt, iinstendi- 
nms oí? tlíeir solilitm. Severnl tliciusnnrl p-iuoners ntid tliirty 
piec~s o€ nrtillery, ivitli al1 tlie nmmirnit,ion and bnggnge, 
rewnrded tlio rictors, nnd tlis loss of men waa 
ír,loventh 
aboat nine thousantl. Pifteen tliousand liowever ~ulIc.ir,+ 
sscaped to Zaragoza, and a detachment of two Victoires et Conqi ih.  
tbousand, under Carkoajd and LiIli in the moun- 
tain8 of Ndrlrn, werc iaolatcd, hence but tmo divisions, incrcaficd 
liy frtgitivw from thc others, mere ralIied the 23th at Calntayud 
sud tliey ~vereritnrving nnrl mut,inous. Tlierc Ctiot~ñoa rw~ivcd 
two rlwpntclies from tlie centrd junta, virtunlly restoring him 
to tlio mmmnnd, ior t.le fimt empoaarerl liim to unite tlie 
bragonese amy with I l i ~  own, nnd tlie second desired Iiirn to 
cooperate miti  Bt. Juan iii infrie Xomosierra to procect &e 
MPitd: the bnttle oF Tudclri liad disposcd of tllc fimt ddespat&, 
tlie sewnd induced hirn to mnrch by Siguenzn upon M~lrid 
Nnpoleon hntl bcfure tliis rcmllcd tlic p r c n h t  pnrt of bis 
cavalry Trom thc opcn coiintry of  Cmtille, plnced seven ar 
eight thousnnd mcn in Riirgoq nnd fiserl Iiis lientl-qu~rtera d 
drandn de Direro thc 23nJ. Intelliymce of thr 
S. j,,a victory at Tiidclu orily rcaclicrf Iiim tlie SFith, md 
operatima hc mns cxcccdingly díscontcntcd tlint Castafios 
MS. liad cscnpcd Ncy, who liad liccn ordcred to rwh 
Xorju thc 21st hntl rcmniii tlicrc iintil Lrtsne~ should hnve 
aieuenth bcatcn t h ~  Sp;pnninrils; tlicii by Agrcdi~ be 'WIU to 
Du1letin. interccpt tlie rctrcnt of  tlic latter. At dusk on 
thc 21st Jomini and D'Eamcnnrtl, officcrs of h'ey'g daff, 
errived with eighty cnvnlry zit Surira, tlic nncient Numantin 
Tliis town stniirling on it rmky hcight, with a fiubnrb below, 
wns ocwpierl by Cnrtoisjnl tl~eti csciqiing from the Nnlrla 
rnoirntriin~, nnd tlie mngiatrates wming to tlic siiliirrb t r ~ c l i m -  
ouviy invitaii tl ie Frenc,h up; liut tlieir ~IlspiL!i~ll~ Iieing cxritd 
tiie plan fLMIer1, Cartonjlj~l maricd iu tlie nigM nnd next dq 
the ~ixth COT nrriverl. 
Jomini urged Ney to continnt! Iiis march upon Calntapd 
without any red; Fut offcnded with the limt of his manner, 
or Borne other cause, Ney refuaed and linlted tFie 23rd and 84th, 
mcrely wncling out ligl~t rnvalry on tFie aide of Medina Celi 
and Agetia. The 25th he marclied, and tlie 26th, pa&ng 
through Cascante, crossed thc field of h t t le ;  tbe 27th he 
nmived aritli one division at Mallen between Tudela md 
Zaragoza, liis advanoed guard being at Arlmon on t l~e  Xalon: 
to the erroneous direction and dilatoq nnture of thae move- 
menta CastaEos owed tlie safety of tlie troops he had re-aisgem- 
bled ttt Calatayud. h'ey must have known of the battle the 
25th, yet Iie kept the road towartls Agreda wIien one mmch 
by Metlina Celi would have brought Km upon the line of re- 
treat from Catatayud, Some wnters have attributed this to 
bis jealousy of Laanes; otlim s y  the plunder o£ 8oria de- 
tained him. The fdsebood of tlle lntter chnrge i s  pgreat, 
Thcre wns a rcquiaition for some slioca ancl geat-mta; but no 
*ontribntion m cmctd, snd there was no pillap. ks to 
t h e  jealousy, a bcttcr cxplnnation mny be found in the peculiar 
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disposition of this extrmrdinnry mnn, mho WLIM careless ziid 
nnlcnrned in tlic sbstract sciencc of wnr, hnd secmcd apnthctic 
until sorno immincnt rlnrigcr nrouccd tlio rno.rvcllous encr-7 
anrI fortitude of Iiis natirre. 
Tudela fell short of NapoIeon'a expectntion, yet w6md to 
break tthe Xpanhh strength and lay oopen Aragon, Navarre, 
and New Castille, as tlie notthern pnrts had j e e n  by Espinosa 
From tlie froritiers of Fmnce to  thosc of I'ortugd, from the 
s e m t  t o  the Tagus, the country mns now ovcrwlielmed; 
JfdPid, ZnWozh nnd tlic Rritish nmy, liftcrl thrir hmds in- 
deed n littte wny n,Iqove tlie rising wnl~m, but tlie oyc looked 
in vain for an sfñcisnt barricr against the ffood ~vlviiich still 
poured on nitli unabated f q  The diyicled state of the 
British troops lec1 tlie emperor to conclade sir Julin Moore 
muld inatantly retire into Portugd, wlierefore he o d m d  
h n m  t o  puwue I'dafox-to ~ e i z e  the imyorhnt position o€ 
Nontc Torrcro-to summon Znragox~, md oifer a comp1et.e 
mncsty to al1 persons jri tlic hwn,  mithoiit rwcrvntion, tlius 
bearing testimony to tlia gitllnntry of tIie first defence. Ris 
o w  nttention wus fixed on Ndrid. Tliat capitnl wos the 
raliying point of the brokcn Bpznish ihnd his o m  pursuing 
divisions, tlie centre of al1 interes ts, a height from whence a 
beneficia1 stream of plibical benefih miglit descenrI to alIay, 
w a clri~ing storrn of war rour clown to extinguish tlie Ere of 
insurrection. 
ON thc 21st, French patrolcs fient t o ~ a r d s  the Sornosierra 
ascertained tliat six tliousaiid men werc entrencliing tliem- 
selv~r; in ths gorge oof tliat dcfile; tIiat tlie camp at Sepulveda 
blockerl tlic roads Icntling ripon Regovia; ~ n d  fliat Beredi 
waq pre~iaring to securc tlie pacsea of the Guadarama. 
Napoleon, rcuol~iig to forre tlie Somosicrra md reach the 
capital bcforc Cnstnños coirltl nmvc tlicre, orderctl Yey to 
pursne liim witliout intermission, and dircctcd Lefcbre t o  con- 
tinuc Iiis mnrcli [)y l'alcncii~, Vnllndolid, Olm erlo, and SegoPia. 
Tliis movcmcnt rncrits nttcntion. Wc Jinll Snd it confusing 
blie R ~ I ~ J  iinrl cntintry pcople-ovmwing thc flnt country nf 
Lcon imrl Ciistillc--pi.otccting tlia riglit flnnlc of thc army- 
men:wiiig Pm?licin iind 8:ilnin:inca - ke~ping tlie beds of 
Blmrd~ iind Biirtl's ooluiri~is fmiri arlvnncing, nntl rentlering 
it dangerouñ for tliem to ntt,empt a junetion--threatening he 
Zinc rif Bope's rnarclt from tlic Ti~gus to tlie Guadurainadi 
persing Bererlia's corps, and finalIy tiirning tlie pass of Somo- 
~ierrii. without erer casing to bcloug tu  tlic concentnc mwe* 
nient o€ tlie ,mt a m y  upon hIeclnt1. 
Tlie time lost in %ransinitting inklligence of the victory at 
Tildela was prorluctive of  serioug consequencea. 
P. 
JOuniid of The oficer despntched with the return instru* 
*ratiousg tions, found Ney arid Monccy, Lunes mas now 
Bl s. 
sick at Tutlcla, eicli dranecd two days' march in 
the wrong clirection. Tlie first wrs at Mallen preparing to 
attttck Zaragoza; thc secontl at Alrnunio pursuing Gastnños. 
Tlicy liad to countemnrcli, md the people of Zamgoq 
recorering fmm tlie consternati on mused by the fugitive~, thcii 
mndc urrangc~nenta for a vigoroirc dcfencc. Castafios niso 
eacaped t o  Signenxn witliout furtlier loss, snve in a riligllit 
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defended by t d v e  thousand men, should from a deliberate 
sense o£ danger be abandoned t o  the wild charge of a few 
squad~onl; wl~ich two cornpanies of good infantry would h a ~ e  
dectually stopped: yet some of tlie Spanisli regiments so 
~hmefully beatcn here had becn victnrious at h y l e n  a few 
montha before, and Et. Juan's dispositions at Somosiem WCR 
far better than Redinds at the forrner bnttleI Tlie h g e  
vie~vcd as a simple militltry operation nras extrn~a.pintlp rnsb ; 
but a8 evincing Napoleon's sagacioas estimate of Spanish 
troops, and his promptitude in seizjng the dmntagc orered 
by tlie smoke rand fog which clung to the side of the rnountin, 
it mna n fclicitous examlile of intnitive genius. The r o w  
troops were pursued towards Ruitmgo by thc French cava!. 
St. Juan lirokt? througl~ ttbc Freiich on tiie side of Sepulveda 
nnd pinctl the cnmp o€ IJcrmlin at Eegovin ; hut thcn the ' 
cnvnlry of tlio foi~rtli corps nppromhd, and thc two gencrals, 
crossing tlie Giiiidimmn, rnll ictl fiomo of td1lc fiigitives from 
Sornosierra on tlie Madrid ~ i r i e  of tlie inounttlina, md wwn 
about to enter f81int capital, allen tlie nppenrance of a French 
patrole terrifiecl tha vile cowards wlio followed them. Once 
more they iled to  Talnvcrn da la Reyna, and thm 
Galacl 
~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ %  consummated tlieir intolerable villanp by mnrder- 
C O P F C ~ ~ n d -  ing their unfortunate general anrl fixing bis man- 
enw. 
gled bodp to a tree, a b r  wbich they dispemed to 
carry tlieir fem into the other provinces. 
Nom ths imperial a m y  carne d m n  from t h e  rnountaine 
the sixtli mrps hastened on from flie side of Alcala and 
G~tadnlnxnra - thc centml junta flerl from Armjuez,- 
C~tnñwr, intcrceptcd on thc sidc of N ~ l r i d  and p r e d  
by Ney, turned townrtls the Tagus. Tlie juntn flyitig witb 
inrlecent linste ~ l i r e d  a tliousnnrl fiil~e rc~)ortq nnd witli more 
than ordinnry pertinscity endearaured tu  deceive the people , 
and the Englisli ganad; a task in ivliicli they were strongly 
aidecl by tlio credulous weakness uf Mr. Frere, tlie Bntkb 
plenipotentiary, who fled with them townrds Badajos. )Ir. 
St'tuart witli greriter diacretion nnd fiminess rernaind at Madrid 
until the enemy actuallj- rtppea~d at the *teso 
After tlie combnt of Durvieca Castaios continued his 
retreat unmolmted by Ney, ~u l io  never recovered the time lod 

was mpaiatable to many of the househoIders, numbem o[ 
whom r~cnped from difl'erent quarter~; deserkm also carne 
over, annd Kapuleon, wliile waiting for Lis infsntry> exmined 
al1 the iveuk points of the &by. Xt W ~ E  incapable of defenw. 
Sheie were no bulwarka, thc houses, although well built, were 
not like tliose of many Spanid~ towns firs preof; there wereno 
oubmorks, tha Retiro tlle Palace m d  tlic heigLts occupied liy the 
h n e h  cavalry pommrtndcd tlie city ; tlie oyen countq round 
enabled tlie liorsemen to discover and cut off al1 conwys, and 
no ~ubsistenec hsd bcen pm\<ded for tlic h u n d d  and fifty 
thousand people conta~ned wítliin the circuit of the place. 
Thl: dcsire of the ccntral junta, t l i n t  Jfzrlrid. sliould mhen thcy 
had lcft it risk tlic liorrors of n atorm, was oqualjy silly and 
k~rbarrrus; thcir crirnirinl apiitliy l i d  dcprivctl Mndrid of tlic 
pumer o€ defence, nnd tlicrc wntJ no r a n n h ~  Iiet\recn it and 
Xnnigoza. Nnpolcon kne.1~ tliis, nnd would not plunge into 
tlir. ~ t rea t s  ainongst, m nrmcd iind cncit~l  ppopirla- 
Append@ tion; heltnew tlirit riilrlrcss irt riegotiation,prdience, 
Xo. 8. 
antl a judicious em~iloyment of nrtillq, wnuld 
Eoon d u c e  tlie most riutmgcous to submission, ruid he hnd no 
Msh to dwtrtroy the capital of bis brtitlier's kingdorn. 
Tu t l ~ e  vening tlie infantry and artillery arriu-ed, md men 
wcre posted a: the most fnvourabIe poiritu; the night ñ a s  clenr 
and bright, the Frencli camp silent and waeehful; 
Fourtwnth but a ttmuItuaus noice wns head from crery 
1.Ialletin. 
quarter of the citj-J as if some mighty b t  wns 
struggling and howling in tlie toils. At midnight a aecond 
sumnions being scnt through the medíum of a prisoner Castellar 
nttemptcd to gnin timc by an cqui~ocal rrply, but thc Prencli 
ligl~t troops sttirmed tlic! ~ienrcst Iiauses, nnr1 orie Finthry of 
tllirty guns o~ieiletl rtgniust Qie Eetiro, wl i i le  nnother tliroiv 
slielll; froin tlie opposite qictrter to distract tlie iittention of 
tlin inlialiitants. The Retiro, situnted on s rjsing grouncl, WHS 
conriecte.d witli a range o i  buildinga erected on tlie wme airle 
of t11ie Prado or public wdlc, into which some of the prit~cipal 
streets opened, and in tlic morning a practimble brireach beiy 
made & tEie Rctiro, Srillattefs division broke in, routed tlie 
gamison, and scixed al1 tbe public buildings cunnected with it; 
then crossing the Rndo, gained tlie bai~iew erected at the 
entrance of tIic streets, and taolt possession of tlie immense 
palacc of Mcdiiin CeIi, whicb wns in itsclf a ltey to tlie city on 
tliat aidc. 
This viproiis commencement created p e a t  terror, tlie 
town aas summoiicd for the third time, md in the afternoon 
Moria and anotlier officcr carne out tu demana a yuspension of 
m, neoessq? t h e j  3ai4 to persuade the people to surrender. 
Tlie emperor ddressed Morlo, in terms of g e n t  scvcrity, 
reproaching him for liia scandrtlous conduct towartls Dupnnt's 
m y .  ' Injitstiw ittid l~iid fiiitli,' he cxclnimcrl, ' allwrtyri remil 
upou tliose who are guilty of either.' A saying wall alililied 
to tht Spaniard, md Napoleon himself confirrneiE its pliilo- 
sophic tmth in after times. ' T l ~ e  Spanisli ulcer destrqed 
mof was expression of decp anguisli mhicli eacaped from 
him in 11ia hour of misfortune. Horla returned to tbe town, 
liis story mas soon told, before six o'clock tlie next marning 
hldrid must surrcndcr or pcrkli! Dissenuions arose. The 
viuIence of the po~iuli~ce ww nlintcrl, but tlic nmctl pcrwnritry 
and the poorest inliabitants still demandcd to 1ic lod qaiust 
tbe eneniy, a mnstant fire cnme from tlie bouses nenr the 
Prado, tlie Frencli p i ~ e r a l  Mylison was wounded, and pnernl  
Bruyeres kdled. Nevertlieless the dicpoaition to fight bccame 
ea& momcnt weaker, blorln aiid Castelfmnco prepard a 
cnpimlation, but Castellar refused to ~ign it ; anil ns t1ic town 
W~VILR ~ n l y  invcfftctl on ane sirlc, Iie efccted his cscnpc with tlie 
q ~ l f i r  t r o o p  ~luring thc niglit, cr~~ryirig witli liim siatecn 
guiis. Tlie people tlicn bccnme quicsccnt, and at eight o'cluclr 
in t l ie  moming o€ tlio 4tli, Maririd mrreuhred. 
Morla was a traitor, nnd 11is personal C O T ~ ~ C G  was excex- 
sive; but Gastclfrniico, also accused of trcason, alipears rather 
weak than tseacharona; thc surrender of Madrid was no proof 
of guilt, jt was inevitable. The boasting u1)roar of a multitnde 
perniitted to rlorninccr for s fcw days is not enthusirrsm; tlie 
retrent of Cristcllw with thc troopg of the line during the 
proginess of tlie negotintion wnti tlio wisest oour3e t u  pursue, 
Tliat tlie peopie neithcr coitld nor would rfefend the city is 
evident; 3lurla and CastelCrnnco could never Eiave effected a 
capitulation in so short a period if the generals, the troopa, 
the wmed perisantrf, ancl the iuhbitants. had been all, or even 
a pnrt of them, determined to  resist. Napoleon carefully pro. 
vided ogailiat nny sudden renction, ~ ind  prmerved the s t r i c t ~  
discipline, a soldier af thc imperial g u d  was sliot for liaving 
a pluudered watch in Iiis possessioii; B e  jnfmtry were placed 
i i i  bmracks aiid convcnts, tlie cn~rilry weim irndy to m u r  tlie 
atrect~, and tlie Gpnniards wpre al1 tliñurmed. The emperor 
fixed liis riwn qunrtcrs nt Cliamnrtin, a liouso four miles from 
Madrid, aiid in a few dq.8  tlie ~liops were opened, the public 
samusements recommencetl, md thc t1ieatt.r~ were frequentd. 
The inbahitant~ of capital cities are emily moved, &lj 
calmed; self-intercst md sensual indulgente unfit tliern far 
noble, sustdned efforts; tliey can be violent, ferocioug md, 
seldom wnstant and firm. 
Durjng the operations against Madrid, La-Peca, after tacap. 
ing from the sixtli corps, arrlved at Qnadalaxara with five 
tbousmd men; on the 2nc1, t he  dukes of Infantado andAlbw 
querque jained him from tha capital; on the 4th, Tenw 
carne up with two thousand men. Napoleon being appiserl of 
their vicinity, dirtlcted Uessi&es upon Quarlalaxrtra witb skteen 
squadmns, s~ipliorting Lim witli Rufin's division ; but tbe 
Spaniards retired through tlie hills by knctorcm tumh 
Aranjuez, and their gum crossed tlie Ta,m at hoedoa 
ltu&n also changed his line, and cut thcm off' from La Mancha 
by the line of  Ocnñz. La-I'eñn wns tlien forced to resign, 
Tnfmtado was dosen in Iiis place, the Sogus was croswi iit 
eweral points, nnd aftcr some sliglit actions with the Fiench 
cavnlry tliis miscrnble body of mcn finnlly saved themaelves 
at Cuenca, wbcm mnny dcscrters and fiigitivca, niid the brigada 
of Cnrtoajnl itntl Lilli, J so  arrircd, md tlie Jiikc promedeti to 
orgaaize another wmy. 
On the French aide, tlie foiirth corps reliclied Segovia, 
pasad tbe Gundarnrna, dis~iri.setl fiomc armcd pensanh aesem 
Med at tl~e Escurjul, and tLen iiiarchcd townrtle Alrnam to 
atttttaclr Gallnezo, who bad assemhIed five or six thousand men 
to dcfend tlie left bank of the Tsps,  and occupied alineof 
forty milc~. The first French corper ente& La 
BIOCW+U Mancha, Toledo immedintely slict its gah; and 
I'apcra the junta of tliat town pulilicly proclaimed thcit 
remIution t o  bury &emseJves undcr the mina of t11c city, but 
at thc rtppronch of tt Frencli divisinn cli~ieovcred contemptible 
c m d i c e ,  LSix wceks liad aufñccd to dissipute tiie boasts aod 
the amies af Xpttin, the glittoring bubble liad hrsted,  md a 
terrible d i t y  remained. From St. Sehnstian t o  tlie hsturias, 
from tlie Astunas to Talavera de la Reyna, from Tdavers to 
tlie @es of the nobre city of Zaragoza, al1 was mibmission; 
and beyond that boundary nll w ~ s  apatliy or drczd. ten thou- 
mtid Fre~icli muld hnve rnurcliad from one cxtreinity o€ Spni~i 
ta tlie ather. 
&ter the fall of Madrid Joseph remtiined at Eurgos, issuing 
proclamations and c a q i n g  on a sort of undeqjlot fhrougli 
the medlum of his nativc ministem The views of the ktter 
naturallg turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct froin 
tlia French, md n source of  intinite mischief to Joseph's cause 
TTM tlius opcncd ; for tlist monnrch, an~iomq to p l w e  tind con- 
oiliata liis suhjecta, c d  t o  b~ n Frencliman witliout becom- 
ing a Spanhrtl. However, Napoleon exercised al1 tha riglib 
af conquest, nnd tlie tenour of his speeches groclamations and 
decrees indiuited sornc ulterior projcct, in wvhich the king'm 
perrron~l intercsts were not concerned I t  appeared as if lie 
wislied the nation to ofer the crown t o  himsclf a a m n d  time, 
thnt lie migl~i; olitnin n plausililc cxcuse iur dopting a new 
policy, by whicli to nttruct t.lie peopFe, or at iexst 
3íonitear. 
soften their pñde whidi mas now the mnin oli- 
ptacle to his suocess. An acsem'ii!agc of the nobles, the c1erg-y 
thc mqmrations, nna thc triburiais of >!&id, waited ulion him 
at Chamartin, and presentcd an address, i n  which Ghey ex- 
presserl their irdesire to have Jasepli among tliem qaiiin. The 
c m p m ~ ' s  rcply wm nn expoition of thc priiiciplw uplin wliicli 
Spxin WEIS to ba governcd, and it forcea reflectioii upon t . 1 ~  
psionatc violenm widi wliicli men rmist positive good to seek 
h g e r  mis~ry and denth mtllier than resign tfieir pr~judioes. 
I aocept,' said he, ' tlie sentiments o!! t.he towvn of Xxdrid. 
L regret tlic misfortnn~ tlint have befallen it, anrl I Iiold it as 
a pnrticuEnr good fortunc that 1 I mabled, undcr thc circiim- 
sta~~ces o€ tlie mamen$ to spnrc t h u t  ciky nnd t o  R ~ V C  it from 
y& greabr misfortunes. 1 Iinve hwtend to take measures 
fit Go trrrnquillize al1 chssea of citizens, lcno-*ing well tliat to 
nll peoplo nnd to ali rnen uncertdnty is intolerable. I. have 
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nation, a king, and Xpanish inclependence, if that king is not 
sure of the affection and fidelity of lis subjeets. Tlie Uourbom 
can ncver ap in  r c i p  in J31rape. Tlie divisiona in tlie royd 
fmily were conccrted by tlie English; it m i s  nok king Charlcs 
' 
or bis fmouritc, liut thc dulce of Infnntrido, the inatrurnsnt oP 
Englnnd, tliat waa upon tlie point of overturning the throne. 
Thc papem remntly founcl in Eirs honee pmve tliis; it w a ~  the 
prepondwmm of  England that they wisl~ed to edablish in 
Spain. Insc~lsate project ! wIiich would Eavc protlnced z land 
wax wíthout end, and wused torrents of blood to I>e shd. 
'No pomer influenced by England can exist upon tlie conti- 
nent; if any desire it their desire i s  folly and saones or later 
M11 ruin tlicm ; 1 dirrll bc otiligecd to govcrn Spnin, md it will 
be easy Eor me to do it by estntrlisliing a viccruy in each pro- 
vince. Hoive~er, 1 wi11 not rcErtse t u  coucetle my rigllts of 
wnquest to tlie Iring, nor to estublisli Bim in Mndrid, wlien the 
thirty thouwnd &tizens wemble in tlie churclies, take on the 
holy sacrament not witli the mouth alone, but witli tlie he& 
and mitliout any jesuitical rcstriction an oath, tO be true to 
tlie king, tn Iove and to support liim." Let the priests from 
the puIpit and in the confwsional, the trndesmcn in tlicir eor- 
reapondence and tlicir discorrrses, incnlcntc thesc scntiment~ in 
the yople; tlicn I will relinquisli rriy riglits of conqueat, tlien 
1 mi11 place thc king upon the tlirone, and I wiLl take B plea- 
sur8 in showing myseIf tho faithful friend o£ the Spainiards. 
The present generation may d i r  in opinions ; too many 
passions have been excitedi but your demndants aiIl bless 
me as the  regenemfor of tlie naiion : they d l  mmk my sojourn 
among you as memorable dnp, anci from those da)% they wilI. 
dnk tlie prospwity of Spain. Thcse are my sentiments. Go, 
consuIt your felIow citixcna, clioose yonr pmt, h t  do it fmnkly, 
and exliibit only true colours.' 
The ten criminnls were the dukes of Infantado, of Hijar, 
M e d i i  Celi, md Oamne; the marquis of Santa Cruz; counts 
Fernan,?diñez, and Altamira; the prince of Csstello Franco, 
Pedro &vallos, and the bishop of Santander. They were 
proscribed, body and goods, as traitors €o Fmnce snd Spairi, 
Nfipoleon now marle dispositions: indicating a vast lilrru cif 





rs demonshte that tbe deliverance of the Peninsula was 
o 0 t h  causes than the conragg, $he patriotism, or tha 
inq of the Spaniards. 
.,,th regad t o  their armiea. Infantado rc~idcd with, 
rntlier thnn ommrantlctl n. few thousand wrctched 
fugitives at Cuencn, rlestitute ond mutinoions. At p$,"LBpo* 
Y~lencira there was no a m y ~  the troopa of the Nnrrntive 
of Mcmre'~ province mere ahut np in Zaragoza, nnd disw- Ganipnign. 
siom had arisen between Palafox and the l o d  
junta in consequerice. In the Sierra Morena nere five thon- 
smd raw leviss, h~stfiy maiie by the junta oP Swart's 
seville after tlie dcfeat of &. Junn. Galluzzo and m 8  
ivm 4 t h  aix t h m n d  tirnid ill-amcrl soldicm in Letm' 
flight, haping been suddenZy defeatecl nk h ~ m n r n z  by a détach- 
ment of the fourth corps. Romana .ñws near - girdohn 
L o n  with eighteen thousmd maways, colIeeted a ~ ~ m  
&er the diqerslon ak &pose ; only f i ~ e  thou- "apem* 
sand were armed, nono mrc fliibordinakc, or mpabIe of being 
didplined : wheu cIieclrd for misconduct t11,liey 
rlcserted. In Gallicim t81~liei-e wras no amy. In  ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ K 6 a  
ths Asturias the Iacnl government were sa cor- 
rupt, so faithless, rio oppressive, that patriotism m rednced 
to a nme. 
bt first the central junta m d e  for Bahjos, but getting 
terrified on the mad fled to  Serille; their irinc- 
Btnart. tivity, more oonspicuoua in this s m o n  of arlver- 
sity thm before, contrasted stmngdy mith the inflated 
languap of their pubbc papers; their inmpmity waa glaring, 
their plans ridiculous, abortive; and the junta of Seville, still 
actuated by their own am'oitious views, now openly reasmmed 
their former nnthority. Spain m s  broken in strength and 
gpi i i t  except at n fiw places. Nnpolcon was in tlie centre a€ 
tLe country; he hetd the capital, the fortresses on the side of 
France, the command of ths great lisa of cemmnnication 
k w e e n  the provincea; and on the militas. horíeon no cloud 
was seen, save the heroic city of Z~ragoza on the one snde 
and a feehle British a m y  on the otlier. Sooner or later he 
knew the former mmt fall, ih mas an affair oP artiUery calmi- 
Iation. The lnttcr hhe supposed in fuEl rctrcat for PortugnI; 
but as the fonrth corps was nearer to Lishon thein the British 
general, a hurried retreat done could bring tlie lattm in time 
to that capital; and no prcparntiona for defcnce conld be 
made, mficient to amst t*l~e sixty thousand Frcnchmen which 
he could carry thcrc at the snme rnomcnt. Thc aubjirption 
of Spain appemed inevitable, but tlic genius and vigour of 
sir J. Moorc fmtrnted Napolcon's plnns, thc Aust.rinn war 
drew thc master spirit fmm tlie scerte ef contcntiaa, and then 
Enghnd pnt forth hcr ~ m t  resourccs unrIcr thc forturinte 
dircction of  n gencml q t i o l  to tlie tn& ooT delivering thc 
Pmineulri, and it m dclivcrd. Eut through :h~iint cheng~9 
of fortune, by wlini unexpectcd belps, by mlint uulooked-for 
antl ~xtrnort1inaI-J' events, u d e r  wliat clificultieg by w h ~ c  
persevernnce, and in despite o€ wliose errore, let posterily 
judge, for in thzt jurlgmcnt only \vil1 impnrtiality and justice 
be fountl 
CRAPTER 111. 
R m  at Madrid, NapoIeon hcad tliat sir John Ifoore hml 
sud(lenIy reliriquishcd his comrnunimtion ivitli Lisbon to 
menace the French l i c  of operatinna on the aide of Eurgos ; 
thia compellerl him to suspcnd his dc~ignri ngainst tlie h t l i  
of Spin antl Portugal. Tlie remns wliicli inrfucerl Moora 
t o  divide liis afmj liwe been relttted. 80 likewiso lmve been 
the a i ~ a ~ m e n t s  which brought Baird to Coruña, withont 
permlssion to land, and witbout moneg t o  e ~ i p  liia troop, 
wlien auffered to disenibark. TIieir after operations are now 
to  be desmibed. 
On the 8th of Novembe~ Moore m rit Almeida, 11Lq 
~rtillery at Tnixillo, at CoruTia, Elnke, pumuerl by 
Glty thousand enemiey w a s  that dny iiying from Mnm to 
Ecplnow; Coistaíios md Pwlafox were qnrarrelling at Tudela; 
Belvedere maa at Burps with thirteen thousand bad troops; 
Napoleon was at Viteria with oone hundrd and seventy 
thousand good troop. 
At this time the letters o f  lord WiMam Eentinck and 
colonel Gmh~m, exposing the foliy of the Spanish genemis, 
clieguieted Woore. Re foresaw the junction of Lis army 
migl~t be impeded by the result of an action wliicli the 
Spaniards seemed courting; but as no misfortuna had yet 
befallen tliem, he continned bis mar&, hoping 'al1 tEra bad 
which might happen would not happen' 
'The 11th he crossed the frontier of 8painJ marching to 
Ciudd Rdrigo. On that day Blake waa disoomfited at Espi- 
nmn, nnd thc Estremnduran fimy, bcaten thc da3 bdore at 
&inoiiaI, ww uttcrly ntiiicd nnd dispcmcd. 
Tiie 13th the hewl of tEe Britisli columns entered Sala- 
manca. Thst day Blnke's force wm finalIy clisorpized a& 
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Reposa, leriving Oire first, secund, and fourth French corpa, 
scventy thousand men, frae to zct against any quarter. 
&r Sohn Moore participated at first in the universril belief 
that tlie nation mas entliusiastic; mil when be detected the 
euaggerations oE the rni1it.a~ agents and the incapacitp of the 
Xpanish generala and rulers, he still trusted the spirit of the 
people rvould compensate for all. Great ñ.as his 
Amnriixm suqrise ta fid the defent of Belvedere, ~ h i c h  Ho. 14.  
lnid CastilIe open'to tlic incursions of the enemy 
uncorered the mar& of tlio Eritish anil comliromised their 
safety, created no gensation among the peopla; the autho- 
ritie~i spred no alarm, took no precautioog rIelivererI out no 
arms althongh many thousands were stored in the principal 
towns, md neitlier encouraged the inhabitants by proclama 
tionri, nor enrolled any of them for defence ! rvw not 
even infomed of  tliis important ocmence until a week afkr 
it hrtypener!, md then ody  throngh a ninglc ofiQ$ channel! 
Ballndolid, whcre thc encmy's cavrtlry mere, was but thrce 
marcha from Salammca ; o d y  four tlioiisand Britisli infantry 
liad comc up, and if tlic Frcncli ~lvnnccrl in forcc this wedi 
division mtrsf filll bnclr towartls Ciudd Xorlrigo. Ncverths 
Iess, ffiaembling tho 1 oml nuthorities,~thc pncrnl cxplainnl 
the nnture of t l~eir  position, slrove to cxcite tlieir ardour, and 1 
resolved not to retire unlm forcad bnck by superior nnmbers; 
he wen hastened up his rear divislons, but sent ordere to 
H q e  and Baird to concentrate tlieir troopa and be preprd 
for a retreat. He produced no eiTect oa junta or people; 
the former were stupified and tunid, the latter tliough avaming 
tlieir hatred of the jnvaders, would not stir in defennce, the 
first feel ig of indipation was exhausted and there was 
iiathúlg to mpply i t a  plm;  tlie fugitives fiom the &es 
passed S i l y  wivitliout shnme, hnd umeproached. In this state 
mattem r b n e d  nntil tlic 18th, the troops were.fnst closing 
np, and thc French mmlry mithdrem from ValladoIid fo 
Pdencin ; bnt tlien ncws af Rlalre's defent reachcd Sdarnmm, 
not by ntmonr or by any direct communi~tion from the 
aLr. h ' a  Mont&t dc Santander, but by a lcttcr from Nr, 
Letter to fitunrt, Ratcd cight d q a  suhquent to thc action; 
the Junta for the oentrd junta hbad not infomed Xr. km 
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of it until tliirty hours after having r e c e i d  oficial intel. 
lience of it themselves. 
IVant of bmsport and snpplies hhn mcauscd tlie Eritish to 
march in small and succcñsive divisin~is, nnrl it was tlie 23rrl of 
November before the centre, consisting of twefve thousaad 
infantrp and a Gattery of six guns, was eoncentrated at Sal* 
manm On that day Castafios and Palrafox were defeated at 
Tudelh tlicir armics scattered .JVWIOU~ a chnnce of rnllying, 
anrE the third sand ~ k t h  French corps h m e  disposnble. 
The mpcror rilso, vicbrious oa both flanlnllrs znd witli a frc& 
b m  o f  aFcrntions f ixd nt Burgo$ wns tlicn frce to move 
with tlie gunrd~ ~ n d  the reserve, eitlier ngt~inst hlndrid ar in 
the hection of Salamaum: detachrnents OS liis 
asniy were h a d y  in possession of Tralladolid, nr--S 
vthe v e y  town wbich, a few daps beforg the '"PWn 
Spanish government had indicatcd for tlie base oC illoore's 
opemtions and the formation of his rnagmines ! 
The 26th the hentl of Raird's column was 1u Astorga, biit 
the rcar extandcd beyand Lugo, whilo thc hcad of Hopc'a 
division wras at tIie Ericuriul, nnd tlie rcnr ut Tnlavem. TRe 
sewind fiencli c o q ~  was thw on tlia Deba, threatening Zeon 
and the Asturhs ; tlio cava11 covered the plains; the fourth 
corps was descending by Cnrrion and Valladolid to seize the 
ps of tlie Oundamma; $he emperor himxlf waa prepwing 
to fmce the Sornosierra. 
Tl~ia summary of aontcmpormry evcnh sl~oma, khnt sir John 
bfoore, though hc had orpnizcrl cq~iippetl fina supplicd his 
wmy, and m m l ~ e d  four Iiunclred miles in the spme of six 
weekg rwis too lato in the field; tbe mmpnign decided 
before the Britisb entered Bpaia as an army, AnrI if the 
troop,  instad of lreing at GIamanca Escuria1 otnd Astorga 
on the 23rd, had bcen unikd rst Burgoa the 8th, sucb mas tlie 
wealuiess of the Spisrds, the strength of the enemy, and the 
~h i l l  of Napoleon, thrat a ciiffimlt setreat vrw tlie ~itmost 
f m r  to be expcctcd from Fortune 1iy the English. Sir 
Jolm Moore Iind rencl i~i  Salnmancn wikhout a plan of opern- 
tions, or data upoa wliich to fnirnrI one; l i i ~  in~tmctions 
merely directeJ. h& t o  open cornmunication with the Eprtnish 
anthoritiee for the purpose of ' framing t.he plan of campxiga' 
superded imrncdintdy aftermrds. Hia uuccmaiir, Romana, 
was rallq-ing tlia reinains of Elnke'a farce in tlie dsturias, tmo 
huirdrcd miles froin tlic only nrmy witli which any ~ilrin of 
ca-o-perntion could be fomcd, niid of u-liose prweeding Iie 
lmew as littlc m,Moorc, to mliom no cliannel uf 
A P P ~ ~ &  
NO. 13, iritelligence linrl bwn pointetl out, and as yet a 
l k  '- stranger in tlie conntry and witliout money, he 
c~ul  rl not mh~?ilidi nny certriin one for Iiimsclf. 
It was tlie will of tlie ~ i e g i l e  of Engltznd nnd tlie ordera of 
tlie government tliat 11e ~hould pusli f om~rd  to tlie msistance 
of tlie Spaniards; he liad done so, witbout r n w i n a s  antl 
witliout rnoney to form tliem, trusting to the official asassurante 
of tlie minister t h t  above a h d d  tliousand Spiinish 
soldiers covered hh mnrch, tlmt the people were snthusi~stic 
and rearlg for any exertlon to Remire tlieir own deliver- 
ance. Ee found them ao v i n e  and unpreped, that the 
French cavalrg, in parties as wealt as twelve men, traversed 
tlie countiy aud mised contriliutions without zG:k diiculty or opposition. T l i i ~  w a ~  the stete of 
fi 6. Castille. &Ir. Stuart mil lord Willim Bentiick 
exposd the selfishne~s, and ap~thy of tlie siipreme govern- 
ment ~t Armjuez. G h  painted tIie confuiion af affaV8 
un t11e Ebro, the jealousy, tlie discord of tlie general% the 
Nurse tbm childisli folIy of the deputy Palnfor and bis 
creatures. &ir8 lid found the Qallicians aa inert a~ in 
Cwtille and Leoa, and the autborities more alisnrd and 
Interested, Hope,exp~essed a like opinion as to tlie inepti- 
tude of tlie centrd junta; and evm the military agents, 
hitlierto so sanguine, now lowered tlieir tone of exultation in 
a markai.11e manner. 
Napoleon's enormous force was unknom to Moore; hh 1 he incw it muld not be Eess thm eighty thousand fighting 
men, and that thirty thoumnd more were momentarily 
expected, and might have mived, Ee knew that Blake and 
Belvedere wero totally defentcd, and Castañm must inevitablp 
be go if he besit~ted t o  retreat. The only concluaion 20 te 
dmwn from tliese fricts wm, that the Spaiiinds were nnable 
ur tmwilling to resi& the enemy, and thc Eritisli would have to 
support tbe cantest alone, unless tliey could forrn a junction witli 
Castaños beforo the latter msentiselydiscomfited and destroyed: 
tbere was no time Eor mch an operation, md the first objeet 
WM to anite the pmelled divisions of the English army. 
Salamanca waa five marcha from Astorga, six from the 
Escurid; five days were requircd to bring thc rear up to 
Salamnum, six to enable Rope to concentrate at the Escuriral, 
sixteea to enabIe Baird to assemble at bstorga. Hence the 
English m y  muId not under twenty daya x t  in a body, 
and to advance in pnroels would ha-ve boen iibsurtl. A retreat, 
though consonant to d e  and to the minister's instmctions 
which forbade my serioua operatien before the axmy was 
united, wonld, while Cmhfios kcpt the field, haw appenred 
ungenerous. Moore's high spint rejected such a remedg. for 
the Mae position his government hnd p l d  him in, and he 
adopted an enteiprise, such ns nono ht grcnt minrls are capIiIc 
of. Hs dedgned, if he couM dm~v the extended wings of liis 
m y  together in good time, to abandon al1 communieatioii 
with Portugal, throw himself into tlie heart of 
Spaiii, rally Castaña' s'armj; if it yet existed, upon 
~+~~~~ 
hia awn, defcnd the southcm provinccti, nnd trust 
te  the eRect which snch an appcril to tlia pntriotism anrl 
courage of tlie Spnninrda would protlnce. 
Rut tlio question wns not purely rnilitury; the muae wns 
not one to he decided by the marches of ra few auxiliary 
tmop; its fate depended on the vigour of the rnIers, the 
concert of the generals, the &y of exerbion, the fixed resolir- 
tion of the people to suffer al1 privationa and die rather t h m  
mbmit. To Moore it appcarod doubtful thnt such a spicit, 
or the means cif creitting it, exi~ted; morc doubtful tliat there 
mas capacity to excite or di& it when arousetl; no men of 
tralent had y& appemd, 8nd gd-wi I1  wss in itsclf nothing 
if impmperly trented. In this crieis he tunied to the plenipo- 
tenthy, Frere. To communimtc! with him upan nll iinpor- 
h a t  pointaJ md receivc with dcference his opinion and adGm 
vas the ordcr of hia gavmment, and tho occacion was 
peculiarly fitting. Mr. Frerc, frcsh &m Englnnd, wtis 
acquainted with tlle minister's viewrs, and in a miita1)le position 
ta mcertain the elasticity of tbe Spanish #use. The decision 
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ef the qnestion belongcd m much t o  liim a6 to  the general, 
because it bo lved  the wliole policy of the English cab'iet 
~vith respecG to Spain; md it wtis the more proper to  considt 
him, bemusc, as a simple operation of rrar tlie pmposed 
ma~ement was rasli; al1 tlie militnry and many political 
reasona calIed for s retreat upon h r t n p l .  Tliat would tnkc 
the army t o  its own resources, ensure its conoentratioa, 
increase ib strength, protect British intcrests, wnd lexvc it 
free either t o  return to Spain if a IavourabIe opportunity 
shouId occur, or to pass by sea to Andalusia and recommence 
tlie campaign in t he  3011th. 
Such were the reflectiona tliat indnced sir John hloore to 
~olicit &fr. Frere's opinion upon the general policy of the 
proposed opcration; bnt in so doing he ncver dcsigned ta , 
consiilt Iiim npun tlic modc of executing tha military part, of 
wllich lic coiiceived hirnself to bc tllc bwt judge. mhilo 1 
~waihing thc reply, 110 dircctcd Bnird, if tbc cnemy shmed no 
disposition to mulcst him, to prish t8hc troepa on fo Snl~mnnca 
as fwt m thcy ~houFd arrivc at Aatorga. Sir Dnl-iid a09 
procecding to do so, wheii Rlnlre ndvised Iiim tlint s wnsider- 
dile Frencli force mas collecting at Rio Seco and Ampuclia, 
ivith a view of ietempting h i ~  march; this me&d tha 
movernent, he ivas men preparing to ftill bnck when he was 
stoppd hy ~IOOT~, who~e infmat ion  letl liim to helime Ghat 
Blake's report was fnlse. Valuable time waa thus lo&, lmt it 
was the mrircá of the fourth corps, then travercing the line 
from Carrion to the Guadaramtl, tliat gaTe rke to tliis contri- 
dictory intelligence; for tlie various climges in the French 
positions mcl the circuIation of their liglit cavalry t h g h  
the plains, bewildered tha spiw and the peassnts. The force 
of the cnemy on different points also confmed the higher 
agents, who, loelieving the greateat amoiint of the inmljng 
m y  t o  be from a hundred to a hnntlred and imenty thou- 
sand men, could never rcconcile the reporta vith this atandad, 
and therefm concIncled that Napoleon exaggemted Es rwI 
nwnbem to creote terror. 
Iloore mote €o Mr. Fwre tlie 27th of hbvembei. On tlie 
1st of December Buird m s  to rnarch by 'Benevente, Rope hy 
To~lcsillas, tlie troops nt Xaliimancrs by Xnmom nnd Tom; 
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tlie march from Coruña, had so rcdmed Baird's hopes tb& he 
prepared to retrerit without relnctance; and though lie maa in 
direct commuiiie~ition witb Romana, the intercourse had rather 
confirmed than wcaltend tlie impression tliat it wag impm. 
sible to  depend irpon tlie promises, the informa* 
tion, or the jiirl,pent of any Bpanish gened. In Eo. 13 , f  3, 
the mean time Kxpoleon forced the Xomosierra 
and summoned Madrid, tlie supreme junta fled tom& 
Endajos, St, Juan mas murdered at  Talavera, the remnmt of 
Cactaííos' army mas driven toñyards ths T q q  the iou& 
corpa npproached Begovia, and Bope's aituation beeiame 
critical. 
Ris column had be~n compdled, from the mnt of money 
and siipplies, to  move in six diaisions, each a day'~ 
JOhn marclz hehind tke other. At Almraz he enden- 
n I m %  
l>nptrg. aoured t o  diacover a way across the mountains tu 
Ilopc'a 
L t  CiurIatI Rodrigo, and s road dirl exisf but the 
peasants and muletwrs declaretl it to be i m p m  
ticable for c2trnqes, and consequrntly unfit for the con~oy. 
The truth af their assertions was miich doubted, but Hope 
was dnily Iosing horses from the gIanilcrs, and with a nmber 
anly nifficient to drag hia p~ns nnd convoy dona s good md, 
lie fearcrl to explore a difficult pmsngc orcr thc Siem.  Whcn 
Iiis lcading division rcndiccl Trilavcrn, Yorla, thcn a e c r c t a ~  at 
wnr, wns niixious to bar-c tfie troops stiI1 more minntely 
~ , f i  w, divirled, and pmpossrf tlint tlie rcgiments slion1d 
I:@nfln@a rnasch tkirriugh JIntlri(d jn tea divisions on as 
Lettem. 
many succcs~ivo dnys, tho first te reecli t t ie capital 
the 23nd of November, wliidi would e=ctly have brought the 
' 
convoy into the iaws of the French rirmy, liope repaired to 
Madrid, lield a conference wit11 Morla, rind quickb 
A ~ n a i x b  satisfi~l hirnself that everyhhing was la confiision; xo. 12, 5 s. 
that tlie Spnnidi go~ernrnent liad ncitlier arranged 
R general plan, nor WRS capdile of conducting one. He there- 
fore paid DO attention t,o Morla, and carriFd liis troops at onoe 
by the road of Naval Carnero to tho Escurial, where he hdted 
t o  cIose up tlie rear, and to obtain bullocks to rrssist in -ng 
the p c  over &e Guadarama. 
On the 28th he crossetl the monntain, md entered the flat 
country; t.hd day and tlie next the infmtry znd p n s  
mere at Tilla Cwtin and St. Antwia, the parc wns at &pinar, 
the mvnly advanced on the road t o  Arei~alo. Reredia wnri 
then nt Segovix, hut the fourth corps wm nt Valladolid and 
Plneentia, nntl ita patml~q were l i d  of ak Coca, only a fem 
mil- frnm Arevnlo. In tlie course of the clay a despteh 
from MI. Stuart announced the catastrophe at Tudela, nnd 
the dispersion of tlia camp at Sepiilvede j at  t.he same time 
the outposts o£ cava1 ry in the front reporkd that four hundrecl 
French liorw were at Olmedo, only tweIve miles from Arevalo; 
four thousand others were in the neigl~,liliourhood, and the 
cawi1í.g scouts at St. Gnrcia on tlie rigtit also trncked t,he 
Frsnch rp in  nt Añayn near Segovia. This &te of da i r a  
wag embnrra~sing. Ta fa11 liack on the Gundnmmn and 
would leave the troops at %lamnnmwithout nrtil- Rape% 
lerg or arnmunition; t o  advance m te malre a Re+#, ES. 
ffanIr mo~ement of tliree days with a heavy convoy, ovw a 
fl3 country, and rrithin a few houm of march of a powerfnl 
ravalry. To delay even for a few hours wns tolet the French 
from Segovia get between the convoy rind the Gndnrnmm; 
nnrl then, attackd in 0ank mtl rcar, it miid lio abanrloned to 
=ve tlio troop~ in tho mounhins o i  Avila. 
-4 man of Iess intrepidity thm Hope mould have been 
mined, but he, as resolute as he mae prudent, without hesita- 
hion odered liis c?vnlry t o  thmm out parties cnutiousIy 
tomar& the French, and maiahin a oonfident front; then 
moving the infantry ~ n d  p n s  from Villacastin, and the convoy 
from I<spinosa by csoss ronds to AviIa, tic continucd his march 
dny nnci niglilit iintil ho rcnched Pcncmnrln. Tbo mvnlry 
covering tliis moveinent closed gmdiially to tlio Ieft anrl finnlly 
ompied Pontiveros on the 2nd of Dember.  The infantry 
and tbe dramght animals were greatly fatigned, but the h g e r  
was not ovei; tlle patroles reporkd thnt ten thousand French 
infantv, tmo thousand camls; and farty gtna, were etill in 
Olnido:  this was tlie eternd foarth mrpa, wl~icli tlius tra- 
veraing tlie country continnally crosscd tlie Iienrls oP tho 
Englisli criliirniis, nnd sremcrl t o  multiply t t e  forces of tha 
French nt al1 points, Bope drew his infantry and mvalry up 
in position, but -de the artillery and convoy proceed witliout 
rcst to'illba de Torines, wliera a detacliment from ~ m a u c e  
covercd their mopement to that t o m ,  T h i ~  vbroup and 
filtilful march u-as thus concludcd The troops coilected their 
stragglers at Penerandq and pushed outpoats to Medino del 
Campo, Madrigal, and Torecilla. d i l e  tlic fourth corps anwit- 
tiugly pursued its m m h  to tlie Guarlarama. 
Noore's rceolution ta  retrent upon Portuel created a great 
Blr, st ullítk sensation at Madrid and st Ar~njuez. The junta 
Corrcswnd- f e 4  with reason, that ~ u c h  a proof of tlieir iam 
enw. paciteitg wouId endanger tkeir autliority and perliaps 
their lires; they were on fhe point of flying to Bdajos them- 
selves, bnt were arixioas others should nish headlong into 
danger. BforIa, and tilose who lilre him were p p e d  to 
r t h d o n  the cause of their country, fclt inortified at losing an 
opportunity of eommemoratirig tlieir defection by a signal act 
of perñdy. Mr. Frere aes surprised and i n d i p t  that a 
general of sxperience nnd reputation should t l i i  for 1Umsel!, 
rsnd decide upon a rnilit'uy opemtien mithout a referente t o  
Iiis opinion. He maa a person o€ merc scl~olnstic athinment, 
very ill qualified for tbe dutics of liis situntion which at this 
moment required tcmpcr, aapcity, and jutlgmcnt. t.~~errnt,hg 
bis own hlents for public ntfatirs, be hatl comc out to Spnin 
impressed with fahe notions of what wwas pasing in that 
ctriintry, and tenacioitsly clinging to tlic pictures of bis imnr- 
nation, rcseated thc iatrusion a€ reason nntl pehulnmtly spiurncil: 
nt fiicts. TIie dcfcnt of Gnmonnl, wliicli Iirolte tlie centre of 
tfic: Spmisli linc, uncovcrcd tho Rnnk nnd rmr of Cndoñod 
ariii y, oliened a wny to Mwlric12 anrl rendererl t l~s  concenhtion 
of tlie Eritiiili divisiens unñnfc if not impossiblc, he ciirioaslg 
d l e d  tlre 'iinIuclcy affair of tlie 10th at Burgoa' After tlie 
battle of Tudela he estimate ted tlia ivlioto Frcncli army on tlie 
side of B q o a  and Vallndolid at eleven thousiuid men, when 
h'arrative they were aliove one hundred tliousnnd yet, witii 
of xom% informakion so oliriurcll y ddect,ive, he w z  prompt 
Campuigus. to interferc with, and eapr  to cuntrol the militar). 
combinntioiis of the genera[, ~vliich were founded upon the 
true m 1  nckno\vledged principlra of the art of war. 
Mourc, while anxiously watcliing t,lm dnngerons progres of 
E o p ,  was suddcnly m~niled liy the rcpresentntions and remon- 
strsncea of ni1 tthese offended, mortificd, and disappointed per- 
wns. The question of rctiring being by the defeiit af Tud~la  
rentlered so pu~cly military, nnd thc ncccssity ao palpable, tlie 
genernl, altliough anticipsting ~ o m e  xpressions of discontent 
from the Spanish goveriiment, m totnlly nnprepared fos the 
torrent of puerile impertinencres with ~vhicli he was owr- 
whelmed. Morla, a subtle man, endwoured first 
to dcccive Mr, Stuart by trenting the dekat of 
casbfios iiglitly, ofñciaily stating tiiat he h d  sxvcd Mr. Rtuart'a 
tlie: grentest part of Iiis m y  ni Sipenzn, and ::Enapond- 
wns on the march to join Eh. Jiinn nt tho Sorno- 
sierra. Ta this he added, that there were only smaU bodies o€ 
French cavalry in the Rat country of Castille and Leun, ancl 
no force on tbat side mpable of preventing the: junction of 
ñioom's amy. Thk was an the evening of the 30th, the 
ernperor h d  forced the pas of the Sornosierra that mom- 
ing, and the dnke of Eiantzic was at VaIladolid! 
Tbe wmt! dny, Mi. Frere, writing from Amnjuez in anñwer 
tu the generalk fnrmer comrnnnication, and hfora 
3lixrre'~ ha wss quainted mith his intention to fa11 bwk, 1 % ~ ~ ~  
deprecatedaretrelit upon %rti;& andassertd t h ~ t  ~P:J~E& 
tiie enthusiasm of tbe Xpaniasds wns nnbounded, 
except in Castille and Leon wherc he adniitted they were 
more passive $han they shoutd be. He even stated, t h t  
twenty t hownd  men were actualIg irseembled in the viciuity 
of tlie cnpital, ttiat Oastnñoci wna falling badc tipon thcrn, thnt 
reinforcemenh ware nrriving daily from tlie sonthern pro- 
vinces, md the adclition of tlie Dritish amy would form a 
force greatly mperior t o  any the Prench could bring against 
tbat qusrter. It was certain, he said, the latter were very 
meal[, and would be afraid t o  dvance while the whole conntry 
ffom the Pyrences to the capital was in arms upon their left 
flcnlr. There wcrc rumoum that thc eonscciplioa had Gccn 
rcsishrl, tlie more probablq becnuue evcry g e r a t  cRport m a d ~  
b~ France wns accompmied by weakn~se and interna1 dis- 
turbante, and a pastord letter o€ tlie bislinp of Carcassonne 
seemed to imply t h ~ t  it was PO at that time. ' üood poli% 
therefore requid, that the French sbould be attacked Lcfore 
their reinfomments joined them, as .any ~lucces~l obtained ah 
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that moment would render a ~inscríption for n third attempt 
i n h i t d y  ditñcdt, if not impracticable. But if, on the otba 
Hand,' said t l k  inconsiderahc pcmon, ' the French are ayloved, 
with their present forces to retnjn theu praent dvantap,  
and to wait the completion o!? their conseription, they mil1 
p u r  into Spain with a number of troops whicli dl give them 
irnmediate p o ~ s i o n  of tlie capital ~ n d  tlie central provinces! 
Two d a p  after the date of this letter tlic empwor m actually 
at the capital and Mr. Frere wa8, with the junta, fiying in al1 
haste, Fmnce remaiuing meanwliile stsong, and hec from 
interna1 dissension. 
This rambling epistIe, tthough d t k n ,  was not d q t c h e d  
before the intentian to fail back upon Portugal was made 
knom to M?. Frere, but Le thougl~t it so well calcalatd to 
p ~ e n t  a retrerat that he forwarded it, accompanied by a sbort 
explnnatory note, which was off'ensi~e in style, arid indicstive 
of 8 petulnnt dispositian. dt the same time, Aupstin Bueno 
m d  Ventura &gente ,  two genernls deputed by tlie junta to 
remonstrnik against thc rctrerit, nrrivcd at head-quartere, nnd 
tliey justificd tlic choice of thcir cmploycrs, being in folly and 
psumptuons iporiince tlie vcry t ypea  of thc governmcot 
tliey repre~ented. hsscrting tlint 8t. Juan Iind twcnty thou- 
sand meii, tliat reinforccmenta were daily jouiing hirn, md tlwt 
tlie Somurrierm wns impmgnnhly fortificrl, tlicy wcre proceeding 
to crentc immcnse Epniiisli amies, wlien tlie p u e d  
M m  
P S ~ .  stappcd tlicir gitrruli ty by int.mdiiMng Grnhnm, 
had witnevsed tlie tlispersion of C ~ o s '  
wmy, nnd harl j i i ñ t  left tlie irnfortiii~te St. .Jiinn Tala~eq 
surrounrled by tlio vjllanous mligatttes wlio murtlered I i i  tlie 
next rlny. It m q  be ensily supposed that snch rcprmtn- 
tions could have no weiglit, the neceasity o i  mtrenting m 
rendered. even more imperious by iliese g1:laring proofs, tliat tthe 
junta and ihe English plenipotentiary were totdly iporant of 
of what was passing rtround tbern. 
But Napolwn was nom in full career- He hd raised a 
hurrjcane of war, and diiecting its hry  as he pleased bis 
advemaries were obliged t o  mnform tlieir movements ta his, 
the circumstances varied from hour to hour, a d  the detemi- 
nation of one moment was rendered meleas in the next. The 
appearhnce of thc French vavnlry in tbe plnins of Mndrid had 
sent tlie jantn and Mr, Frere I i d l o n g  townrds Rrtclnjos; bu* 
tlie peoplo of Madrid, as we Lavo seen, sliut tllar gates, and 
displayed the outward si,w of a resoIution to imitate Zara* 
goza Infantado was one of the junta of defence, yet Morla 
designing a find effort to hmlm the British m y  in t h e  dis- 
tniction of bia own country, peraunded him t o  quit Msdrid for 
tlie m y  of the centre. Thc trnitortlius bccnmc solo mnster, for 
only ttia rluke and Iiimsdf had iilfluence with tlie mob wlio 
had. murdered Perdes and filled the city with tumult. 
Wizen Napoleon mimmoned the city, Morb in concert with 
the prince of Castel Franco, ddressed a papw t o  sir John 
Idoore, in which tlicy stated that ' t.w~nty-five thousand mea 
untIer b € ~ % o s ,  md ten thousand from the Xornosierrtl, were 
mnrcliing in 811 bwte to  tlie capitnl, whcrc forty thousmd 
otlierñ were in ams.  N~vcrt!iclrss, npprchcnding an increnae 
of fom on tho enamy'a sida, tlie junta Iioped the Engliah army 
wodd either march to tlia asgistanco of Nadrid, or take a 
diroction to fa11 upon the rem of the French; and not donbting 
thilt tlie Xngllish general h d  alredy formed a junction with 
Rlnlre'e amy,' whicli they mcll knew had h n  dispcrsd, 
' tliey hopcd he mouId be qriclr in liis qeratiane.' Tliia~alicr 
wiis sent by s govcrnmcnt rncspeiigcr tn hlamancn, hut ere Iie 
could reach tliat place, Moda, whe liad co:oinmenccd negotia- 
tions before the ciegpatch was nritten, capiitulated, ancE Na- 
poleon ntas in 3hdrid. This comrnunication aould not liF&~e 
sufficed to arrest Noore's retrograde rnovement, for lie lmew 
then h o a  Spaniqih armles were created on paper; bnt Mr. 
Sturtrt also cxpresscd a bdicf tlitit Madrid m 1 r l  makc a 
vipmua mistlitioe; nnd the ti& of fnlsc infomntion linvirig 
set in witli a strong current, every moment lirought fresli 
assurances thnt a great gpirit had nirisen 
On the day Morla's commiinication arri~ed, there appeared 
at hd-gnrrrters one ChamiIlp a Frcnch adventurer. This 
man, triiicc dcnaunced in the British pparlmcnt asan argñnizer 
of mnsination in St. Domingo nnd a fmuriulent iinnkrupt in 
London, mme as tlie eonfidentinl lagent of Nr. Frere. He h d  
been in Madrid durin~ tho nigllt of tlie Ist, and left it €ha 
nevt morning, aftm liaping lield a oonference with Morla 
u 2 
Taking the rond to Talavera he mct with Mr. kere, aad 
paintcd tlie spint annd eiithwinm of Wdrid in mch coloum 
tliat the emoy Imparted bis own views in return, and not only 
entmsted this stranger with lcttcrs to sir John hloorc, but 
act~~al ly gave him a misñion to obstruct thc ictreiit, Cliar. 
milly bast,ened t o  Snlarnnnca and grciscnted Mr. Acre's fird 
missii-e, in wliicli, after alliiding to former rcpm~iitd~ions ind 
to tlic information of which Charrnilly was the bearer, viz, 
the entlinsiasm in the capital, he madc a formal remonstrrincc 
to thc cffcct, tlint propricty nnd polig rlenianded fin iimrnediirtc 
advance of tlic Rritisli ta st i~~port  this gcneroua dort. Cliar- 
milly also demnnded a pcrsorial intervicw, which m gmaterl, 
yet RToore, Iiaving somc suspicion of the man mhom he had 
sccn Iicfore, listcned to his tnlcs with n o o l h c s s  which hffled 
tlie penetmtion of tlic adventurcr, nnd be retired thiolrig 
retrcat eertain. 
Porrnanriy yema so mueh ridicule hadbecn attaclicrlto the name 
of an Englisli expcdition, tlint weak-lieacied men clnimed n sort 
of pmscriptive right to censure witliout r c p d  t o  mbordina- 
tion thc conduct of tl~cir generala. It hnd bcen so in Egy-pbI 
sliere a cabal was formerl to deprive lord Biitcliinson oE tlie 
commnnd; i t had bccn so nt Ruenoa hyren, i,t Fcrrol, and in 
Portugal; it waa so at this time in Moore's army; and it will 
be found in tlic coursc O€ liis work, tiint thc s~ipcrIntivo taleots, 
vigoiir, nnd aneceas o f  Wcllinpton, could not, even at a hte 
pcriod of thc snr scmirc liim from such vcxntious follyly, YTI~B 
tliree gencrnls wliu commnntle~l tlic siepnsate divisiona o€ the 
army, and wliw were it i  corisequerice ncqiiainted wiQi al1 the 
circiimstancw nf t1ie momcnt, ivcre sagrcol? nR to the propiiet7 
of a retrelit, but iii otlier rlunrtcrs iridecent murrnurs wrre M 
prevnlent among ufficcm o f  mnh ns to cnll for rcfiulre. Ilhnr- 
milly, ignon~nt of tlie decirletl clinractei of tlic gcne~d-in-cliief, 
tiiouglat tliie teinper favoiiralile to tlie object of liie rni~siob 
and presented r secona lethr, whicli Mr. Frere l i d  cliar~~d 
him to ddiver, should tl10 iirst fnil of eKcct. TLe purpartsss 
to dmire, if sir Jolirt Miiare still perñistcd in his jntention of 
retreating, ' hearw m.JILt he prrmeenoks1?j eammid Iigm I 
mwnd of aw;' in otlier woida, that Mr. Frere, conviaced of 
t h e  general's incnpacity and want of zeal, wm determined ta 

Astor,? and he hirnself prepard for an atlvance; but he 
remained withont information ns to the fate of Madrid, he ~t 
Graham to obtain intelligena of wha* m pwing ,  nnd 
his answer t o  Morla, Shis ~esolntion being d e n ,  he wrote 
t c  Mr. Prere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past con. 
duct, and those mhich aetuated him in forming a frwh plan 
of operatioa ' 1 mish anxiously,' said this noble-minded man 
in conclusion, ' 1 wisli anxiouslg, EW tlie khg's rninister, to 
continue upon the most confidentid footing with you, and 1 
hope as we have but one interest, the pnblic welfare, thwgb 
we occssionally see it in djfferent aspects, thrrt this wiil not 
disturl; the hamony w&ch should subsi& betmeen us. Fully 
irnpressed as 1 am with t h e s ~  sentiments I shaU abstiiin frorn 
amy remarla upon the two letters from you, delirered t o  me 
l ~ a t  niglit and thie morning bp colonel CharmjEly, or w th 
rnewage TPhiCh accompaniecl them. X certainly at first did 
fed nnd exprwsed much indignation at a person iike bimbeing 
made the chanuel of a communic;ition of that sort fromyon to 1 1  
me. Those feelings are at rin cnd, and I dare say t h q  nwer 
wiII be crented t o d s  you again.' 
Military operations now oecupied his &d. !I%e Ilomo- 
sierra and Guadarama were In tlie enerny7s h d s ,  wherdore 
no direct mo~ement on Madrid could be made, nor indeed nny 
operation on thah side M o r e  the 12th, when B&d$ rear 
mouId be dosed up to  Asterp. Moore knew Zarngoz~wns 
rcady t o  stand a semnd sicge, nnd he had in the finit n 
parnntce for its abstinac~. The junta of Toledo had formally 
nsmred him thnt thcy woufd dic on the mina oF thc citp, liut 
ncver submit; and from sweml quarters hc was told of ncw 
lwiee croding up from the south. Romana aIso now d e c l d  
hiinself rsblo t o  aid with twenty tlioueand mcn. U p n  thw 
circumehnces he concelvd a dnring eritcrprise Kkarnped with 
the sea1 of pnius, political ancl militnry. 
He judged the Frencli emperor moro mxious to atnie B 
Mow @nst the English, thm t o  overnin m y  particular p 
i n c e  or get posseasion of nny town in the Peninmla. IIe 
reaolved therefore to tliroív himsell upon tlie communications 
of the Prendl a q ,  hoping, if fertnne wae favour~ble, t o  
I 
, 
i d i c t  s severe Iom v p n  the troops guiirding them before aid 
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eould arrive. U NapoIeon suspencling operationa against tlie 
aouth alimld d-h largely, Maclrid would tliereby be 
mccoured; if he did not detwh Ieirgdy the British oould hold 
their ground. 11100~ knew well tliat great commandei would 
mwt likely fdl with ha wholc force upon thwe who menaced 
Lis line of communication; but to relieve Spain at a criticnl 
momcnt, md $ve timc for the sonth to orgiinize ithl dcfence 
nnd r m e r  cournge, 11e ww willing to draw tlic rnem~r's wltole 
power on liimself. He RIW the periI for his o m  
army, knew that it mwt glicle along the d g e  of a 
precipite, cmss a gulf on a &ten p l d  ; bnt he 
also knew the martia1 qualif iea of hig soldiem, felt the pul* 
tions d liia cim geniiis, md the object being worth the deed 
he dared c8my it even againct N~poleon. 
Oniham returncd on the 9th, liringing intclligcnce thnt 
bfdrid hd mpitulat~l. RE 11ad only reachcd Talavcra, 
wliere two fugitive memliera of tlie supreme ,iunta told Iiim 
twenty tlousancl Freuch were in the Retiro, but the peopIe 
retained their arms and La-Peiia had thirty thousand at  
Guadalmam ; tliat fourteen thousand of St. Juan's and 
Heredia's forces were msembled at hlmaraz; that Romana, 
with whom they anxiously desired the EngLish should unite, 
hnd an amy o f  thirty thonaanrl fighting mcn; fínnlly, thnt 
thc most cncrgctie mcns1irm wcre in d iv i ty  wherever the 
enemy's prexnce did not control tLe patriota. 
Xortifying as it was t o  h d  3larlrirl after so much boasting 
hold out bnt one dity, the event itself did not destroy the 
p u n d  of Hoore'a resolntion to  advance. It WIW so much 
lmb, it diminishd the hope of arousiiig the natiou, and it 
inmsed the danger of the British army by leiting loose 
a greitter number of the cncmy'~ t roop;  brit as a rliv[;rsioti 
for tlie m t h  it mi&h still succced, nnd ns iong rur thcre 
unp liope t2ie resolution of the Engliah general wns fixed to 
pmve, t h t  he would not abandon t l ~ e  cause even when the 
Spiards wem abandaning it themselwes. 
CHAPTXR TV. 
ON the 11th of December tne movehent w t ~  commenoed,but 
preparrrtions for e retreat on Portugal mere also continned, and I 
Eaid wna ortlered to f o m  rnwpziliea at hne~ente ,  AAsto~q 
Villa Francq and Lup, by wllich two lines of operation and 
greater fredom of &ion were obtaincd. Noore'a fuYt desjgn 
vas to march on ValledoIid to cover t,hi arrical of bis atores 
snd ensure hia junction ~Yith Dairdj w110se mar wm #ti11 
behind Astorp. In this view he&-qiiarters wera at Alaejos. 
The 13tI1, two brigades of infantr~r and Lord Paget's cavaly 
mere a$ Toro, nepe was at Torrecilla, and Charles Bewart's 
horsemen were at Ruda, having tlio niglit befoore surprised 
tliere ñfty infantrg nnd thii-ty dragoons. The prisoners said 
tbe French believed tho English army was retroating m 
Portugal, mil an intercepted despatcli from DertIiier,,discloa- 
ing the emperor'a viem, chmged tBe direction of tlie march. 
I t  ww addrmed to Soult, and said Ndrid was trauquil, 
tlie ~ h o p  open, the pwhlic amusements going on aa in pro- 
fonnd peitce. The fourth mrps WBII at Talavera on the w q  to 
Badajos, and this movement mould force tlie English to 7 t h  
1 
on Portugal, if, contrary to the emperor's belief, tliq M not 
already done so. The fifth corps wm on the marcli to Zar% 
goza, the eighth to Bargon, Soult was tlierefore directan to 
drive the Spaniardsi into GallicE$ to occupy h o n ,  Benevente, 
iind &mora, and keep tlie fiat country in subjedon; for 
which purpose hG two divisions of infantry, and tlie mvalrg 
brigades of Franceschi and Dehlle, were considered aufficimt. 
It is remarkable thai tliisj $he fiat oorrect information of 
the capitulation of Xadrid, slioulcl h v e  been thus aquirtd 
from the enemy, ten days after the event bad faken pIaca 
Nor is it lees curious, that wbile Mr. Frere's letters were filld 
with vivid descriptions of Spanish enthiasm, Napoleon 
should bava been so convlnoetl of thoir pria&veness, as to send 
this important despatch by an &m, wllo rode post witliout 
m incort, and in safetg mtiE his abusive language t o  the post- 
maskr erb Valdestillos created a tumult in' whieh he lost hia 
Iifc. Captain Waters, an E~nglisli officer sent t o  obtain inteIli- 
gente, happening to arrive in tbat place, beard rif the murder, 
and immcdiatcly purchnsed the dcspntch for twenty 
doIlwa; and this nccidentd informntion wrts tho ~~~~~~ 
more ~~IuaFilc, m neitfier money ner patriotisrn 
h d  litherh induced the Spaniards to liring any intelligenoe 
of the enerny'a sihation : each step the m y  liad made wm in 
the brk.  It was now certain tbat l3urgos iras or would be 
stronglp protected, and that Raid's line of m& was unsafe 
if Soult, following these instructions, adranced. On the other 
Iinnd, as tlii: French mcre ignomnt of the Rritish movemcnts, 
there wns n cliance t o  surprise nnd hcat Soult beforo hpolcon 
muld come tu liis suocour. WhereForc Hop wias orderd to 
pesa the Duero at TodesiLk nnd direct his marcli upon Ville- 
pando; bearlquarters were removed t o  Toro; and Valderiks 
was given for the junction of Baird'~ divhion, tlie head of 
which wvm now e t t  Rene~ente. 
On &he 16th Xr. Stunrt arri~ed at Toro, accompnied by 
F. X. a r o ,  a mcmbcr of thc Spnnish government, 
wlio bmught tmo Icttcrs, tlic one from thc juntim nroows . 
the otlier from >ir. Frcre. Tliat from tlie junta PnPC'B1 
complained, tli~t wlim &mana proposed t o  unite fourteen 
thousand piclid men to the Britisli army ~ 4 t h  a view t o  
make n forlvarrl movement, his offcr had been disreprded mil 
a retreat dctermined upon in despite of his earnwt xemon- 
stmnws; a, rcti'ent unmllcd for, md highly impol i t i~  ' as the 
encmy rms never so nwr Ftls ruin ns in Uiat moment." If tlio 
Spanish and BritisIi armies sliould unite, they mi& it wouId 
givo liberty to the Peninsula. Romana, with Lis iourteen 
thonmad select men, was s~ill ready t o  jein sir Jolm Moow 
and thirty thousand fmh levia waald in a rnooth be addd 
t o  tbe ranks of tlio allied Eorce. 
Tliri t i m e  of faiselioods, for R o m a  hd ripproved of ttha 
intention to rctmt and newr had ubove six tliougnnd men 
m e d ,  was a d h a ~ d  to Nr. Frere, ancl by him tranmitted 
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fo tha gcnerrel, togetlier with one frem Iilmaelf, which, in 
allnsion to tlie retreat upan Portugal, contained tlle following 
cxtraorrlinary pasaagw : 1 mcnn the immcnsc rcsponsibility 
witIr wliicll you cliarge yourself by ndopting, upon n wpposed 
milikry necessity, a measure which must be followed by 
immediate, if not final ruin to uur ally, and by inddible 
disgrace to the country with A o s e  resources you m 
entristed.' CI am unwilling t o  enlarge upon a subject in 
wliich my feeling must be stifled, or expressed & the risk o€ 
offence, which with guch an interest at stake I should feel 
unwilling to excite; but this much I muat say, that if the 
British army liad been sent abrod for the express purpose of 
doing the utmost possible mlschief to the Spanish cause, with 
tlie single exception of not firing a shot bgninpt their troop, 
they would, acmrding t o  the meuures now aanounced IW 
about to be pursued, llave completely fulfilled their purpom! 
These letters came from TruxiIFo, for tlie junta, i thinhg 
Badajos unsafe, hnd proceeded so far on their way t~ Seville, 
the French continued to ndvancc, the rernnanta of the  8pnkh 
armies to fly, and everything bore the m & g l o q  
$ofl:'l:?. appearance. &Ir. Frere knew tbis. In s snbsquent 
letter hc aclmowledged t h t  cnthusinrimwns extinct, 
ond a gcncral prinic commencing whcn he was pcnning t h o ~  
offcnsivc pimsages. Ignonint of tho nnmbers, tho ait,i~ntion, 
and the resonrws of tlic encrny, he formcd l~ypotlieses, insnlkd 
sir John lfoore, and endangcrcd the interestri of liis eountry. 
The Driti8h general, while struggling with unavoidalila diffi- 
culties, s, thus hamsed by remonstrrinces and representations, 
in wbich common serise, truth, and decency were a l i e  dism 
garded ; but he did not fail to shom how little pemnd feeling~ 
weighed with Km in oppoaition to t h ~  public ívelfare. He 
had reason to snppose Mr. Frere r e c e i d  P u s  Ietter relative to 
Ghmilly's mission before this Inst insiilt was offered; y&, as 
it was not acknomledged, be avluled himself of the omision, 
and with singular proprietg and dignity thus n o t i ~ d  the pleai- 
potentimy's second insulting communication:-d da to VJMLT 
h8.h ddiwwed ta m at Pmo hj &fr. iSWrC, 1 s h d  mt w m w k  
UPM2 &. h k t?L9 8tyk 0f #?M tt00 o01¿k7b hflh 
CQlmLal C I m G l y ,  a d  collmpmfly WaB W P T ~  by mEgl km 
c+# the Gth, of &,ich J m d  you a d u p k k ;  th& d j e c t  ik f 
hopeatmtr 
At Toro it w mcertdned tht Xomnna, dthough knowing 
of tlie BritisIi advanco and pledged to suppart, was 
sir ;lohn 
retiring to Gallici~; nomimlly generalissirno, he BICWIT,~ 
lid onIy a few thovaand miserable solioldiers, for ;,"E: 
the junta with geat ingcnuity con t&ed to have Soymrg Cor- 
no general wlicn they h d  an -y, and no a m y  n'pOnacnw- 
d e n  they had oi general. After the disperaion G e n s d  
at Reyno+ Romana hnd mIlied five thousand men Lcith. 
ah Renedo, in the wlley of Cabernuigo, designing t o  bold on 
t o  the drrtiiriita, but the d e  conduct of the Asturian junh  
joined h the tcrror crcnted by thc French victories, had com- 
pletoly mbdiicd tho apirit of tl ie pewsantry, and mino8 tlie 
resourms of thnt provincc. Ht! compl~ined that his mcn when 
checked for miscondrict qitittcd thcir stnniidartls, nnd thnt any 
sliould huve rcrnnined witli the caloum is to  be ndrnired; fur 
among tlte sores of Spaiin tliem were nons more cankered, 
more dispting,  than the vnality) the injuustice, the profiigte 
comption of tlio Asturjan authorities, Thep openlg divided 
the English subsidies, xnd defrauded not only the 
soldiers of their pay and equipments but the 
miserable p e w t s  of their bire for work, doubling 
the metchedness of poverty, nnd deriding the miscry they 
acmioned by pmpous declarntions of thcir o m  virtue. 
From the Asturins Romana led this remnant to Leon, abont 
the period o£ Mooreqs arrival at Xalamantnca ; like 
others he Iiad been demived as to  tlie real sh te  of $5:;:;. 
tlie c o n n t ~ ,  aaad repented of corning to Spin He 
liad quickncss ~ n d  gcncrnl knowlcdge, yct was disqnalied by 
natum for milittuy c o m n d ;  u livel y principie o£ crror prvnded 
all Lis notions of war; no man ever lwro the title of gencml 
less mpable of directing an smy. Nor was he exempt fmin 
the prevailing wealrness of hia countrymen; at ttliis moment, 
when he had not strength ta stsnd upright, his letters were 
teeming d t h  gigantic offensive projeets. He hnd befora 
apprwed of a abre& he waFi now as ready t o  urge ib forward 
movement, promising t o  co-operate with twenty thonsand sol- 
dien when be conld not muster a thard of that number, and 
tlime but Mf armed ancl swcely knowing their own standarda. 
At the time he made thii promise he wna retiring into Gailicia, 
not meaning. t o  deceiva for he WM ns ready to advance as to 
retreatat, biit thie apeciea of boasting is inherent in his nation. 
xt 11ias becn asseiJcetl that a r o  ofiered t h  chief cornmand of 
the Xpmish armies ta sir John Yoore, aiid the lattei refusd 
it. This is aot true. Caro liad no pomer to do so, theiie were 
no amies. to command, and he professed t o  be wtiafied of tBe 
soundness of tlio English general's views, and ashamed of the 
folly of the junta 
Hed-quarters were at Castro Nuevo the Zdth, and Yoore 
inforrned Romana, of  hia design qainst  kult, desiring his M- 
opcration, and requcsting he would, according to ]lis own plan 
giren +.a tlic BritisIi minister in Lontlon, rescrve the Astunha 
for his iine of communication rincl Icn.vs GtilFicia to the British. 
Tlie Iattcr wcre now in full march, Baird was at Benevente, 
Rope nt Pi l l rpnnd~~  and thc mva1rp, scouring tiie country on 
tlic uide o€ VrtIlarlolid l i d  wvernl successful skirmishes, the 
~noet  remnrkalile tieing fouglit liy miijur Otwg of tLe 18th 
Eiussm, wIio capturecl colonel Aiitignnc aild brouglit off more 
prirroners thnn l i i ~  own partj* amourited to  : tlie Frencli could 
thmdore he no Ionger iporant of th0 movement, and the 
Engiisli gcneml brought fnrward his mlumns mpidly. On 
tlie 20th khe army was u&d, tlie cavdry at Xdgar Abaxa, 
tlie infantry at Mayor- both as much conoentrated as the 
necessity o€ olitaining cwer in a eouritry devoid of fud and 
Jeep with snow would permit, The weather m 5  v e l  severe, 
tlie marches long, but the men were robust., th& disciplino 
admimblg therc were few stragglers, and the experience of one 
or two cnmpzips onIy wac wanting to perfection. The iium- 
bcr wns srnrtll, nominnlly thirty-fivc thousanii; liut foar regi- 
nicnts wcro still in Portupl, and t h e e  l i d  bccn lcfk by B~nid 
at Lugo nnddstorgn; oce tliousand ~xhundred nnd cightg-swen 
WFW dct,achrd, fuur tlior~sand wcrc in hmpital: tho 
fi:;? actunl numlisr present under arms on tlie 19th of 
December, was only niueteen thoiwantl and fifty- 
tlirea infuntry, bwo t~iouennd two linnrlrcd nnd rieventy-eight 
mwlry, one thousctnd tliree liundrarl md fifty-eigIit gumer3; 
foming a tata1 of twenty-three tliousmd fire hmbed md 
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ekhty-three men, with sixtp pieces of artillcv. !Chey mere 
o p i z e d  in three divisions rind a reserve of infantq, and 
there were two independent brigades of light troops. The 
mvdry mi in one dixGsion, four battenes were attrtched t o  
the infantq, two te thc homemeu, antl onc mns kcpt in rcscme. 
Ramnna, whe had been able to bring forward very fcw mcn, 
pmmiscJ to murch in two collirnns by Alrnanrcr nnrl Guarde, 
and sent some informntion of tho cnmyk position; iiut 
Moore tl~ougtit 1itt.l~ of liis inklligcncq when lie found Iiim 
even so Iate as t h e  19tli, upon t,lie fiiitli of inform~tion from 
the junta, repreaenting Madrid as still holding out; and 
when the advanced posts were aIready engaged at &liaaqn, 
proposing an interviem at Bene~ente to afrange the plan of 
operatioas. 
On the French Bidg SouIt was oonceutring his ferce on the 
Carrion. After bis rapid and brilliant opening of 
S. 
thc campaign, his comp remuned on the defensive Jo,,&l of 
nntil thc rnov~ments against Tiidcle and Madnd E r t i m q  
wew complctcd; tlie ortler to rccommenm offen- 
si~c!  oper*tions was intcmpted on tlie 12tJi, hut on tlic 16th 
Iie hmrd o f  tlie Englisli army. A t  tliut periatl Ronnct'x divi- 
sion occupied Barquera da h n  Vincente snd Potes un tl~a 
Deba, watching some thouaxnd Asturinns whom Dallcstcros 
liad collected nmr Llanes ; Merle'~ and Mermet's divisions were 
on the Carrion; Pmnceschi'8 dwoons at Valladolid, Debelle's 
at Snha31n. Tbc whole furnislied ~ixteen or seventeen tlioii- 
sand infantry and twelve hiindred clivalry prcsent under arms, 
of nhich only eleven thousand infantry and twelve hunrlred 
cavulry coiild bc npposcd to tlie Rritish without iincovrring 
tlie Im~iortant post of Rnntander. Alarmcd rit this dispiirity 
uf furoe, fioult rcquired Matltllicu Dumas, comrnandiirit at 
Burgos, to  direct al1 tlie diviliions and detaclimenta 
S. passing ttrough that toivn upon tlie Cerrion, wliak Janid 
ever rnight be their origina1 destinatioion, This inw 2;ytio'ls. 
assented to by Dumas and approved by the em- 
peror. 
On the Zlst, Bonnet'~ diviaion wm still on tlre Debh 
Xermet'ri m in the t o m  of Cwrion, 3Tcrle'sa at SaIdaíia. 
Franceschi'~ mvalry liad retired from Ydludolid to Riliciws de 
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la Cuesc~, but general Lorge, coming from Rurps, m h e d  
Pitlencia mGh tliirtecn hnndred dsagoons, and Debclle cont.inued 
nt Stthagnn, wbere the tenth and fifteenthBritIsh hawars under 
Lord Paget surprjd him before dayliglit on the 21st. Tbe 
tenth marched straight to thc town, thc fiftccnth iumed it by 
thc right and endca\~oured to mt oí+' the cncm y, n patrde g ~ v o  
the ~ I n r m ,  and whcn fonr hunbed of  the fiftcentli lind reaciied 
thc rear of tho viliam they found a Iine of tnxltundrrd Frcnch 
dmpons. T h c  tenth were no t  in sight, but lord Piiget cliarging 
with tlie fifteentlq Lirolre tlie Frencli tina pursued tliem for 
some distmce. Tlwenty killed, two Iieutenant-colonels, and 
deven otlier oiticew, with a liunrlred and íicty-íour men pri- 
soners, were tlie rpault of t l~is  vigorous affir. Debelle then 
retired ta  Xanterbq the Endish infantry occupietl 8ahapnI 
and head-qnartere merc eatablished there, Durinathsse evmh 
Bomana remained a$ Mancilla, m d  no assis&oe could be 
expected from him. Ashrimed cif exposing tlie weakness and 
misery oE his troops he kept amy, for after al1 hitr p r o m h  
he c d d  not produce six thousand fighting mea. His letters 
were as uwal extrerndy enauraging. The PmcJb fm ifi 
Spin uias d i n g l y  wed; Pahfox had p ~ o t  6m d$c& 
ttt Tu&; Sozclt, iddivtg fin&'$ divkbn, hcld c d y  
u.& dealmy him b.fm hd eouEa! Ii8 t%xow&;-with otlier 
follies of this nature. 
Tbc Rnglish troopa having outmtlrchcd their mpplics hnlkd 
the 22nrLaad 23rd, tind Soult titisteriert the mrdi of his rein- 
forcementa from the side of Burgos. Fmring for his commu- 
nicatioa with Placentia, he abandoned Bdtiafia on 
s. 
,,, , the 23rd, and concentrated tbe i n f a n t ~  to bis left 
Op~mti~m at Carrion Debelle's cavalry again advsnced to 
nis. Pdlatilla md Ydlacuenda, Franceschi r e m a i d  a; 
Riberos, Lorge ciccupied Paredes. Damas hurried f o m d  
the divisions of the eighth corps, Laborde was alredy ah 
Palencia, hkon and Heudclct followed at the distan= of h a  
da?' marcli. but they were w& Moore designed to move 
duilng thc night of tht! 23rr1, so as to arrive at k r i o n  by dag- 
light on t,hc 24th, to fume t h ~  bridgq and thcn mcending ths 
river fdl npon tbo main Wy, which his in fomt ion  led him 
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vincm and plm~ted 13;s ~bnnrlord nn tlio Linnira of the Tagus, 
tliat mmonnrcli hnd put 011 the scaources of hiri sulitle geniita 
j n h  ractivity, cndm~ouring t o  saftcn the  piiMic mind, md by 
cngrafing Iiencfita on thc terror his  victoria Iind crfnted to 
p i n  ovcr tlie peopfe. But lie likewise gntliered in liis extended 
wings for 8 ncw flight, dcaipctl  to mrry Ilim over nll tlio 
miitlicrn lringdoms of the Peninsi~ln, nnd give liim tlis m k s  
of Liahon rts u mting-place furliis eagles. Miiilrid was trnnquil; 
Toledo, notwitlistantling lier lieroic promises hall never e ~ e n  
~hut  ber gates; one divi~ion of tjie first corpa occupiecl that 
town, anotlier waa at Elcaña, and the liglit camlry sconred 
the whole of La ñ,Iitncha to the hortlers of Andalusia The 
fourth corpa, with Milliaudk and L~allc'a horsemcn, wero at 
Taiavera preparing to march t o  Ddajoa j and sixty thousand 
men with cine hundred aad fifty p n s  and fifteen kys'pm- 
visions in carts, were ieviewed at the p t e s  of Madrid npon 
tlie 19th: three days aftermzrtls they were in fult march to 
intercept the line of sir John Moore'a rnmch. 
Napoleon mas informed of that geneneral's advanw on thc 
21st, and in an instant the Spariiards their juntns and their 
armies were dismissed from his thonglits; his mips were 
arrested in thar different movcriicnt~, tcn thouaand mcn were 
Ieft to control the capital, and on the cvening of the 221111 
fifty tliousand men wcre nt the foot If the Guadar~ma d 
dccp snow chokecl t.hc psssca, ririd tmclvc boura of ineffectnd 
toil Icft tFie nrlvancetl guarda f i U  on tlic! wrong siilc; the 
general comrnnnding r6pcirted tliat t l ie rond wns impmcticaile, 
but X q d e o n  plucing liimself at tlie Iicnd o£ tlie coIumn, on 
foot and amidst storms of hail and drifting snow, 1ed liis 
aoldiers over tlie mountain. Maoy men and animal8 died 
during tbe  pssage, whicli kstcd tuvo days, h t  the emperor, 
personally urgirig on tlie tmops with unceasing ~ehemence, 
remhed T'iIlwaatin, fifty miles fxoom Madrid on the 24th. The 
26th he was at Sardcsillas with tlie guards and the divisions 
of hpisse and Dessoles; tbe dmgoons of La Hoiissaye entered 
Valladolid the same day, md Ney witb the sixtb corps rvag at 
Rio Seco. 
From Tordesillns Napoleon mote to Sault, concluding bis 
despdch thus : ' O w  awdv smuk am &ea& al Rewtmk 
0' f l ~  fl?I$J!bh 93~7.88 h&VJ &4 g& *Eio?a m 
a 
m h t :  i j  t iq atlaclc pm ZailJb al1 t lw i~  fom ,  Y O U ~ R I  ~f 
d i m  me daojti onmch; t h  f d w  i%j p m d  $7~3 $Ftion4* 
&fÓT M. If #MJ rdTt%t p U V w i  ~hll~ E ~ ~ T J . '  
Then, fuIl of hope, he hastened himsclf to Valderas, but h d  
tlie mortificztion to learn he was twelve liours too late. IIe 
had d e  a wonderful march, resting neither dap nor niglik, 
but the British were across the Esla! I n  fact Soult was in 
full piirsuit when this lettcr wns u-ritten, for BIotire. wdl aware 
of hiti own situation, harl givrn ordcrs ta rctrcot th¿ momcnt 
tlie intclligcnco of Nnpolcon's maicli from Madrid rcnchctl Iiim, 
and tlis limvy bngpge wiw iirimcdintcly rno~ed to tlic rmr, 
wliile tha reserve, tlie liglit brigades, and the mvalry remnined 
'a+ &haafn, tLe latter piiuliiiig patroles up t o  tlia eneniy'a 
lineg antl skirmishing to hide tlie retragrade marcli. 
On the 24tb, IIope, Iiaving t~vo didiiiisions, retired by the 
roui of hlayorga; B i d  with anotlier, by tlid o€ Talencia de 
San Juan, where tbere mas a femy-boxt to eross tlie Esla, river; 
tlie matquis of Itommin undertoolr t o  gil& the bridge of 
Mansilla. hrge'ti dragoom arrived the 9 W n B  dny at Frccliilln, 
and tlie ilivision of I~tliorde ciitcrcd Pnredea. The 25th 
Mmre witli the reserva aud light LEripdes, followed Hope's 
column to Valderss j tiie 26th Bnird pmsed tlie Esla at Valencia 
antl took post on tlie othm sirle, yet with some difficulty, for 
tho boat nTae smaIl the fords dcsp and tlie river rising. Tlie 
commandcr-in-cliief approached the bridge of Castro Comalo 
enrly in tlie morning of the 26tl1, Iiut tlle ~tores wwere a long 
time passing, a dense fog intercepted tlic view, and so nicely 
timd was tlie march, tliat the seout* of  the imperitil hoysemen 
wcre alrenrly infesting tlic flnnk of tho column, aud evcn 
carricd off soma of  tlis briggxge. 
The Ieft b m k  of ths river commanded the lirEdge, and gene- 
m1 Robert Crawfurd rmained 6 t h  s brigde of infantry ancl 
two gans t o  pruted the passage; for the m l r y  \ r ~ o  di11 
mtehing Soult, who was now pres~ing f o m r d  in purallit. 
Lord l'iigct, after passing Mayorg4 b d  been intercepted by a 
Btrong body of horse belongiq to the emperor's army. It 
waa embtittled on a awelling ground close to the road, tlie soil 
was deep and soakcd wiih snow and r in ,  yet two quudrnns 
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of tlre tenth rode ~tiffly up to the aummit, and notwithstand. 
ing tlie enemy'fi advantage of numbers and position, lrilled 
twenty and captured one hundred. This was a liardy adiw; 
but tlie English avalr~r had bem engged more or las for 
tvelve successive dap, with ~udi  fortune and bra~ery that 
above five hundred prisoners had already fdlcn into their 
limd~, and their l e ~ l e r s  being exoellent their coufidenee was 
6. nnbountled. From Wayorga l3aget procede11 tu 
J-ni of Benevente, e,nd Soult, with great jud,ment, 
*PratioU* pushed h r  Asturgri by tlic rand o€ Mwcilln, mherc 
BIS. 
upon Romana, lrnving tlircc thous~nd m w  nnd 
two guns t o  defend the bridge nt tlie Iuttcr plnce, fe11 bwk to 
Laon. Tlius 3Ioore recovered by a critica1 mrircli Iiis commu. 
nications witli Gallicin, and so Fnr hnñ3ed ihlie cmperor: ytt 
Ifis psition IW neitlier =fe nor tennl~lc. 
Renevente, n ricli open plnce, winarlrnlile for a mal1 but 
curious Moorish mstle containing a collection of i~ncient 
armour, is situated in a plain ,vliic¡i a tending  Erom tbe hl- 
lician mountaine to the neiglibourliood of Burgos appears to 
be boundless. Tbe nver Esla ~ n d c c l  tlirough it about four 
miles in Ront of Benevente, and the b r i d s  of Castro Gonzalo . 
was the key to the town; the riglit bank of thc &la was Low- 
ever entirely mmrnanded from tlie further sside md there were 
many fods. Eighteen miles liiglier up, at Valencia de Sm 
Juan, a sliorter r o d  from Maycirp to Astorga crossetl the 
river by tlie ferry-boat ; and at Mancilla, the ipaqqe b e i y  
only defended by Xpaniarda was in a manncr open to bu!t, 
for Rommo h d  not destroyed tlie arches of tlie br idp 
Beyond ?iXnncillri, under the bilh skifiing this geeat plain, 
stood tlic tewn of Laon, whicli wris inclosed with walla md 
captible of rwisting a midden nssaulh. 
Moorc knowing tlie line of tlis Eda coidd not he main- 
tained, resolved to rernain no longer.tlinn m nmsary  tii 
c h r  out bis mqmines nt Beneventc, and covcr thc mar$ of 
liis stores. Rut tlie road to Asturga by ]Ron wns mucli 
~lmrter tIian Il~at tlirougli Benwente, and as Romma w i ~  
incliied to retreat to Gallicia, sir Jolin requested Iiim to 
maint~iia Leon as long aa possible, and lea& Qallicia open 
fop tlie Eiiglish nmy. Romana, assented to both requeds, 
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and r 3  he h d  ra grcuk mbblc, nnd a n~mhex of citixena and 
vololnntcers wem williiig nntl evcn eagcr to figlit, thc town 
might havo ma2c rcsisfnnce. Moorc Iiopctl it woiilrl, and 
onlers to  break down tlie bridge at Cnstro Goiiznlu in 
liis own front, tlie moment tlie stmgglere and &gage ehould 
havc pnssed. Meantime the bad example of murmuring 
given by men o£ high rrxnk bad deccentled lamer, mxny 
rqimental officers neglected their duty, nnd what with dislike 
to n retreat, the scvcrity o€ tho weather, and tlie inexperience 
of the nrm y, the prcvious fine discipline o€ thc t.roops was 
bmken down: disgrweful excesses h d  becn comniitted at 
Talderas, and the general severely reproached the armg for 
ita mil deeds, appeding to the hononr of thc soldicrs for 
amendment, 
On ths night of the 2 6t.11, the light cnvnlry of tlio impcrid 
gunrrl, rirfing closr: iip t o  the liridge of Cn~tro  Gonzalo, 
captured soma women and liqgagc, nnd rnrletivoured to 
mrprke the post, which p T e  rise to a remnrkable display of 
COara0:e and discipline. Jolin Walton anrl Ricliard Jackson, 
privah soldiers of tlie forty-third, wcre poetod beyond the 
bridge, with oordera tliat m e  sliould dand finn, tlie otlier fire 
and run back to the brom and gire notice whetlier tliere were 
many encmies or few. Jnckson fired but was ovcrtakcn trnd 
m i v e d  twelve os fourteeri snbrc cuts in ~bn instant; nevcr- 
thebss, hc carne staggering on and gavc tlia ~ i g n ~ l ,  wllilc 
Walton, dtli cqcal i-csolution, st.ood liis grou~ld a i d  WOUBCTCLI 
m r n l  af the ascnilrintg, who rctiied lenving liim uiiliiiit, lmt 
witii his mp, knrtpsnck, belts, rand rnusliet cut in above twenty 
plaees, liis bayonet bent duuble, bloody t o  tlie hilt, and nutclied 
IiIce a 8aw. 
On the 27th, the CRTFL~T and tlie stmgglers = ~ i n g  al1 over 
the river, Crawfard commenced destroying the bridge amidst 
torrents of rain and snow; h l f  tlie.troopa worked, tlie other 
half kept tlie enemy at bay from the bciglitg oa the Ieft Einnk, 
for the cnvalry scouta of tlie hperial guad were spreprtl ovcr 
the plain. At teu o'clock at night a ltlrgc papty, following 
some waggons apin endeavoud h pass tlia piq~tets and 
gallop down to  the bridse; that failing, a feew dismtiunted, 
and extendiag ta the riglit ibnd left commenced a aliirrnisliu,rr 
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firc, wliilc otlicm ~ m n n i n d  rendy to chaige if the position of 
tlie troops, d i c h  tbcy expectetl to nsoertain by tliis scheme, 
slionld offer rin apportunity. They failed, and tliis nnxiev to 
intcrnipt tlic work indcced Cmwfui'd to destrop tso archs 
instead of one, and blow tip the oonnecting bnttress; t,he 
masonT waa so solirl, tliat it ws not unti1 twelve o'dock in 
the nigljt af fhe 28th tliat al1 prcparntions wcrc mmplthd, 
when the troops descended tlie hcighta on the l e f t  bunk, and 
pnssing very silrntly by single filcs rind ovcr plonlrs lnid 
amos8 thc brokcn rtrclics, gaineri tlic othcr side without ION: 
nn instnnce of s:nguIar good Eortune, for thc night wap dark 
md fcinpest~ioiis, tIic rivcr rising rnpidly with n roaring noioe, 
and tlle enemy close at lzanrl. ?lo litave resisted an attadt 
wouId hnve laen impossililc, but thc rctrcat ww undiscovered 
and tlie mine sprung iritli goorl e f l c t .  
Crawfiirrl mnrcli~rl to h e v e n t e  wherc thc mvdrp and thc 
rmcrve ~titill rcrnuinsrl. Rerc: severa1 tliousnnd i n f n n t ~  slept 
in tlie u~ipcr pnrt of an irnmense conveut liuilt round n sqnire, 
and friglitful catnstroplie IVM irnpending; for tlie lower 
grillcrics were thickly ~tovred witii cnvaIry liorses, there m9 
but one wt,rance, and twu oficers of tlie forty-tlird cominn 
from the bridge perc~ived on entering tlie con~ent, tiiat a 
brge wintlow-sliutter wa8 on fire, thzt in a few moments hh8 
straw under tbe horses mould ignite and six thousand men 
md animal9 must iiievitlttily perish in the flrtniek 00neof 
them, captairi L!oyd, a man of gwat strcngfb and activity, 
and of a presence of mind ivhich ncver faifed, made a sign d 
siIence to bis companion, and springing on to the nearest 
horse, run along the backs of the others until be mched tlie 
blazing shutter, which ha tore oiT ita liinges antii cast out of 
thc window; thcn amlcenlng a few mcn, he cleard the 
p s s ~ g c  mitlioiit anp alnml, wliich in such a m e  would have 
been aa destnictivc ns thc tire. 
%o dnys' rcst hhnd bccn g~ined at Benevente, hut littls 
couEd be clnne t o  remove thc storcs, aiid tbc greriteet part were 
degtroycd. T h e  nmy wns and liad been from the 5rh withoid 
mfficient menns of trnnsport, thc gencral Iind no moncy to 
proenre jt, and tl~e iI1-will an(1 sliuffling eonduct of tlie jrintas 
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tinoq bad tmvm~ed two liundred miles of hostile counb, md 
trmsported fifty tliausand men from Madrid to Astorga in a 
diorter time tliiin a Spaiiisli courier would have taken ta h v e l  
the snme distnnca ! 
Tl i i~  ~tupendous mnrch W ~ R  renrfcrcd fruitles by tlie quick- 
ness of Iiis. ntlvmary; hit Nnpoloon, t l iougl~  11e liad failed to 
destroy Uie Rnglish m y ,  resulved, nevertheless, to ~ a s t  it 
forth of tlie Pcninnnlti. hing  Eiiinself recalled to France by 
tidings t h ~ t  lic Aiistitriiin storm wtm rcndy te bumt, Le fired 
upon Soiilt to mntinue tlic! pitníiiit. For tliis pwpose tliree 
divisions of cnvulry nnrl tlires of itif:tritry were n t l d d  to that 
mamhal's fomer wrnlnrtnd; yct o€ tliesc Inst, the tno com- 
mnnded by h i a o n  nnil Rcurldct mcre scvernl rnnrcli~ in the 
m r ,  un tl Ronnct's rcniainctf alivnys in tlie Non- 
S. 
,To,~. taEn Je St. Aiidcr. Hencc the whole nnmhcr 
QpcmtIon* irnmdiately led to tlie l i u ~ u i t  sm nbout twenty- 
31s. five tliwxand men, of wliicli four tliousnnd tiv& 
hundrcd were caviilry, comliosirig t1ie divisions of Lorges, Le 
Floiiswye, md Friincenclii; fifty-four p n s  were witli the 
columns, and Lnison'~ antl Heudclct's rlivisions followed 
forced marclles. Biit 8oul t  was supprted by Yey with tbe 
~ixth corp,  wonting its third diviuion, yet mustering 
sixteen tliousand men unrier arms, tlie flower of tlie F~nch 
army, and haviug tliirty-aeven pieces of artilley. TLiw in- 
cluding Lburde, Heudelet, and Loison's division, nearly s i 9  
thoussnd men rtnd ninety-onc s u s  were put on the track of 
the English army. The emperor returned to Vnlldolid, whme 
he reeei~ed tlie addresses of tlie notablm and deputies from 
Mdr id  nnd ot.her great t o m s  and s t m ~ e  by promisa and 
otlier means to min t l ~ e  good opinion of  tIie pubIic, Ap. 
pdnting Joseph liis l i e u t e n a ,  he allotted separate pm 
nnces for each ' corps d'arm8g' tha imperial p a d  ww ta 
return to Pranee, and himeelf departing on I~orsehlc with 
aearcely anp escwt,frustrat~l some desigris. wbich tllespnniards 
Ira4 it is said fomatl against his person, by tlie iestoniaLing 
speed of his joxrniey. 
BOOK ZV.-CHAF. 5. 
SOULT nnowise inferior to  iany of bia nation, iT tlie cmperor 
be excepted, followcd Moore ~vitli a vigour inrlicnting his 
desise tu finish the carnpaign in n rnanuer suitirblc t o  ita 
opening nt Gnrnontll. His ninin brirly f{>llowed 5. the route of Foncrvxdon and Poiitefercarla; a. JO, , , ,~  ,f 
mhmn took the road uf Cninbarros afid Bsnibibre, $ytioii% 
and Francesclii entered tlie ralley of tlie Xyl, in- 
teiiding to move up tlmt river and turn tlie pposition of TTiIla 
Franca del Bierzo. Tllus Woore, after having h i c e  Iinffled the 
emperor's combinationrr, IVM still pressed in his ret~eat  wit.h a 
fury ttbat seemed te  i n c r e ~ e  every inoment. Ttie sepnrntbn 
af hls líght hrigade2, re~tictmtly adopted on tlia barf coumcl 
of his qnnrte~-mnstcr-g~ni:i~1 Murray, liad wwkcned tlic nrmy 
by tl~rer! t8honwtnd mcn. . Ho l i c i ~ ~ v e r  still pris~eqocrl ninctcen 
tliownnd of nll rarrns, good ~oldicrs to fight, and &ron& to 
merch nltlioupli ñliuken i ix  di.icipIine by tila disorderx at 
Valderas nnrl Aetorga; for his exertions to restore order and 
regularity wr.re by many officem slig-litly s~conded, and by 
soine aith scnndalous 1~vit.y disregnrded. Tliere waa nr: clioioe 
but tn retreat. The astonkiiing rapidity with whicb the 
empcror had bronglit up 11i~ overbearing numbers and tiirust 
tlie EngTisli army into Gilllicirt, had rendewd tl~c natural 
strengtli of that country unavailing; the resourcca \vere few 
cven for an rirrny in wintcr quwirtcrs, and fur a cnmpaign in 
tlint smqon tliere wcre none nt ull. All tlie drnuglit cattle 
tliat cauld be procured woiild scurceIy have transported am- 
rnunition for two buttles, \vbcreas the French, alveeping tlze 
ricli plains o€ Castille with tlieit powerfut cavalcp, miglit have 
formed rnqadnes at Astorga and Leon, and been wpplietl in 
abundante ~vliile the Englisli were stawing. 
Before be d ~ a n c e d  from fialmncli, Noore, foreseejng kis 
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trength f t nt eOtllltr ili ; t r r es were f
ven f r Ilrm i i ter narters, for n Cll i i
tllllt ~ell.'lon th r er at 0.11. ll tllC ra ht eutt.l
h o l e u Bcurcd u
muuiti t attles, whe t o , sw i tll
ricb lai s r astille itll their erf l ca alry, i ht a e
fonned magazines ut storga and eon, nnd been supplied in
abundance while the nglish ere starving.
f r h adv nced fr Sala anca, Moor , f r s ci hill
movemcnt must sooner or later end in a retreat, had gent 
oficers ta cxamine the rolads of Gxllicia, and tbe barbouw 
Appendix. ~vhich uftered tbe peatest advantages for em. 
NO. is, bartation. Ey tlie reports of tliose oíficeq ~ h i c h  
' & arrived from day to  di, and by the state of the 
magazines wliich he bad drected to be formed, bis memures 
mere constantly regulated. Thc stores at  -4atorga, 
5it Joha Beneventc, and Labancxa, liad Iip untowurd eir- 
l'npcr~. cumstanca and tlie deticieny of transport been 
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rendered o€ no avait beyond the mornentwy supply; 
and part of tl~eir contents falling iiito t,he enerny's han&, pve 
him some cause of triumph : tliose at J7illa Franea and Lnga 
contained fourteen days' consiim~ition, and tliere were smaller 
magazines formed on the line of Orense and Vigo. 
More tlinn tliis could not Iiave been accomplislied It nas 
now only tlie fiftee~cth clay ~ incc  he liad left Salamanca, antE 
already tiie torrent of lar ,  diverted from tlie gouth, vas 
fonming among the rocks of Gallicia Nineteen tliousand 
British troops posted in ctrong ground niig-lit liave offered 
battle to very ~uperior nurnbers; yet wliere wns thei use of 
nierely figliting an enemy who had tliree liundrd tllousand men 
iu S p i n  t Notliing could be gainetl, but he mighlit 
~ ~ " ~ ~ ; -  hy n quiclr retreat rencli Fiis sliips uninole~ted~ md 
cnrry liis n m y  from tliat nurrow corner to tile 
southern provimes, and renew the wrir unrler more fwouraIiIe 
circumst.ancm. It was by tIiia cornbinstion of a fleet and 
army the grentest nssistance uiuld be given to Spain, aud the 
strengtli of England Lecoma most formidable; a few dapl 
6fLiIing ~ o u l d  carry the troop~ to Cac?iz; six wccks\orishnt 
rnarcliing would not briog tlie Piencli from Gallicia ta that 
neighbourliood. The northern provinces were bmlren, subdud 
in spirit, and possessed few resources; the soutliem provinces, 
rich and fertle, Iind ~carcely tieen ctn enemy, and tliere wm the 
seat of p e r n m c n t .  Moore, feasoning thus, reaolved t o  fa11 
down to the coast and embark with as lit.tle delay as might be; 
hut V f p ,  Gruña, and Ferro1 werc the principal listrbonm, and 
their relative ndvantages couId only be detenniiied bythe reporta 
tif the engineers not yet received; and as tbose reports Game in 
h m  day to day the liae u£ retreat became ~vbject o chanp 
%#en SouIt toolc the comrnmd of thc pnrsuing arniy Hope'a 
and Frasec's divisions were at Villa Franca, Ihird's at Uernbibre, 
the reserve and mvalry at Camhrros, six miles from htorgn. 
Eehind Camliarros thc mountainu of Gitllicia rosa nbruptly, 
yet tlicre wns no position, bccnusc, nftcr tlic firvt risc nt tlie 
villagc of Rodrigatos, tlic gniiind cantiniidly rlcsccnJed to 
Cnlcabellos a smltIl tuivn four miles fmn YilIa Franca; and tlie 
old r o d  of Foncwmlon nnd Ponteferradn, wliicli turned tho 
mhole of this h e ,  wns ctoIred mith tlie dmncing AwndiX. 
eolumns of tlic enemy. me reserve nnd t.lie SO. i s ,p  P. 
cavaIry therefore marclied during tlie niglit to E:E~,tael 
Benibibre, nnd on tlieb arriaal IEaird's division pro- bmitli's 
ceded to CalcabeUos; but in the immense ivine- ICcport. 
vaults of Bembibre liundreds of men remaixred inebriated, 
the followers of the army erowded the honses, and many of 
lbmana's disbnndd mcn wcre miñed witli this hetero, neneous 
mas! of marrsudeirs, rlrunknds, mulctccrs, womcn, nnd cliiIdmn : 
tlle wcatlier ~vm tirelirlful, nnd (lespite the uttnost exertions of 
the gened-in-cliief, w11en tho reserve mrclied tIic next 
morning, Qie nurriber of tliose uiifurtunate ivretclies was not 
&mi&bed. BIoom Ieaving a mal1 guard with them pro- 
c d e d  to Gklcaballos, but scarcely had tlie reserve iiiarchcd 
out when sorne French cavairy appeared and in a moment the 
mad m íilIed with thc miserable ~tragglers, wlio carne 
crowding aftec t.he troolis, mme witli shrielis of  distms and 
wild gestures, others with brutal exclamationa. Somc overcome 
with fenr tlirem awap their -9, otbem too stupidly intoxi- 
mted: to fire reeIed to  nnd fro aFike insensible to  danger and 
dis,pce, and the Iioreemcn tearing at a gnllop tlirougli the 
disorrlerly moh, cutting to tlic ~igltt and lefb as they ~irrssed, 
rode so close to the retiring column that it waa furmd to linlt 
snd clieck their aiidncit. 
dt Calcabellos tlie reserve took up ib position, &ird rnarchd 
to IIerreriw, and Bfoore went on tu Billn Frnnci~; b u t  in tlirat 
town also p& excesses had heen cominittd by tlie preceding 
rlivisions; the mqmines were plundered, the balcem Jriven 
froin tlie ovens, the wine-stores forced, $Le commissaries prcs 
vented making tbe re,..ular distributiona; the doors of the 
Bouses were broken, and a scanddous inb;ubordination then 
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~howed a discreditable relnxation of discipline by the ofticm 
lloore anrated t h  disorder, mused one m n  taken in the act 
ofplundering s magazine to be liangd in thc marlreLplplnce, 
md then isauing severe orders rcturned to CnIcabeUos. 
A smnU but at tLis season of thc pear a ddeep strenm, cdledthe 
Cluia, run tlimugh t1iat town, and was crossed by n stone 
bridge. On tlie Villa Franca side rt lofty ridge, rough with 
vineymls and shne walls, was occupied by two tliousand fivc 
hundred infmtry, with a bnttery of si l  pina; four hundml 
riflemen, and a like numhcr oF mvalry, wcre postcd on a hili 
two miles beyond the rivcr, to wnteli the ronda of Bembibre 
and Foncevndon. In tbis situation, on the 3rd of Jamar?; 
s, littlc after noon, thc Frcnch geneml Coihcrt npproaebcdiFith 
six OF eiglit squndrons, biit okrving thc grouud bebind 
Cnlcabcllos so Atrondy oocupicd demltndcd i~inforeements. 
Soult bclieving tlic EngIish did not m e m  to stand, ordered 
Coi'bcrt ta  clinrgc witIiout dclny, and tlie Iattcr, sGung by thc 
rnessage, olieyecl witli prccipitntc fury. From one of thcm 
errora so frcqiicnt in war, thc British cnvalrv, thinlting a grcatcr 
force was riding n%pinst hem, retired at sped to Cnlcriliellos, 
snd the riffcmcn wlio liad witIidrawn wlicn tlio Fmncli fjmt 
carne in ~igllt ,  were just ps i i ig  tlie bridge, \vhien a crowrl ciE 
staff-officerri, tlic cnvalry, ~11d tlle cnemy, carne in upon tlicm iii 
one naw : tliirty or forty men were taken, and Collierkcrosmog 
the river cliargcd on tlie spur up the road. Tlie reminder 
of the riff emen had Fiowever thrown tbernselves into the vine 
yards, antl wlien tlie cnamy approsiclied witltin a few yadq 
opened such a deadly 6re, that tlie greatest number of the 
PrencEi liorsemen were killerl on the spot, and among the rest 
Colbert. His fine nartinl figure his voice his p t u r e s  and 
his great valour, had excited thc adrniration of tho Britiah 
anrl a general SeeIing of somw predominant mhen the 
gdltint soldier fell. Some French vo:tigeum now crossed tlie 
river, and a few o£ tbe 52nrl regiment descended fmm tha 
upper part of the rid,ns t o  the assistanco of tlie riflemen, 
whereupon a sharp skirmish commenced, in ñliich t w o  or 
tliree hnndred men of botl~ sides wer:! killed or woundwl. 
T o w d s  the temxnation Merleb infantry amenred on the 
liiils and d e  n demonatriition of crossing opposik to the ldt 
of the Endish position, bnt n tuttery clieckd thiq night carne 
on, and tlie comb~t  w e J .  
As tlia road ftom Villa Franca to Lugo lerl tliroiigli a mggd 
mntry ,  the cn~talry wcre sent on to the Idter town, and 
during the nigl~t tlie French patroles brealcing in upntlie 
rifle piquets, woiinded some men, yet mere beaten b c k  witl~ont 
being rhle to  di6c:iver that tlie Englisli had abnndoned the 
position. Tliis liowever was the M e ,  and tlie rcsenre renchd 
Berrerim, .s, diatancc of cightecn miles, on the morning of tlic 
4th, Bnirrl's division being then nt Wognla, Hope's and Frnscr's 
ncw Lugo. 
At Herrerias, Moore, wlio consbntly directed tlis movs- 
ments o€ tlie rmr-guard, received tlie first reports nF tlia 
engineers relative to tlie hnrhours, Vino, besides its grertter 
distante, ofikretl no position to cuver the embarkation, but 
Comfira and Betauzos did. The march te Tigo was tlieref(m 
abandoned, tlie ships were directed rcund t o  Coruñn, and 
the geneni!, d i o  now dccply rc,pt.ted the sepayation of 
bis light hriprles, gent forward instructions for tlic lcading 
division to hnlt nt Lugo, wlicre Iie de~igncri to rally tlie nrmy 
xind givc hnttle i r  tlie cnriny woiilrl acccpt it. TIicsr: import,aut 
orders were cerriecl to IInird by cnphin h r g a  Napier, aide- 
dscamp to the commaiider-in-cliiaf, yet sir David forearded 
them Iiy a private drzgoon, d o  goh dmnk and Iost the 
despatch; this 1iIxmeable i][~c,"ullarity was minous to Frnser's 
troops, for in lieu of resting two d a p  fit Lugo, tliat general, 
nnwitting of the arder, purslied his toilsome journey tci~varrls 
St  Jago de Compostella, ancl returning without foorl or rect 
Iost more thrtu four hundred stragglcrs. 
On the Sth, tlie rcserve, hnving Liy a foroed mnrcli of  tliirty- 
six miles gained twdve Iiotirs' shrt ol  tlie enemy, renthllierl 
Nogales, and tliere met a Iwge convoy o i  Englisli clothing, 
shoes, and amniunition, intended for Xximm.na's nrmy, yet 
moving towads tlie enemy,--a circumstance cliaracleristic of 
Spain. There was a bridge at Nogales whicli tlle engineers 
hiled to destroq; and it rrm of little conseqnence, for the rivcr 
wm fordable above and below, and tlie general W R ~  uowilling, 
anless for somc palpable atlvrtntnge wliicli scldom prerienterl 
itself, ta injure tbe communicntionv of R muntry he was unabis 
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to serve: the bridge8 dso mcre commonlp m-y ~olidlj m- 
dructed, and the arches liaving Iittle span, coiild be rendercd 
passable apin in a sliortcr time than thcy cguld be deatrciyd. 
Noreover, tlie rond was cevered with baggage, sick men, 
women, and pIuuclerere, al1 of mhom would liavc been thua 
sacrificed; tlie pcrislintry, a1tlioug.h armcrl, diil not molest tha 
enemy, and fearing both sirles alike csrrid tlieir cffccb iuto 
the mountains, yet evcn tlicre tha rillnnous rnarnudera followed 
thern, and in Boine cases vere l i l let l ,a just punisbment for 
quitting tlieir colours. linder the most favoumlile c i ~ u m -  
stnncw, thc taiI uf a rctrenting force exliiliits terrible smca 
of distresg xncl on tlie roilil near Noples tlie follnwers of the 
amy wcre dying fast fmm cold and hunger. The soldieq 
bsrefooted, harassed, and wenltend by their excesses at Bem. 
bibre and Tilla Franca, werc dropping to the rear by hundreh, 
wKle broken mrts, d ~ a d  nnimnls, nnri t,l~i ~iiteous upectnclt: oF 
wornen antl cliildren, ~truggling or Edling exliauated in tlie 
mow, completed a picture of uBw, wliicli, like Janug has a 
double fnce. 
Francesclii, aiter turuing Villn Fiancn scourcd tlie vnll~y oof 
B. tlie Sy1, cnptnrcd m ~ i i y  8pnniqli priponem md 
~ m n r n t o ~  bogpge, antl now regained tlie line of mareli at '  
Operutiwis, 
MS. Beceren. TIie Frmch sirmy, aIso, recovering tlieir 
lost ground, pamed Nogales towards evening, 
galling tlie reer-gunrtl with a oontinual skirmisli. Bere it wari 
that dollam t o  tlie amount of twenty-fivc tliousand pounde 
were abandoned, Tl~is small gum mas kept npnr bwdquarters 
to answer sudden emergmcies, and the bulloclts dmwing it 
being tired, tlie generd, who could not s a ~ c  tlie money si&- 
out risking an ill-timed action, had it rollcd doun the Bide o í  
the mountain, where pnrt of it was afterwards gathered bp the 
enemp, part by tlie Gallician peasants. The returns laid 
bcfom parlinment in 1809 made tlie sum 60,0001, and the 
whoIe loss during the cnmprrign nearly 77,0001.; but it is 
easier to make an entry ef one siim for a fremry return than 
ta state the  ildajls accnrntely; the monepagents like tbe 
mílitnv-agents, iicted inrlependently, aad al1 deficiencies went 
dom under the h e d  of abandoned treasure. OEcw actnally 
present agree, tlut tIie onlp t m u r e  a l i a d m d  by the nrmy 

left by Baird d e n  lie first dvaneerl from Astorga) had rejnincd 
tlre mmy between lliTilla Franca and Lugo, nincteen thauaand 
combatants were still under arms. 
On tlie riglit the English pound mns com paratively flat and 
partially prohected by a bend of tlic Minho; the centre wa 
nmonpt vinegardrc witli low stone walls, T h e  left, sornewbat 
witlilield, rested on tlio rnountmin supported nnrl co~ered by 
tlie cavalry ; for it waR the intt.ntion of the gen pral to mgr1~8 
depply witli Ibis rigl~t and mritre before he closed with his left 
wjng, in wliich he had posted tlie flowei of liis troop: he 
tliought tlius to bring on a decisive bat tle, and tnrsted to the 
men'~ d o i u  so to hantlla tlie cnemy that Iie would be: glad to 
let tlie army retreat unmolested. Other liope to re-embark 
tlie troops without loss tliere wns none, sme by dratagem; 
Soult, comrnantling soldiers Iiabitutited to war, miglit be 
t e m p t d  but could never he f o r d  to engage ia a clecisim 
battle amongst tliose rngged mountnbq wbere whole dap 
rniglit pass iil skirmishing without iiny progrcss bemg made 
to~vards crippliig an a h c r s q .  
It was mid-day hefore the French marslial arrived in pcrson 
at tlie heod of ten or twelve tlioiisand men, an(1 the remaindtr 
of his power fcllowed in somc disarrny; for the marches h d  
not bcen so a y  but that mnny even of tlie oldest soldiers bd 
clropped behind. As the culuinns carne upi tbey formed in 
orrler of battle along a strong mountain ridge frnnting tlia 
English. The lattcr merc partly liiddcn by incqunlities of tlm 
p u n d ,  Soult doubted iF tliey serc  nll bcforc him, and hkiog 
foiri p n s ,  and somc aquadrnns coinmnnrled by mlonel Jiallc- 
mnntle, hc dvanccd townrds the centre and opncd a fire, 
wliicli wns imrnediatclg silcnccd by n rcply from fiftccn p i m :  
tlie mnrslinl tliiis conviriced tliiit soriictliitrg more tban a xnr- 
gunrd was in Lis front retired Atmut nn hour after he m n d ~  
a feint. on tlie rigllk, and & tlie Eanw time sent n column of 
infnntry iind five p n s  @nst the left, On that &le tlic tlirce 
re~iments wliicli liad latePy joined were drawn up, nnd tl~e 
Frene11 piisliing tlie outposts liad, were gaining the 1iilt~311ings, 
ivlien Moore arriveil, rallied tlie 1igl:lit traupq liruke the d v e ~  
croluirii~, aud trwted it very roughly in LIie pursuit. Tlle 
e~t imnt~ l  l o ñ s  of ttte French between three a d  foiu 
Iiiinrlied mea 
r 
It wlh~ now evident the Briti~h meant t o  give brittIe, and 
h u l t  hnatening Uie march of Laborde's division wliich w~ 
still in tIic m r ,  rcqumted Noy, thcn at Villn Fmnca, ta  dctach 
n tlivision of tlis sixtli corp  by tlie Vol de2 Orrefi t o  Orense. 
n'sy boivever, merely sent finme troops in ta  tlie 
S. 
vdEey of tlie Eyl, aad puslied bis ad~anced posts J~~~~~ or
in froiit as fiar as Nogales, Poyo, anrl Dniicos. At ;fytioaa.  
daybrdr on the 8th tlie two armies were etill 
emhatled On the French side, seventeen thous~nd infantry, 
four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery mere In line, 
yet Soult d e f e d  the attack nntiI the 9th. On thr. English 
part, skteen thousrtnd in fantrv, eigl~teen liundrerl cxvnIq, and 
fortp pieces of nrtillery, impratiently awnited t he  assault, and 
blnmcd tlieir ndvcrcnryfor tlclnying a contcst u~hich thcynr<lt.ntly 
desiretl; tiut darkness fe11 w+itliout a diot bsiitg fircd, nncl witli 
it fe11 tlie Englidi general's Eiape to cngnge his enemy on equnl 
terms. What sm to be done t Asmil t heFmch  position, remtiin 
another day in expectation of an attack, or sccretly pining a 
march embark, or at least ohtain time f O wcnre a gaod cover- 
ing position hr the embarkation. Tlie first operntion was war- 
rnnted ncither by present nor future dvanhges, for how muld 
an inferiorarmy e x p t  ta crippla a superior one, posted aa 
the Fmch were on a strong rnountaio, with an overbearing 
eavaly to pratect thpir infantry should the latter be beateii, 
and l i a h g  twenty thousand frcsli troops at t,he distance of 
two short marches in the renr. Tlie Rritish army wns no$ 
providetl to  fight nbove ano brattle; tliere werc no drniight 
mttle, iio meltns of trana~iortiug reserve ummunition, no 
rnogw~ines, no lioñpitrile, no second linp, no provi~iuns: a 
ilefcat would have bacn ruin, a victory uscless, A battle is 
aIways a serious affair, two battles in mch circumstances, 
though both should be victories, would haye been cfestruction; 
but s h y  fight after the army hadbeen riilIied and the dismters 
of the mareh from Astorga remedied? W h n ~  if beating first 
SouIt aad then Ney, tht EEtish had arrived once more above 
ARtOrga, witli perhnps ten thouaand infantry, and hnlf as many 
hundted aivalry; from the mountains of Gnlillicia their gcnml 
rnigtit have mst hia eycs m fw RB the Morena without Licing 
elicered by the siglit of B siilglc Spnnish nrmy, nune e ~ i s t d  to  
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aid Iiim, none to whoni lie migl~t give aid: even Mr. Frm 
acluiowledged that at thie period, sis tliousand ill-nrmed meii 
collmted at Despeñas Peros, formed the anEy barrier hkween 
tFie FrencEi and Seville.. Sir John hIoore h d  liwu sent out, 
not to wnste English blood in fruitiess battles, t u t  to aasiit 
tlie universal S1il~ni~li nution ! 
Tlie second opration wm dc~ided by the ~ t a t e  of the r n p  
Jolin zines; tliere wm not hread for uuotller dafs con- 
nsoorea sumptian rernniniiig in tlis stores zt Lugn; fhe 
Papera soldiers wem iu hwrt for figlitiiig, but d i s t d  
by fatigue nnd hnd wentlier; nnrl mcli nioment o€ delq 
increased privations thnt rvouEd sonn liwc rendered tllein 
inac ient  for a cnmpnign in tlie soutli, the only lioint whcro 
their xrvices could bo effcctual. For tmo whole d a p  bbattle 
h d  lieeü offered, this was ~snfficient o rally the troop~, r d o m  
order, and preserve tlie repuhtion of tlie army. About LV 
there was strong p u n d ,  yet it did not cover Coruííts, being 
tnrnd Iiy the rostl leading from Orense to $t. Jago da Cm- 
postclln, ~qhich tlicrc waB no rcmon to supposo the Frcnch 
woulcl ncglect: Soult pre..qcd Ney to follow it. It wm then 
impossible to remrin, uselcss if it had becn pwaible. The 
gencml adophd tlie thinl plan, nntl pwpnred to rlecamp in the 
night. Ee ortlercd thc tires to be kept briglit, nnrl exhorterl 
tlie troops to mak~ a grcnt cxcrtion wliich Iic tmatsd would 
be tlie lnst rerpird of them. 
Immedintely in rcnr of ,tlia posit!on, t,llie ground werr in- 
hmecked lry ritone walla, onrI a numiier of intricate lanes; pre- 
cautione were tberefore taken to mnrk the right tracks by 
pllncing bundles of stra~v at certain didnnces; oíñoew were 
oppointed to p i d e  tlie oolumns, and at ten o'cloclr tlie qi- 
nlcnts silcntly quittcd their groiintT, nnd rctired in excclTcnt 
order. But a moody fortune pursued Noore tlimughout this 
carnpnign, tinfning liis prurlmce ond thwarrting liis viewq M i f  
t o  prove tlie i~nyielding firmnesa of his mintl. A terriblcstorm 
of wind and rnin, mixed wit1i sleet, oommenced ns tlie nrmy 
broke up from tlie position, tEie rnarTw were dwtroyed, ths 
p i d e s  lost tlie true direction, only one of tlie diviuions $iied 
the main mad, the otl~er two wem bewildereil, and wben 
dayliglit brolce, tbe rear coIumns rvere rrtill near trr Ziigo. Tke 
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fatigue, the depression of mind occnsioned by tliis rnisfortune, 
and the want o€ slims, broke the order of tlle rnarch, shgglem 
became numerous, ~ n d  unfortunritelp Baid, thinking to relieve 
tlie men Juring a halt which took place in the night, desired 
the leading division to takc refugc from tha wciatlicr in somo 
liousea a little wey o f  thc. rorad. Complctr! diaorganixation 
followed tiis imprudcnh act. From tliat moment it became 
impoasiMe to mnkc thc soldiers keep their rnnks, plunder 
succeeded, tlie ex~mple was infectiatis; and what witli real 
suffering, nnrl evil propensity encoumgd by this error, the 
main b d y  of the arrny, &ter hrrpin~ bivonacked for six hours 
in the min, arrived n t  netanzos on t he  evcaing of the 9th, in 
a state very discrcditable ta í ts discipline. 
The commander-in-chief, ~vho covered this march with the 
reseme and mvaIry, odcred seved bridges to Mr JamPa 
be deatroyed, but the engineers failed of auccess in n r ~ w s  
everg ~ttcrnpt. Fortunately, tlie enemy did not "'m"Vc 
oome up witli tlie rear bcfore t110 evcning, anrE thcn only with 
their uvalry, otliewise muny pri~onem must hnve fallen into 
tlieir hande; for stragglen uncovered by the papsage of the 
reserve were ao nitmeruus, that when pressed, they united under 
riei-geant Newman, of the 43rd regiment in force suecient to  
repulse the Prench c a d r y :  a signd pronf that the disarder 
vas omioned os much by insubordination as by fatipe. The 
reserve, commanded by Edward Paget, a rnan of firmness, 
ability, nnd ardent mal, remaincd in posltion during thc nigllt, 
u fcw milca from Betanzos; thc rcst of tha nrmy wna quartcrcd 
in tlint t an :  nnd ns the enemy could not ptlier in atrengtli on 
the 10th, the commonder-in-chief bulted thnt dsy, and tha 
wd'y passd fiom the rear-guard to the head of  the column. 
The I l th ,  the French intempted those employed to destroy 
the brid>ge of Betanxoa, but from some mismanagemcnf 
althongh the twenty-cightli regimat repulsed tlie first S&- 
mlshers, the woden bridge was only partially dmtroyed. 
Sir John now a~semhled the m y  in one solid 
mass. Theloss in the mnrch from Lugo toRetanm izBk 
had been greater than tliat in al1 the forrner part of 
the retmt, added to al1 tho lossee jn the axlvanca and in tbe 
diierent actions. Fo'onrteen or fifteen thomnd infantq were 
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howcver di11 in colt~mn, and by an orderly march to Com@ 
demonstrakd, tliat imttention and tbe wwnt of e,~perienoe in 
the oficers !vas tlie tnie cause cif the disorders, which had 
s&lietd the amy Tar more than the seord of the enemy or 
the rigour of thc elements. 
As the tmope approachcd Comila, the generltlg Iooks were 
eamestly directed towards the ha~bour, but an open expanse 
of water pahíully mnvinced him, tlint to Fortune at leiist he 
was in no way Iieholden; cúntrary w i n b  still detained &e: 
fleet at Vigo, aiid the lnst consuming exertion made by tlie 
army was rendered fruitless l The mea were pnt into qnar- 
ters. md tlieir leader awaited tlle progresa of events. The 
bridge of E1 Burgo was now destroyed, and so mas that of 
Chrnhria, Giituated a few miles up the Mero river, but the en- 
gineer emplogrcd, mortified at the former failures,mas so anxiou4 
that he remained too near tlie latter, and waa killed I ~ F  the 
exlilosion. Meanwhile tliree divirjions accupietE the tom and 
suburhs of Conifitr, and the reserve was posted betwwn tbe 
village af El Burgo md tha road of Xt. Jago de Compostda 
For tuelve days tliese hardy 8oldiañ had covered the retreat, 
during wliich time tbey tra~ersed sighty miles of road in 
two marchea, passed aeverd nigbts under nrrns in the snow of 
thc monntains, were scven times cngagcd, and now &Ir 
tlic outpsts Iiaving fen-er men rnissing from the mnlrq includ- 
ing tliase who lind fnllcn in bnttlr, tlinn nny otlle~ (livision iu 
tlie nrmy: nn arlniirrtlilc inst.nnce of tlic valuc of good di~ci- 
pliiie, nnd n mnnifest proof of t1ie mulignunt injirstiue witli 
wliicli 3fooi.o Iias been nccusad of precipitttting Iiis retreat 
Iieyontl tlie measure of humnn st,rengf,li. 
Comíía, altlioug11 sufficiently strong to compd nn enemy to 
brenk ground bei'ore it, was wenkly fortified, and to the soutli- 
w a d  cvmrnaniled by Iieights close t o  the wnlls. Moore cmed 
tlie l a d  front to be; strengthend, and oc~upied tlie cibdel; 
but be disarmed the sea fam of the worlrs, and tlie inh~biibitants 
cheerfullg and Iiononrably joined in the labour, dtliuugh they 
mere a \ ~ m  the anny wouId finally ernbark, and they vould 
incur tlie enemy'n anger by talcing part in tlie military opem 
tima Sucli flaslllies of light from the dtlrk doud at tliis 
moment 13ovming Spain muy startle the reader, and make him 
doiiht if the Spraniards could have been so insrificient to their 
own deTcnce as represented. Set the fncts were as told, and it  
m q  sucli, pmcloxicnl indications of chaswker that deceived 
tlic world ab tlie time, and inrlirced men to  helieve the recklecs, 
daring dcfirtncc of thc power of Fntnce, sa loudly proclifimeif 
hy the pntriots, would bc streniionsly supportecl. Of provcrhi- 
nlly vivid iinaginrition and quick resentments, tXie Spaniards 
feel and act individuzllp ratlirr than natioionally, and dririn~ this 
par, whnt appared constrincy of purpoze, was but a repetition 
of momcntary fury generatetl lilre electric qmks by comstant 
coIlision i t l i  tlie Prcnch, yet daily becoming %ater as eurrtom 
rcconcilcd tlie n~ffcrers to khom injuries 2nd insulta which are 
cornmonly the attttcnrlnnts of m?. Promndinntion and impro- 
viilence me tleir beetting sina At tliis moment l a p  m i p -  
zines of arms and smmunition, wKch had lxen sent iu the 
a r l y  prt of the precsding p a r  from Englund, wem still in 
Coruña, unappropriated by a nation infmted Tinth three hundred 
thonsand enemies, md liaving a hundrerl thousand soldiera 
anclothed and withont wcapons ! 
Thrce miles from thc towu mere piled four thousand bmcls 
of puwtler in a magazinc htiilt ulion a, hill, and n amnllcr 
qunntity ww eollecked in' auother storehourie some drstance 
from hhe fi& Both were fired on thc 13th. The inferior 
one expIodd witli a terrible noise shaking al1 the hovse~ in 
the t o n  ; and when tho train reiaclicd the p e a t  store, tliere 
ensued ta cmsh like ihe Iiurtrting forth of a volcano. The 
eartli tremblcd for miles, the rocks u ~ ~ c  torn from t l~eii  bases, 
tlie agihted ~ a t e r s  of  the harbour rolled tlie ~essels  as in a 
d o m i ,  a vast colurnn o€ smoke snd dud, with flarnaq and 
S ~ I L ~ ~ R  ~honting out from ita dark fliinks, rirose perpcnrIicu- 
larly rtnd slowly to a, gr& heiglit, ivliere it bursG, nnd then a 
sliower of rrtonea and frapcnts of dl kinds deacending witk 
n roaring sound, k i l ld  mang pemons who had remained too 
aear th spat : stillness, dightly intermpted by the lashing o£ 
tlie maves oa the slore su~eeded, and the business of the war 
ment on. 
Now H. pninfiil metisure was adopted; the groiind in fmt 
of Curtifia i u  irnprndimlde for cavnl l ,  tlie Iiorses were gene- 
r:illp Eoiindered,it was irnpossiblc tu embzrk them al1 in tlie 
face of an enemy, antl a peat number mere mluctnntly 
ordered to be ~11ot; worn dowii nnd foot-breken, they mould 
otliemise llave been tlixtriliuted among tlie Proncli ciivalry, ar 
used as rlr~ught wttlti until rleatlitli relieverl tliem lram p rp  
emqtiiiiiterl suireriiig, But tlie very EIIL* OS tliciír Iicing so 
foundcrcd wus one of tlic rcsulh of incxpericncc; tlic cavnlry 
l i d  cuma out to Coruña witlioiit Iiroppr equipmetitg tIio 
liomea ware ruined, iiot fur want of sliues, Lut lvmt of hnni- 
mcrs nnrl nnila ta piit tlicm on ! 
Sooii tlie Frcncli gatlierecl on tlic Mero, nnd Moare souglit 
a position of battlo. A cliiiin of roclry clevntionq commenb 
ing on tFie sea-coast nortli-ivest of Corirña anrl ending on tbo 
Mero b~liiiid tlis villnge of El Burgo, offcretl a god  lioe, 
wliidi, w ~ e r d  liy a brimc1i of thc Mero, would havo f o r d  
tlie enemy to adviince l ~ y  the r o d  of Compostclln. Rnt it 
wm too extczisive, nnd if n o t  wli01Iy occupied, thc French 
cuuld turn tlie right mrI move nlung I siieoessiun of hille to 
tlie very grttm of Coruña: tho Eoglisl~ geileral wtts thus 
rcduccd to  occupy an inferior rnrigc, encloscd ns it were, md 
commanded by tlis fimt witliin cnnrion sliok. Soult'ti amp, 
exhnu~ted by coiitinual ttoil, could not coneentrnte bdore the 
12th, but on tliat day the infautry toolc poet opposite El 
Burgo, wliile La Houasnye's heavy uvalry lined the river 
far as the ocean ; Frmceachi, crossing at tlis bridge ol Celas, 
seven miles higher up, interceptd some &ores coniing irom 
St. Saga and made a few prisoners. Tlie 14tl1, the hridgs at 
Ei Burga being rendered practicabl~ for artillery, tmo d i i -  
sions of infmtry and one of cavalry pmed the river, and to 
cciver their march Borne p n s  opened on tlio En,$slr post3 
but were soon silenced by a auperiar fire. In t l ~ e  vening the 
transports from Vigo bwe in si&; they entered the Iiarbonr 
in the night, and tlie dkmounted cavalry, tlic sick, tlie best 
horses, and fifty pieces of artillerg were embarlíed, six Dritish 
and three Spanish guns worked by Englisii gunners only, 
being kept on shore for action. Oa the 15th, Koble's Ex- 
peditiun de Laborde's diviaion arrived. 8oult then occupied 
üallice. the greater ridge enclosing the BDtisli psition, 
placing his right on the intcrsection of the rodc  leading to 
St. Jqo  and B e h z o g  his left on a mcky .emioence oveP 


loolring both armies: Iiis mvdry extended al0ng tho lieights 
to their owu lcft, isnd a sligl~t sIrirniiall took place in tl~e 
rulIey belaw. The Englidi piquets opposite tlie riglit of tIie 
French also engnped, aud being p l l e d  by the fire of tivo p n s ,  
colunel M'IFeuzio of tlie Eiftli rgimenk, pushed out witli some 
companies to seize tIie Ziattel, whereupon a line of infantry, 
Iiitlierto conceaied by some stone walls, immediatelj* arose, 
killed the colonel and drave hi men h c k  mith loss, 
In the iiight, Roult with p t  difficulty dragged eleven 
lieavy pag to the rocks wliicli closed tIie left cif Iils line, and 
in the morning he formed his order of battle. Lahrdea.e"s 
divkion waa poated on tke rjgl~t, one half being an the high 
ground, tlie otlier on the descent towmds tlie rivei. Merle's 
rlivision \vas in tlie centre. aferrnet's division formed the 
bft. The position rras rovered on the rigljt by the vi1lag.e~ 
of Paln~ia Abnxo mtl Portosa, and in tlie centre by n wocid. 
The left; secured by ~ L I B  rucIzx wlierc t h ~  grcnt bntterj- wns 
e~tablifilied, iras twelve hundred ynrtls from tlio right of tlio 
l3ritisli liue, and rnidwny tlir! little villag* of Elvins ww lield 
by tlie piquet~ of the fiftietli Britigh regiment. 
The late arria1 of the transports, tho increasing rnn$y 
force of the enemy, aiid the disadvanhgeous h n c r t o  
natnre of the position, augrnented the clificulty "yb 
of euibarhg so rnuch, tlmt sorne generals now 
arlrised a negotiation for l e a ~ e  to regain tlie sliips. Tliere 
m IittIe chance of tliis being p n t e t l ,  and tliere !vas no 
reason to trp; the army liad suffeied, but not frum defent; 
its situntion wm pcrilous, yet far from desperate. Moore 
ñould not consent to remove the stamp o€ prudence aiid 
energy from bis retreat, by a proposal wliich wouId have 
given rin nppmmnce of timidity to his previous operations, as 
oppmite to thcir rml chnractcr n8 liglit is to durkncss; h i a  
I i ih qir i t  rand clcnr jiidgmcnt rcvolted at tlie id% and he 
rejecterl tlie depuding nrlvice wit.liout liesitntion. 
AI1 the encumliraacea Iieing sliipped on ti10 rnorning of tlie 
16tli, it was intended to embark tlie figliting men in tlie 
h n g  night, and tlijs clifficult operation would probahly 
have Leen happily effected; but a glorious event was destinrxl 
to gin a more graceful though meltwicholy termination to 
t t e  ciimpaip. About two olclock a general rnov~nient of 
the Fr'rench line gave nobice ol an approncliing bitttlc: :;lid the 
OCCU- Dritisli idaiitry, fourteen thousannd fiva Iiuiirlrecl stron,, 
pied tlieir position. Daird's division 4~n the ri$tt, and 
govemed by tbe oblique direction of tlic ridge appronclrerl the 
enemy; LIope's division, forniing the ocntre and 
rdC mm left, dtliough on stning ground abutting on the 
of the Bntrie, 
Mero, was of necessity wit~ilield, so thzb tlie Fcencli 
battery on the roeks raked tlie wliole line of battle. Ooe of 
Raird's bngacies was in column beliind the right, aiid onc of 
Hope's behind the left ; Pnget's reserve posted at tlia vjllage of 
Airis, behind tlie centre, looked dowu tlic valley sepmting 
Uic rigl~t of  the position from tlie hills oocupied by the Frencb 
camlry. A battnlion detnelicd from thc rcscrvc kept t h a  
horseinen in check, and ~ ~ i s  i t ~ e l f  caniiectcd with the main 
budy by a clinin o f  skirrnislicm extender1 RcFm the vnlleg: 
h e r ' s  divi~ion lield tlie liciglih immcrliutcly bcfom thc g~.stc~ 
of Coruña, wnkliing fhe mnst rosd, but it s a s  uIso ready tn 
succour any poht, 
Tbese dispositions ivere dictated by the goand, which was 
very favourable to the eiiemy ; for Fmnceschi's cavalry reacbed 
nearIy to tbe Pillage of Can Cristmal, a mile begrond &id's 
right, and hence Noore w v s  forced €o weaken liis front and 
keep Fraser's clivision in reserve until Soultms attack sfiould be 
completely unfolded. There wns liowever one advantage on 
tlie Rritisli side; many thousrind ncw Engiisli musketa, found 
in tlic Epanisli &oircs, w m  givcn to tiic troops in licu of t l ie ir  
niñty linttered armci, and m t h ~ i r  nmmunition wria nlso Smh, 
tlieir fire was far batter wstziiiied tlitio that of Ilie eneiny. 
Wbcn Laborde's dilision arrived, the French forcem not lees 
than twcnty thoiisand mm, finti tl ie ditlrc of Dalrnstia made w 
idlc cvolutions of disp1rt-y. Ristriliuting his ligliter p.uns dong 
tlic front of liis position, lie riyaned a firc from tlie lienvy h t k r y  
on Lis lefh, and insht ly  descended tlie mountnin with three 
columns covcred by clouds of skirini911ers. The Britisb 
piquets were driven back in disorder, and tbe vilIage of Eivina 
ww cnrried hy thc first French column, which then dividerl 
and attemptcd to  turn Bwrd's riglit by the valley, and break 
his front tlie samc tiine. The sccotid column mjufe qa ins t  
the hglinh centre, nntl tlie third nt,tilclcccl Hopa's left i it  tlie 
villitge of PaIavitt Al~nxo. 8uult1s hewier giins overniatclied 
tlie English six-pvuntlers, ranci sw-cpt the pnsition to tlie centre; 
ht 3hom obsarving t l i n ~ l l e  enemy, accordiug t.o liis expec- 
tations, did not show anq- liody of infautry beyond tliat rnoving 
up tIie Palley to outflunk Exird'a ríght, ordered Paget to 
carry the mhole of tlie rwerve I% where the detached regiment 
wBs posbed, and, na he bad'hfore arranged with him, tuim tlie 
le& of the French coliimns and menaee tlie great httery. 
Frascr he ordered t o  support P~get, and then throwing bltck 
thc foiirth rcgimcnt, whicli fomed tlic right of Enird's divifiion, 
opened a lieavy fire upon thc flmk of tlie troops penctrating 
5p the valley, while tha fiftietli and Srirty-sccciiid regitrients 
met those Iireaking Ilirougli Elcina. TIie ground aIiciut tlint 
village waa intewected by stone walls nnd IioIlow roxls, a 
Bevere scrambling fight ensued, the Prench were forced back 
mith great Ioss, and thc fiftietli regiment entering the village 
with the retiring mass, drove it, nfter a seconJ stmggle in Glie 
~treet ,  quite beyond tlie Iiouses. Beeing tlais, tlie genera[ 
orderd up a battaliiia of tlie parde  to fill tlic void in tlic line 
marle by the adwnce of tlioss rcgirnents, whcreupon tlic forty- 
second, mistnkiiig Iiis intcntion, rctirerl, ivitii exceptiori of tlie 
penadierc, niid nt thnt momeiit tlie enemy, beiug reiiifurcsd, 
renewed thc figlit hc~ond tlir: villnge. Major Napicr,' cout- 
rnanding the fiftietli, waE wounded and taken prisoner, nnd 
*The author's oldmt bmthw; ha m mid ik ho dain. When the 
French rmemd tha attack on Elviiur, hc rr-m somcwhrit in dmnco of 
tlmt ~illiige, and dr,ne, for the tmopswere scattewrl hy tha nnture ofthe 
p u n d .  Reing hurt in tbe leg, Iie endeavoiired t o  retire, biit was over- 
taken, and thrown to the ground with five wounds; a Franch drummer 
reacud liim, and wlien a solilierwitli whoiri Iie had k n  stqgling iiiade 
ri. second atteinpt to kill liim. tlau driiinrner once more intertzred. l'lie 
morninp after tlis battls ~narstiai &ult sent Iiis own surpriri tu iiiajor 
Nüpier, and, witli a Liiiidness nnd considerntion cery uncuriimoit, wrote 
bo Ezpolwn, dcsiring tbot his prisoncr rnight not bc scnt t o  Pmnce, 
whirli from the n ~ t e r n  othrd~iFiiRing cxchnnqcs u-ould hnvn mineti !iin prn- 
fmiunal pripecta; the dmmmei alsu rcceiverl tlie c r w  of the lcginn o f  
hunour. When tlie eecond corp quittcd Conii~n, msrstial Sdult remm- 
'Illvinn then became the scene of another contest, whicli being 
observetl by tbe oomuimdcr-ia-cili lie addrcssed a fem anc 
rna t in~  words to the forty-second, nnd mused it t,o retuni to 
thc iittaclr. Fagct had now descended into the vallcy, snd 
the liiic of tlic slrirmi~liers licing tlius suppcirt~d Algorously 
eheclred tlie advance of thc cncmy's troops in tliat gunrtcr, 
wliilc tlio fourth rcgimciit gnllcd tlieir flanlr;  EL^ tlie mme tima 
tlie ccntre and lcft of Qie ariny aIso b m m e  ctipuged, h i r d  
NW BCVCPC~Y woundd, B R ~  n fuiloiis nction ensued nlong the 
linc, in tlie vnllcy, nnd on the l i i l l~ .  
Sir Jolin Moirc, ivliile earnestly watching tlie result of the 
figl~t about the vilEage of Elvina, &as strucli on tlie left breast 
Ly a cannon shot; the sl~ock threw hirn from his horse with 
violente; yet he rose ap in  in a sitting posture, bk counB 
nance uncliangd, snd liis steadftist eye still fixed upon tbe 
regiments cng~ged in liis front, no eigli bctraying n scnsation 
of pain. In a few rnoments, wLen he saw tlie troops wcre 
gaining grounrl, liis counteiiance Irnglitened, and he auffererl 
himsclf to be tnkcn to the rear. Tlien was seen the dreadfut 
iiature of Iiis liurt. Thc shouIJer was sliattercri to pie. tlie 
arm lianging by n picce of skin, t he  ribs over the henrt brokcn, 
and b a r 4  of flcsh, tlic rnuxcles o f  tlic brcnst torn inta Ion2 
stripes, inkrlticerl' by their recuil fiom tlio dragging of tl~i 
diot. As tlie soldicm placed liim in n, Manket liis sworil pt 
cntririg1:lcd and tlic hi1t cntmed the wound; ~ $ p h i n  Hndinge, a 
mcnded his prinonet to the attmtion of marsh1 Ney. The latter, 
trmting hiin mther with the kindness of  o frimd tlim the civility of an 
eiieniy, lodgccl liim witli tlie French consd, supplied him witli inooev, 
p v u  lliln a gen~rril invitxtion t0 l i i ~  house. and not only refmined f& 
sending Iiiiii to Prance, but when b a f i ~ g  of truce he lcnew t h ~ t  mqjor 
h'npier's mothcr wits mourning for hirn ~5 < I c ~ ,  Iie pcrmitted hirn, ~ n r l  
with hini the fcw aoldirm tnltcn in the xction, t o  go at once to  k;nyhnd, 
merelj. exacting a ~irnmiw tlint none shmld serve nntil exchangtd. I 
would not huve touclied et  nll upon these private dventures, were it not 
tlist gratiturlc deriiands a public mcknowled~~ierit  oi sucli gerierosib, aid 
Ihat deinand i s  ruridered niore imperative by tLs nltar inidi>rtitnne~ oI 
rnarshnl iicy. That bbrve ennd noble-mindwt mm's Sab i s  hut too mU 
k n o m  ? Ile who hnd foughz firc hnndrcd hattlcs fur Franoe, not nns 
n ~ i n n t  her, wns sliot as a tm~tor! Cauld tlie bit&& rnmy of tbe 
Iliiiirhons have more a trongly marked the difference beheen their i n t e y b  
sud thoae of thc natiou t 
Btoppod him, sxying ' I t  k m as&! m it &* 1 nc. Jnmm 
Yoore's W ~ a t h  it s l m l d  ge mi of 1 7 ~  &Id witia me;' 
 ti^. 
and in that manner, so becoming to ri eoldicr, 1 ~ f i ~ i " g ~  Lcttw. 
Moore was bornc from the fight. 
Kotwitlistiindi~ig tliia p n t  tlisnster tlie troops gywiiiied groiind. 
The reserva overtlirowing evcrytIiing in tlie valley, forced 
La Housmye'm clismountcd dragooii~ to  retire, and thw turning 
the enemy, approaclied the eminence upon wliicli ihc great 
b ~ t t e y  was posted. On the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head 
of some companies of t l ~ e  foiirteeiith, cnrried Piilavia Abaxo, 
mhich general Foy defended but feebly. Xn tlie centre, the 
obstinate dispute for Elvina tesminated in favour of the Eritish; 
8nd when the night set in, their line w;ts considerably d w n c e d  
beyond the origiiial position of tlm morniog, wLile the French 
wene falling bnck in confwion. If Pmser'~ dirision had been 
bwiight into action along witli the rescwe, tlie enemy could 
hardly hnve escnpcd a signnl ovcrthrow; for thc littlc amrnii- 
nition huIt lid lieen atile to bnng up w ~ q  ncnrly exIiaustcc1, 
the river Mero wus in fulI tide beliind hiin, and the diiiimlt 
oommnnieat,ion by the b r i d ~ c  of El Durgo wns alons open for 
a retreat. On the other Iiand, to fighe in the dark was to 
kmpt f~rtnne; the Frenchivere still t l ~ e  most numerous, their 
groiind strong, and tlicir disorder facilitate? the original plan 
oEemb~;rking during the niglt.  Hope, upon whom tlie com- 
mand had rlevolvcd, resolvcd tlierefore to ship the rtrniy, and 
so complete were the arrringerncnts, tliat no confusion or dilli- 
eultp ocmirred; tlie piquets kindlcd fircs to cover the retmt, 
and were tIiemsclves witlir'imwn nt dnyl~rciilc to cmhrk undcr 
the pmtection of Kill's Irigiidc, wliicli xl\.m in position under 
tha ramparts of Coruiía. 
When morning dawned, the French, seeing the Brithh 
positioa abandoned, puslied 60me bathlions to tlie height.s of 
San Lucim, annd about rniddap opened a bnttery on the sliipping 
in the harhur. This caused peat  confusion amoiigst the 
transports, several mnsters mt their mbles, and four vwseIa 
went on share, hut the troops wcre mcued by thc mcn of 
wnr's boats, tlie strnrided vesecls burned, and tlie flcct got out 
of hnrbuur. Bill tlien embnrl~ed at the citadel, wlicli was 
mriintninetl by e reurguitrd nnder Beresford until h e  18% 

be (lid not. even iii tliis mornent forget t o  recommend tliose 
whose merit had @ven tlicm claims to promotion. When 
life m just extinct, Wth an unsiibriued spirit, as if nntidpnt- 
ing the basenem of' bis paathumous mlumniators, iie exclnimcd, 
' I h g e  t ? ~  loegb of Xyland  eoz'll be suti$& l 1 I q  rnn/ 
C O * U & ~  d 1  do m @tica/' Isi n fcw miiiuti:~ arterwanle 
he diel!, ehd Lis corpse, wmpped in n militiiry cluidi, was 
in temI  bythe officers of his ataff in the citaclel af Coniua. 
The p n s  of tlie enemy psid liis funernl honours, anti Bonlt 
rvitli ra nuble feeling of respect for his valour raisccl a monu- 
ment to his memory on the field of bitttle. 
Tlius ended tlie cnreer of sir Jolin Moore, a mrtn whona 
anconmon mpzciQ was mtrtined by the purest virtue, an11 
gwernd by a disinterested patriotism more in kceping Mtli 
tlie prirnitive than the lururious age of a great natiion. Hip 
tal1 graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongIy defined 
foreheod, aad singulnrly exprewi~-e rnouth, indicatcd a noble 
d i s p ~ i t i o n  nnd a rcfincd undergtrinding. Tbc 10% sentimcnts 
of bonour habitual to  his mind, more ndarned by n subtlc 
pl$iil wit, mliicli gnvc Iiim in ccinvc~~~ttion an nsceudnncy lie 
d~rsys pragervd by tlic decisive vigour of l i i ~  actions. EIe 
maintain~d the rigllt witli a veliemeiicc liordering upon fieroc- 
nas, mxnd every importiint transacti~n in wIijcli ho was engagcd 
increased his reputation for talent, mil confirmed 11;s cIisiracter 
as a ~tcrn eriemy to vi=, EL atcndfust friend t o  merit, ajust 
and faithful aervant of his country. Tlie henest loved hiin, 
the dihonest feared liim For ~vliile he Iived he Jid arit 
shun, but scornd and apurned the base, and with cliarrac- 
tcristie propricby t h g  ~ i ~ r n e d  at liim mhen he wns dead. 
A soldic~~ frorn liis cnrlicst yonth, Moore tl~iratecl fur tlie 
Iionoun of bis profession. Hc Icncw liimsclf worthy to lcn(1 t i  
Rritish nmy, aacl Iiailed tlie fortune wlilch plirccd him at t.he 
head of tlie troops destined for Spai~i. AB the streain of time 
pussed tlie inspiring hopes of triumpli disappelired, bat tlie 
aucterer glory of suffering remained, aud rvith a 6rm henrt Iie 
aceepted tlitit gift of a scvere fate. Confidwt in the stnength 
of bis pnius, he disregwded the clmours of presumptuoiis 
ignomoe. Opposing sound m i l i t q  vicws to thc foolisli 
projects so iwlently t h s t  upon hbn by thc nmbaesndor, t e  
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conductcd his long nnd arduous retreat with sagacity, intelli. 
gence, md fortitude ; no insult. disturbed, no fal~cliood c c e i ~  
Iiim, no remonstrnncc sliook his detcrminetion; fortitne hmPd 
ivithout suhdning his oonstaiiq; death struck, but the spirit of 
tlle mm rcmaincd unhrolcen wlien his dintkred 3iotly scnrc+ 
afforded it a liabitntion. Rwing dono al1 thnt  m j u ~ t  
towirrtls othem, he remombered u-fiat wm due to lhself, 
R'eithcr the sliock uf tlie martal blow, nnr the Iinpring hoam 
of I L C I I ~  pnin wliicli preceded I i i ~  dissolution, could queU tlic 
pride of Iiix gallent Iienrt, or lomr the dignified Eeeling ~ i t h  
which, consciwtrs of inerit, be at the last mement sserted hb 
rigbt to tlie gratitude of the country lie lid ~ e d  so truly, 
If dory be a distinction, for su& a man death ia riot 8 
leveller! 
CEIAPTER VI. 
GiWERAL VIEW OF TBE CAMPAIGX. 
MR CAITNJXQ, in an official communication to the Spanish 
deputies in London, observsd, that ' the wnduct oP the cam- 
p a i p  in Portugal m s  uns~tisfactory, and inadequate to the 
brillhnt successw with which it opened.' Xn the relatlon of 
that i t p G g n ,  it h~ been ahown Iiow little the activity and 
foresight of the ciibinet contributed to those succesaes; and 
the f~llowing ahort annlpsis will prove, that with rcspect to 
tlie campnign in Spain also, the procecdingw of tbc ministcrs 
were mnrked nlilíe Iiy hrdincss and inc~tpwity. 
JosepIi ahandoned Mtltlrid tEic 3rd uf August, and tlie l l th,  
Fmnch troops, cnming from the most distnnt p r t s  of Europe, 
wre in motion to rcniedy tllo disasters in tlie Peniusuln. 
On thc 1 s t  of Septemlier a double conscription, furnishing 
me hundred md sixty thousand mm, was called out to replnce 
the tro~ps withdrawn from Poland and Germany. The 4th of 
Septernhr the emperor announced to the senate, that he was 
twolvcd to puah the affaira of $he Peneninaula with the peatest 
activity, and to destroy tlle armies mhich the Emglish hnd dis- 
embarksd in that country.' The l l t h ,  $be ed~anced guard of 
the nrmy corning From Gcrmnny rewlied Puris, and wns tlierc 
publicly hnrangued by tlic emperor. Tlie 8th of Noveniiier 
that monmh troke into S p i n  u t  the lieitd of tliree liundred 
thoumd men. Tlie 6th of Decemlier, not a vestige of tke 
Spanish armies rcmaining, be took possession of JfadricF. 
Now tbe Aaturian deliuties m r i ~ e d  in Eondon tlie 6th of 
Junc, and an the 20th of  Aiigust, the battle of Virniere being 
then unfaaght and conscquentIy thc fatc of the caslpaign iu 
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Yoiti~gnl uncertain, tlie Eiiglish ministcrs invited sir Km 
Dalryinple t o  discuss tlirca plans of oparntions in Spain, ti& 
Ifolinded upon (lata uttcrly fiilae, and nll objcctionnl i a  dctuil. 
Sir Artliiir Wellcñley -3 requircd te go to tiie hsturiac to  
~scertnin wlint: fi~cilities tlmt ccciuntry offeretl for tlis diserii- 
tiurkation oE an RnglisEi rarmy; uoil tlio wvhole numhr of 
troops rlisposnl~le for tlie ca~n pnigm, excliisive of those already 
in Portugal, wcre stated to  be twenty Uiousand, of which oue 
half wiis in EnglariJ und tlie ottier in SiciIy. IE was acknow- 
l e d ~ e d  tliat no information l i d  enabled tlis cabinet to decido 
as to tlie applicaticin o€ the form at home, ar the ulterior use 
to be made of tliose in Portirjirtl. Yet witlr ainplar rashnea, 
the ~vhoIe of the soutliern provinces, contriining the ricbest 
citia, finest harbours, and most numeroufi armies, were diy- 
carded from consicferatian; and sir Hew Ddrymple, who wari 
well acqminted nith thnt part o£ Wpnin, and in close and 
frientlly correspondcnce witb tlie cliict's, was directed to con- 
fine his attwtion entirely to the northern provinces, of wliicb 
hc knew nathing. 
Junot's defeat in Portiigd and the discomfiture o£ Joseph 
on tlic Ebro, mcrc rcgmlcd as certnin cvcnta, and tlie ~icwfi  of 
the ministcrs were clircctcd, not to tlie bcst mode of atbick, Jiub 
to tlio clioice of a l i i in of nlnrcli wliicli woirhi enwre the uGter 
dedniction nr cnptivity of the wl~rile French anny. And so 
dated mas th0 cahi net witii tliis extravfigttnt liope, 80 strangdy 
contemptuous of NnpoIeon's power, thnt Iard William Ben- 
tinck waa instmcted to urge the central junta t o  an in~asion 
a£ France, as soon as the army on tlic Ebro shonld be mni- 
hilated l Tlie Englisli ministers were therefore eit.her pro- 
foundly ignorant of the real state of affaim, oor mitb a, force 
scattcred ir1 England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding 
forty-five thuusand mcn, thcy expccted in one umpaign t.o 
subdna tnmtpsix thonsnnd Fwncli undcr Jnnot, t o  destroy 
cighty tliousand rmdcr Joscpli, and to invndc Fmnce ! 
Wlicn ihc battle ofTimicro hnppencd, s i r  Artliur Wellmlv 
nnturtilly declined t.lie Asturian misGon a& more tiiiitnble t o  a 
shft criptain tlian a victorious cornrnnnder. Eiit liefore   ir 
He~v's answer, expnsing the falee cclculations of tlie ministd 
pl:inp, conld be received in Engliind, a despatch, drtted tbe 2nd 
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of September, announced the resolntion oT the government to 
employ an army in the northern pmvinces o€ Bpin; and 
tmeoty thousand mcn wme to bo helrl in reedinesa to unite 
wifh other ~ O ~ C C S  to be wnt from England. Tliis project nlso 
waq rw cnidc, tbnt no intirnntion wtm @ven how tlie junction 
was to be effected, whether by sea or lend ; nor liad the minister 
e m  ascertained that the Bpartiards vould permit Ilnglisli 
h o p  t o  enter Spain. Tlirec weeks later, lord Williarn 13en- 
tinck, writing from Madrid, sap, '1 liad an intcrview ~vitli 
Florida BIfincr?, he expressed his surprise tbere ahou1d be a 
doolit of tlic Spaniads wiahing for thc assistnnce of tlie Eng- 
Iish nrmy.' Rucli dao wns tlic oonfusion nt liorne, tlmt lord 
Cndmgli repentPrlly expreascrl his fcnm Iest thc cmliarlirlintion 
of Junot's troops sliould linve nlisorbed nll the rncnns of trnn- 
sport in the Ta,ps, d e n  a s+le reference to tlre transport 
o6ce in Xiondon would h v e  satisfied him, tliat although Che 
English army sliould also be embarlred, there would still 
remain a surplus of twelve thousand tons, 
Khen tlre popular cry rose against the convention of Cintra, 
the generale-in-cliief were recallec1 in succcssion as rapidIy as 
they Iind been appinted; the despatches ddrcsscd to one 
general Tell inta thc hnnds of his siicccssor; 1iut tlie plnne of 
the miniukm bemms nt lad  rnaturc, nnrl on tlic 6th. of Octolicr 
sirJoLn BIoore wtb~ fintally nppointed to lend tlie foroes intti 
Xpin. At tltis pmiod tlie l i d  of tlie gmud Frencli a m y  was 
nlmdy in the passes of tlie Fyrenees, tlie hostile troops on t l i ~  
Ebro were mming ta blows, tlie Xpaniards were weuk and 
didded, the English forky marches from thc scene aF action: 
yet said tbe minister to sir John Moore, 'itliere will be fuTl 
time to m c e r t  your plan of operations with the Spanish 
p e d s  before the equipment of your nrm y can be completcd' 
W a  this tlic way to oppose Nlipolmnt Ganlcl such pro- 
werlinp Id to ai~glit but distaster? It h n ~  bccn unid that 
DnIryrn1)le'a nsligmce wm tlic miisc of this delny, thmt he 
shoiild h a ~ e  had the t r oop  in ml iness .  TIiat general muld 
not prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march, an 
army that was IikeIy to be embtirked; he could not divine tha 
plans of the mini~ters More they were fomed, and it is evident 
tht the error athcl~es entirely to the govcrnment. 
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Tlie glaring fatal incapacity of f i o  Spanish geneda ha 
bmn sufficiently expwl.  Tiis energ-y ruid rmpidity of tlie 
French emperor dmmd careful examination. Hi operations 
were not, ns it 11aa lieen said, n ponipous disphy of poww to 
create an appearance of conquest; not a mere violent imp 
tion with a aultitude of men, but a s e r i ~  of fikilful and 
~cientific rnovemenh ñrortby of so great a general and politi- 
cian. His force rms immense and the Spmiards but con- 
temptible soldiem, yet lie never neglected the lessons of 
experience, nor devinted from thc strictest niles of ar2, With 
astonisbing activity, nnd when we consider the atate of hiai 
political reIations on the continent, with astonisliing b o l d n q  
he colhted mpIe  menas to attain hia object. Deceiving bis 
enemies lvith regnrd to  bia numbera position md intentions, 
choosing Iiis timc with admirable judgmcnt, he broke t h g h  
the weak part of their line, and seized Burgos, a central point 
which cnablcd liim to enveiop rtnd dcstroy tlie teft wing of 
tha Spaniada before their right could Iicar of his nthclí; tlie 
latter Leing itself turnd by tlio sime movement nnd expwd 
to a Iiko Me. Bis fir& position enuliled liim to menace the 
capital, keep the English s m y  in check, md cover the forms- 
tion o£ those rnagwzines wnd storea ivtich were nwssary to 
render Burgos the base and pivoG of further aperations. 
Napoleon's forces were numerons enougli to have attxkcked 
Castaños and Prtlafox whde Blake wns being pursud by the 
6rst and f o h h  oorps; but trusting n o t h i  to chanec, bo 
waited for twelve da], until the position of the English army 
was aseehnincd, tlie strength of thc northern provinw quite 
broken, and a secure placc of ams  d s l l i s h c d .  Then leaving 
the second corpa to cover liiu comrnunicntiori, and senrIig tlie 
fourth corps into f i e  flat muntry, to cnast m it were the Ireads 
of the English colurnns, and turn ths pases of tlie Carpentino 
mounhins, he cauaed h e  Epanisli riglit winp to he d e a t ~ e d ,  
and approaclied the capital, wl~en no vestige of a national 
army was left, when he Itad p o d  =son to think the English 
in full retreat, when the whole of his corps were close at band, 
and consequently when the greatest moral eflect cauld be pro- 
dueed, and the greatest physicd power concentrated at tho 
same time to talce advantage of it. Napoleon'a dispositiona 
were indeetl surprisingly skilful; for tliough Lefebm'~ precipi- 
t~ t ion  u t  Zornos~, bby prolonpjng Bldce's agony, lost six d a y ~  
of pmmise, it is, certriin that even reverses in battle muld neither 
have checked the emperor nor heIped the Spaniards. 
If %ult hd bwn b b n  at Gamonal, Napoleon w m  ebt  hand 
to mpport the second corpa, and the sixth corps would have 
fdlm upon the flank and re= of the Spanida. 
If the first c o r p g  h d  been dcfcatod at Espinosa, the ~econd 
and fowh corps, and the empcror's troopéi, wouEd bnve takcn 
BInke in A~nk and Tmr. 
II h i i e a  liad been defmttd at Tudela, be conId llave fallen 
back on Pampeluna, tlie fiftli and eighth mrps were marcliing 
to mpprt liim, aiid the sixth corps would have taken the 
Spaniards in flank. 
If the emperor hd been repnlsed at the Sornosiem, the sixtk 
c o ~ g  would have turned that position by Guadalaxam, and the 
foarth corps by Gundamma. 
If MOOL bad retreated on Porfugd, the fourtb m~ was 
nemr to  Lisbon thrin he was, and if he had overthrown Soult., 
thpt fifth niid ciglitli coqiti rvcrc rcady t o  ~udtbín t.hat rnmncshtxl, 
w h i i ~  Napolecin with fifty tliousnnrl nien was preprtrerl to cut 
the Britisli. line of retrent intu Gallicia. No possible went 
conld have divided tlie emperor's forces, and he constantly 
preserved a, central position wliicli enabled liim to unite bis 
m a s w  in mficient time t o  repsir any momentq dimstcr. 
By a judicious mixtuw of force and policy, he rnade Madrid 
sumnder in two dap, and thus prevented the enthusiasm 
wliich would doubtless have arisen if that capital had been 
defended for any time, and thc helirt-burnings if it; had been 
stomd: tlie second swecp Iie wss  preparing t o  mnke wheri 
3Imre'~ murcli ual'ted off his nttcnti on from the south, wnald 
undoulrtcdly iinve put liim in posswsion of tlie remaining grcat 
cities of the Peninsula. Then t1i.e civil benefita promised iu 
bis decrees and speeches wouId hzve produced their fulE effect, 
and t,lie result mfiy be jurlned of by the fact, tbat in 1811 rind 
12, Amgwn, Talancla, aand- Anddusia were, under the &ni- 
nistmtion of Soult nnd Suclieb, as submissive ris any departrnent 
of Frtnce. Eoth general$ raised Spanish battaliona, and 
employed thm not onlp to preserve the public pwcc, biit 
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to cliase and put down tlw guerillns of tlie ncigfibouring 
provinces. 
Moore'u dents sa~eved tlle Peninmlri a€ tliis crisirr; and hera 
onIy a rnilitary error of Fapoleon's may be detected, Foqet- 
ting his own maxim thnt mar is not a conjectural art, be took 
for granted the Engligh a m y  was faIIing back to Porhigd, 
and without ascertxining tliat it mas so, rtcted upon the 
suppxit ioii. Tliis apparent negligente, so unliks hia usual 
cirmmñpectioii, Ieads to tlie notion, t h t  tliniugh Morla he 
might llave become acq~~iiainted witli the peculiar opinions and 
mli bmper of Mr. Frere, and lioperl ihe treacherous arta of 
tlie Spnniard, in conjunction with thc prcsumptnous diposi- 
tion of tlic plcnipotcntiary, wouId so mislead tlie EnglisEi 
gcncral as to indiice him to cnrry his arm y to Madrid, and 
tlius tlcliver it up entire nritl bounrl. It maq n rnistnlre; liut 
Nnl~olcon cnuld be deceivetl or iicglige~erit only fur a moment. 
Vith ahat vigour lie recovei.erl lirnsdf, and hasteiied to 
remedy liis error ! How instanhneously Iie relinquislied iiis 
intentians apinst tlie south, tnned liis face from the glitter- 
ing prize, and bent Iiis wtiole force against the only man 
among liis advemaries who had discovered tnlent aad deckionl 
h t  tliose wlio havc secn Glie prepnmtions necessary to enalile 
a srnlill army t o  act, even on a pre-conceivcd plan, say what 
uncontrollabJe energy tlint mnn poriscsscd, who snddenIy 
interruptod in such grcxt dcsigns, coiild in tlic course r i f a  f e s  
honre piit fiftgr thousnnil mcii in movemcnt on a totdly new 
liue of opemtions, nutl in tlie rnidñt of winter exemite a mnrch 
of two Iiunrli-eJ. miles witli a rapidity harclly to be eqtialld 
nnder tho most fawurable cimumstances. Nor is Soult's 
intlefatigable v i s u r  to be overlooked, as cont.ributing to tlie 
puccess. It is rernarlcable hnw Iie and tlis emperor, dvancinj 
from different liases, sliould have so combined thek move 
rnents, that oifter marching, the one above a Iiundred and tlie 
otlier above two liiinilrerl milea tlirough a liostile ctinntry, 
they effected thcir junction at ra @ven point and at a giveii 
heur witlioiit failurc: nor is it les6 remarkable, that  such wll- 
oondnctcd opcwtions should llave bcen bnffled by a general nt 
the Iiend of an inexl)cricnced army. 
When Sylla, nfter al1 liis aictorics, 8QIed himself s bppY 
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rnther than ,n p r t t  generd, he discovered hia profound 
kiio~ledge of the rnilitary art. Experience ttlught him that 
the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, tlie obsti- 
sias; tbe ignoranee, or tlie treachery of s subrdimte officer, 
waa suEeient to mar the best concerted plan-that tlie inter- 
nntion o f  a ~lhowcr of rain, fin unexpected ditcli, or my 
~pparent!p trivhl aceident, rniglit detcrminc thc fatc of  a 
vhole amy. It taught Iiim tliat tlie vicksitudtiri of war 
sre so mnny, disqpointmcat will at.tenc1 tlie ~vivrsest comhion- 
tions; tliat a minous defeat, tl ie work of clianoo, often closea 
tlie career of tlie bolclest and most sagacíous of generals; and 
tliat te judge of a commander's conduct by the event done is 
qnrilly unjuat and unphilosophical, a refuge for vanity and 
ismorance. 
Tliese reffections aeem to be peculiarly applimble to sir 
Sohn hfoore's c t l m ~ g n ,  wlJch hns by mncl ry writers been BO 
iinfrrirly dim~ased. Many of thc subsqucnt disastersi of the 
Frencl~ mn norv be distiiictly trnccd to tlie operations of tlie 
British mmy at tliis period; it can ba demonstrated that tba 
reputation of that exoellent general r n ~  bssely gacrificed at 
the perid of 11is death; and the vir~ilent censures since pnsaed 
npon bis conduct lmve been as inconsiderate as thcy are 
unmerited sud cruel. Tbe nature of his commands in the 
yenrs 1807-8-9 forced him into a series of embarm~sments 
from whieh few men could have extricntcd tliemsclvea, llfter 
i~fudng the chargc of thc nlixurd expcilition, to Egypt in 
1806, which endcrl as Iie jiidg~l it must do, unf~vournhlg, ha 
sucwderl to tlie eommand of tlie troops in Bicily ; a situation 
wliich irnmediately involved him in unpleaant discuasioes 
rrith the queen of Naples and tlie Eritisli euvay Dnunmond, 
tlie friend of Ifr. Cnnning; dismsions t o  which tlie mbse  
quent well-knomn enmity of the cabinet of that day may be 
traced. By his frank conduct, clenr judpeat, and firm spirit, 
he soon abtaind an influence orer the wnetched court of 
PaIermo whicli promiscd t , l~c  happiest r(a11lta Thc qnccn'a 
repugnante to a refonn was ovcrcnmc, tlie minifiters wem 
a ~ d ,  the miserable intiiguea of the &y nhted,  the Siciiii 
anny re-organixed, and a g o d  militsry g a t e m  waa eommenced 
under t1ie arlvioe of the Britipl~ general. 
Tliia promising &te of arair3 1mtd but a sliort time; &e 
Bumitin fleet put into the Tn,gu~,  thc French tiirmtened 
Portugal, and Sicily was no longer co~iaidererl! Sioore WQ 
artlered to qnit tlint i~lnnd, antl nssemlile a largo force r 
Gibraltar for n ~pecid  scrvirc; Iiut tlie tronps to  be gathere 
were disliersed iii tlie Mediterranean from Egpt  to tli 
stritrait~; ~ n d  tlieir jusiction could not be rtffected at a!, udet 
the Englisl~ liml~assdor at Constantinople shod 
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mcceed in brin$ng a neqtiation, then pendin 
JOmal, between tlie Surks znd Ewsians, ta a happy ismt. 
31s. Now this specizt sei-vice in qiiestion liad tw~ 
objects, 1: t e  aid sir Sydney Smith in carrying ofT the ropI 
family of Portugal to the B d l s  ; 2". fo take possession of 
31adcira; yet neither were made knom to the gener~l be 
liis arrival at Gibrnltar, which mas iiot until after Junot 
tnlren posaesaion of  L i a h m  Moore thcn, following 
jn~tmdions,  proccedcd hnrnc, nntl thus Englinh inter- in 
Biclly vme agitin rilinndoned to tlie victg nnd intngues of the 
coiirt of PaIermo. On the pa~snge lie croswd Spncer going 
mith a frirce a p i n s t  Gutn, nnd aoon after rrarlid Englnnd, 
ud~ence lie wa9 deaptched to Sweden, wi tbo~t  any Wfic 
object, and witl such nape  instructions that an irmediate 
collision with the unfortunnte Gustavus vas the consequence. 
Having with much dexterity and jud-pcnt withdravm hin 
aelf md his army from the capricious violence of that monarcl 
sir Jolin was sugerseded, and senG to Portugal with the thir 
rank in an army which at that time no rnan bsd aucb goh 
cInirns t o  eornrnnnd as hirnself. The mode of doing this wns 
nlso offcndre, and it WRB evident tbe ministers d~sircd t o  drin 
liim into private life. Tlieir efforts wcre powerlcss apinst  his 
pare nnd clcvnted pntriotism. In a personal confemnce with 
lorrl &~tlcrengl:li, l is  expressetl Iiis indipntion at the insnlts 
offered to him, and then repired to liis stntion atPortcmoiitk 
An oficial letter fnllowed liirn, the purport beirig that Iiis 
rcmonstrancei waa disrespectful, would be r e f d  to  the king 
for reprehenaion, and measures hken to remove him from 
what appeured to  be a disapeeable situation: in otlm wo& 
that bis regignation waa demanded. Without w moment's 









the very spirit of rnanly dignity nnd patriotism. '1 am,' he 
mote, ' this moment Jinnoiired with yonr lodship'~ 'aetter (by 
mmsenger) of yesterday's date. As I have dready had the 
honour to express my sentiments to your lordsliip fuIE J at my 
last interview, i t  i ~ ,  1 thik,  u n n m a r y  to trouble you w-ith a 
reptition of them now. 1 am about to proceed on the senioe 
wliich 1 Lave been ordered, and it shdl be my endeavourto 
luit myrielf 6 t h  the same zeal by which 1 have ever beea 
tuated when employcd in tl~e ~ervice af my country. The 
nmication mhich it has beea thought proper to m k e  to 
najesty cannot fail to giive me pleasure; I have the most 
hct relitrncr! on his rnajcsty's justioc, and shdl ncver fcel 
ter security than when my conduct, rny chaiacter, and mg 
lur are undcr Iiis majesty's protection.' The Iring saw tKs 
r nnd Moore h m d  no mnre on that a~~bjOCt, 
i e  goml fortrine of Englnnd wna never more oonqicuoua 
at thh period, wlien lier arrnies and fleetm were thus 
id abont, and a blinrl ch~nce govemsd the councile lat 
a. For first a €ore colIected from BU parta of the Merll- 
,,,,,nmn was tmpported to the Bsltic, at a time when an 
expedition compoaed of troops vhich had but a short time 
before come back from the Baltic, was saiXing from England 
to the Hediterranem. An army intended t D conquer South 
America wra happily maembled in lreland at the moment when 
an unevpectd event dld for its semkca in Portugal. A 
division destineil to nttnck the i?,paninrda nt Centa, amived nt 
Gibraltar at thc instnnt when tlie inaurrection of Andnluaia 
fortunately prevented it from maktng in attempt that aould 
have materially aided Napoleon's ~cliemee apinst khe Pmin- 
81ila. Agwin, thiee d y s  after Noore had withdram bis army 
from Sweden, orders arrived to emplq it in carrying o f  the 
Spanish troops uoder Bomanq-an operatioe for which it m 
not raguired, and wliich would have retarded if not eatireiy 
fmtrated the crampaip in Portugal ; but the ministers were 
resoI~cd at any cost to prevent Moore from mmmanding the 
army destined for Portiigal. Nor was i t  the lensh ptirt o£ 
Englands fortune tlint in sucl~ long-continued voyages in bad 
sensons, no d i m t ~ r  hFe1 the Fiuge fleekq thue bearing hes 
strengtb from one ext.remity of Europe t o  the ather. 
After tIie convention o€ Ciiitrn, Yoore wm qnin p l a d  at 
tlie lieml uf an nrmy, an itppuintment unwpectd by him, Tor 
tlie frnnk anrl boId mrtiiiier in which he expressed liimself to 
tlie tniriisters left liim littIe ta I ~ o p ;  but khe p n o d  g o o d ~ l l  
of tlie kiiig and liis own toweriug reputation crushd al1 
opposition: in n few rnoiiths after Iis quittcd Swerlen Iie was, 
despite of the mini~tcm' iil-~vill, zt the head cif an army in t' 
beart af Spab. TEs m y  dirl not exceed twenty-four tlic 
saud men, and he was opposed by Napoleon, who hs,d pasa 
tlie Pyrenees rit the liead of tlirce liundred and tliittp thoum~, 
and wuld readily bring two hun&ed antl thuty tlioumd io 
Iiear zgninst the Britisli. genera2 : a vmt disproportion of num- 
liers, anll s suEcient answer to aU the idle censure8 pmed 
upon the r e h t  tu Coruña, 
The most lilausible grouníls of aceusation against liis conduct 
twt on t1ircc allegeed crrora :- 
1". He divirlcd his fnrccs; 
So. Ee ticivaticed ngWnst Sonlt ; 
3". He n i d e  a precipitate nnil unneccswry rctrcmt. 
Wlwn R gcnernl, awire of thc strongkh of Iiis ~tlvcrsarps 
of the resources tu La phced at liis own dispod, a m g a s  n 
plan of campigri, lie nmy be strictly judged by t.he xulm of 
art ; bnt if, as in the case of sir John Moore, he is snddenlf 
appoinhd ta mnduct important operations wiaitboui a plan 
being arranged, or tlie mcnns given to armnge one, liis cap i t?  
or incapacity must h Jurlgcd of by tlie energy he disphys, tlie 
mmprchensi~e view he tekes of aff airs, and the rapidity with 
whjcli he accoamodates hh memures to events, wliich thc 
original viceaf bis appintment wiil not pemit  him i.0 controL 
Sir Wdtcr h t t ,  in his L i fe  of Napoleon, with thak i n h -  
pidity of crror whieh chriractcrizes the work, hw nsserted, 
' Tliat Mmre s ~ n t  ten tlioucinnd men under sir D. Baird by sen 
to CoruL-tlint the general science o£ wns upon tlie moat 
extcndd scale, fieerng to have been so littlle nnderstod or 
practid by the Englisln gencrds & tlik time, t b t  instearl of 
the w h - y  being carefully reconnoitred by afhcers of ski& 
tha mar& of the amy mas a m n g d  by guch hasty aud bao- 
curate infomation as could be collected from the peawnw; 




The acoond of thcsc irasertions; is dcvoid of rcason: and Iiotlr 
are contwry te fnct. Sir David h i r d  wns nevcr at U ~ h o n ,  
lie u-us ~ e n t  witli Iiis troops, by tlie ministem, clireet frum 
England to Coniñ~t. The 'general science of war upon the 
niorit extended smle,' is an inflated and unmmning expression. 
The most contracted o p t i o n  y u i r e s  that good inforrmatioa 
iould be obtained; and as to the fact, Moore 
nployed his own staff offieers t o  examine the 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; .  
>a&, sought inforniation equnlly Trom noble and 
J(uisnnt, and liko al1 grcnt cornm~ndcrs,rcgtilated hia pmmdinge 
by Biegenernl rcsult of liis inqiriries. Tlic first dividing of tlie 
anny wns tllerefore tlie nct of tlio rniriistcrs, wlio tlcnt Rnirtl to 
pn-iiíía. Tlm after sepurntian of tlie artillcry wns sir Jolin 
)re's, the reasons for wliich have h e n  alread~! attited; but 
worth wliile to examina what the effect of thet meañnre 
. and whnt it miglit have been. Here it may he observerl, 
oiigl~ a brigrtclc of liglit six-pounders did accompany the 
~ps to dlmeidrt, tlie rond in a rni1it.q sense w a  mt pracli- 
dJ foi  tlic p n s  wcre in come placea let down thc mcks hy 
~ ~ r ? s ,  in otlicra ctirried by hirrnan strengtli over thc diEcult 
laceñ, a pra~t~icnble nffiiir witli one bripdc; liut Iiow could 
ie pest trnin of guris ltnd nrnrnunition-waggona whicli accom- 
snierI Hope hwe pas~erl ñuch places, without a 103s of time 
iat would have proved more injurionsi t o  tlie operations h a n  
ie separation of the artillery 8 
Three continpncies &ded the ailmnce, any one o€ ~vhich 
orising would hnre immedbtely influenced the operrrtions :- 
lo. Elnke on the left, or C~tnños and Pahfox upon the right, 
migh have beaten the French nnd dvanced t o  the Yyrcnccs. 
2'. Tlig miglit tiave mainfniued tbeir position on tlic Ebre. 
3" Tlie arrival of rei~iforcements from Frnuce might have 
foicad. tlie Spniarrls t o  fd l  linclc upon the upper Duero on 
one sic1~ and the Guadalaxara on tlie other. In the first case 
there was no risk of marching by dirisions towards Burgos, 
which was the pojnt of concentration @ven Iioth by the Eritish 
and 8paniah rninisters. In the second case the army could 
d e l y  nnite at Valladolid. In the third case, if the Jivision 
of gi r  David Baid restched Toro early in November, and tbia 
it lrss reasonitble to expect bocause that geneml arrived at 
Coruña the 13th of October, tbe r e t r o p d e  movement oí  tbe 
Spaniuh armies wouId probably have drawn the En&h to tZiB 
Gwadamm4 as a gafe and central point between the retiring 
spanish w i n g ,  
Now tha artillery marching from the Alemtejo by +,he roa& 
of Tdav~ra and Naval Carnero t o  Burgoa, wouId pass aver 
one hundred and two spanish leapes; to A m d a  de Duer 
eiglitp-nine leapes; to Yalldolid, ninetptwo leagua; ñhil 
tlie coIumns tlat marched by Almeida and Balamanca woul 
pass over one hnnclred and skteen IWes to  Burps, -- 
ainety-eight to Talladolid Wherefore, auppposing the Spanir 
successful, or even holding tlieir own, the separation of 
artillery was an admntage, m d  if the Spaniards were di 
bnek their natural line of retreat wodd have been towr 
Madrid, Btakr; by Aranda ta the Sornosierra, and Casb 
and PaIafox by Siguenza m d  Tamncon fo cover the cal 
and mdntain an interior communication between the 60 
siem and the Hen~res river. Tlie British artillery al 
then have halted nt. Espinar aftcr a m ~ r c h  of on1y eig 
leapea, and Baid and Moorc's corps, uniting at Salutn~ ...
early in Novcmber, miglit 1 ) ~  n, flnnl~ march to Arevalo hav 
insured tlie eoncentration of tlis whoIe army. 
Thus in the thrce anticipatea m e s ,  tthe ñeparation of th 
artillery \va9 prudent and promised to he advantngeous. Ther-t: 
was indeed a fousth case, that which reallg happened Al1 
the Bpanigb m i e s  were di~persed in au instantl utterly 
effaced! But Moore could not have divined such a catas- 
trophe wliile his ears w m  ringing with the universal c l~mou~ 
about tbe numbers and entbusiasrn o£ the phtriot~:; if he had 
fomeen even a pkrt of their disasters he wonld never have 
advanced from Portugal, With the plans of the Spnish 
govemment he wa~i nnncquerintd, but he was officially 
informed that one hundred and forty thousxnd Spa~isli 
soldiera were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy; the 
intercepted letter from the governor of Bayoune stated, that 
the reid~lrcernents would onlp arrive bctween the 18th of 
OctoZicr ~ n d  the 18th of November; it wna thcrcfore reason- 
nblc to supposc the French moiild not commcnco ofl~nsive 











he affoded t o  concentrate the English iiroops under the pr+ 
kmion of tlle Bpanish timies. 
1F bfoore could liave snspsíiected tha delusion nnder which 
tLe Dritish government acted; if hc could Lwe divined tbe 
incredilile foUy of the central junta nnd tlie Spanid generals, 
or sthe inriccirmcy of the mitihry agcnta; If he could liave 
suplmsed €he Spanish ermiea were wea1r in numbcrs, wcaker 
In spirit, dcstitntc of food nnd dothing, or, that thc Spnnisb 
niitliuriti~q wliile prcassiiig him to arl~arioo, woald wnntonly 
detiiiu B~irrl's trorips sevcnteeii dnys on board tlie trrausliorta; 
if he could llave imagined al1 this, undoulitedly his arrauga- 
mcnty oudit and woulii have h e n  dxerent; liis army would 
Iiave becn kept togetlier, and t l ~ e  road to  Sdainanm tlirough 
&ri$ however difbcult, would h a ~ e  been preferred te a divided 
murch. 
!he  absurd pm;tion of the Spanish armies, md the remote 
situati~n of tlie British troops in Qctober, may he esplained 
by the annexed d i n p m .  Lisbon hing tnken ns a centre, 
and tlie Jistnnce A betwecn Lisbon and Coruña, being the 
radius, let a eircle passing through Madrid be desmibe4 and 
3et the tangential. line c be drnm perpendicular t~ the m1ius 
A, mecting tlis scmnt n nt Snngucssn. Tlic cxtrcme riglit of 
tEie Spaniad~ being posted at Sniiguessn, and b t a ñ o s  at  
CaIal~~nliurra wliile RInke wns ncar Duruiigo anil the main W y  
of the French at Bitoria, tlie latter not only dividerl tlie 
Spanianls, bnt was twenty-he miles nearer to 13urgos md 
Valladolid, the points of concentrration for Moore and Daird's 
mrp, han either Castaños ar Elake; seventy-five miles nearer 
than Palafox. On the 10th Napoleon defested Behedere and 
eeized Burgos; naird did not quit &mña until the l2th, and 
did not bring up the whole of hia froops to Astorga before tAhe 
4th of December ; hence it is ciear, that whaterer road the 
artillery had taken the Brithh armg could not have averted 
the ruin of the 8pniards. 
Xuppoae the tioops assembled at SaTamanca on the X 3th o€ 
Nowmber. They rnirst haw advanced either to Ya1laduIid or 
to  lfadrid. 1f to Valladolid, tlie emperor was at Burgos ivith 
the imperial guards, tcn or twclve thousand cnvnlry, and a 
hundred. of arti2ler;g; the fima wrps aas wit,liin a dny'~ 
marclq tlie sooonrl nnd faurth c o p  withm three marches, and 
tlie sixtli corps within two marches. Above a hundreci 
thousand French soIciiers could therefore bnve been con- 
ceiitrntd in thrce clr~y~; and it i~ tm be obscrved that Moore 
never h d  twenty-five thonsand in t he  field. It Is a i d ,  he 
miglit have gone to b í ~ l r i d  In  thnt casc tlic separation o€ 
tlie artillcry would hxvc been d v a n  tageouq and tlie separation 
of Baidg  corps, whicli was not tlie gcncml's nrrnngcmcnt, 
tlie et~or.  Uiit tlic amy could not h v c  rcwhcd Mdrid  in 
less t h n  seven tlnys, ami tmenty-four tlioiimnd BritisFi 
soldiers mdd noi lime been couccted in the capital More 
tlic 21st Novemlier. Mcantirnc tlie fourth French oorp 
wliicli reached Segovia the 1 s t  of December, wouId have 
cut tlie cornmunication witli Portugal, while the emperor 
mith forty thousnrid mcn would have been at Arantla de 
Duero. Cnstaños, mho l d  been defcated on the 23rd o€ 
Novemlier, waa indeed with tha remnant of m army at 
Uu~t(laIaxara about tlie 1st of Decernber, but the sixth mrps 
!vas close in pnrsuit. 
Jloore must tlien b a ~ e  done one of three tiiinga. Admnd 
h the sriocour of Castafioa, joined St. Juan rit the Sornosierra, 
or mtreated a m s a  tlie Tape. In tbe fimt w e ,  the empemr 
woull, as he did, force the Somosicrra, ~ n d  uniting with thc 
fourtli corps, have placed oixty tliousand men upon tlte Englisli 
rcar. In thc sceond cuw, thc sixtli rtnd fourtti corpa, turning 
tlie dlies' flunk on encli ~ idc ,  would hnve effocted s junctioii 
bcRiiirE tlie Somosicrra, nnd ctit tlicni ofi from llpxlrid and 
fmm Portugnl, wliile Nupilcon with forty thousnnd men 
nssailed thcm in froiront Tlic third cnse wits to d o p t  thc 
soutlicrn lirovinces Sor R ncw Iiiw of opcriatione, and miglit 
Iinve lieeti useful if tlie S1ianiurds would llave rallid roand bim 
aitFi cnthrisi~sm ant? courngc ; but ivould tliey liave done RO 
wIien the ernpcror W~IS ndwncing mitli 11ia cnormoua foml 
After-mperience proves thcy would nok Soult in 1810, with 
an a m y  very inferior tri tliatJ uuder Nupolcon renchcd the 
grites of h l i x  witlroiit s, iwioua Mow lieing struck t o  oppose 
Lim; aiid xt tliia time tlie peopIe of the rroutli were reckIess 
af tlie opportvnity procured for tliem by Moore'a match 01 
Sahngun. 

so much at he&;-because the peculiar position of the French 
army st  the rnriment, afforded the meam of creating a pmer- 
ful diversion in favwr of the smthern provincea, These are 
the nnanawerable msom for the advance tomards Xal iap .  
The detnile of execution may be liable to some trifhg abjeb 
tions; perlinps it wmld have been better to have carried the 
army on tlie 21st at once to Cmion, neglecting Magun and 
Saldanha; but in its strategic and political cliaracter it was 
mdl conceived and well timed, hardy and successfnl. 
Al1 tbe irrihting interference Moore was called npon to 
repel, the treacliery, and tlie folly equal in its effects to  treachery, 
Iic wae compelled tp gvard against, have been sufficiently dwelt 
upon; get Iiefore discussing the retreat fxom Astorga, it may 
be of Borne military interest to show that the line of PortugaI, 
althougli tlie natural one for tlie Bntish army to rctire npon, 
IVM not at this pmiod nececsarily cither aafe or useful: g-reater 
evils thm tliose incurred by a retreat through aallicia wodd 
prohably have &tended a retropade march upon Lisbon. 
The mgged frontier of Portugal, Iying between the Douro and 
tIie Tagus, is vulnerable in many p i n t a  to an i n d i n g  arrnp 
ofmperior force. It may be penetratea between the Dow 
and Pinhel, antl betireen PinheI and Guarda ; tietween Guarda 
and 8abugd by roads leading into the vallg? of thc Zezere 
nncl thc Meudego, Bct~voen thc Sierra dc Estrella mrf tlie 
Sierr~ de Gata, there i s  the r o d  from Alfayates to Sabugd 
and Pcanmncor, nnd that by Giianla. Fmm Corin it mny bo 
picrcpd bctwocn tlie Sicm dc Gatu ancl tlie Twrr by Idanbe 
Velli~, C'ustello Branco, and Xotircira Forrnosn; m d  from tlie 
Tnps  tn t.lie Guadiana, B distitnce of t~venty lenpefi, tIis 
A1cnitej.j p m e n t ñ  nn open coiintry witlioirt nny strong Fortm~ 
aave Ln-Lippe, wliich mtiy be ilisregwded nnd pnssed withont 
daiiger. Moow commcnd liis fo'omnril movcmcnt from 
S:ilarnanca tlie 12th of Dcceinber, nnd tlic fourth corps lieing 
tlien nt Talavera de 1s neynn, vas miicli nrarer to Lisbon than 
tlie Britisli army; tha emperor wnn preporing t o  foIIow \iith 
tha aixth corpu, the guards, and tbe rmefve. He could, aa the 
duko oF Berwick di4 penetrate by botli sides of tbe T a p ;  
and what was to prevent liim frum reacliing Liston liefore the 
Rritisli force if the latter had retreated froin 8tilamancaf He 
marched on a shorter line and a bettsr red, and he could 
mpply bis trcmps bp rcquisitions; but Moore with a scanty 
milihry chest must have purcliaeerl liis supplies from a sue- 
picioue psantry rendered mow distruptful l ~ y  tlie retrertt. 
In Lislion there wem i n d d  six tliousand British infantry 
and two liundred and sixty camlry under sir John Craddock; 
but th Portuguese provisional government lmd only organized 
a fem ill-composed battalions, and were so inactive tbat it was 
the 11th d h e m b e r  before even a proclamation calling on 
the people to arm was issued. In the arsend there were 
acarcely muskets and equipments for eight thousand men, 
and the nem levies were only required t o  asaemble nhen the 
countrgr sihould bo actnally invaded. Sir NoIrert Wilsoa Iid 
organized two thousand of the LuRitnnian legion, and marcheti 
in tlie middle of Demmber from Oporto t o w d  Almcidn, nnd 
this was al1 that could Le opposwl to an army more numcronq, 
more fnvourn.1ily situnkd for jnva~irin, and incornparabty l~etter 
comnianded tlian tlint witli wliich Massena invded tlie country 
in 1810. Thw it may h iememetl, that if a xetreat upon 
Libon was dvisable before Napoleon took Madrid, it waa 
not s snfe operati011 after that event, and Moore neitlier lightly 
nor injudiciousIy adopted the line of Qailicia. 
Those who deny tlie necessity of fnlling h c k  even behind 
tbe Esla, are scarcelj worth notice; a simple reference to the 
nnmbera under the emperor, m d  tlie direcbion of bis mitmll, 
is d c i e n t  to expoae tlieir futility; buh the neceesity of tlie 
continricd, and as it has been unjiistly mllcd, thc precipitate 
retreot t o  Coruña mny nut be quite so ohvious, TFie dvance 
to Snlingun was iritended t o  ercnte a diversion which sliuuld 
give tke spitniarda an opportunity to epther head in tlie 
smtb. It succeeded in drawing away tlie enemy, yet tho 
S p i d s  clid not make any h d ,  the central junta displayed 
no energy or wisdom, and a few sliglit demonstmtitions by 
Palacios on tbe side of the sierra BIorena, and Infantado. on 
ths s i i h  of Cuenca, mce1y disturbed the first corps which 
rcrnained in La %lancha. Iren thonsand men were sufficient 
to mainhin Madrid in perfect tranquillity, and a part of the 
fourth corpa even rnnrclied from Tnlavem by Plncentia on 
hlamanca. &Ir. Stuart, and the apies, informd Moore I.' 
al1 tlimc tli~l~cartcning cjrcumstances, but thi? intelligenoe 
arrivcrl slowly nntl at intervaIs ; and he, J w a p  hoping the 
Spxniards would finally mnkc an bncffort;, announcod Iiia intcn- 
tion to ltold thc Gallicins. MI. Stiinrt's continued corm 
spondence dcprived Iiim of tlint hope, and the prcscncc of thc 
emperor, tlie great amonot. of lris force, and tlie vehmnencc 
witli which he prcscd forwrid, confirmed the nnhappp truth 
tliat notliing muld be expected from thc ~oiitli. Be could 
not witl,~ hcnty-tlirce thousnnd mcn mnintrtin liimsclf q i n d  
t lw wliolc Frtncli n m y ,  nnd nnbil Iie rcncliml A~torga Iifs 
fliinlcs w r e  nlwnys exposal. From tJicnce lie rettrenhl in 
con~pnrnt,ive scrurity; but tlic strcngkli of tlic muntry between 
tliiit town nntl Contííi~ mislcil prrmns of slinlliiw judgmcnt, 
wlio Iinve t;incc iricoitsideratcly atlvnticctl muny vague nccum- 
tions; sucli kq tliat pwes wliere n l i irntld n e n  could stop nn 
mmy sera lighitly ali~nclond, tlint tlie rstimt w w  a fliglit, 
rrnrl the genenil'a jlitlgment clorirled by tlie ilrtngcr of hia 
aituntion. Tlicre mig1:lit be some fountlntion For ñucli ribserm 
tiniis if miiitory cnin~nundera were like priaefiglitem, Iiound 
to strilte alwnys at t11.e front; but a9 lonp M armis are 
dependent fnr tlieir subsistenco and ~mmunition upon lines of 
mmunication, the safety of thcir flanlís xnd rear must be 
considered as of conseqnencc. lloore knew lie coda repel 
any attack in aome of tlie p i t i u n s  on tIie r o d  to Comria; 
yet, unless for a, pennanent defence, sucli battles would have 
been worse tlian nselecs, and tliitt was ~inpossililc, for there 
wcre nnne but ternpomy rnagaírincs ncarer tlian Coruña, and 
he had no means of transporb or money. A sei*ere winter 
liad just set in, the people were disinclined to nid, and as tlic 
prorEnce tras paor few resources could be dwwn from th 
viciiiif y. 
Nor mas tllcre s singlc position that could be mainhined 
for morc tIinn s fcw dnys ngainst a superior fom. That of 
Rodrigntos could bc turnotl by tlie alrl ~ a c l  lmdlng to I'illa 
Finnca; Villa FPRRCI~ itmlf 1)y the vallcy of tlic Syl; nntl 
from tlience tlie wliole line to Coruíín miglit be turned by 
the road uf Orczisc, wliicli nlso Icd dirrctly t o  Irign; and 
tintil Iie r m h c d  Nognlcs, Moore'~ jntention to retire to 
Trigo. Tlic Frendi could liave rnnrclied througl~ tlie richest 
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part of GaIIicia to St. Jago snd Cor& on the left, or froin 
tlie AsturXran, by thc ~vay of Mondonedo, on the right. IT it 
be asked, why they did not do so? the answer i s  pmrnpt, the 
einperor having qitittcd the a m ~ ,  tbc  jcnIousim nnd misun- 
demtanding usual bctwccn gen crnls of cqiiiil rank impdcd 
the openrtionm. A coolncus sulisisted lietwceii Ney md BouIt, 
and without entering in ta  tlie grnunds vf tlieir difference, it 
is clear tlie judgrnent oc tlie ltltter i v a ~  the soundat. The 
former comrnitted a grwt error by rcmaiiiing at Villa Franca 
ilistead of pusliing bis corp, or x psrt of it, a8 recommeridd 
by hult, dong $be valley of Orense to St. Jag-ri de Com- 
postella; thc British aimy would have been lost if the sixth 
corps 6ad mched CoruFu bcfore it; and wlint would llave 
bccn thc chiuiccs in fhc bnttlc if thrcc additional Freneh 
divisions had bcen cngagcd? Grantiiig thcivforc thnt tlio 
tmops could 1ia.r.e been nourislied duriiig the wintcr, Villa 
Fmca, Nogales, Constnntino and Lugo, were not permnneotly 
rlefensible by an army whose bnse wxs at Coriula, ztnd tence 
Moore resolwd to ernbark and rcnew the aar in the soutli: 
Ilannibal codd have done no more. 
It has been aslíed, why he did not throw ivmclf into 
Ferro11 Tlie general answer Is that it would liavc involved a 
siege. He c~uld not beforc Un enemy abnndon thc p t  
naml nrscnal of S p i n ,  and t o  havc cooped the m y  o£ 
Englrantl up in a corncr would havc rcduccd hcr mornl md 
pl i t id  pcisition I~FI  1ow M thc Frcncli cmperor OT the Sp~nisli 
junta could liuve desired, Tlie circuinstuncm of  the momcnt 
merc however adverse to it. Sir Jolin Moore had, sorne 
yeam before, been sient by &fr. Pitt to examine Ferro1 and its 
6cinity with a view to an attaclr, and his impresaion ww tht 
ghipa working down the Ferrol river would be exposed to m 
enemy's fire; tLs and the reports of the engineers despatchd 
to nswrtain the facilities for crnbarking e t t  Vigo, Coruíh, and 
Ferrol, antl to examine Retanzoa aiid thc positions on tlie 
river tliere, ivhich 110 thoiight might be ~ l v n t ~ c o i i s l y  owu- 
pied, induoetl liim to adopt tlm sltortest and most aecure line 
of march which WM 014 C ~ r u h .  The needless u r c h  of  
Fraxer's divisiou t o  Sh. Saga and back-the s l o ~ ~  p r o p g  in 
gttiiig off tlie Lugo position occnsiond hy thc boktcrous 
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wenther-the careless ilI-managed balt of Baird's division, 
which c~mmenced t h  disgmceful soene of straggling, bbecans~ 
the men were suffered to spread to  the right and left of the 
road and take shelter in barns and isolateci honses, renilered 
it diaicult ta  check the enemy effectively at Be- and 
make that stand Moore h d  designed. Tlrherefore knowing 
lie liad gaiued two marches on the Frencb, and evpecting to 
see h¿s ~hips  in the l~arbour of Coruña, hc mnrched at once to 
that place. It is such varying influencm, al~vayx 5ecting 
military aperations, that make tbe greatest general0 wowhip 
fortune, She was not favourable to Moore, but bis retreat 
mas RrmIp and ably conductcd despite of her f r o m .  'Honmr- 
able retreats,' eiaye lord Bacon, 'are no ways inferior to brave 
chnrgea, as hnving less of fortune, more of discipline, and aa 
much o!? vdour.' That is an honourahle retreat in which the 
retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains mcq 
charge without being 'orciken, and final15 aftw a sievcre action, 
re-ernbarks his army in the face of  a superior enemy wit11out 
being fieriously molested. It woulci be honournhle tu efi& 
this before a foe only formidable from niirnhers ; it is infinitely 
morc cditahIe, when the commanrler, while a h g l i n g  with 
bad weather and worse fortune, Iias to oppose rreternns rith 
inexperientxd troops, lrnd eontcnds tlgriinst an ranhgonict of 
eminent nhility who mrcely lets a single ndvantage escape 
Iiim during a long and vigoroua pursuit : u11 tliis IIoore did, 
md finished hia work by a dentli as trm and gloriom M my 
thnt antiquity can bowt of. 
Pnt to  lml Bacon's test,, in wliat slirtll the retreat to 
Corufii be found deficient? something in discipline perhap, 
but that fault does not a h h  to tlis general. !hose com- 
mandem wlio have been celebrated for making fine retreats 
were in most instances well acquaixitd with their armiec, 
Hannibd, spenking of the elder Seipio, derided him, although 
s brave and skilful man, for ihat Iieing unknown tD his om 
soldierñ, he sliouId presume to opposc bimself to a gened 
who could caIl to eadh msn under bis command by name; 
thus inculcdng, tthat troops must be trained in the miar 
methoir of a commantler, if the latter is tu achieve anytbing 
grwt. Moore bad a yomg army siiddenly placed under L-Ee 
gdcaidance, and it was scarcely u n i t ~ l  n~hen tho snperjor 
nnnibera of thc enemy foieed it to a retrograde movement 
mder very harasuing circumstanees; he had not time tbere- 
fore to esbbllish a q s t e m  of discipline, and it is in the leding 
erents not the minor de tds  that the just criterion of his 
merits iB t o  be sought for. 
Was the mtreat ~iincrilled fnrl Was it unnacessarily preci- 
pitntel Wns any opportrinity af crippling the enemy lost 3 
Ww any wakness to  bs discoverecl in t l i~  personal cliaracter 
of tha general ? These are tlie quefitiom t.hat menrribEe men 
di rtsk. The f i t  hazi been alreatlp exarnined; the aecond i~ 
r matter of simple calculattion. The rear-guard quitted Astorp 
on the 1st of January ; on the 3rd it repulsed the enemy ia a 
Ébarp s k i i s h  at Cdcabeioa; the 6th it rejoined tlie main bdy 
&t Lugo, having three timea check4 the pursuess dunng the 
mnrch; it wns unbrukcn, h d  lost no gun, suffered no misfor- 
tune. Tl~e wliofc army ofcrcd h t t l e  at Liigo for two succes- 
sive daps, it was not acoeptd, and tlle retreat recommencing, 
the troops reached Ikitanzos. on tlis morning of the 10th, 
Coruíia on the Lltli; tbus in eleven daya, three of mliich wcre 
dap of red, a smali srmy pmed over a lluadred antl fifty 
mila 6f good road. KapoImn, with fifty thousand men, left 
Nadrid tlie 22nd of December, the 28th he was a$ Tillapando, 
hving performed a march on bad mads o€ a h c l r e t l  and 
sixty-fmr mila in seven days. The retreat to Comk WM 
oonseqnently not prccipitntc, unleas it cnn bc shom thrrt 
it was unncccmry ta  rctrmt at al1 beyond Viiia Franea; 
neitlier can jt be assertd tlrak any opportunity o€ crippIing 
the e n q  ww lost. The cavalrp twioe defeated Uie puming 
French between Xahagun and the Esla; two dayfi the army 
m a i n d  beliind that river, and on its banks agpin defeated 
the Fmnch cadry  and took a general. On the hanks of tbe 
liitle river Calcavellos the British again htilted and slew 
wother general with many men. At Nogalea t h q  checked 
the pursnem, md r e p M  them at Condantino with great loss. 
kt Lugo thcp haltcd, and olyercd Lmttle for two dap? and in 
one of them repulsed an attacIt with great n1auglite-r. At 
~ ~ n z o s  they checkcd them again, and nt Coniñtl dcfcated 
thm. This summwy ~liows l i o~v  firmly m d  vigorously thia 
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lalile retreat !m effected. But to figlit e Zinttlc m thc game 
o€ the h m e h  mamlinl, nnd hc mny Iic ccnsurcd for delaying 
to at.hck at Lugo. Tictorious OT 'ticaten it woiild h n ~ c  i e c r e u d  
the emhmasmcnts  o€ liis d v ~ r s a r y ~  who m u ~ t  bave continued 
Iiis rctrcrit cncurntrcred witli tlie wourirIed, or tlie latter mnst 
havc bccn tllinnttoiid without succour i ~ i  tlie midst of winter. 
At Corurin tlie rhence uf tlie flcet necessaLily biou~ht  on a 
linttle. Thnt it wns Iionourrtblo to tlie Britisli troops is c l q  
tliey embarkecl witliout  los^ after tlie action. TI13 it m 
nbsoIntely nemsnv  io ninlinrk notwithetanding tbs suma, is 
a ccrtain proof how l i t t l ~  advantagc could h v e  Iicen deri~ed 
from any bat$e; fouglit fartlier inlnnd, aníl of Moore's prndmce 
in decIining an ackion thc moment be liad rallied Ills nrmy at 
Lugo, and restored tbat discipline mhich the previous movb 
mcnk hxd sbrtken. But notwitlistanding the clamour with 
whicli tliis eampaign has been zssailed, a if no army bad ever 
yet d e r e d  mch misfortunes, tlic nominnl loss was smali, the 
real luss smaller, sinking to nothing when compated with tlie 
advantages gained. An army which, aftw marching 
~ ~ ~ r x '  in advance osrctreat above five hundredrniles before 
an enemy of superior forw$ has only lost, hclud- 
mg those ki11d En battle, four tliousand men or a sixthprt of  
its numbers, cannot be sajd fo  hare suñered severel9 ; nor 
would the loris havc bcen so grcat 1)ut for the intemention of 
the accidcntnl occurrenccs rncntiond in the narrativo. h'iglit 
marches nre seIdom hqipy, thnt from Lugo to T-tanms cost 
tlie nrmy in strngglm more thnn doul~le tlia numher of men 
Iost in al1 tlie prcccding opcrntions. Nmerthclcas, tbe reserve 
in t l int  ns in al1 tlie other morcments auffcrcd little; nnd tlie 
liglit brigada detnched by tho Vigo raad, wliic1i were not pur- 
suerl, m d e  no forcetl marches, slept under cover, and were 
well supplid, hft in pmportiw to tlieir strength as many 
men behincl zs any riyther pnrt of the anny. Thw aceumulatec 
proof upon pmof that inexperience was the pirnary and prin- 
cipal causc of the diorders wIiicL attended the retreat, Shws 
diserden were suffciently grcat, yet many circurnsfaii~es con- 
ributed t o  produce an appearebnce of sdering and diayni- 
zation whieh was not real. 
Sir 30hn Xoorc'~ intcntion wari t o  haw! Prooccded to 
Vigo, in orkr tu restore osder before he iiniled for Engiand, 
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i m t d  of which the fleet stmred ]loma diredIg irom Coruiiri, 
and a terriblo storm scattered it; m n y  ships wera wrecked, 
and the remainder driving up the Climnel were glad to liut 
into any port. T h e  soldiera tlius throm on shore were sprcd 
from the h d s  End to  Dover. Tbeir l qgnrd  appeaiance, 
q g e d  cluthing, and dirty mntrcrncnts, t h i n p  common 
enough in wm, struck a pcopIe anly used t o  tl ie dnintincas o€ 
prarade with surprise. The usual exagprations of rnen just 
egcaped fmm perils and distresses, were increased by the uncer- 
trrinty in which al1 were as to the f a t ~  of tlieir c o m r a k .  A 
deadly fc~er, tlie result of anxiety and of tlie sudrlen change 
from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitale 
at eveT port with officers and soldim, and thus the miserable 
date. of sir Jolin Moore's -y became tbe topic of every letter, 
und the theme for every oountry newspapex along the coast 
The d o n ,  F L ~  thnt time unuscd to  p a t .  oopcretions, forgot 
dint war is noh a ~i~rmlcss  gamc; aiid jurlgirig of the Ioss 
positively, instead of comparatively, wns clispoaed to beliere 
tlie dumniw of intercdd men, eager t.a wt a ahade over 
one of the brigl~ted- chracters that ever domed t2ie conntry, 
Those calumnies triumpbred for a rnomenf, but h1 oore's last 
appeal to his country for justice d l  be succeasful. Poste- 
rity, reverhg and cheriahing 1;s name, will visit wch of 
l i i  odious calumnktors as are not too contemptible to be 
~ememberd, with a just and severe retribution; for thw it is 
tbat time fmhcns thc bcauty of vlrtuc ~ n d  withers tbe  cfforts 
of baaeness. And if authority bc sought for in a caac whcre 
reason spenlia RO plninly, future historinns will not fiiil tn 
remark, that the mnn wbose tdents exacted tha prnises of 
Soult, of Wellinghon, antl of Napoleon, could be no ordinary 
aoldier. 
' Sir John Moore,' aiays the first, ' took every advzntage 
that the country afforded fo oppose sn active 
nnd vi,aarous mktanm, md lie finished by dfing 
in a mmbat tbat,must do credit to his memoy." 
Nnpolcon more thnn once affirmed, tbat if he committed 
a few trifling emors, thcy were to  be attribiited Yiviank 
to his peuliar Fiituntion; for his talcnta mrl fim- ~ B ; ~ ~ m U S  
nesa done had saveri Qie Englisli nrmy from Voice worn 
St. Ilelenn. destnietion. 
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~o sir J&n Noore's campaigo: said the duke of Wo1ling. 
ton, I can see but one error; when ha arlvanced to ~ ~ l ~ % ~ ~  
he shonld have cansidered it Rs a movEment of retreat,, and 
afficem ta  the rear t o  marh and prepare the halting. 
places fm eveq brigde. Eut this opinion 1 bave formd 
after long experieace of war, and especinlly of tLe ptcuiiaritia 
of a Spanislt war, which must have been scen to be un&wod; 
 MI^, it an opinion f o m d  after the c m t ,  
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h EngIand, 8ir John Noore'e campaign was not justly con- 
sidered. The pulilic, trained to party politicics, and .ñithout 
real power b rebuke the folly of the government, regarded 
disastms and triumphs with factiuus rather fhan nationd 
fnelinp; it wns dikc w p  t o  draw attention from wcighty 
mattera and t~ fix it upon things of littIe moment. To clmg 
tlic dulce of Yarlr's 1,rivntc frailtics before tlie world was 
t h q h t  e~sentid for the welfnre of tlie nntion, wliie ehe 
ministerial incapacity which caused England and Spain t o  
moum wss lefc unprobed. An insular people, protected from 
the ñront mila af war, may be thua deluded; but if a di- 
trous campaign brought a devashting enemy into the heart 
of thc country, tlie lionour of n faIlen gencm1 and the rnilitnry 
policy of thc crtbinct, would not bc considerct1 mcre aubjccb 
for a vile sophiatia sccfffi and rnisrcpresentations. 
Parlimentaty oratom expatiated iniieed with p a t  w m t h  
upon the campaip, but their speecbes were only specimeas of 
astute eloqirence without aocnrate knowledge of facts. The 
oppocition speakem, eagg fo miminate the government, ex- 
tiggerated the disastem. Comprehending eeitlier the rnotivea, 
nor the movementa of air John Xoore, they urged untenalle 
clior,p q n i n s t  the ministera, who, dimnited by personal 
feding, did not ndopt tlia samc ground of  dcfcnc~. Lord 
Castlmagh and lord Liverpool, silent on the cabinet erro- 
'which at the ontset gaTe the general only a choice o£ diffi- 
mlties, assertea, truly> t h t  the political advanws of the 
advance on Xahagnn more than compensated the military 
losses in tbe subsequent retrelit, md they made honouralile 
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mention of tlic cammnntlcr. Mr. Crtnning, unswupulonsly 
resolute to scrccn >Ir. Frcrc, ra~~cnted tn tlie cmneoiic stnb 
ments of tha oppsition, and with malignnnt dcxterity cm- 
verted tlicm into clinrgcs ~gainst thc fnllcn hcro. Sir John 
Moore wns, he said, wliolly rancrwerahle for t1ie cnrnpnip; 
glorioua or distressing, dmiretl or dcplorcd, it m his own: 
Iie had lrcpt tbc govcrnmcnt in ignomnce of hio prowedinga 
Bcing eloscly prctiacrl on tliis point by >fr. C. Hutcliinson nnd 
Mr. lVl1itInrn4l, hc ilclilcriitcly rcpentcrl tlic mscrtion, yet nd 
long nftcrwnrtls, hlooie'a Ictbcr.9 to  tlrc rniniaters, written 
filmo& dnily, nnd furnisliing cxact and copious information 
wers laid before tlia liciiise! 
'#hilo tlio vitul nnticind interests were tlius treated, tbe 
public mlour sornewlivliat aliated; but the wnr, rightfnl in 
itseIf, remaincd popular, and n t m t y  was concluded with the 
siipreme j u n h  tlie contracting powerers licing bound to maks 
common causo agaitinst Prnnce, But tlie ministers, whiIe 
professing unlsouilded enthnsiasm, rmlly considered the 
Peninsuh s t r u ~ l e  as a ~econdary oliject. The mmlilre prepa- 
ratioiis of Austri4 and tlis rcputation of the arcliduke 
Charles, mhose hlelents were fooiklily said to exceed Ntipo- 
Ieon's, hrid a~vakcnctl tho dormant spirit of mnlitions, and it 
was more apecafile to tlie EngI.Iish cnbinet to hare the French 
dcfeatect l)y a monarcli in Germrtny, tban by n plebeian 
insumction in Spain. Xome obscure intripee of the princesa 
af Tour and Taxis, and tlie ~ccret soeicties on the continen6 
ernandng ras thcy did Yrom ptricinn souroes, excited t,hbe 
sym11ntliy of tlie rnini~tcrs, cngngcd tlicir rnttcntion, nnd 
nourislierl tlioso distcinpered fcclings wliich mnde tliem ae 
only weakne~s and disaffection jn Frnnm, when tliroughout 
that rnigl~ty empire few denired, and none dnred to oppmse 
the emperor's wislies; w11en ei+ett siecret dkcontent ~ i a s  con- 
fined to  some myalist cliiefa and splenetic republic~m, whose 
infliience was never felt until Napoleon had sufferred the drest 
reverses. 
Unable to rnemre the gandeur o€ thnt monwch'a genins, 
the ministers attributed bis Buccess to chance, Iiis victoria to 
twasoii, to corruption, to anything but thnt dmirable skill 
with which be wicIded Ghc moat powcrful rnilitnry force tbat 
ever abeyed tlie onlers of ib single ehief. Tbw $el€ dducled 
nnrl misjudging difficiiltieg, tlicy doptcd idla pmjccts nnd 
squmdmed tlieir rmources nitliout ehct. Wliile negotinting 
for the oocupation of Gadiz, they were planning an expedition 
qknst Italy; and whiIe asserting thcir resolution t o  defcnd 
Portugal, r e m d  their principal force for a sudden bloiv in 
Holland, their preparations Heing however marked by a pomp 
and publicity tottilly ansuited to war. Wihh mhat ii mortd 
criIamity that prqennt clascd sha1E be noticeri hemftcr; nt 
prwmt it is fitting to tmcc the pro,ms of t l ~ c  opcrntions in 
Spein coinciclent witli Uie retrent of ctir Jolm Moore. 
'CVhen Madrid uurrenrlorcd, Nnpoleon refufied to let his 
hrother return there, unleas the public bodies and l i ~ i r l s  of 
familia mould demand I~is restoration, and mcar fedty, 
witbout menta3 reservntion. figisters wcre opend, and 
twenty-eight thonsnnd six hundred heads of families inscribed 
thek names, voluntarily making oath of their 
sincere dwire to receive Joseph. Deputationa ~ ~ ~ , . m "  
also, from the couneils, from tlie junta of com- 
merce and maney, thc hall of the A l ~ l r I ~ ,  annd thc corpomtion, 
waited on the empcror at Vnllncloliii, whem, joind with tho 
rnnnicipality of that town, tlio dcpiities from A~torga, Lmn, 
nnd otlrer plnoca, tliey proffcrctl thcir ontlis nnrl desired Joseph 
rnighb be king: tlius antrmterl, he waq permitted again te 
assumo the roya1 functiona. 
Xapoleon'~~ victories and golicy liad now in the capital xnd 
other gmt toma, rendered the multitude ws well as the 
notables sulimiaive; and if his murse liad not been inter- 
rapted by extmneons circumstances, tlie exam ple would have 
becn genemlly followo~l, in preference t o  the more glorious, 
bhouph indcctnnl rcsistance, offered by those cit ic~ w11oso 
fortitirrle and emlnmitics h ~ v e  forcert from mankind a ~orrowftil 
ndmiration Tlia murie of Spnin wos at this time lo&, iF Any 
cmse depending on ivar wIiich i m  hit a siicowsion of violant 
changes mu be called so; tlie governmcnt was bewilderecl, 
the people dismged, the amies dispersed, the cry of mist- 
anm was hushed, and the Btern voice of Xapoleon, answereii 
by the tramp of three hmdred thonsand veterans, was heanl 
throughont the land: but when the hostaity of Austria arrestd 
Joseph, escarted by hic six tliousand Freuch p n h ,  entered 
Madrid tlie 23rd of January. Re masliowerer witliont revenues, 
and would hnve been witliout the semblante of power, if he h d  
not been norninated tlie emperor's lieutenant, ~vhich pve him 
th cornmand of tlie French aiiny. Tliis offended the m b & ,  
who mould have ttliwartd liim, cwn if he bad kept 
Jolrepli'i c a p  
tnr& com- within the limits prescrihed by liis kirother; but 
*p~nde"w, when he issued orders throughhis Spanishministm, MSS. 
they were repelled as coming from men despised for 
tlieir want of militmy knowlerlge, nnd suspected, as f~~ouring 
intcrcets o p p o d  to thom of tlic nrmy. Napoleon's iron p p  
compmsing tlie ambltious jcalousy o f  tliemamhals being t h  
relaxed, tlie pnssions wbieh hnd mined t h e  Spaniards began to 
affcch tlieir cnemies, prorlucing i n d d  Img Mal &c&s b a s e  
morc circumscrilid, yct sufiicicntly pcrnicions to stop the 
coune of conqucst. The French army herctofore temible, n l ik~  
from mnssivc and Rexiblc strerigtli, bccame a collection of i n d s  
pendent bnnh, eenh formidable, liut ~ l o w  to combine for grent 
objccts; and, by jrregulaities md insubordination, ~howing 
tht  the traops lmew the differenco between a warrior chief 
and a voluptuoue monarch. These evils Iiowwer appeared 
lnter, and tlie distributien of the army wben Napoloon quitkd 
Rpain atil l  bore the impress of hii geniue. 
T h e  first corpa m qnartered in La Mancha, hving it4 
second division, under general Lapisse, rletached to  Sdarnm~ 
where it waa joined by Naupetit's brigde of cavalrj, The 
second corpa was to invade Portugal, but its dfth dipision 
undcr gcncrnl Bonnct, was detached to the Montaña de Sm- 
tander. Tlie third md fifth corpa besieged Zartagoza Tlie 
fourtfi corps m m i n d  in tlio valley of the Tagus. The sixth 
corpmwns t a  hold Gtillicit~, its third division, undcr general 
Dcssolbg ramaining in Nadrid. The seventh eorps warred in 
Cutdoni& Tlie rmerve of heavy mvalry being broken up, 
Latour &ubourg's division joined tlie first wrps, Large md 
La Houmaye wers atttached t o  the aecond corps, h ~ l l e  wmt 
ta  the fourth corps, md two brjgdea reinforced the sixth mrp 
Milliaud's divhion reniained at &drid, Ke1lemmRa guarded 
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the lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and 
Falencia. The imperial guards Loltcd at Titoria to pro- 
tlie peat  communicatiw wikh France unta Zaragoza ~horild 
fall, md were yet ready for the Austrian war, because t h m g h  
Fmce they could movc hy post. 
This urrangcment, Mnilrid Iic:iiig still tlie pivot of opera- 
tiona, cniabled tlie Frencli, Lip u, concentric movement on thnt 
capital, to crush any inwrrection within tlie circle of their 
position, and the p t  massea, beinng on the principal roads 
diverging from llldrid to the extremitiw of the Peninsula, 
intercepted the communications between the provincea; while 
the second corps, tl~nist bcyond the circurnfereiee m d  designed 
to mcep mund from point to point, wonld find a supporting 
clorpa, nnd ncw line of retrent on wery great road l d i n g  
from Xadrid to the unsubdued pn* of the Peninñuln. Tlie 
communication ñjth France, secured by the fortrsssm of 
Burgos, Parnpeluna, md St. Bebastian, and by ddimsions posted 
at Santander, Bilbao, Burgos, and Vitonta, wm also supported 
by la meme at Bayome. The northern provinces were par- 
celled m mili* governmenta, whose commanders corre. 
apondcd with cacli other and repressed pctty insurrcctions liy 
iiioveublc columns. Thc third and fifth coma, bascd un Pam- 
* .  
pelunn md besieging Znrngozq aidetl also to cover tlie eom- 
mnnications with Fmnoe, una were e x p d  to no flank a t a ,  
eaoept from Cuen3 w i m e  ~nfantadds troops were gathered 
but were themselves watched by Victor'a corps. 
Atl tbe lines of correspondence with Frmce, and those 
between the diferent mrps, were secured by fortifid posts, 
having grenkr or lesser gadsona according to tbeir impor- 
Wce. Between Rnynnnc and Rurgos tlirre were &ven mili- 
tarystiationa; between E q o n  niid Xhdrid, by the raild of 
Aranda md .Sornosierra, &&bit; eleven protected tlie more 
cimitous rout e to the capitai by Vdladolid, Begovia, and the 
Gusdarama. Between Validolid and Zaragoza there were 
fifteen forts ; behween Vallindolid and hntander eight ; between 
VnllatIolid anil VilIa Franca dcl Bierzo nine,, including Bene 
veiite und Astorgn, nnd twa conneeted Ron~vcnte with Leon. 
361 PENT?JSULA WAR, [ISOS. 
strong, thirty-nine thausand being cavalry. Kfty-eight thm. 
s~nd mere in hospital, arid the depAts, governrnenb, gamsons, 
pnsts of compondence, prisonew, nnd liattalions of mrch, 
wmposed of strtraggIers, absorbed twenty-five thoumd. 01 
'he rmnaining two Iiundred and forty thousand, fifty tlionsand 
guaded the communication with Frnnce. in positions strength- 
ened by tliree fortressw rtnd sixty-four fortified posts, showing 
how carefulIy Napoleon, who has been cdIed a recklesa general 
made war. 
Galliisao's dcfeat on tlie Tagus has heer? incidentally noticed 
The dukc of Dnntzic sccing liim occupy ra nver line of forty 
milcs ivitli six thoiisantl nicn, mndc n feint of crossing ~t 
Arzobispo on the 24th Dcccmber, liut xudrlcnly descendetl to 
Alrnnr~ antI foorcsrl n phssnge, killing rnany and triking four 
guns; SO comp1et:to wn9 tlic ovcrtlirow thnt for a long tinic 
iifikrwn~iia Es trcmradiirfi Iirirl not a mnn in ama 
2%:- TIic Frcncli cnvnlry i ~ ~ c r c  fitill in piimit mhen 
Moore'e advnnce to S i~ l iqun b e m e  knoan, anrl 
thc dukc of Dnnhic wlia lid Ieft eiglit IiundrcrI mcn at 
Sepovin, recrossd tlta Tngus and took post I-ietween Talavera 
and Placentia. Ro ww Boon aftmards recalled to  France 
nnd Sehastiani siiceeeded him. Meanwhile marslid Victor 
entered Toledo and puslieíl outposts towards Cuenca and the 
X i m  &forenoi. 
During tbese events, t l ~ e  centrnl junta renched Sevill.e, and 
being urged by Mc Stuart md hYr. Frcm to  make some eRort, 
ordered Pdafox and Infantado to admce, tbe one towards 
Tndela, the 0 t h ~ ~  towards Madrid. The iequiquia of Palalacios 
who had been remlled from Catnlonia, and was a t  the head of 
f i re or six thousiind lcvice in the Norexia, was also ordered to 
movc into Ik Mancha. Bnlliixxo, Cnstniios, Cuesta, nnd other 
o f f i m  werc now prisoncrs of stnte, m? \vere clmgged from 
placc to place )y thcir infamoris govcrnment. Cucsts m 
howcvcr popnlnr in Fstrcmndura, ~ n d  thc central junta, thmgh 
fcnring ond dctesting him, werc forcerl to gire Iiim tlia 
comnimd of G~lluaea's fugitives, who l i d  rallietl beliind tlie 
Gnadiann, and being joioed by fresh levies wcre hkiiig the 
fonn rnthcr tlian thc consistencc of nn army. SIiis nppoint- 
ment depaded tlie government by exposlng its fmrs and wetnk- 
nem, and it wns pernicious because Cuesta was pliysically snd 
mentdly incapltble. Xtrickenin p a r s ,  obstinate, jedous, Iieed- 
less of time, citcumstances, and fitness; to  ptuiish barbarously 
md rush heudlong to battle constitutd with Km al1 the func- 
tions of a gcncrat 
Florirla Rlnnca, eighty-onc ycnrs of  agc, now dicd at Scvillc, 
nnd tlie inwrjuis of Adorgtl sumrlcd him na p~csident, 
yet tlia character of tha jt~nta did not ammd. Some fleetiiig 
indications of vipur h d  lieen produced Iiy the imrninence of 
the dnngm during ththo flight Erom Xranjuez; but a l n q e  
~mi t t~ance  of ~ilver from Xouth America arriving at Cadix, 
abwrbed the atbntion of the members, and the public weal 
was blottedfrom their remembrance: even &Ir. fiere, ashamed 
of their mndnct, appeared t o  acquiesce in the justness of sir 
John Moorc's cstimnto of tbe vduc of Sptinisli co-operation. 
It b d  beeu decreed tliat 6ve liiindrerl tliciusantl mcti sliould 
te enrulled. Bmrcelg one-tliird bnd joined tlieir mIoum, but 
l a rp  hdies were aasmbIing at different points, because tlie 
peasantv, evecially in the south, although dimnayed were 
obedient., md tlie l o a l  juntas at a distance from the warf.dre 
vigorously fomnrded recruits, hoping fo keep the enemy Emm 
their provinces, or te  have the cxcuse of being without fighting 
men to p1ea.d for snbminsion. The fugitivcs also, rcadily 
colIeeted winj p t l p  from patriotisrn, partly bemuse tbe 
Frcnch were in posawsion of tlicir nativc provinces, partIy 
tliat they nttriliuted tlieir dcfeats to Grcncliery, nnd lieing 
deceived by tlze gross falseliods and lioastiug of the govern 
mcnt, with d ; v  vanity Wieved tlie enemy had auffered cnor- 
mons losses. In fine, men were to be ltad in abundan% 
yet heyond assembling them and iappointing some incapxble 
person to command not.hing m done for defence. The 
oficers wcre not dewived, but Bad no confidente either in 
their own troops oc in the govcnmcnt, nor merc thcy re- 
apccted by tlieir mcn; the Inthr starvcd, rnisiised, ill-himndcrl, 
posscssed neitlier the compwt strength of ~Iiseipline nor thc 
dwing of entliusiasm. Urider such a g s k m  the l~rasantry 
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could not h o m e  energetic soldiers, nor were they active sap- 
porters of the cause ; yet witli a wonderful eonstancy they 
endured fatigue, sickness, nakedness, and famine, Bispla$ng 
always a distinct and powerful national charaeter. This con- 
atancy, m n d d  nugatory by the +rices and folries of the juntas 
and leading mcn, hallowed the people's effurts, md the flagitioaa 
violence of the invasion almost justified t h i r  femcity. 
Palacios now adv~nced with five thousand mcn t o  Vilharta 
in La Mancha; Infantado, anticipiiting the instructions of the 
junta, was alrcacly in motion from Cuenga; md bis m p ,  
reinforced by the divisions of Crirtonjal and Lilli md by freah 
lcvicns, wns about twenty tliousand mcn, of which twa thouriand 
werc ctavalry. To chmk the French borscmcu; he had, a few 
d ~ y s  after Napoleon Icft Madrid, dchchcd Senm nnd Venqaa 
wit.h cight tlio~~mnd infantry nnd al1 the hoae, to ~oour the 
muntry roiincl Tnrnncon nnrt Arnnjucz. Tfie f m c r  mterd 
Rarca jdn ; t he  latter endnzvourecI to cut off a cletachment 
Ziut wm liimself surprised and beaten hy a very inferior fora 
Tictor wnq alarmetl; hr! witlidrcw Iiio ndvnnced posta, concen- 
trateir RuiTm's tind Vdlattds rliviaions of incanty and Lnbur 
Msubouq's cnvalry nt J7illa de hlorna, in the vicinity of 
Toledo, and left Tenegs  in possession of Tarancon. With 
the Spmish gencrals mutua! recriminations foIIowed their 
defeat; Infantado possessed neither authoriby nor talenta to 
repress their disputes, and in this &te of dairs, having 
rekvea the orders of the junte, he ptojeded a movement on 
Toledo, intending t o  wiieiae that place and Aranjuez, t o  break 
down the brirlges, and maintain the line of the Ta,p. The 
10th he quitted Cuenca, with ten thovsand men, intencüng 
f o  join Venegas, who mith the reat oC the army ms at 
Tmncon; but the 13th hc mcG a m w d  of fiy.itivw near 
Caniscoaa, and licnrrl mitli eqiinl surpriso nnd wnstcrnation, 
thak Benegas wna beaten and tlie pursucrs dcwe at atand. 
, 
TTictor bad moved on the 10th from Toledo to &!a, 
mhereupon Venegns took post xt  Ueles. On tlie 12th the 
Frendi admced in tmo columns; one under Ruffin lo& ita 
w g  mtnd arrivcd n t  Alcn~ar; the ottier led by Victur himself 
unexpededly encuuntcrad tlic Spninrrls cnrly on the 13th 
and witliout Iirsitntion fe11 nn. Tlie Spniorrla fled towrarrle 
Nmzar where t.h~y met RuFm and were totally discomfited. 
Several thousanda mere taken; one liorly retreating towards 
O c ~ a  fe11 in with the French parc of artillery and was 
seattered by a heav d i s c h q e  of p ~ e ;  and of tlie whob 
fotoe only a weak division nnder general Giron forced a 
psssege by the roarl of Carnscosa anrl rejjoind Infnnhdo, wha 
effected hia own retrent to Cuenca becntise the Frcnch m~nlry 
were too fntigued to purme. Rom Cucncn be sent Iiis guns 
townrds Trnlcricin by Torblim, Iiut ~nrarcl~ed with hia troops 
hrat tu Tol ium on tlie frontiem of M~rcin, nnll finolly to 
huta. Grua de NudeIto ncar tlie dcfles of tlie Sierra Morenn; 
he arrived there tht! tieginning of Felimary, aftw a cimuitnus 
retreat of more tlian tiiro Iiundred miIes in n bd season; his 
pns had been captured at Tortola, and his troops were worn 
out with fatigue antl rnisery. 
Victor ai'tfter iicouring tlic Cuenca district endeavoureci to 
sn@w P~alncios a t  Villinrta, but he liad joinctl Infrantdo 
md thc Frcnch rctiincrl to Tolcdo; the prisunem of Ucles 
I i d  h e n  sent to Ilailrid, and tliosc unnlilc to innrcli were, 
iollowing Roccdñ rriemuirs, cruelty ~ l ~ o t  hy Victor because the 
Spranitirds liad hnngcd aomc; Prcnch prisonas. If so it wns a 
Lwhrous and shamtful retaliation unwortiiy nf a soldier; for 
whnt justice or propriety is sliown in revenging the desth of 
one innoccnt person by tlle murder of  anotlier? 
Wlien tIie Frencli retired, Infantado antl Pdacios proeeeded 
t~ re-organize their forceq as the Carolina n m y ;  new Ievies 
fmm Qrenda and other parts carne upj and tlie duke of Mliu- 
qucrqne, leding thc Spnriish mvalry, ende~vourerl to siirprise 
s Frmch regimciit of clrngoona at Mom, Iiut it c~enpcr! witIi 
little Eoss, rand Alliuquerque fe11 bnck to  Consnem wl~eiere lie 
mas athcked next dtiy and got off iuith dificiilty. Tbe junta 
now displaced Infantado; his successar, CnirtonjaT, was a good 
officer, and restored discipline. STe took post on tlie upper 
Guadiiin~, md opencd a communication witli Cuesta, wIio liad 
wlieu Moore's advrince dreiv off tlie fourtli corps, rehlren the 
line of the Tws with sixtecn thousand iiifaiitq and three 
thoiisand mmlry; for tlie Spaiards suffered moh in fligbt 
md tlicir horsemen, eacaping ii-ith les8 hurt, wcrc more 
rallicrI thnn the i n f a n t ~ .  The French had fortified an 
h j i l e ~  to Iiold the bridge af Arzobispo, and Cucst,% aten&,. 
li& force along the mountaina ta tlia riierto de Mbdbete, 
brolte the bridge of Ah- mapificent Roman stmk 
centre urch of which w a ~  nearly ono hundred md sixty 
feet 1,igh. Tliis terminnted the Spaiiisli cxcrkiona to ligliten 
tbt! prcssm on tlia IIrjtisll nrmy; two Fwnch divisionri of 
infantT &nd as mrany lirigmlm ~f cnvalry hnd sufficed te bamB 
tlicm, niid tbus mnde it mariifcst thut tlic aouth waa saved by 
John Xoore's divereion iu the uorth. 
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FROM the battle of Tudela all O'Neil's null great part of
Castaiios' ann)' fled to ZaragOl,ll. With them cseaped man)'
carriages and the military chests; for the roads were excellent
and the purlluit 1I111ek. The city lIlul lleighllOurllootl were
astolluUCfI, tlley had believed in the bofL~t.ing promises of the
chicfs, nnd never doubted that speedy destruction would over~
whelm the French. When tlleir hO}lcs were thus blasted,
when the troops ~me pouring back with all the tumult of
panic; when the popnlu.tion of the country through whieh
they hud fled rushed into the eity !llong with the multitude
of BCllred soldiers lIIul Cllllljl-followers, c\"Cry hC>.ut sunk, and
Zllru::,'Oy,a's glory wOllIIl llUve elldud with the first siege, if tlu}
French had followed up tlu:il' vietof)'.
Napoleon foreseeing tllis confusion and terror, had provided
means, nnd giveu directions for such an attack as
would inevitably have overthrown this bulwark
of the eastern provinces. But the sickness of
La.snes, the difficulty of eommuniclltion, the false lllovemenU!
of Moncey and Ney; in line, fortuue, omnipotent in war, bnflled
tho ellllleror's lOllg-sighted t:lllcullltiong. The Sjlll1ligh IUlt<lel'l:!
luul time to restore order, provide storCll, colllpletu the 11efoll-
sil'e works; and with ferocious exercise of pOII'er tllOY insured
implicit obediellce: the danger of resisting the enemy appeared
light when a suspicious word or even gesture was instantly
puuished by dell.lh.
JIoucey's COrpS Imving missed the propitious moment, and
being reduced by losses and detachlllcnts to seventeen thou-
sand of all armg Imlted on the 1'.,\)ou, while a
battering train of si:d)' guns wen fumislled, whieh
had been previously formed by Napoleon at }Jalll_
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peluna, embarked on the mnd of Tudcls, Mortier wari to 
have joined in the s ic~e ,  but he dso liad Iieen arrestcd by sir 
Juhn Xoore's advance towards the Carriou, so widely did that 
geneml'n s2íilful and dnri~ig march nffet% the Xrrench operatione, 
Wlie~i Nnpcileoii's criiiuter-~nuveoieut mmnienopd, Moitier N+ 
surncd b i ~  marcli, joiiierl ?iionocy, and tlicir unitcrl foms, thirty- 
fivc: tliousnnd of  nll a m s ,  ndmnced ngninst Z n r a ~ o ~ .  But 
then fear bad pmsed, tke defeiioo was arrangetl, aud the 
obstaeles were no loiiger tri jling as in tlie first siege ; the p l i q  
the river, tlie ~itrong houstx, nud tlie nurnerous conventa re- 
mninctl tlie same, but. intitructed by expcrielicc and inspircd by 
tlieir heroic r ~ l u t ~ i o n ,  either the mies of art, nor the re 
sourcea of genius were neglecbd by tlie defenders. 
Grq,noza presenteJ. four irregular fronts on the right bank 
of the Ebro. Tlie first, reckoniiig from the riglit of the towo, 
extended from the Ebro to u convent cif bure-footed Carmelites, 
being about three hundred yards wide. Tlio second, twelre 
liuntlrctl prtIs in extent, reaclied from tlie Cnrmelite to B 
bridnc over the HuerLa. Tbe tliird, likewise of twe1ve hun- 
dred y d s ,  stretehed from this bridge to an oil mnnufacto~ 
built lieyond the walls. The fourtli, on an opedng of Tour 
huntfrd yads, remhed &om the oil manufactory tu tlie Ebm 
On the 6rst front, an ancient wali, flankd by the guns on 
the GrmeIite, was atrengthened hy nem b a t k r i e a  and riim- 
p~rts. and by tlie h t l e  of Aljafcria, commonly called tbe 
Castle of the Inquisition. Sbis wa5.a squam fort beyond tbe 
mpar t s ,  but connected by Ioopholed wails; it had a bastion 
nnd toivcr nt ci~ch corncr, anda stone ditcll. Tlie secondfront 
wna n dotilile rnmpnrt, the exterior atie fncd wjth sun-dried 
hricks, mtl covereil by a alitch witli pcrpcndiciilar sidcs fiftcen 
feet decp and tiventy wlde. It was fl~iinkd by thc CHmeIite 
convent, a circular liattery in tlic ccntrc, n Cnpuclifn mnvent 
called tl~e Trinity, nnd some emlrth works ut tlic bridge of the 
Euerba The t h i d  front was covered by tlie ñuerba, wliich 
run close to the rampart. 
Beisind the river a double entrenchment extended two Iiun. 
dred yads from tlie bri i ls  to the projecting convent o l  &tu$ 
Engracia, which was very atrongly fortifid. Fmm thence tlie 
Iine wag prolonged t o  the oil manufactory hy an aneient 
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the vast fortress they liad formed. For doors mil rPindews 
wcrc built up, Iiouse fronts loop-lioled, interna1 communica. 
tions opened, streets trencbed and crossed by &bcn rnmprts 
mounted witli cnnnon, and evcry strong buildingwas a sepuate 
fartification: tbere mas no weak ppoint, there conld be none in 
e city Y;hich was al1 forrtresq, wilicra the spce covered by 
houses ww the measure of tlie ramparts. 
Nor were tbe leaders unmindful of moral force. ' fhe  people, 
cheercd by continua1 referentes t o  tlle fimt siege, contemplated 
with mnfidcnce the vast works exccuGcrl, and were remindd 
that the comiug ñ-ct season ~ a u l d  vread disease nmongst the 
enemy and frustrate hls efTorts. Xeitlierwas snperstition ne;i 
lected. Proceseions imposed upon tlic ~ight, fnlse miracl~ 
bcwjldcred tlie imanrnation, nnd terril~le denunclations of the 
divine mili shook the minds af men whose hnbits md sitw 
tion renderctl them peculizrly susceptibIe: rana the leadera 
were su prompt rtnd terrilile iil punisliment, that thc pmtest 
conrards showcd tlie boldcst benring to escnpcsuspicion. Vith 
a view to avoid any peat czplosions powder was made as 
occnaion requird; Zilragoxu contzined a roya1 clepbt and 
r e f i ~ e y  for saltpetrc ; ancl thcw mcre poder-mills in the neigh- 
bourliood ~ v l ~ i c h  funistied workmen familiar with tlie p m .  
Tlie trecs bcyond rlie mnllswete cut down,tlle honseswereeed 
piecerned into the town, tlie pi~blic magmines contained six 
montlis' provisions, tlie crinvents ivere wdl stocked, and the 
inhabitants lid their own stxires. Doylc also sent a convoy 
from the side of Crttnlonia; and thcre wns abundante of 
rnoney, hbecausc the militery diwt of Castaños' army, 6lEed 
tlic night before the battle of Tudela, had been carried to 
Boylo'n Cor- Zaragoza. To nttend tlic hospitals and carry 
respondence, ammunition to tiic conibatants> ssorne oompnieg 
318. of wcirncn wcrc enrollcd under tlie counte~ of 
Biirity a lady of heroie rnind, who displaycd ri noble eharackr 
in both sieges. 
Tlicrc wcre tltirtmn cngincrm, cight huntlred wppm and 
minora composed of axcnrators furrncrly cmployed on thc 
cnn~l, and iiliout two tfioiisand cannonecrs. The replilar 
trntips, fugitives from Tudclii, rcinforcctl lly two  small clivision~ 
from fhngiicsan and Caparosa, nrnoriiitetl to t h t y  thou~nnd 
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formlng 4 t h  the citizens and peasanta a nasa of f i f t j  thoueanrl 
combattnnts, who, mith passions excited almost to hnlry, 
awnih! m bnasult ninidst tlioae miglity cntrencliments, wwhcre 
every house was a fort nnrl every hmily a garrison. To besiege 
with only tiiirty-five tliousnnd ulea a city ao prepred, waa 
truly a hardy enterprise. 
Mortier and Moncey, having formed their hospitnle i~iid 
ma,aainea at Alagon on tbe XQlon, advanced tlie 
20th Deceder  q a i n a t  Zaragoza The infantry 
of tlie t h i d  corps m o ~ e d  on the dght ha& of the canal, 
Suchet's division cif the fifth corps mrehed between the canal 
and the Ebro, Gnzan's infnutry crossed the Ebro at Tande, 
nnd moved to tlie GnlIego river. Thc tmo firwt columna 
arrivcd bcf~re the place that evcning, and Siichct, driping back 
the Sl)anish posts, Iialtcd ono lenzue frotn tlie Trinity convent,; 
the fifth corps taking: ground on both sides of the Huerba, 
s e i d  the aqusduct coni-eying the canal over that river, and 
pmceeded to raise batteries ag8inst thc Monte Torrero: asmn 
reached tlie Gallego without meeting an enemy. 
At &y-break on the Z la t ,  the French attacked Monte 
Torrero, defended by fivc thoiismd mcn undcr gcncml St. 
Xlarc. Tlie nttention of tlis Spnninrtls wns attrnr.tr.il tiy one 
column, while n second crosserl tlie canal under the aquerluct, 
aud penetnting between tlie city md tlie fort enteml tlie lztter 
by the rear. A tliird column stormed tlie works tit the grand 
sluice; and ihese sudden attacks, ~ 6 t h  the loss of 
the fort, mused the Spaniards to retreat hmtily, cBvu"em~ 
which so enmged the plebeian leadcr~ tliat 8t. Marc was with 
difficulty saveíl by Palafol. 
&m assaulted the suburb aimultaneously with fhe atta& 
on tlie Torrero. He drore back the Aragonese, cut off a 
h d y  o€ Spranisli Swiss too much iirlvancd, and killcd or 
took thrce or four hndred; biit Iic did not ftdl on XtoBnhtat, 
the mburb itself u t i l  tlre Moute Torrero attmk 
terminated, and then witliout previous examination; hence the 
besieged, recovering from tlie first alarin, beut him off with n 
loss of four lirindred msn. TIiis restored tlie shaken confidenta 
of tlie Spnnianls wt a critid moment, nnd exclimged thofe~er i~ l~  
impulxe of victory for the cltilling process of tlie engineer. 
Zaragoza was complekly invclited the 24th. On the leh 
o€ tlie Wro, &m lield tlie bridge over the Gallego, and 
cnvcred Iiis front with cuts nnd inuntlntions b~ the mmhy 
plain. On tlie rig11t liank Xiudiet occupied the space between 
the upper Ebro m¿i the Buerlia;-~Iorlot encnmped in the 
Ziroken holIaw bd of the Huerb~;-3fcusnier mmed the 
Torrero;-Gmdjean, continuing the circuie to the lo\ver Ebro, 
communicrated xross that river with h ; - a  boat bridge 
on tlie upper Ebro complcted tte circle of investment, and 
severa1 Xpanish foraging detacliments were thw cut off and 
never repined the town. General Lacoste directed the siep 
as ehief cnginccr. He instituted one false and two real 
attmlrs on tlie right af tl~e Ebro, and nutwitlishnding Gaaan'~ 
fnilure hoped to t n k e  the suburb by a sudden nssault. His 
trenches wcre opcned in thc night of  the 29tli, and the 30th 
tLc plncc was summoncd. Tlie tcrma bcfo~w offcred by N n p  
leon Iicing repented, and tlie cxample o€ Madrid citd, PrJRfox 
rqlicd : 1Tf J f d &  Jm mrmnckred i f fcadd hau bm ~oid 
Xarcyo::a i&lE dtlser h soM m menda. '  On rwcipt of 
tliis IinugIity reply tliror! attrrclrs oommericed: on ths rigIit 
egain~t tlic Son JosqIi, in the centre npinst the uppsr bridge 
of the Huerbs, on tlie left; a false one; qainst the Aljafena, 
On tho 31st the besiegd snIlied against tliese athcks and 
werc repulsed in al1 witb loss, yet some of tlieír cavaly glid- 
iiig between the parallel and the Ebro surprised a post oF 
iiifantry. Thia trifling succesa exzlted their entliusiaq and 
Palafor gatified his personal ~ a n i t y  by mmifestoes, soma . 
bearing indeed the starnp of gcnius, the greater part ridiculona 
On the 1st of Jmua'jr the semad parallels of the me 
lsoa attncks being commenccd, Palrafox mused the 
Fremh on the right bank of the Ehro ñith 
slcirmishcs, bnt sallied in force against &tan an the left bank 
Re was rcpulaed Mth Ioas, yet Iiis siíirmbhers obtained soma 
siicccss on the other side. 
Monocp WM now called to Madrid. Junot mcceorIcd him 
in tlie tliird corps, nnd Ilortier wtis rlirected to tulíe pmt with 
Snchet's :alivjriion at %laGayud, to protect the commttnication 
with M~drid. The gap in the investrnent waa stopped by 
extentling Morlot's division, nnd a line o€ contmvnllntion sup- 
plied the want of numbere. Tlle besieged, expectiilg each day 
tlie usual fa11 of min, continued tho defence brislrly and made 
counter approlaclies, but an anomalous dr~r señson bffled flieir 
hopes, and B tliiek foff rising each morniq ceovered the Frencli 
workmen from observation and from snllies. On tbe lOththe 
citg was bombardcrl, and thirty-two picccs battcrcd the Pan 
Jwcpli ~ n d  tlie worlrs of tiic sccond b r i d p  ovcr tlic Hucrbii. 
The convent ums Srolren, and the Spi~nir~rrls witlidrew tlieir 
guns, and two liundrd men makining a vigorous tliough UURUC- 
cessful sdly at midnight. lost half tlieir nuniber. 
On the Ilth, the batteries hnd opened a practicable breach 
in fbe San Joseph. and the assault was ordered. The chief 
defence was a ditch eighteen fect deep with a coverd way 
fdIing bAck an both flaiilrs to tlie Hiicrba, rtnd extcnding some 
riishnce nlong the banlc; it wns occupieil atrongly, bnt when 
tlie Freiicli pins mkerl it from tlie right, tlre Spniiinrds mmsed 
the river and took refnge in tlte city : tlie convent itself waa 
immdiately assaulted, and some chosen companiw fmding a 
mal1 bridge, mwed by the rear wliile the front s í l s  being 
stomed. The FmcL lost few men, lodged themeelves in 
the convent, mised a mmp~it dong the river, and commenced 
Imtteri~ e n &  the bodp of  tbe place and the works at tthe 
uppcr bridge, from whence, nntl from the town, tlic Spmish 
guns scnrclicr! thc convent. 
Al tlie bridge works in front of Suntrs Engracia were 
carrjed with the Ima of only tliree nien on tlie 15tt, and 
tlie Spaniards mtting the bridge itself s p m g  % mine, but it 
did no mischief. The tliird parallela wem then complete&, tho 
trenches of hoth attacks unitd, and the bcsieged confined ta 
the city defences, from whenoe they muld no more sally on 
the right banlr af the Hucrbi~ Tlie paswgo of tliat stream 
m thcn cffccted, md bmliing and counter-bsttenes, mount- 
jng fifky pierna, werc conrjh.iicted npinsh tlie h d y  oF the 
plnce; their tire alm iorcricliert tlio bridge owr the Ebro nnd 
internipt~l the intercnurse between tlie city snd tl~e suburh. 
Unskaken by this atrpect of affairs, tlie Spanisli learlerri 
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forged intelligence of the defcat o£ tlie empaor, and with tbe 
souiid of rnusic, amidst tlie sliouts of tlie populace, pmlainied 
the names of the mstrsh als who liad been kiHed; tliey w r t e t l  
also, tliat the maquis of Lazan, brother to Falnfox, wna 
alreariy msting France; and tliis extmwgance met with 
implicit credence; for tliroughout this war, thc imnginntions 
of the cliiefs were tzxcd to produce absurditia pmportionnblc 
to the credulity of their followers. The mnfidence of tbe 
besieged aupentcd as the danger increased, and victoy 
seemed realixed wlien the ni@-fires oF a sucoonring furce 
wcre discerned, blazing on thc liilh behind Gmnh trop. 
Diffic~ilties were indeed aiigmenting an the French eide, fur 
while enclosing Zaragoza they were encircled by insurrections, 
antl so strnitened thh t  fminc was in t h e  carnp. Diputec 
amongst tlie generhls also diminished tlie vigour of the o p m  
tions, thc bonds of  disciplina were wlaxcd, tlie adaur of the 
soliliers relaxetl, ond tbey reasoned openly upon the chnncec 
of success, wliich in time of danger is but one degree ahove 
ma tiny. 
Exooedingly favourablc Jao for the Spaniarrls ms tlie 
country nbout. Zamgom; for tlic plaia WRS hedged in by monn- 
tnins, and en tlie soutll Mequincnzo and h r i d a  oficred 
plnws of arms for troops curning from Valencia nnd Catdonin. 
Tlia Frcnch drew their supplies fram Pamplan+ and their 
line uf communimtion, rrinning througli Alagon, Tudels, and 
Cxpwom, wawar, hnmsed by insurgenb; Alagon was menaced 
from Q i l a  and t h e  Sierra de Muela; Tudela from tlie hillri of 
Sorira. Laxan, R ~ X ~ O U S  for liis bmther, had brought five 
tliousñntl Gtalonians to the Sierra de Lieiñena, or Alcubiem, 
.on the left of the Ebro, and d m  rounii him al1 tlie armed 
pcasants of the valIeys as high as Xangumsa; Iiis line wliich 
extended h m  VilIa Franca on the Ebro t o  Zuera on tbe 
&llego, bemmed in Gazan; and his detachments harassed tlie 
convop from Pnrnpclunii m fnr as &paros& In this atate o í  
affuirs thc French plnccd two or th~ee tbowand men in 
Tudela, Cnparosm, nnd Tnfnlla; some also in A l w n  and 
Montralbnrrn, nnd betwoen tlie lntter town and tlie army Pis 
liundrcd mvnlry wcre di~poaed; a likc forcc wns p n ~ l  at 
Snnta F& to  imtcb tbe pmes of the Sierra de Muela. Fimlly 
skteen hunrlred cmvnlry tind trvelve hundred infnntry under 
general Wntliier, Iieing pudicrl soutlr, ílispersc(I five tliousand 
insurpnts at Belchite, taok Alcaiiitz arid r~rnained tliere in 
observntion during the siege. Laaan liowever stilZ held the 
Alcnhierre. 
On the 22nd, h n e s  having roco~ered from his Iong illness 
arriverl, and his influence was immediake.tely perceptible, He 
m l l c d  Suchet fiom Cahtsyud and sent lum mross tlic Ebro; 
ho odcred Morticr to nttnck h z a n ,  and direded 
Ilagniat. 
ii detacliment qainst thc insurgenta in Zuera; 
meanwhile, repressiilg rill disputes, he restored discipline antl 
pressed tlie siege vigorously. A t Zuera the insurgents m e  
beakn, and tlie French toob pocsessian of thnt place and of 
the bridge ovcr tlie Gallego. Iilortier pushed tlie Bpanish 
dtxnocrl pmrd from Perdepern to  Xuestm Señora de 
Vrqdlrtr, N-liere tlic mnin body gnrc brrttlc liut wns defcatcd 
with trie loss of four guiia Tlie Fmncli ~ p r e a d i ~ ~ g  tlien on a 
hl f  circle from Huesc.3 to Pinn on tlie Ellr4 awetl the country 
between those plraces and Zaragoza; rnensures which gyve tbe 
b & q m  peater frmdom. 
Previom to Lasnes' arrivd, the besiepd had been gdled by 
a m o h r  battcry beliind tlie second parnllel of the centre 
athck, and one Siariano Galindo undertook to silence it. 
Lenrling eiglity voluntcem, he surpriscd the guad of tlie 
trencfies unll entered tlie F~nttery, buut tlie guards rallid, the 
reserve a m e  up, ancl GnIindo while fighting b m d y  waa 
wouodd nnd taken, md al1 his comrades perished ~ i t h  as
mucli glory simple soldicrs can attain. After this noble 
action, the rnrmed ves~els fired on tlie Iiatteries raised against 
tlie Aljnferia biit were forced to retire, and the besieged 
ivorlu licing arricd over the Huerbn, the tIiird parallels of 
tfio b e .  attncks were completcrl in the night of the 26th. 
The ~ i 1  manufactoi-y and otlier posta, were tlien incorpornted 
wljtli tlre nppioaches nnd the second pamllel of the false attwk 
was oommenced. 
Tliese operations had been interruptd by salIies, In which 
one Fmnch post was  burned and two guns spikd, but the city 
mnIls were Liroken and two prricticablc brcaches opcnd by the 
a b r o d  way was made into Santa Engracia, and tbe 29th at 12 
o'clock four chosen columns rushing from tlie trenche~ l e a d  
upon the ruinerl waEls of Zaragoza. On the rigllt, the French 
tivice stormed s stone house. defending the breach of Zjaint 
Aup~stino, and twice t,liey ivere beaten off; in tbe centre, 
regardless o£ two small mines cxploded at the foot of the 
walls, they cnrrieil the breach fronting tho oil mannfactory, 
and tried t o  break inta the t o n ;  but a heavy fire from the 
inner retrenchmcnts made them conknt to keep their first 
lodgment and connect it with the trenehes. The third 
column Ton the breach and thc housei behind algo, CE hr m 
tbe firat 1aqe cro~s treet; beyond tbat line i t could not pq 
yet it waa cstriblid~ed within the walh, and opened a c o m a  
nicntion with thc trcnchca. 
The fo~irtli column, composed of Poles from the Kstiil~ 
stormed the San Enpcin md tho convcnt ndjoining it, nnd 
tlien, uncl~eckcd by tlie fire from tlie I iou~cs  and undauntd 
by tbc cxplosion of six wnnll minca plnnted oii its pnth, m p t  
thc rampnrts to tlie left m fur 08 tlie fid liritlge on tlie 
Ruerlia. Tlie p n l s  of tlio trenclies, excitsd hy tliis mmw, 
ruslicd forwnrrl tuiiiultuously, rnonnterl the waIlu, bayonebtd 
the artillery men at tlie guns in tlie Gp~tchin, and continuing 
tiheir carecr, endewaurcd, some ta reach tlie semicircular 
h t te ry  and the Misericordia, others to break into the c l ~ .  
This wilcl assault was suon abataCl by gaya frorn two pns 
planted behind a travme on tlie mmparts, anfl ligr ia murder- 
ous fire frorn tlie houm, and hey were driven bsck Uito the 
Capuchin. Tbe Rpaniards wre even breaking into that 
wnvent, when two battdione detached by Morlot from the 
false attack wmred possession; but the Spaniards wuId not 
hme held it, because the guns o€ &n Engmcia aw it in 
rcrerse. The hench  lost sk hundred men, and La Coste, 
ahndoning the fdse attack, fortified the Gapnchin and a 
house standing wliere an aingle of the wall abntted on tbe 
bridge oTer the Buerbrr; then joining them u:th his trenehes 
he made the rampwt the fmnt line of the besiegers. 
T h s  the w a b  of Zaragoza went to the ground, but Zrim- 
goza remained erecb, and as the broken girdle fe11 fmm k f ~  
Leroic city the besiegers started ait ker mked strcngth. The 
nular defenoea had cruolliled, but tlie popuhr resistmce TWa 
re, 
instantly called d t h  al1 it9 tterrors into action; and if 
fodnne hd rcaolved to mark the emct moment when the 
, 
ordinary cn~culfttions of science hould  cese,  tht! diicf en@- 
neers on h o t ~ l  sides WCTe ~ i m ~ l t ~ ~ n ~ ~ i t ~ l ~  slain. Sli : French 
p c r r i l ,  LR C O S ~ ~  a young mm, intrrpid, ~kilful, nnd cntlowd 
Titli pnius, ~ierislied like a brave soltlrcr. Tlie fipSnisli 
colonel, Xxn laenis, died, with the hoiiour of ra soldier and tlie 
gl.lory of a patriot: fnlling in tbe noblest cause, hig blood 
ahined tlie rarnperts mliicli Iie hud liimself rnked for tl,e 
limteetion of hiu notive p l w  
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Now rapd tlie mar in tlic strccts of Z~rngoza, thc alrarm-be11 
lVras hmrd in every qt~nrtcr, thc pcoplc cromdcrl the h o m  
nenrest to the lod,ments of the cncmj-, rirlrlitional barricada 
were constructed acrocs tlre principal tliorouglif~res, mines 
werc prcpad in thc more open spaces, and the interna1 com- 
munlca€iona h m  housc t o  Iiousc wcre multiplied until they 
formcd a iwt Inbyrinth, tlie intricake windings of írhich werc 
onlp t o  be trraced by tlie wcapons md tlie d e ~ d  liodies of the 
defenders. Tlic junta, become more powerful from tlie ceasn- 
tion of ~egnlnr  wnrfnrc, urgsd thc dcfcnce with rdonlild 
encrgy, yct increnseri tlis horrors of ttic s i e s  by n ffenicity 
pudied to tlie verge of frcng. Evcry person suspected by 
tliese furious mcn, or ttiose nl~out tliem, wiis put  to rlestli; md 
nmidst tiie noble lsulwarks of war, a horrid amy 
C ~ v a n m .  
of giWets >vas seen, on which croñds of mretclies 
were each night sqended, because tlieir oourage sunk undei 
nccumulating dangers; or that aome doubtful expressIon, some 
gcsture of distress, had bccn mismnstmed by tticir barbarous 
chiefs. 
From the height of tlie wdls he hnd won, h e s  contem- 
templrated this terrific scene, iind judging that men EO 
passionate rnd SO prepiared could not lx pmdently encountered 
in open battle, reaolmd to proceed by tlie slow but d n  
process of the mattock nnd the mine. Tliis also rras in niiison 
with tlie emperor's bstmctione, and heme, nntil the 2nd of 
F e h a y ,  tbe efforts of the Frcnch were cntireIy directed h 
the enlargement of their lodgments on tlie rampar24 an 
ubject only t o  be dected by severe bghting, by cxpldons, 
and by working thraugh the nearcst Iiouses; nntl tliey m- 
tained mmy counter-nssaults, of ii-hicli the fiercest was made 
by a frhr on tho Capuchin conrent. 
An. 1809.] BOOK V. - CHAP. 9. 351 
It has been said the Iiirge streeta divided the town h t o  
mal1 districts, or islrtnda of  bouses. T o  ivin tliese tliey not 
enly mined but fonght for cnch housc; and to rrosa the pcat 
intcrsccting strccts tliey lind to canstruct trnvcmcs iibove 
gruund, or te work underground; for a Spankh hattery rakeil. 
w1i street, and each bouse \vas defended by a garrisoii wliich 
had only tlie option of repelling the enemy in front or dying 
on tlie gibht erccted beliiild. %lile the Spaniards held t l ~ e  
conventa and churclies the liouscs were of little advantage to 
thc Fmch: thc  strong gn~nsons in thc grcater b~zirildinp 
cnnbled tFio dcfcndcrri, iiot only to mnkc siim~sfirl snllics l ~ u t  
til mnterrnina their eneniics, mhose ~ki l l  .ñw often frustrated 
b7 the perrievcrjng cnerg of the liesiegsíl. To remerly this, 
tlie batteries breached the eonvents of Anp&in and Santa 
Yonlca, and the Iatter ~ m s  talccn t h e  31st of January ; for 
whilc thc nttaclr lvns liot in ftbont, the wnll in anotl~er ynrt was 
Iiroken Iiy n pctnril, nntE tlie besicgers t l iu~  tnliing tlic mnin 
Iimcli in mnr clcnred tlie ccinvcnt. Tlic bwicgcd immedintely 
puslied a gallery froin tlie Augustius uniler Suiitn htonim, but 
tlic Frencli stifled the minern, and next day openly menacing 
the brcmli in thc Au~s t ins ,  thcy sprung a mine wllich had 
been ~:cretlp puslied f r o a  Santa Moniw, and enkrcd by the 
opening. Thc besieged takcn by siirprisc thcn lmt thc con- 
vent, yet mllping in a few Iiours nttempted to rctiike it; the 
Frcn~h reliiilñuil tliem, niid breaking tlirougli tlie Iriiuñcs 
reaclierl tlio jnnctiori af tlie Qucmadscstreet witli tlia Cosso, 
wllcre tlie Spzniards turned nnd finally drove their enemies 
back t o  tLe convent witli a loss of tivo liundred. During tliis 
figlit a. more severe action hnppened at San Enpwin; for 
tlrotigh the nciglibouring Iiouses had been destroyed, wvitli niany 
mcn, by two powerful crplosionq the defenders fouplit hnrcl 
for tlie ruins, and tlic Prilisli trnops coulrl scnrccly effect u 
lodginent. 
A cliange in the mode of working now took place. IIitlierto 
the Prendi mincs had brought clown tbe biiildings so as to 
leave tlie soldicrs expsed to the Spenish fire : tbe enfiíncers 
therefore reduced the qmntity of powder, witli a. vlew to 
destroy tlie interior only and lenvc tlic walls nnhrrikcn. The 
Spaninrd3 witIi rcody ingcnuity, tlien srtturrttcd tlic tinibera of  

On the city side tbe besieger~ vainiy strove for three days 
to pass tlie Cosso. TLey t hen  extended tlieir right to reach 
the guay and so connect h i r  attack witli tIzet on the suburh; 
md tlieir left t o win the p t  convent of Frnneisco, vliicb 
they cffected after cxploding nn irnmense mino nnd making 
two msnults. At thc right tbf,ta~I~. mincs wcre nlso uprung tlie 
11th nnd 12th andcr thc univcmity on tlie Spitnirrli side uf the 
Gosso, but tliey did not open tlie wiilIs well and tlie stormecs 
failccl witli losa. Nevertl~eless tlie French pasged the Cosso 
by means of traverses, on the 17th, ancl prepared fresli 
mines under the university, but deferred tlie explosion until a 
simnltaneoiis efort could be mmbined on tlie side of the 
wburb, At the lcft attack a number of Bouses boiulering on 
tlie Coaso werc gninccl, nnd a bnttcry established whicli m k d  
thnt p c n t  thoroiiglifnrc nbove p u n d ,  while under it, six 
galleries wcre driveu, sntl six mirics Iondcd to explode nt the 
sama moment. But the ~pírit of the Frejicli ariiiy WRS nolv 
exhausted. Tliej- lid lnboured and fouglit witliout intemis- 
sion for fifty Jays; tlicy h d  cnimbld tlio wdh wwitli thcir 
bulleh, bnrst the convents with their rninw, carried the 
breachee with thcir bayonets; fighting above snd beneath 
the aurfnce of the earth they Iinú spnred ncitlicr firc nor aword; 
their brnvcst mcn werc fnlling in tlie cilismirity of ra suhtm- 
rnnean marfm, ftunine pinched tliem, and Zaragoza was still 
anwnquered I 
'Bdore this sieger thcy exclaimed, ' wm it ever Irnana, th t  
twenty tlionaand men shouIrl Iiesieg~ fifty thoiisaud 1 b c e l y  
B fourth of the town is won, and we are already B . i a t  
cxlianatd. We auat wnit for rcinforoerncnts or 
we ~Iiall 1111 ~ierish nimong thcse mirserl mina, which will 
bceome oiir own tornbs befere we can form the last of these 
hat i c s  fmm thc la4 of tlieir dais.' 
Lsnw> obstinate to oonquer, en.rleavorired to m i ~ e  the 
soldiers' bopes. He told tliem tlie Iosxes of the besieged fxr 
exceeded their own, the Spniiirds' strenflh would soon be 
exhausteil and their courage sink; the ficrceness OS the defence 
ms already abating, and if c o n t r q  to exl~~ctntion tliey should 
renew tlie exaniyle of Xumautin, tlieir ittter destmchion wouId 
be effeded by tlie united evils of battle ~icstilence and misery : 
bis exhortations were suceessful, znd the 18th of Febniary, 
al1 the coml>;natioas being complete, a generai assault took 
place, 
On tlie right of the French, s party-m11 being opened bp an 
explosion, the besiegers m d e  a, sudden rus11 throngh some 
burning mina, and without a clieck won the ieland oE housa 
Ieading down t o  tlie qtmy, with thc exmption of two build- 
ings; the Spxniards thus taken In rear, aliandoned al1 the 
externa1 fortificationa between Saint Augstln md the Ebro, 
wkicli tliey liad preserved until that day. During this mliult 
the mines under tlie nniversity, conhining thiee thouand 
pounds o£ powrler, were sprung, :,he eaalIs tuinliled with a 
terrific crnsli, a column of tlie bcsiegers e n t d  the plm, 
and aftes one repulse secured a lodgment. MeanwhiIe fifty 
pieces of a r t i l l c ~  tliundcrcd upon tlic siiburb, plougl~ed up 
thc bridge over tlie Ebro7 ~ n d  liy mirlday opened a practicable 
breach in the eenvent of Saint Laxar, tlie principal defenct on 
tliat side. Lnsnes ordercri an msault there nlso, by mhich 
Xaint Lazar wiis talcen, the passnge of the bridge intercepted, 
the braron Tcrsnge Killed, nnd Iiia tnops clestnyed, witb 
exception of tliree hundred, 7~110, braving the fh on the! 
bridge, got bPrck into thc city. Gaxnn immedi~tely occupied 
tha  Spanish works, md tlius cut off ancl forccd to  ~urrcnrler 
twe tliousnnd men posted on tlic Ebro abovc tlic suburb. 
This success, followetl on thc 19th by another fortunnh 
nttndc on thc riglit bank of the Ebro, and hy the dewtat- 
ing explosion of sixtccn hnndrcd pioundq af powdcr, shwk 
tlic mnritnncy of thc bcsicgcci. hn nidc-de-camp of Pdn- 
fox cnmt: fortli to demnnil, in ndditien to ccrtain terms 
hcfora nffcrctl by ttho rnarahal, thiit tlio gxrrifion shoitld bo 
nllowed tn join tlie Spmidi nrrnies, with a fi~d nmnbcr o f  
covered cnrri:~gcs. h s n c s  re,jecterl tliesr! propnsnls nnd the 
fire continued, but the liour of silrrcndcr wns come! Fifty 
pieces of artlllery from the left bnnk of the Ebro lnid GIie 
liouses on tlie q u g  in niins; tlie cliiirch of Our Ldy of tlie 
Hllar, mider wliose especial protection the city a= supposed 
t o  exist, w:is nearly e h e d  by tlie liomiiardment; and six 
mines undcr tlic Coaoo, loaded 16th mnny thousand pounrls of 
p o d e r ,  were re* for a simuk.aneous explosion, which wonld 
have Iaid a quarter of the remaining lionsea in tho dii~t. In 
fine, war haa done its worIr, and the misery of Zmgoza could 
no longer be endurod. 
The bombnnlrnent, unceusinp from the 10th of Janwrv, had 
f o d  the wumen and childrcn to tnke rcfuge in vnults witli 
wliieli thc city nboiintlcd j tliere the constunt comliustion of 
ail, tiie clo~cnesri of the atmospliere, unusunl diet, and fear 
onll restlessness of miud, comliined to produco a pestilenc~ 
whicb soon spread to  tlre garrison. The strong and tlie ~l-ezk, 
the daring solrlier and tlie slirinlting child, feU before it nlilre; 
and sucti was the predisposition to discasc, that the sliglitest 
ivound p n p n e d  antl became incurable. In tlie bcginning of 
E'cbrunry tlic dnily clcnths mcre Eram four to five hundred; tlie 
liviiig wcre unnlrle to Liiry t1ic tlcnentf ; nnd thousnnds of cnreascs, 
acnttcrcd nliout tlie strccts and coiid-yards or pilcd in Zicaps 
at tbe doora of the churches, were left to dissolve iu tlicir oivn 
eorruption ur be licked up by tlie flames of burning liouses as 
the defence bemme contracted. The suburb, the grentest pnrt 
of the wralls, and ane-fourth o€ the houses were in the hands 
of the Frcncli; sixteen thuusand aliells tlirown. during the 
bombnrrlment, and tlic explmion of forty-five tl~ousand pounds 
of powdcr in tlic mines hnd shnlccn tlic city to i t , ~  Cavallew. 
foundritionei; nnd tlic honcs o£ more t h ~ n  forty Ro,~niat. 
tlioumnd persona of every n,rre and oex bore dresd- ssw"h 
fui beetimony to  tlie constancy oi  tbe besieged. 
Palnfox ms sick, the curste of St. Gil, the lemonado selIer 
of thc Chao, tlie Tios, Jorge and Jfarin, liad been slain in 
battle or ssept arvay by the pestilente, rsnd the obdmte 
violence of tha rcmaining leaders was ablited; a fresh janta 
m formed, and nftcr a stomy consultatian, the majority 
bcing for a surrcidcr, n deputation waitcd upon Lasncs t.he 
20th of Felrruiiy to n ~ p t i n t c  n cnliitulation. They proposcrl, 
that the garrison slionld mnrch out witli the hanours o€ m ,  
and the peasantry were not to be considered prkonera; and, 
at tlie particular request of the clergy, they d s o  demsnded to 
have the fui1 church revennes p m n t e e d  and punctudly paid? 
Tliis last article m rejectcíl ivith indignation, and accordiiig 
to French writers, the placa snrrendered at discretion; Iiut the 
Spanish TPritem nsserh, that Lwsnea grant.cd certnin terma 
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drawn up by the dcputation at thc moment, thc nrime nf 
Ferdinand tlie VIIth being purposely omitted in the inotru- 
ment, which in substance run tlius :-Tlic gm~i60n to mawh 
out witli the honours of war, ta be constituted prisoners, and 
sent to  France; t l ie  officers to retain their smosds, b % ~ g . e ,  
and homes, tIie men tlieir ktiapsacks. Pemons of eiihes c l w ,  
wisliing to serve Joseph, to be immediately enrolh?cl in his 
ranks; the peasants to be aent to thcir homes; propmty m1 
relision to be parsnteed. 
Witli tliis unrlerstnnding thc dcpntics rcturncd to the ci?, 
~vlicrc frcsli commotions liad nriñcn during tlicir nliwnce. The 
party for protrwting the defcnce wcre lcast nurncrom, but 
must ciiergytic; tliey Iixd bcforc scizctl nll the liuatx on tlic 
Ehru, fcnririg tlirit Pii1:rfox nnd otlter suspcctcrt pcrsons would 
quit tlic town; tIicy wcm rncnncing and pomcrful, nnd the 
rli:puti~~ not dnritig to pasa tlirougll tlic ~trt:etñ rctircd out- 
sids to tlic cndle of Alj:ifi?riit, iinil friim tliciicc scnt notite tO 
tJie jutitn oT tlicir procredin~v. Tlie disscritient. pnrty mould 
hltve fallen upon the others ncxt day, if tlie junta liad not 
taken p w m p t  rnensures to enforce the surrender, by clirecting 
tlie o f i m  mmmariding tlic walls near the castlc to give np 
his post to tlie Freneh. Farther resistance wnci then i r n p o ~  
sible, aud on the 21st of Febriiury kom twdve t o  filteen 
thoumnd sicklp beinp, ha+ jaid down tliose arms nhich 
they could now scnrcel iiandlc, this m e 1  and iucmorahlc s i g e  
tcrminated. 
19 When tlie 0 t h  events o£ the Spanisli w n  slhall be lost 
in tha obscurity of time, or only trnced by disconnected frag- 
ments, tlie story uf Zaragozn likc some ancient triumphd 
pillar standing arniclst n ~ i n s  will te11 a tale of paqk glory: antl 
alrendy men point to the heroic city cnlling her Fjpain, as if 
hcr spirit serc comrnon to thc 1%-hole nation: pet it mas not 
so, nor nrris tbc dcfeiicc of Znmgoza the effect of nnalloyd 
virtiic. T t  wths not pt,riotiom, nor wm it coiirnge, nor sliill, 
nor fortitudc, nor a sy~hnr of terror, brit 011 conibined rrndcr 
peciiliar circurnstrancrñ tlint ii~ilield t l ie  work. Tliis ~ 0 m ' t ) i ~ -  
tiou and h v  it WGS brought ahout s~ioiild Iie well considered; 
for it is not so much by mtching learling rwmhlnnces, as liy 
stuclging flie differences of gteat aíTairs, that the exploits of 
0110 %e can be m d e  to scrve as rnodels for anotlier. 
2". The sige may be esomined unt1er two points of vjew; 
as an isolated evcnt, and as a timinsaction benring on the 
general struggle in tlie Pcninsnls. With respect to the Intter, 
it p r o d  tlittt neitlie~ tbc Spnish  pcopla nor tlie government 
p&,ook of thc Zrirngoenn encrgy. T t  wns impossilile tlint in 
thc midst of clcven millions nnirnntcrl by nn arilent erithusikqrn, 
fifly thonpanrl men could for two rnontlis be besie~ed, 6hut in, 
destropd, t l iq and their works, huses  and bodiea rningletl in 
one terribIe niin, by less thnn tliirtpfi~e tliousand aclveimrics, 
mitbout one effort lieing r n d e  t o  save tliern I Depri~re tlae 
trawtion of its rlnzzling colours, znd it shows thirs. Thirty- 
five thousand Freiieli, :n tIie midst of insurrections, md deapite 
of circumstances peculinrly fnvourabIe t o  tlic defeuce, reduoed 
fifly tthouwnd of  thc bravcst anrl most cnergctic mcn in Spnin. 
Tlic lrsttcr suffcrcd nohly, but wm tlicir examplc irnjtat~ll 
Geron~  indeerl, dtliougli less celcbmtcd, rivnllecl, pcrhnpa more 
tlinn rivalled tlie glory of Zw~gosa; clscwliere, her fnte spuke, 
not tnrmyettongued to aruuñe, but ivitli. n mailing voice that 
&d dismay t o  tlie bcart of tlie n a t' 1011, 
34 hs an isolated transnction the s i g e  of Zamgoza I s  very 
remarkable; yet it would be a gext  crror to suppose, thrit any 
tom, the inIin3iitttnts of whicli wTcre equally rcsoliite, might he 
ai weil defended. Fortune xnd bravery will clo mucb, but the 
combimtiona of sciencc wc not to be dcticd with impunity : 
them arc no rnirncles in war! If tlic lionscs of Zarngozn liad 
noh bew nearly incombustible, t l ~ e  bombardmeat done would 
linve cuused tlie bcsicged ta surrcncier, or ta perish witli tlirir 
flaming city. 
4'. The advantages offercll by thc pcculiar struchirc af thc 
houses and tlie nurnber of convents antl cliurclies, rvere nhly 
seized by the Spaniards; sud tlioiigli Rognint, Laco~tds iiw 
cessor, treats his opgonents' akill in fortificntion witli contempt, 
wlonel San Genis' talents are not to be judged of by the 
faulty constmction of a fcw outworks at a time when he was 
nnder the control of a disorderly and ferocious mob : he k n e n  
bom to dapt lis system of defence t o  the circumshnces of tho 
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mument, and no stronge~ proof of i d  genius cae be ginn, 
'Do not wnsult me about ri capitulation,' >vas hls cornrnon 
eupressian. ' 1 sJlañl m w  be of opinbn thd Za~agoaz cm 
m k e  m furtKPP dsfmce.' But neitlier tlie talents of San 
Genis, nor tlic construction af the hunses, would Iiare availed 
if the pcopIe within hnd not been of adeqttate tcmpcr. Tlioy 
did not Iiowever display active b r a v q ,  for t h y  wcre twice tlie 
niimber of tlie besieged, md yet never mrade a serious im- 
prcssion by sallies, nor defended tlie Iircaeliea. In ldrgc masscs 
thc titandnrd o€ disciplined coi1rng.e moy bc infcrior to fnnatic 
cxcitcmcnt, Liut tlie Iattcr is ncitlicr lnsting nor quablc, lie¢ause 
men aro 5f differcnt suñccptiliilitim following tlieir orgnniza 
tions; and hciice terror Iim nlwnys heeu tlie rcsuurm of Icnders 
w l o  in grent cnterpriscs could nut finrl discipline: entliu~iiism 
staliccd in rront, but puiiishment I-irought uli tlie rear. Zarfigom 
was no exqtion.  
53 I t  may bc said the majority of tlie bwiegerl not liei~g 
animated by any peculiar fury, terror could not be carricd to 
tiny great length ; but a c1ose sxxmination explainc this seming 
mystery. TLe defenders were composed of three distinct 
parties,-thr? regular troopg, the pmantry from the c o u n t ~ ,  
and t11e citiaens; tlie last hariiig most to lose, were natnraIly 
tlie fiercest, and amongst tliern the system o€ terror waa 
gcncrntd. Tlie pensantry foiiowcd tlic cxrtmplc, m al1 i po -  
mnt nicn nndcr no rcgular control will do, tlic selrlicm morlíllrxl 
little witli tlie intcrior arrringcmcntq, and tlie ilivision of tlic, 
town iiito idunas nf posts, rcridercd it fcnsilile for r;inlent 
pcrsons posscssd of aiitliority to  follriiv tlie bcnt of tlicir in- 
clinntions: tliere IVM no aant of men, and tlie prriñon of 
each idmd kept tliose in front of thcm to tjieir posta, that ttbc 
daligcr iiiighh be tlie longer stnved oiT from themseIves. 
6". Paltrfox ms onIy tlie nominal cliief of Znrqoza; the 
FaurcIs gatliered in both sicges should adorn plebeian brows 
But tliose laurela dripped uith kindrcd nsr well ns foreign bIood; 
tbe energy of the real chicfs and tlie cause in wl~iclr tliat 
energywig ezerted may be admired ; the acts peiyctrated wre 
atrociou~, and Palafox, althoiigii unable to  arrcst thcir savap 
p r o ~ l i n g a ,  can cldm little credit for bis o w  cr~nclnct. For 
more tlian a rnontli, precehg the surrender, he never came 
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forth of a mnlted building irnpervions to shellq wlierc he and 
some others of botb sexen lived in a stlttc of sensunlity, foming 
a dispst ing contmt to thc wrctclicilne~s tlint surroiindcd 
them. 
7". Beforo the m r i d  of Lasnw, the French operations 
were ~ ~ a u c t e d  withlittle visur ;  £he want of unity as tr, time, 
in the doubla attaclt of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, 
m a flagmat error unredeemed by any subscqucnt activity-. 
Mter hk mival the siege was  pursaed with singular intm 
pidity and Grmness. Rogniat dia~ppro~es of Snchet's division 
h h g  been sent to Cnilatapd, but it geems to havc been a 
jndicioiis measure.-lo. To pmtect the line of correspondence 
with Madrid. 2'. To have a corps aG hand, lest Infantada 
ahould quit Cuenca, hrrnd tbrow himself into tlie Gnudnlaxara 
cliatrict, a movcment that mot~ld hnvc bmn extrcmeIy cmbnr- 
ms8ing to thc Irimg. Sndict ~tt Cnlatnpd ft~iilfillcd tl~csc objects, 
without lobing Uie powcr of suceouring Ttidclti, or of Inbr- 
oepting Inhntarle if ha attempted to raise the sieg~ of Zara 
goza; but when the Spanish army at Cuenca wns directed ta 
Ucleq and h z a n  was gnthering strcngth on the left bank of 
the Ebro, h n w  was riglit to rmal 3iia. 
89 Infantado's errors were made mnnifest by thii &e* 
Instead of courting defcat at Ecles be shonld have marched 
to the Ebro, estatilished depBts at Msquinenm and Laridq 
opened a communicntion with Murcia, lriilcncia, and Catdoniri, 
nnrl joincd Lwnn's troops to his own. Rc miglit have formcd 
an entrenclied cnmp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, antl atrried 
on n methodicul war witli at Ieast twenty-fivo tliousuiitl rgiilnr 
troops. The inmm~ctiona on the Prciicli flunírs and line of 
communication w i t l i  Pampelunn woulci then Iiave beconle for- 
midable; and Infantado, Iiaving t h o  fortressm of Catdonia 
liehind him, might mith wtivity and pmdence hme rdsd tlie 
&-p. 
1): Fmm a rmiew of al1 the circum~nces,  we may con- 
eliide that fortunc mas fmusable to the Frencli. They were 
brava, pemevcring, and skilfiil, iind did not low abow fonr 
tlrousand men; but tlieir success, pnrtly raqulting from tlie 
errors of ihcir opponents, wna principally rluc t o  tFis rlestruc- 
tion caused by tlie pestilencc \~ltliin the town; for of the 
 multitud^, mid t o  hitve fall~1, six thnusand 
R@at. 
merc sIain in battle, and alt1ioug.l tl-iificen 
venta snd churclie. h d  bem t ahn  wheu tlic tcwn 8Umndeped, 
forty rcmaiiied to bc f n r d  ! 
VCK: tiie principal circumstances of this mcmornhla 
b;Cg:6. T l l ~  ~0ntcmpomry events in Catdrcii~ s!iall now 
reloter1 
ITRCIP thc second siege of Gcrona .RES raisd, in Sug~~iist, 1809, 
Dnhesme returned to Ikii~elona, Reille to Figueras, and botli 
remained on the defensive. Napoleon aided tliem plrimytly. 
MrLiile tlic s icgc m yct in progcsg hc nsacrnhlcd troop ttt 
Pcrpignan sufieient wjtli tliosc uIrcntly in Cntnlonia to form 
the ~ c ~ e n t l i  curps, forty tlioiist~nrl stroiig, undcr Gouvion S+,. 
Cyr, tu drom lie s i v e  tllis einyiliatic ordcr. ' P m m e  A'arce- 
Fona fm me. lf 'fl~ai plou Iirr ht, 1 c m t  r&& it w-iBb 
80,000 qm.' 
Xt. Cyr's troops were mostly rnlv conscnpts; Neapolitans, 
Etruscans, Romans, md Xwiss, mked witli a few old regi- 
ments, and the prepmtions for the p d  army had absorbed 
tlie attention of tlie Frcnch administration. 8%. Cyr was so 
straitcned for means that Ir is young soldiers, sntrering priva- 
tions, ñere depressed in spirit and inclined to  descit. Nnpo- 
leon's omlcry liowcver prcscribed immcdiate action, antl his 
g n e r d  crossing tlie f&tier estalilishcd liimsclf at Figuerns 
tlie 5th o€ Nuvemhcr. 
But in Cataloiiia, m in other pnrta of Spnin, Icthnrgio 
vanitr md a b u m  liad succeerled entliusiasm and witliered tbe 
energy o€ tlie peuple; tfie local juuta issued abuiidaiaiice of 
¡lecmes, and despatchett a p t a  to tbe supreme junta and the 
English eornmandetri in tlie Mdterranean and Portugal, al1 
chnrged to dernand ams,  ammunitfon, and money. Tlie 
supreme junta treated tlieir demands Tpith contempt, the 
Eriglish authorities answered thern generously; Iord Colling- 
wootl instnntly lent thc assistancc of his flect; arms wpre sent 
from Malta and Siu15; anrl sir Hew 'Dalrymple compIetely 
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It mny howcvcr bc doiilitcd i f  thc ccntrnl jiiiitn on this occl~ 
aion were not thc ívi~cst, for tlie locnl government 
iivoana ~ o r r e -  estillilisherl at Tarmgona IVM so nsglectiul and 
Epontlmce. mrrupt, tlint; tlle arms supplid were sold t o  
foreign mercl~nnt~ ! 
Xilihry riffnirs wcme as ill cunducted, Caldaguts, ~hr 
reli~ving Geroiia) bad resumed the line of the 
Cabanes. Llobregat; anrl wvlien fiftecn hundred rnen, dmnn 
Trom tlie gmrison of Cnrtllagenn, bad reaclied Tarrapna, 
I'alacios, accompnnicd by tlic junta, q u i t a  tlie Intter toim 
ami fived l i s  quarters at Villa Pinnca qitliin twcatj- miles of 
Caldapes the Ltter then dicposed 1i14 troops, f i ~ e  thousand, 
an diffcrent points Tietmecn Nartorel and San Boy, covering 
a Iine of eigl~teen miles dong tlie lcft bnnk of the r i ~ e r .  
ILow-ever, Duhesme, m110 lid rested buiut a fcw rlays, marclied 
in tlie niglit from Darcelona witli six tliou~antl rnen, nnd at 
daybreak ths 2nd of Septemb~r, aatt~kad Caidves' line nt 
severd places, but principally at Xan Boy rtnd RIolino del %: 
the former post was mi-ricrl, aud tlic 8paniads pursued toVegaa, 
R dishnoc of sevcn or cight miles, but at Molino del Rey tbe 
French were repulsed anrl Dulrrsme returnd to Barcelona. 
It was designed by tlie Britisli ministcrs, that an ausiliary 
force should sail from Eicily about tEUs time to nicl the: Cata- 
lana; and it would have been a mjse and timely eFort, bnt 
Naplcon's foresight prevcnted tlie exrention. He directed 
Murat to menace Sicily; nncl that p h c 4  feigning t o  collect 
forces in Calabrin, spred reports of armamcnts in prepam 
tion, and scnt gcneral Lamarquc apinst Capr&, where sir 
Hudriou Lowe first Ficame lrnown to history, I-iy losing in a 
fcw dnys an ivliind ivl~ich, witliorrt prctcnslon to fame, migbt 
Iinve bccn dcfcndcd for as mmnny yenrs. 3furnt's clcrnonstrn- 
tions imliuscil iipon sir Jolin Stiinrt; tcn or t-ivelve tliousilnd 
British tmops were parnlyzed nt a criticitl pciiotl; rtnil su& 
will n l w y ~  be tlie resiilt nf a policy unilefined nnd unstnblc: 
when sttltesmen do not see their owii way clmrly, tlie execo- 
tivo oficers wilI seldom wt with v i p i r .  
Dnring Beptember the cahlan forces incrcwcd; tlie tercios 
of migueleteri were au,pented, md s regiment of huasars, 
hitherto kept in hlajorca, arrived at Taragonn. Pdncios 
rernaiiied a t  LTLlla Franca, CaIdapes on tlie Llobregat ; IIarimniio 
Alvarez commanded the arlvanced guard, near Figucras, com- 
posed of the garrisons of Gerons and Itosw, the c o q s  of Jum 
Qaros, and other partiean chieb. Francisco IfiLans, and 
Milans de hsclr, kept the mountains nortliimrd and etrshvnrd 
uf Fhr~lona;  tlic lattcr hemming in the Frcnch riglit ; tlie 
former covering the district of E1 ValKs, and wntcliing, Klie a 
bird of prey, the enerny's forqers  in tlie plnín o€ Burcelons, 
Tlie little porL of Filieu de Qui~oIs, near Falarnos nay, sas 
filld witli privateers, and Engiisli frigtes, liwides aiding tlie 
Spanish enterpises, c a n i d  on a littoral \;idare in tlie guZf of 
Lyons. 3fmy petty skimislies happenerl, but on the lQth of 
Octobec Duhesme sttackcd 3Iilans de BQSCII at St. Uerony 
beyond tlie Eesos and dispersed Lis corps. Tlie I l  th, colonel 
Deviiux, with tmo thusand men, entered Oranollem, which 
the Spnninrds dcscrtcd altliough it wn9 tlicir cliicf depht, and 
Dcvnux retirrncd to Mollct. licrc n coluinn of eqtial trcngth 
lintl been stationed for Itia support, but now it proceerl~l iiridcr 
Ilfillossowit~ to forw Ef ValIés. Caldagues ~vlio lind drawn 
together tliree tliousand infantry, t r a  squadrons of cavalry, 
and six p n s ,  rnarclied by the "ock of the liills tomrds Mon- 
m&, to intercept the FrencIi on. tlieir return to Barcelona: 
~~l lossewitz  and Iie met utiexpe&dIp tct San Lnfnille. 
Culgat, and in a confwed nelion tlie Frencli urere Campave de 
Catnlouia. beaten, rand retrerited across the mountahs to 
Barcelona, whilc Caldagucs, justly proud oC his soldier.like 
momment, ret~~mcd to liis cnmp an tlic Llobrqat. 
On tlie 28th of October, Pi~Tncios teok tlic commnnd of the 
ievies collecting in tlia Siem lforciin; Vives succedecl liim In 
Cntnlonin, nnrI rewiverl more infnntry from Mnjorcn; tlic 
Spaiiish troolis, mlemecl by tlie coiivention of Cintm, rJso 
arrivetl at Villa Franca, and soven or eidit tliousnnd Grcnradan 
levies were brought up to T-one by Iteding; at tlio same 
tinie six thousrnnd men, drafted from the army of Aragon, 
reached Lerida, under the cammand of Lrnzan. Tliis aecurnu- 
lated force wne or,aized in six divisions, one being formed of 
the troop in the Ampurdan, including the garrisons of ROS- 
blicb,  &ronti, md R w s .  This 'amy of tlie it 
wzis called, amounted to thirty-sk thousand, of whicli twenty- 
two t.1~ousend foot and twelve hunrlred horse mere uliout Bar- 
celona Vives haPitig suek a poivm, and possession of tlie 
bilIs and r ivm around Baircelonn, resolved to d o n i  it, md al1 
t l i ing seemed favourable. The inhabitnnts wcrc rearly to &e, 
a Iiattalion of V\rnl l~a  gurirds, ivhich had remaincd in n kind 
of neutrality, plotted t o  scize one of the @es, m d  D u h ~ ~ m e  
was inclined to abandon the t o m  and hold only ttlie citadel 
and the Montjuick; but from tlir~t he was dimrtcrl by tho 
rcmonstrances of thc chicf cnginccr Lnfnillc. In this stat% 
'ITives m d e  a general atta& ou tlic Frencli o~itposts, but was 
rcpillsetl at every point nncl rctiirncrl to the moiintains. Tlie 
Wtrlloou guads were then asnrmed, tlie in11nlitnnt.g awcd, tlie 
defeilces of the tawn ilicreamd; md from that pcriod to tFie 
rnising of tho blockade, tlia 8pmisii general's u+atfam waa can- 
temptible, although diiputes amongst his adversnries l i d  
arisen to uuch a keigli. that Duhesme was advised to send 
Leechi a prkoner to France. 
CatalonXa was now a prey to disorder. Vives had been the 
friend of Godoy and wtls not popular; he had, when eomrnand- 
ing in the islands, retzined tbe troops there with sncli tenacity 
as to  create doubts of hia attnchment to tbc cauee; yet thc 
Lord Cloliw suprems junta., whi1c privxtely expreasing their 
uvmaip cnrre- suvicions nnd requcating lord CdFingwood to 
6pUdenccv force liim t o  an n\.oivnl of his true ~entiinents, 
wrote publicly to Vives in tlie inost fliittciing term4 nnd 
finally appoinked him captain-general of Cstalonia. By tLe 
people he and othera were vehemerrtly auspected; and as the 
moh governed tliroughout Spain, the authorities, civil and 
military, mere more carehl to avoid giving aflence to the 
niultitirde than anxíous to molest the enemy : hence, althongh 
Catalonia was fulI of strong places, they were neither armed 
uor pmvisioned, and al1 persona mere confident the French 
only thought oof rctracating. 
This ww the etate of the pmvince mhen hrapoleon, then 
redy to break into tho nort-licm pnrts of Sprtin, ordered 
St Cyr tu commencs operatione. His Torce, inclnding ta 
Imprial Oermrtn division of six thousand men not yet 
JTuatw roiie, arrived at Perpipan, exceeded thirty tliousand 
MSJ. men ill-composed and bdly provLded, and St. 
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Cyr himself WGS exf;rcrneIpdiscontented. Tha cmperor Iisrl gii;e:i 
hirn cliswetTonnry powm, only rememl-iering the importante 
of relieving Baroelona ; but Bcrf,hier neglect ed the equipment 
o£ the troops, and Duliesme d ~ I a r e d  his mrigazinw aould not 
hold out longer than inecembcr. Ta mnrch directIy t o  Barce- m 
lona WM neither eng nor advanti~geous ; tliat city muld only 
he provisioncd from France, and bcfore the roiid ivus c l m d  
by tlie hkiog of Geronn and EToataIricli, no con~oys could pasc 
by Iand; it wiis essential tlierefore tci obtain Ros= asan inter- 
mediate port foi Prench vessds passing mth supplies tu Bar- 
c e h  ; and to deprive the Englisli of a sectire harbour, whence 
the 8paniard~ muId En conrxrt witli tlieir dlies intercept the 
wmmunicationa of the French army md even blockade 
Figuerns, which could not be prorovisioned at this period. These 
mnsidmtions rletermined St. Cyr to commencc the siege. 
Rcillc oonducted the optirntions and liaving ririven thc Spnniards 
into the place investeil it the 7th Kovemlier. 
SXJXJE OF ROSAS. 
Thia town was a namw slip of houses bunt along the 
shore. The citadel, a lwge irregular pentagon, wns on tlie 
left flaok; nn old redoubt, built at the foot of thc rocIry 
mountains whicli skirt thc  swampy flat of tlic Ampiirdan, wns 
on tho right; andan entrencliment lialf u rnile long covered 
the houses nnd connected those worIrs. Tlie roadshd pcr- 
mitted ships of tlie lina to anchor u-ithin r*uinon+hot, antl ai 
gtw fort called the Trinity, on tlio right coming up the ~ l f ,  
cromed a rngged hill a miEe md a quartw from the citadel, 
tlie cornmunieation being by a nnrroiv rond betweerr the hills 
and the water's edge. Tlre garrison, bhree thousand stroq, 
m reinforced by captain West with some seamen and marliiea 
from the Excellent seventy-four and tmo bomb vessels, which 
were nncliored close to thc tom.  Thc damqcs oF an 01rI 
sige nere only pnrtinlly rcpnired; ancl the Trinity m com- 
manded at tlie distnnce ol pistoI-sliot by iy nclry point cnllcrF 
the Puig &m; both it and tlie ei tdel  were nlso ill-foud in 
storea nnd guns. 
'FteiIlea~ troops, condsting of his own and Pino's ItaFan 
&+,ion, skirniislid hily with the garrison, but heavy rain 
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rcndered the roads of the Arapardan impn~wble for ar t i l l e~ ,  
and delayed the opening of the twnches, Souham's division 
a. cyc. oovered the sicge on the side of Gerona, and 
Chabot's Itnlinil brigndc TRIS stationed at Rabos 
and &po!la# to koep off tlie somtenes; h i l l e  bd p r e v h s l ~  
detachcd a battalion to  thtlt quarkr, trnd reinforccd it with 
tlirm more, but too late, thc somatenea cut off two com- 
panics ; but t l is  enraged the Ihlims and clrecked descrtion; 
nnd St. Cyr, unwilling t o  Liiirn villagea, sciecd an eqiiitl 
niimiicr of villngcm and scnt tlicni t o  Prance. During thm 
crents the lieople of Rrisas cmbrkerl or took rcfuge in tbe 
citarlel, Icnvjng tlicir houses nntl covcring cntrenchments tn 
tlie French, yet tlre fire of tlie Englisli ship 
prwented a lotlgwient; and in n few dnp a 
m i x ~ d  borly of driiers rinrl townsmen reesta- 
Iilklietl tlie poat. On tlie 8th caphin West and the garrison 
made a joint, salIy but wcrc repulsed, md next day several 
yads of the citndel ramplart erumbled amay. Tlie Frencli 
clid not discover tliis, and in tlia niglit it  as repaired; on 
tlie 15th rin obstinate mault on the Trinity !vas repulsed, 
principally by the Eiiglish seamen, Next dny the roadg 
permitted the French htterinptrain to more, the nid 
leading up tlie Puig Rom Iras repaired, and two battnliona 
werc established there with three guns on the 19th, over- 
looking the Trinitg. Trenches mere then opened against the 
citadel, and the s h i p  af war mere drivca fartker off by 
mortnm. 
Sortliam was  rneanwhile hnrassetl by the mipeletes, the 
Frcneh cnvalry unabIc to forngc, went b k  to France, and 
8t. c~r. Nupoleon, disquictcd, by Duhcsmc'~anxioi~srcpo~a, 
for Btircclonn, orilcred tlic scventh wrpa to reocli 
thnt city by the 26th. St. Cyr refwcd tO abnndon the siega 
~vitTiout a pmitivn order. On the Spiini~h aidc cnptnin W& 
!vas awuscd o l  secking to possms liirnself uf Rasiis, iinrler 
prctencc of der~nding it.; aiid t l~e  junta wrote nngry letters to 
the governor, Pedro O'Dnly, abont this mily charge, j e t  t d  
no mc?as~~res to reise the siege. Pending this co~wpondeno~, 
captain Weat sitiled, and ms sncceeded by tlie captain of the 
Fame, who endeavoured but ineffoctually t o  talre ike batterg 
m the Fuig Xom. 
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O n  $he 27th, tlie Kench stormed tlio mixed post iii tlie 
derrerted tom, a hundred and fifty Spaniards ;vere tnken, 
fiRg escaped to the cihdcl, and the rest mere killed. Ereach- 
i i  batterjes nere thcn c o m m e n d  amonpt the ruined 
hades; nnd communication n<th thc ~ h i p ~  mna rcndcred so 
ansnfe, thnt L m ,  who hnd come from Leriiln to Gcroiiti, 
witli six thousnnd mcii, nnrl oallccted sup~ilies nt  
tLe mouth of the FIuvia to tlimw iiito Rosas hy 
sea, ahncloxied his desiga Reille apin sumrnoned the 
citadel, h t  OlDaIy was fim, and the brench in tbe Trinity 
being judged practicable, nn assnult waa ordercd for the 30th. 
bu Itnlian officer, ivl~o bad forrnerly ser\-cd in t h e  place, 
heing t o  Iead, ssjd the breach wns a fdse one, yet lic was 
unli&ded, and indeed tlie marina of tlie  ame had been 
withdrawn, thc fort being considercd nntcmlilc. Rut  at thnt 
monient lord Cochrnnc, n man rif  surp~issinq courage and 
entcr~irise, airivetl niir1 threm liiniself ivitb eighty 8CEnien into 
the fort. He found the bieach prricticaIilc in itseIf, yet f~lse  
tlie Itdian said, bcing onIy broicen inta m old pllery; 
tliis he filled witli cartli annd hammocks; the unfortiinate 
ItaIim could do notliing, asild felI with a11 his followersJ save 
trio who got baclr, and two others, sprired by the serunen md 
drawn np with ropcs; a second assanIt a few dnys later wae 
nlso repulsed. 
Whilc this pawcd nt thc Trini-, the hrcncliing brttterics 
opcnod apinct 61ic citndc!, nnd rr hlsc atta& vna comrncnccd 
oo tlio appsite side; next riiyl~t the garrison mnrle n mlly 
wi8i aome siioccss; but tlis ~vnlls wore completely broken by 
the French firq and the 5th of December O'Daly, hopcless of 
reliec surrendered with two thousand four hundred men: 
Lord Cochane tben ahndoned the Trinity. 
Et. Cyr aays the grmison mi@ Iiave been carried off at 
ni@ by tbe British shipping. To cmbnrlr two tliousand five 
huiidred men in tlie bonb of two slcps, un~ler fire, is not 
enay, yct thc prcparation migl~t have been previousiy made. 
Witli eaception of lord Cocllrnnc'q cxploit tlie defenm wwss 
not brillkiit, yet it resishd tliirty d&; and If thnt time 
had been well ernplaycd by tlie A~ianinds outsidp, tlie l o s  of 
the gnrrison woiild llave been ainply rcpaid. Vivm, wl~olly 
oocupied with Barcelona, was indiffcrent t o  tlie fate of Rosas - 
s fniitless aStack on 8ouliani's posts rna& ley Mariano Almrex, 
w i e ,  MS. was tIie onIy effort; Lwan could not reiy upon 
rnrtre than tliree tliousaritl of his forw, and his 
:tpyilicstions to  n\-eu for a. reinforcenient wtsre unlieedcd. 
St Cyr iiow prcpared to Buccour Raicelona So effect tllis 
lie \vas to tuni Glerona aiid Hastalricli by paths hpervious 
tu cnrri:q~s, consequcntly no p u s  md very little rnwket 
ammunit.ion ~ould be cxrried, and tho country  vas fuIZ oí  
strong liositions. Tlie German divtsion hd not pt entered 
Spaiti, and Reille WM tlierefore to remtGin for the protection 
of Xosm and Fiperns; hcnce, les8 tlinn eighteen thonsand 
mcn, iilcluding the caralry, now recallcd from Frnnce, remained 
disposable. On the Slianish side, Reding hving come up, 
there were twenty-five tiiousand in camp before Earoeloq 
ten tho~isand under h z a n  aiid ,4lvarez at Qcrona, hut al1 iii 
Cabanea. orpnizcd; tmo-tliirtls of tbe: mipcletes m r i d  
only pilrm, many lind no m s ,  the military ~ t e m  
wnq unqoiind, thc gcncrnls indolcnt, ignorant, and dcspised by 
tlicir osn pcolile. 
St. Cyr hnving conccntmtcd Iiis troops o n  the Fluvin, 
passerl that river tlie gth, drovc tFie Cntnlans over tic Ter, 
nnrl lialterl tcn tnilcs fmni Qcroiia Re desired to &<ve Luznn 
a blow first, lcst lie should liarnss liis rear on tlie rnarcl~, but 
St. Cyr. tlie latter would not íight, sud 8t. Cyr made a 
tiliow o€ invc~ting Gerona to misled Vivq imd 
render hiin slom in brealcing up before 13arcelona This 
mcceeded, t l~e  Xpadnrd remainerl in his camp irresoIute md 
hclpless, ivhile tho Frencli ml~idly passed the defiles and rivea 
hetu-een Geronn and tlie Besos. 
Tlie mtur~ o£ tlie country between Figueras and k c e l o n i  
has Iiecn descrihed, the only carriage roads by which St. Cyr 
could mrch nere, one by tlie sca-eomt, one lending tlirough 
Gerona rtnd Hoshlrich. The frrst, exposd to  the f i e  of the 
Englisli vcsscls, hatl bcen broken up by Iord Cochrane in 
hiig~st; to  usc thc sccond, it was ncccssary to take the h a  
forlressr?s, or turn tlicm by rnnrdiing for tlirce dnya tlirongli 
tlie rnountnins. Xt. Cyr adopted the last plan, tmst.ing to 
scpnrato Lmnn tind 1l1mrcz from Yivea md defcat thcm nll in 
succc.qsion. Un the I l t l i  he cmsscd tlic Ter uiid renclierl La 
Bislinl. Tlrerc Le lcft tlic Inst of bis carringes, d e l i v d  out 
fmr d q s '  Iiisciiit md fifty rounds of amniuriitioii ; and mitli tliis 
prorisioii, s drove of &tlg and a rcserve of only tcn rounds 
of ammunition for cacli mnn, hc conimenceri his hmrly march, 
making for Palarnop. 
Haviving bcntcn thc mi~iiirlctcs witli Junn Clwos, Tie Iid t o  
pw under firr: of tlie Englihli ships near P d ~ m o s ;  Sut Le Iind 
p i n e d  tlie first step, urid oo tlie 13th quitting tlie coast he 
r ~ c l i e d  lTidrcras nnd Lhgostera by a foroed march, thas 
pI&g liimsdf bctween Vives and Lmnn, for the lntter b d  
~ o t  p a w d  the Iiciglits of Cnslm de Selva* TThc 14th marching 
by Maznnct de Selva and hfwtorel, he reachcd tlie lieights 
above Hostalricli, anrl encnmpd at itrions and ñíasmiis. Bis 
imr hha bccn slip"11tly hnrtwscd by Lnzan nod  claro^, yct he 
w r i ~  wdl c n n k n t  to  fiud tlie strang hnnlcs of tlic Torvlcrn itnrlc- 
fendorl by Bivm. Lbnixlm nnd Cliiroa Iinrl, howcver, tlie onc on 
the Ilth, t t e  0 t h  ou tlie IStli, inforiricrl Pivcs of thc move- 
ment, and the Bulk of tho Spanish Como befoxe Bnrcelona 
mi$ be en<xiuntFred on one of tlie manj- strong positions in 
front; tlie Gerona force close on liis renr ; tfie somatcnes 
were gatherliig on tlie hiIls on his flanlts, Kostalrich mas in 
front, md his men h d  only sixtmn rounds of nmmunition. 
H ~ B  dcsign was to turu Hostalrich antl gtin the mnin rond 
beliind it; the smugglers of Perpipitn told lrim tlierc was no 
ptlinny; a shcplicrd nss~ircd Iiim tlirro wns n trnclc, and when 
tlie stnff fnilctl, St. Cyr 1iimsclF discovcr~l it, but nenrly fe11 
h t o  the IiantEs af the ~orntiter~efi in tlie smrch. Next rluy Iie 
gained tlit road by thia pxth and rcpulscd ib mlly of the grirri- 
son tiffainst his rmr; the sornatenes, howwer, einlioldened by 
the French a-~~rsioil to lvasting tlieir aminrinition, became very 
troublesome, and nenr St. Celoni the liead of the column 
enwuntered aome migueletes under Francisco lfilans. Not 
being n m r c  OE St. Cyr's approach thep were easily dlslodgcd 
and fcll badr, pnrt t o  tlie lima of ViT1:l Gorguin, part to tlie 
liejght8 of Nutqtm %nora de Cordera; tlie French tlius gained 
the mmtli of tlie cTnngcroila dcfilc mllctl fie T~cnt~ptpnsris, ~ n d  
being exlinuñted with fntigve (Icsired ta bnlt; $t. Cyr com- 
pelled tliem to clcar the rfcfilc, nntl they renchctl thc plninq 
beyoncl at ten o'cIocl~ tlint night ; Lltzan was ntrt fclt in tIie 
rmr, lnit in front tlic fircs nf Vi~.es' wmy sere  descriellon tlio 
hills Iietwecn Cadxdeu and Llinas. 
Shnt general knew of St, CjT"cl marcli the 1 l tli, md could 
have bcen on the Tortlera befare tlie French liassed it; but 
GAbanea. news of tlie h t t l e  at Tudels, and t l~e renemd 
sicgc of Zarngoxtl m i v d  at tlie same moment, 
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and Tivcs vacillated hetwem 13arcelona and EL 
Cyr. De liad on the 9th seilt Tteding witli s k  p n q  six 
hundred cavdry, and a tliousnnd Infnntv t o  command in tlie 
Anipurdam, nnd be hntt reached GranolIcrs when h a u ' s  reprt 
nrrived, but then Vives sent Iiim more reinformrnentc and 
fresli orders to move on Carcladeu. The 14th he directed 
Fmnckco Milms 197 hfnttnro md Arenas de Mar to lwk for 
tlie Frencli on tlle coast road, and if it mas clerir to join 
Rcding. The lStli, 31ilnns m benten a t  St. Celoni, yet 
rallted Iiis people in the ni# on the lieiglits o£ Cordera, thm 
Aanking the Frencli Iine of rnnrch. 
On tlie 13th CJdagues lind pmposed that four thouand 
migueletes shovld wntch Duliesme, whib the army rnarched to 
figh.ht Et. Cyr ; but V i ~ w ,  10th to aliandon tbe si-, Ieft 
Caldagues witli tlie right aing, nnd casried the centre and left 
by GranolIers to the hcigl~ts o£ Cardadcu, wherc he anfted in 
the niglit of tlic 16th ciglit tfiouannd regiilnrs, mclusivc of 
l f i lan '~ divi~ion and sornc: thnn~nnd ~ornntcncri. Doiiesme 
immdiately toolr tlie grountl n1)aurlonerl by "Vives, and q i n -  
rritcti Iiim from Cdrlagucs; Iiut St,. Cyr ivoiild Iinve hccn vmy 
uusde on the inoriiing of thc lritli lwfore nny other than 
Bpnnish generals. Ti i res nnil bis licutennnts were, however, 
not deficient of boasts, they calIed t l~e Prencb in daision 'tire 
mc026~: and, dlutling to Brtylm, rinnouneed a 
st. Cyr. 
second 'hl2-Jgltt' in wliich Reding woald a,gin 
be WrnatacEw.' Tliey liad nrit t o  dcal with a Dupont; í3t C ~ T  
formed. his troops in one masa at day-break md marched 
iigninst the Spnnish centre, telling tlie column to  go l i rdong 
on withont; firing. 
Vives' position was high nnnd wooded, He tooIr tha left, 
Rsdiii, the riglit, and tli0 ~ornatcncs clnstered on a n'dge 
sepaisted fmm tlie latter hy the little r i m  hlogent; the L b *  
road lcd tlirough tthe centre, and G branclr road, ruming be- 
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tween the Mogent and the Spani4B right went t o  M a t h .  
General Pino leding the attack qainst Beding, being galIed 
in ffank by the somntcncs, hralterl, cxtendwl tto liis lcft and 
eent for fresh instructiona; St. Cyr reitemtcd his fint order, 
but M i n g  liad u lrc~ ly  cngngcd thc extentlerl tmops, ancl n 
fire m commenced witliout aminunition to maintain it. St, 
Cyr instankly s ~ n t  forward Pino% right wliich was still in 
column, and employing two mmpanies t o m e n m  the Xpanisli 
left, lled souham's division by the Iiranch roatl against Wing's 
extreme right. In a rnoment tlie Spnniaids were broken on 
the rjglit nnd centre, and heing chargcd by tbe cavalry dis- 
pemed, 1e:~ving all tlieir trrtillory nnrl ammunition mcl two 
thoumrl prisoncra Vivee eampcd on foot to Mattnro, wlicre. 
liegot on tmnnl nn Engliñh shihip; Rding flccl by tlie main 
md, and the next dny, rrillying some fugitivw at Monmalo, 
retreated by tlie mute of San Gulgzt to Molino del Rey. TIia 
French lost six liundrecl men, and tlle battle \vas so decisive, 
thnt St. Cyr resolved to pn~11 on to Dnroelana witlioitt secking 
llilans or Laran, antl hoping DEihesme, who had becn i n f o m d  
the 7th of the intentled march and muld hear the sotind of tlie 
wtillery, wauld turn back the flying troops. Smrcely was tlie 
httlc won whcn Milans nrriverl, but seci~rg tlie rout retired t o ,  
drenns de Miir and gavo notico tu h x n n ,  who retrented tu 
Gerona. Bt,. Cyr's rCnr WRB ~ O W  C ~ B H ~ ,  bi~t  Dubemne iiistenrl 
of intercepting tha beutm troops, sent Lecclii agliinñt Cnl- 
dapw, d i o  repiilsed Iiim, and retired beliind the Lloliregat, 
leaving beIiind soma artillery snd tlie mngazines collectctt by 
Vives. St. Cyr renchd Barceloiis without meeting Dubesme's 
troop, and d e ~ c r i k  that general as stonisIiingI.ly negligent, 
regardlcw alikc af Che enemy and of his friends, trenting &e 
serPice witli iridifcrcnce, mnlring falsts rctunis, and conniving 
at grom mnlverñntiena. Tliese nccusations are to be received 
witli do&,-Duliesme IIRE~ not wantcd dcfendrrw. 
Rdecting now upon tlio fmility of bcating tlie Cntnlan~, and 
haw diflicult it was to overtzlke tliem, St. Cyr resolved t o  mt 
rtt Barcelonn, thinkiiig they would re-assemble on tlie Llobregat, 
 her re Iie might strike them so bard they wouId be unalile 
to intempt rs sirge he m s  meditating. He wns not deceived. 
&fing joined Caldn,meq and collmted fmm twelvc to fiftccn 
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tlioumd men behind the Llobregat; Vivea reIandcd d Sitja, 
and ordered Mil~nii nnci h r ~ n  to join tim by ttho wag of 
VallEs. Ttie Frcnch gcncral got intelligence of t.Iicm dispoei- 
tions, yet tliinking Milans' nrrivnl iinccrtnin, jurlgd it brtter 
td attack M i n g  at once ; whmfore upon tbe 20th having 
united Chabran's dix-ision t o  his o m ,  he advnnced agnin~t Xt. 
Felieu de Llobrcgat. The Spniarde ocmipicd the hcighte, 
wliicli arc lofty, ruggcd, anrl witli a frcc v i m  of al1 the np- 
l~roaclics from Rnrcelona Thc rircr wvcrstl their front; 
their lek conld onIy be 3swiIcrl from tlie bridgs of Molino del 
Rey, wliicli was cntrenclicd nnd protccteci by Iicavy guns, and 
Reding liad it thoussnd cavnlry nntl fifty liieces, most of which 
ivere at tlie bridge. But Iiju riglit wau acccmible, tlie rii-er 
wm tliere fordable, and tlio roya1 roarl to Ville Franca ltrl 
through his posilioa Vives cnme to tlie graund tlie 19th yet 
returned t o  Villa Franca, and when tlie Frencli iippearcd on 
tlie 20th there was no comrnunder. A council ivas held 
Borne were for fighting, some for rctrmting to  Orcial, n strong 
post twelve milea in the rear. An oRcer m 
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sent to Tives for instnictions, tlie answer per- 
mytted Eeding t o  retrcnt if Iie coiild not defend biri position, 
and he resolved to  fight though mtkipting disaster, for be 
expwkd accusation, perliap cleath if he retired. Snow m 
fdliig, Both arrnies sufered; but the Epaniards had been 
previously clefeuted, the French h d  Leen victorious and wcre 
oonfident. In this mood tlie nrmies p w d  the night. 
8t Cyr obseFPing Reding's 'sttention fixcd on the bridge 01 
Molino, ordcred Chabrm t o  oren a fire of  adiIlery there, and 
then retire as if vnzble t o  si~stain the heavier Spanishguns; 
butblien be shonlcl see tlieir centre and rig1i.t; aasailed ta return 
nnci force the pntssage. Ikding immediately accumulakd troops 
on hig leh. Mennwhilc Souhnm fnrrling tlie rivcr sevcral miles 
beTow a~ceiideil Ghe riglit henk, md covered Pino and (;linliot 
M tliey pnssed by s ford ia front uf Rt. Felieu on the 
Spanisli rigl~t ; the ligl~t cava1 ry fullowetl Cliaht'a dividon, 
and tlie cuirassiers supported ChaLran at 3folmo. Retlinifl 
winp were on two flrit mouniains ssparatd by a narrow 
ravine nnd a torrent, and hia right being weakend) waa 
easily driven from its groiind bg Pino, whcreupon he fomied on 
the 0 t h  mountain perpendicularly t o  the river, still holding 
the bridge in fercc mliich m thus bcliind his lcft. 
St. Cyr plrtced Soulinm on his o m  right, Pino in tlic centre, 
Chnbot oa tlie Ieft, nnd nttaclrd this new position. Chnliot 
~ought to cnt tlie Spaninrds off from Till~ Franca, Soulmm 
and Pino, crossing the ravine, wssilcd the front, and the light 
ravalry, filing bet,ween the monntain and the river, endeavourd 
to conncct tlii movement witli Cliabrm's attack. The 
CataIans opend a regular get illairected fire) and their first 
i i ie  eharged, yct hd not conrsge ta close, aand theb reservesi 
immediately sent a volley agninst both parties. Xn this d b  
order Chnbot, haaving pined the VilIa f r a n a  r o d ,  drove their 
right upon thcir ccntrc, nntl botli upon their Ieft, and the whde 
mawi wns t.Tien ~iunIietl brtclc on Molino dcl. b y .  Dunng the 
figIit, psrt of Clitnbmu'a division l i d  pnsaed tlie ~ i v e r  a b v e  
BIolino,bIocking tlie roud of Xartorel, and tlie light covalry now 
cliarged. TIis deatniction of tlio Spailisirds would hme been 
mmileted if C?n~bran Iirid puslied scross the river, bit alwltys 
irresolute, that general remained paasive mtil 8ouham reachd 
the bridge, and the routed troops dispersed over tlie monntdns. 
Tives mmLng up at the end of the figl~t was forced to fly 
nith the i ~ s t ~  and tbe French pursuad in three columns. 
Chabran ment tomarda Ipiiialnrla; Clirrbot bwards San Sndttrni 
to turn OrcInl; Souhnm to VilIe Frnncn, mhcrr! hcd-quartcrs 
w m  estalilished tlin 22tid. Trillu Niievt~ xnrl Sitiw on tlie 
coast were m i i p i d  by Fin(>, whilc Soulinm purcizd tlie 
Iugitives to  tlie p t e s  of Txrngona. Tlie Cutalms loss {VM 
not great, for o~vjng to tlimr ~wiftnoss in tlie li i l l~,  only 
Caldzgues, a man ssemingly pedmtic and lioastin~, but certainly 
paessing courngc and talent, waa made prisoner. A11 the 
artillery, with vast qunntities of powder, was mptured, and s 
magazine of unused Englisli muskets was found; yet m. 
of the migueletca were unarmed, and the junta was uncensing 
ki ik dmands for more? The history of ane province i6 tbe 
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RARCELOXA wañ nom prnviaionerl from tlie cnpt~ired mapineg 
for several rnnntlis, there was no Cata1.m force ia tIie field, 
siid Taragonz, where eight or nine tliousand fugitives liad 
Gabanes taken r e h a  \vas in terrible diaorder, T h e  mob invndcd tlie public stores, carried off weapong 
and mshcd about seelring someliing to vent its f u s  upon; 
the head of Vivee was demanded, md Ming nho was pro- 
claimed gene&, cast hirn into prison for protection. Tbe 
regular oficers were insdted, thew was tlie usual crji for de 
fence, and memccs ag-xin~b ttrraitorn, but neither ams  nor powtler, 
nor provisions, and Se. Cyr rnight bave tnken the place, if, 
intmt upon gnthcring siibsi~tcn cc nnd forming n battering 
tmin, he Iind not Ict tlic opportunity dip: Reding, bcyond his 
own hopes, Iind time ~KI rully tlie troops and put tlic! worlrs 
in a 6gliting stritc. Eleven tboufilliid infantry and eight hun- 
b y l e ,  118. dred czvalrg were reunited on the 1 s t  o€ Sanmry 
at Taragona and Reus ; a. Gwiss regirnent from 
M+jorca, two Spariish regiments Frorn Grenadrr, and thm 
tliousand foiir liundrd men from Talentia augmented tliis 
force on the 5th ; and that city also sent five thonsand muskets 
powder, ancl ten thausnnd pikes, nll h s h  frorn England. The 
Uritish agents at SeviIIe fomrded moiiey, and tliis train of 
fortuitous circiimstanocs, ~ v i t h  St. C~T'S inactfvity reatored the 
Catalnns" hopeq but tlieir l s t e m  rcmnincd nnchmged, for in 
Spnin confidcnco Icd +.o insubortlinntion, not t~ victory. 
Some of tFie fugitiyca fl ed t~ Rnieli, ivhich wae mnwided 
impregnalile since tlie derm~ts of Ehnbrnn aria Xwart~;  the 
somatrnea joinrxl tliem, and electcd mnjor U m n ,  an Englisli 
militiiry agent, gened; wherefore St. Cp, to reyay t I i o ~  
disasters, sent CIirtbran to take his revenge, aria t o  mcowq 
him dimeted Chabot to turn Erucli by San hduroi md 
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and the mipdetes, ill-armed md naketl, devwttnkd the eoun- 
try lilre BU enemy, Tlie sornatenes would oniy fight at the 
times and plxces tliey liked, they rcfiised advice, reviIed those 
who differed from tbem ond enused mmy oficcrs to be 
removed ; they ncvcr g w c  tbc gcncrnls good information, but 
tlie SpnnisI~ pli~ns IVCPO nliuilp lcnown to tlic Frcncli; for nt 
Redingaa qunrtcrs, as n t  Cuctnliou' licfore tlie bnttlc of Tutlcla, 
i111 pnijecb wcre odenhtiowly discussd. nerEng liad no 
military hlalsnt, his nctivity \rna physical not mental; but he 
wag hrave and honourabIc and popular; for being wivitlioiit 
design, or arrangenient, and easy of nature, he crossed no rnan's, 
hurnonr and fl oited gently in the tronbIed waters unti1 their 
sudrlen refl ux Iefi him on thc rocIcs. 
Four indcpcndent Catiilan corl~s wcrc in mtivity. Alvarex 
Iield Gemnn nncl t l~c  Arnpurrlam with four fliou$nnd men, 
Tmnn wiis ncnr 7;arngore witli fiw tliousnnd. Jiinn Ca~tro, 
mcuserl by tlie Spmiards of treachery and d i o  <lid nftfterwiinrls 
join Soaepli, mmma~ided fiixteen tliouaand mcn, cxkridcrl from 
OIesa on tbo uppcr Llobrcgat, t o  San Cristina near T n r q n a  
Xleding's line, running tlimugh Druch, IgaIada, md Llacurcij 
was above siñty mile~, and he kcpt twelve thousartd men at 
Taragona, &us, and tbe vicinity. Hi8 troops were fed from 
Valencia and Arqon, the convoya from the former corning by 
scn; but tlio fieltl mngarrriics, ~wctrrnnliitad on one ur two 
poi~itx without jiidgment, fetterei1 Iiim nnd regulated t he  
movements of his able srlvcrsnry, whose only d*cnlty was 
tIie obtaining subsistenee. 
Xt. C j ~ b  mmmunications wcrc much vexcd by the Roma- 
tenes snd tlle Engllisli ships, and ewIy in February having 
ex1inust.d fliic country arotrnrl his army, he conccntrntcd his 
diviuions at VcnrIril, Villa Franca, Son Xridurni, nnd Bi~~rtorel. 
Tlis German division ~ n d  some conscript~ Iiaving 
"Waix joined him, he U forty-one thousnnd =en under 
J 6 .  
amsj bnt only twenty-three thousnnd fighting 
men were with himse?f. Eis line was not more than thirtr 
rnileq xnd he Iind a roya1 road f'or retreat oa Barcelona, while 
the S l~n i sh  h e ,  sixty rni1e.s long, wwns on a, half circIe aronnd 
Iiim, and ivitli comrnunimitiona mors rugpd. NcricrtlieIess 
by avoiding seriam fighta, tlie Gatdans miglit llave forced 
the French to ahandon the country west of the Thbregat; 
f a h e  and the drain of mountain warfnro woulil have effected 
tliat; and 8t. Cyr c~u ld  ~trike no formidable hlom because al1 
tlie important placa wem fodfied. Tlie never-failig aro- 
p c e  of the Spnisb charncter, md the nnstable mind of 
Ileding, abolished these ad~antages. Tfie concentration of 
tlie French tmops and some successful skimislies were ni% 
nified, the Iast into victories, the 5rst into ~ireparation for 
flighht: the clamour for figl~ting thus augmentsd, and some 
Iiopes mere conceived of regaining Barcelona by a conspiracy 
withm tlie walls. Indeed Iong before tliis some absurd p m  
posals hd been made f o general h c c h i  for betrnying the city to 
tbe patriota, md nothing more rrtrongly m ~ k s  tlie absurd seIf- 
mficiency of the Spnnirtrds in thie war, than their frequent 
attempta to compt  tthc Fcnch commanders. As late as 1810 
4Turtio Cnrrem, 11inving two thousrind q g e d  h Jf-armed 
pensnnh cnenmped untlcr the pmtection of the English out;- 
po~tri, ofemd mnmhnl Ncy, thcn invmting C i n d d  Rodrigo, 
rank and honoum if he would dwert t 
Reding, dricen by tlie popular cry to aktack, ordered Castro 
, 
to fa11 by Llncuna and Igualarla on tlio Prench right and rear, 
and to send a detmbrnent to  the pass of Ordnl to intercept 
tlieir retreat on Barcolona Redin: ie person nas to move 
Gth eiglit thousand men by Tendril and Xt. Cristina aggast 
tbe front, and t.he somntenes and mipeletes betmeen Gerona 
and the Besos were to aid ; t i~e object being as usud t o  sur- 
mund the enemy! The plan being made public, St. Cyr$ 
datruction was confidentIy nnticipated, hut that general hwl 
liis troops well in linnd and ~tnick  the first blow. TThe 
Critalans rcrc in rnotlon the 14th, and St, Cyr, leaving 
Buuham st Vendril t o  kocp Rrding Ln cbeclr, macbcd the 
1 Gtli from 'Ville Franm wjth Pina'a division md overthrew 
htro's ponB at Uncunn and 8t. Quinti : thc CntnInn centre 
was thug piwced, the wings scpamtcd and Cnritro" rigbt tbrowu 
bnck on Capellodcs. 
On the 17th 8t. Cys reachcd CiapellnrTcq W ~ C ~ B  Chnbot nnd 
Chnbran were to mcet liim, tlie one from Sadurni tho uther 
from Martorel; he thus ~kilfully avoidecl the ~ S S  of Bruch 
and canoentrnbxl three divicions on Catrob  lcft centre, and 
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c lo~e  to his mngmines at Igual da. Chabot arrived fird nnd 
being uasupported was beaten back mith Ioss, but then the 
other French a m e  up and tlie Spaniartls fled. T l i q  rallied 
st. m. again at ,tabla de Claramunt, between Capelldes 
and Igualada, to Et. Cyr's content, because he bad 
sent blazzuchelli's brigade from Llacuna direct upon Igualtida, 
and if Chabot liad not heen pressed, the action at Capellrdea 
\as to  hava boen delnyed until liiazzuclielli hd p t  into the 
rear; but when ihat Inst named general. mas descried, Castro, 
wlio m s  at Igualada with his resemes, rccalld thc troopa 
from Pobla de Claramunt. The Frencli were cloae, nnd the 
whole pilcscd tlirough I p n l d n  figliting, rtftcr which tlie 
Cablnns threrv uway tlieir nrms and IierI by tIie tliree routea 
ol Cervera, Cnlaf, mrt Manrese. TIiey were pursued all the 
17th, yet tIie Frencli returaer1 tlie next diry witli few prisoners, 
because, saya St. Cyr, ' ¿ILE C d h  a r e  mdou,~d by &m 
m*€?¿ sbrmy hm.' 
Bavjng tbus liroken through the centre, defeated a pmt of 
the le& wing md hken the magaaines, St. Cyr pwted Chabot 
ontl ChaEiran at Igualada fo keep the beaten troops in check, 
whib himseIf, rvitli Pino's division, marchcd on tbe 18th to 
6ght Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. ?da@. 
Suuham alno had been jnstnict~l, wlien by preconcertcd ~ignids 
Iic should know the rathek at IgwIada hnd succeeded, to  force 
the pase of Cristinn, nnd mcet st. CJT nt ViIla Radoña St. 
Nagi was carried on the eveuing: of the 18ti1, liut it wm 
imposailile t o  find a guide for the iiext day '~  mar& t o  t h ~  
JL *. abbey of Santa Creus; in tliis perplexity, a wonnded 
captain, wlio was prisoner, demanded leave tli go 
to Tampna, St. Q r  msented, offerjng to carry hirn to Santa 
Creus, and thus the prisoner unconaci<iuslg acted as LL p i d e  to  
his cnemies, The m r c k  w119 long and diiiicult, and it was late 
ere they reacbcd the abbey, a strong post and o c q i e d  in force 
by thc troops bentcn from Snn h h g i  the cvcning befora; 
whercfore tlie French, after a fruitleari dernontitratian of 
assaulting it, took a position for the nigl~t, Meanwbile 
hding,  Iimring of Castro's dcfeat, made a draft of men xnd 
p m  Erom the Aght wing and was marcliing by Pla and tha  
pass of Cabra, intending to rally his left wing; bis road 
jnst behiid Santa Creus, and he was passing at tlie rnunieiit 
d e n  the Frencb appenrerl beforo that place; but neitlier 
general was awm o l  ths other's presenoe, uutl lotli continiipcl 
their pmticulrar movemeiits. Tlie 20th Xt. Cyr crnsscd tlie 
Gaya river undcr a Frre from the nbbey, und msirclied upon 
f i l a  Racluñh near w11ich be dispersed a smdl  corps; Xouliam 
m mt come up, aiid an oher ,  eacorted by bbattalion, wos 
sent to bim, for his non-arrival p e  mason to believe tbe 
staff-officem and spies previou~ly sent had been interceptecf. 
One day and a half mas t h s  lost, whicli mi@ haw suficcd 
ta cmsh RRding's riglit ning, surprised as it would h a ~ e  been 
without a chief, in the plain of T~mgona. 
While the French restad at Villa lbdoiin, Reding pursncd 
hh march to St. Coloma de Qucmnlt, where he r a l l i ~ l  mmy 
of castro's fug:tives, and the asyect; of affnirs ww siiddsnly 
changed; for Sonham, d t c r  foreing the pnss of San Cristina, 
reachcd ViiIa Ihdoñn tlie Zls t ,  nnd at the sxme time, tlie 
wcakly men left at Villa Pmiiea also arrived. Hence more 
t.han two-thids of tlie Frcnch ltrmy wcre concentratcd at 
Pilla M o E n  nt  thc moment when tlic Spanisb comnnndcr, 
l~ ing  joined by thc dctwhment ticaten from Srin Crirrtinn nnd 
by tlie troops from tlic nliliey of Creus, l i d  alsu rallied tlie 
greateat prt. of Iiis forma at Bt. Coloma (le QuerauIt. EwI1 
general could now Eiy a rripiid rnnrcli overwfidm his dvemry's 
rigtt wing, but tlis troops left by Reding in tlie plain of 
Tamgona, could retire upon thnt furtresa, d i l e  tliose lefl by 
iSt. CJT at Igualada were without support; wherefare, when 
the lstter, continuing Es movernent on Tmgonn, seaclied 
TalTs the 2.2~~3, and hesrd of Reding's mrarch, he immediatelg 
retnrned witli ;Pino% division te Pla, resolved, if flle Spaniah 
p n e d  should dvence towards Igualada, to  follow him with a 
sharp spar. Xoubam Iialted at Tails cin the 23rd to watcli tlie 
Catalans in t.he plain of Taragona, Pino was then at PIa, 
whence he det~ched men t o w d f i  Santa Creus and Bmta  
Colums to fecl for Reding, and in the evening tbey icturned 
uith aome prisoners, who siid the abbey waa abnndoned and 
Wing gone baclr to Taragona by Fameal tand 3fomlilacch. 
St. Cyr then retainecl Pino w t  Pla, but pnshed pasts on liis right 
to the abbey, and in front to the defile of Calira, dmigning to 
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meet tlio Spnniards if they returned by tlioae rondu, nnd L 
ordered Souham to post Lis left on the Frmmli, liia iight 
towarrls Pla, witli tio advanced p m d  at Pixa Moxona watcliing 
the Momblanch mad. 
On tlio 24th Reding being at Santa Coloma, held n council, 
at which Doyls asisted. One party was for fighting, anotlier for 
retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran at Igualada, 
ot fonrth for regaining the plain o£ Taragona. Them mere 
mrtnp opinions, but neither wisdom nor rasolution, nnd finally, 
Fkding, leaving Wimpfen with four thousand men a t  hn 
Colama, decided to re+ Titragona and took tl ie route of 
Iiomblancli: with ten tliousand of bis best troops, followjng the 
Bpaniah accounts, but St. Cyr s a p  with fifteen thousand 
Tlie CataZnn gcnernl kncw Valls n.as occupied nnd his Iine 
of marcli jntcrceptcd; yet hc iinnginerl tlie Prench to be 
only five or six tl~oumnrl, and ITho sitiintion nnd strcngth of 
an cncmy were particulurs tlut seIiloin trtiuliIed Spnish 
commnnders. 
At dq-bmtk on thc 25th Febrnnry, whiti: iii full rnarch 
witlitiut nny scuuts, tlie l i d  of Reding'~ column w n ~  suddenl~ 
fired upon nt Pixs Moxons hy Sotifiani's rlehc11rncnt; bowever 
tlie Frencli were iuimediately driven in upan tlie main body, 
nnd tlie attaclr b e q  vigorously foollowd tlie rvhole division 
gcve way. Under cover of this figIit the hnggage and mtillety 
passed tlie Frmcoli riuer, the macl t o  Tarngonn was opaid, 
and Reding rnigbt have &ccted 11;s retreat witliout diíñculty; 
yet he continued to prces h u h a m  until St. Cyr, who had earIp 
intefigencc of what m 3  pasuing, carne down &m Ha upn 
llis left flmk. N%en thc French dmgoons, prcccding thcir 
infantry, appmred in Souham's line, lteding re-crossed the 
Frnnooli nnd took a position bchind thnt river, intcnding to 
retrmt from Uicnce in thc evcning, but hia nliIe opponent 
m d e  him fight, and ~t thres o'doclc the tnction reoornmenced, 
Tho banlrs of  tlie Frmcoli were stcep and n i g e d ,  tIie position 
beyond strong and difficult af access, yet Si. Cyí- wicliing, a 
he &ates, to incrcase the moral nsccndancy of hia soldi-, 
forbad tbe ssti1Iei-y to play on Iteding's bafhlionq le& thep 
should fly More the infnntry eould r m h  tliem! 
Under this mtrious amngement the brittle was b e p  by 
the light troop. TIie fiencli, or rather Italian infantry, mere 
supcrior in numlicr to tlic Spnninrris; mvercd Iiy tlieir skir- 
misliers B~cy pnssc11 thc rivcr witli nlrtcrity, nnd oscentled tlie 
lieig1,lits nndcr a vcry rcgiilmr fire, wliich m continud unti1 
tlie ntti~clring t ronp  lind nenrly rmclid thc summit of the 
p~ition; tlien hotli Swiss and Catnlam wavered, and m tlie 
infnnky ccould cloñe witli tliem they broke and were cl~nr,ged 
by the Prench cavdry. Reding received sevcral sabre ~vounds 
yet s a d  liimsclf at Tairgona, whcre the peatest numlier of 
the vtinquished also fook refuge, the remaincler fled towards 
Tortom and Leridit. The count of C ~ t e l  d'0rius and many 
other superior oficers were taken, togetrier with a11 thc artilley 
and baggage, and four thousand mcre killcd or wound~l. 
Uaring these movements Reriitig rcceived no assistance from 
the somaknezi, nnd it may be received as an axiom in war, tliat 
armad pcmants nre oniy fomidablc to strag~lc~s md smdl 
detacbments; when the repilar forces engris, tbe poar oountrg- 
man sensiblo of Iiis own ivcal:nws wiscly quits tlie ficld. S*. 
CF l ~ s t  only n thoiisand mcn, nnd on the 26th Souliniri 
entered tlic rich t o m  o f  Rciiq where, mntrnry t o  the generol 
c u ~ b m ,  tlie inhnhitnnb rem:tined. Pino tlien occupied PIS 
Alcover, and Valls, dctaclmenta were ~en t  o X3lou and Villa 
&ca on the ~ea-comt west o€ Taragona, and Clial-iot, m l l e d  
fromIp?ada, was poseed at the Santa Creus to watcliWimpfcit 
wbo still remained at Santa CoIoma de QuerauEt. 
Tliis loattle finislied the regular warfare in Catdonia for tha 
time, Tbose detacbments, nhich by the previons movements 
bd been cut off from'tlie main body of tlie army, joined tlie 
sornntrn~, and aacting M partizana troubled the communicationti 
of the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a reguiar irmy to 
dcal with in thc ficld, and Tortosn, bclng in x dcfenceless con- 
clition, witlioiit provisions, mnst Eiave fitl!eu if any nttcmpt had 
been m a d ~  npinst  it. Lnzm indccd, aftcr his dcfcnt near 
Zwxq crwried a few men to Tortostt, nnd rleclaretl liimself 
indcpendent uf Reding'a wmmand; but tlie h t t l e  and the fa11 
of Zaragoza stmck terror far nnd wido, the neigllbouring pro- 
acting cach for its o m  safcty, had no regard to  any 
general plan, and thc confusion was universal. The fugitiva 
fmm Yalls and tlie troops nhenrly in Taragen&, crowdd tlie 
lntter place, nn infectious disorder broke out, nncl Bt. Sr, 
satisfied tbat mckncss ahodd do tha work of the swartl, begirt 
the city mith a resoliition to hoId hi~i positiona wliile food could 
he procured. Ic thie policy he rcm~ined stcadf~t iintil t1ie 
mirldle of Mnrch, nltliougli Wimpfen nttacked md dmve 
Cliubran in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and 5%. Quirrti, 
to Villa Franca ; and although the tmo Milans and Claros, 
acting between tlie Besos mithe  Uobrefi.at, cut liis communi- 
cation with Ilarcelona, and in conjunction with the EngIish 
aqudron, renewed tlie blockade of that city. Uis plan appears 
injudicious, The sickness in Tas~gona did not cause it to 
surrender, and tbe subjuption of CataIonia waa certainly 
r c t d e d  by tlie cessrttion of offensive operations; he should have 
seized some atrong place, Tortosn, Tarlikpna, Gerona, or Lerida, 
while the tcrror o£ dcfcat was fresh ; his inactivity aftcr h l o l i o  
del Rcy and at this period, cnablerl tlic ~~Lt*¡onians to put 
those towns in a atatc of defcncc, nnd lie gnincd only a barrcn 
d o v .  
Towards the mid(11lo af Marcli, kIto country briing exhaustd, 
Iie determined t o  abandon the p l a k  of Tamgona, and take 
some position '~vhere he could feed l ~ k  tmops, coxr the pr* 
jected siege of Glerona, and yet be at Eiand t o  relieve Barcelona 
The valleys about Vich offered al1 these ndvmtages, blit u 
Cla~os and the lfilans were in force nt Molino de1 Rey, Chnbran 
was ~rdered t o  drive them back first, tLat tlie sick and wwnded 
men might be tmsfcrred from Valls to  Barcelona. Chnbran 
sent a linttalion witli one piece af urtillery, tbc miguclctcs 
tliinlring it the tidranced guarrl of a greater form iihandoncd the 
po~t,  yyet soon returned, bbeak $he htlit~dinn and took tlie gun. 
Cliabm received odem to  fa11 on witli liis wliole division; Iie 
st. C ~ T .  reached the bridge, but returned without daring 
to attack ; St. Cyr repated his orders, and tben 
f.he troops, apparently ashamcd of their general's irresolntion, 
carrid the bridge and occupied the beights on Iiotli sides of 
tlie river. 
It was now found thnt Dnlicsme, p r ~ d  by the migqeletes 
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without, was ~Iso extPemely fenrful of coconqiraciw nitliin tlie 
walls; rind his- fcars, and t,he vilIanous conduct of his police, 
hd d l y  excited the inhabitants to attcmpt mhat m ao 
mach drearfed. An insurrection was plnnned in wncert wjtli 
the rniguelete~l rcnd tbe English squdron, and thc latter 
coming close in cannonaxled the town on the lOtIi, expcctins 
Wimpfen, thc Milnns, and Claros t o  bnve msriulterl the ptcs, 
which mns tlie sipnal for insurrection. Tlie inbnbitnnts were 
snnguine, because there wero above two thousand Spnniali 
prisoners in the city, and outside tlie walla twa tercios secretly 
remikd and mdntain~d by tho citixens; and theso Irrst 
being without uniforms, constantly passed in and out of the 
towa, yet Duhesme was never slile to discover or t o  p m n t  
tbem ! bnt in al1 matters of surprise amd stratagem gpaoiards 
are mnvalled. This project asainst the city was bafld 1iy 
Chabm'a actions at Molino del Eey, which occupid tlie 
partizan corps outside tbe walls ; nnd tbe British squadron, 
exposed to  s henvy @le and disappointed in tlie co-operation 
frm the land-aide, mil4  away tlie 11th 
a. Cyr designed t o  retire the 18th, but the 17th a c m -  
nonade wair h c d  on tlie side of Momblnncli, whicli procecdd 
from n dotnchmc~t of six hiindred men, witli two gunri, 
under the cornrneod of colonel Rriche, who lid been aent by 
Mortier t o  opcn the communication nfter the fdl of Zamgozn, 
and l id  frirced a wny throu~lfli tlio Spnnish partixans. To 
favour 1iia return the arrny hdtlted tmo d y s ,  yet, aftm a trial, 
be found i t too dangeerons aud attached bimself to the 7th 
mrps. Wow bowevar St. Cyr's inactivity and Cliabran's 
timidity had depressed the spirit of the troops; they contem- 
plated the retreat with uneasiness, and many officem sdvjsed 
the general to  hide his movernent~. To check this al= St. Cj-r 
gave tlie Spnnixrds formal notice of his design, desiring Beding 
to  send oficcrs t o  take charge of tlie hoqitah at ValIs whiclt 
cnntnind thc Spnnish mounded and samc Frcncli. Then lie 
rcpnwcd tFic Llobrcglit, followed at a distance by some feeble 
Spanidi detncliments, nnd bicnt Pino immedintcly apainat 
Tmpien, who IiarI rallied tTie rnigueletes of Juan Claros nnd 
the hlilrins at Tarnsa. Pino defcatetl him, foraged the country, 
and broughh bnclt sufficient to Eecd tbe armv without d h n g  
on BBiOClon& 
lZeding clied at tbis time of his wounda iri Taragong whme 
the English consul had snvcd from thc mob, which 
always attributed defent to the genemPs treachery. His mili- 
t n ~  oonduct was condcmned by his own officcrs, his know- 
ledge of aar wns slight, ME cournge and lioneaty unquestion- 
nble, snd lie wns coi~~picuous for humariity. Abt tliis unhappy 
period, whcn prisnners in evcry pnrt of Spain mere tortured 
with mvnge cruelty, and wlien to refrnin from such deeda m 
Gt. Cyr. to  incur suspicion, Reding not only repressed al1 
barhrities, but concludcd a oonvention with SC, 
Cyr, under wliieh waundd men on both sides xeceived deoent 
treatment, and were cxclimged as soon as thek hurts were 
eured. In his last moments he said he I d  been ill-semed as 
a general, t h t  the somatenes M not supported him, that his 
orders wcre ncglwtod, and l i s  pians diselosed to the enemy 
wliile he could ncver gct true intclligence : complninh which the 
cxpcficncc of Noorc, Rninl, Cidock, Mvliimy, ~ n d  Wcllington, 
proved to Le n~i~iliablc to every part of Spriin, nt every period 
of tlie war. Coupigriy succeded Rerling, yet wna aoon mper- 
~ e d e d  liy BIake, who was appoiuted captain-general of ths 
Coronilla, or little crown, a title given to thc onion of Valen- 
cia, Amgon, md Catalonia. The Cataran warfare was thus 
intimately oooonneeted with Bragon, and a short account of 
wliat waa passing tliere is necessary. 
Wlien Zfirapoxa fellll, h n e s  returnd to Pranm, nnd Morticr 
sent detaclimcnts agninst Monaon, Jaca, Mquinenm md 
Lerida. Monxon, mmmantling a passage ovcr tlie Cinca 
river, waa abandoned by tlie Spninds, Jaca uurrendered, md 
thus an importmt lino of communication mas opened mith 
France; but the demonstration qainst hfequinenza failecl, 
and the snrnrnons to Lerida waa fmitless. Blodier then 
quartered his troops on Lioth aidw of the Ebro from Bar- 
bnstro to Alcriuitx, ~ n d  scnt coloiieI Briche, ns we have seen, 
t o  opcn R cornmunicnt,ion witll tlio seventli corpñ. Wiis mas 
in Mnrch. In April Mortier mtlrclied the fiftli eoqis to 
Castille, Iaving Junot witli the tliird mrps to bold Aragon; 
bnt tbat offioer soon returned to Trance and wae replaced by 
Buchet. The third corps was now much reduced. One 
brig.ade was empIoyed to protect the comrnnnication with 
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N~vamc, another to escort priaoner~ from Zaragoza to 
Bagonne; many artilIcry-mcn and non-commissioned officers 
were w i t h d r m  t o  ~ c n - e  in Germanya and the nnmbci of 
diqosable tmops did not exeeed twclve tliouesnd men nnder 
w s .  T k i g  weaknesq gnve thc ncw general uneaaincss, which 
mas not Jlaycd whcn hc found men md oficcra discontcntd 
and dispirited. Suchct wns howevcr no orfinary man. He 
immedintely c o m m c n d  n systcm of discipline nnd order iri 
his govmment wIiidi cnrricd him from one succcss to another 
unt,il hc obtnined tho rnnlr of mnrsiial for Iiimsdf, and for hia 
tmops tlre bonour of being tlie unly Frcnch corps that ncver 
b~ffered a aipd m e m e  in Spain: He Iioped St. Cyr'g 
~ c t o r i e s  mould give llim time t o  rsorganixo 3iis forcc in t.i:rii- 
quillity, but tliat quickly fled. Tlie Arngnnesc penñu~:ts, 
detecting liis wealr~iesa, w m  rmdy for insurrection, and the 
mipele tw and somatenes about Lerida and Mcquinwza were 
alredy in tictivity under tlie colonele Perefia and Bag-et. 
Blake a1~0) drnwing troope from Valencia and Taragoma, had 
joined Lazan, and fixed bis quarters at IvIorella on the frontier 
of Aragoe, daigning t o  operate in that province. 
His first effort was t o  kindle the fire of inaumedion, nor 
n.ns fortune Bidverse. Part of the p i s o n  of Bionzon havjng 
m d e  a marauding eñcursion bepnd t he  Cinca, tbe citizens 
o~erpwerd those who remaincd, and Pcre6a e n t d  the 
plncc: this hnppcnd whiIc Jrinot still cornmandcd nnd he 
sent a &ron@; f m c  to rccovcr it, but Rngct hnving re infmd 
Pereña tlie FrencEi were repulfierl; the Ciircs rose behind tliern, 
nnd tliongli tlie mvrilry euatpecl by ~Rwimming, tlie fnfantry 
uix hundred, after three days' mnrcliing nnrl slcirmiuhing sur- 
~rmdered rind were sent to Tarngoni~ wlisnoe they were 
excliangd nndw the convention betiveen Reding and St. Cyr. 
T b  wccw excited cxtravagant hoyes, the Spanish gar- 
riwn of Mequinenzm burned t l ~ e  Frencli boat bridge at Cmpe 
on the Ehra, and Blake tlicn rw1vancd fighting t o  Blcanitz, 
the French retiring with los1 to Smper and Ixar. l t  waa at 
this moment when the quurters on both sides of  the Ebro 
were harnssotl and tlie u7ing.s scparated by thc loss of the 
Cnspe bridgc, thnt 8uchct nsiiurnal tlie commnnd of  the third 
corps. It was widcty sprentl nnd in dnnger. He nliundonecl 
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the lsft bank of the Ebro* nnd concentmted hig force a t  Ixar 
with tbe exception o€ a small garrison left in Zaragoza> but 
his soldiers were fearful and disorderly, and to 
~~~~~. iaise their ripirit he marched the 23rd against 
Blnke. Thrtt oficer was in front of Alcanitx, 
his centre mas covered by a hill; a bridge over the Giroda- 
lupe mm in lile rear; bis left rested on some pods of watrr; 
his right \vas exposed. He had twelve tlioumd men of 
al1 arma, and the French did not cswed eight thouaand 
infantrg and sevcn hrindrcd MI-alry ; yct S~~chct, hinking 
if Iie cot~ld cnrry tbe hilt in the ccntre, tlie Spanish w i n p  
rvould bc ciit off from t11c bniIge and forcerl to surrender, 
msde dlapositions for an attaclc. 
To dmw Blnke's rittention t o  his flanks, a ama11 coliimn ras  
rlirected against ewh wing, md when the slrirniiahers wers 
cngngcd, tlirce thoirannd mcn rnpidly nttackcrl the ccntrc hilE 
Tlic Spninrr?~ s t o d  firm, thc Frcnch tlcd, nnd tlioilg-h Buehet, 
wlio ~ 5 4  Iiimself wounrled, rallied tliern ngain in tlie plain, 
and remained thera nll rliay he dnred not renew tlie ti~%ion. 
In tlie ni@ ho retreated, but his troopa mere sehed with 
panic, and at dqlight pciured into Samper with al1 the dis- 
order of a rout. Elake however rcmnined inact iq and the 
French general cauoing the mnn who first commenccd the 
a l x m  fo bc shot, cxhortcd the rest to rneintain thcir Iionour, 
rcstcd two d y s  in pmition tliut he miglit not secm to fly, and 
tlicn fe11 11iwlr tu Znrqonn, Tlii~ bnttla a.ns a ~ u h j d  of 
triumpli al1 over Spain. Tlie supreme junta gnve Blake m . 
estate, md a d d d  the kingdom of Mur& to Lis command; 
bis army then rapidly augmented, he hoped ta  recover Zara- 
goza and tumed al1 his tlioughts on Amgon, negIecting Cah- 
lonin, t e  which province it is time to return. 
St. Cyr remaíned until the middle of  April in Barcelani, 
~triving to rcmody Diibcme's b d  governmcnt; be aiso filied 
the mngmintri for three months, anii as thn prisoners were a 
Bource of dnnger he resolved to eend tliem to Prance. FindEp 
transferring Iiis sick m d  ñ r e a k  rnen to the grariison, and 

not oliliged to empIoy at al1 I Xt, Cyr acknowledges, that 
whcn Iie received Iiis instnictione, he observed the emperorvai 
affliction at Dupont's diswter ; yet he wodd Lave it believd, 
that in the mirlat of this regret, Napoleon, with a singular 
self-dmaging malice, masi preparing gceater disasters, mcrely 
b dispace the comrnander Le was talking to. b n d  whyt 
h a u s e  the latter liad formcrly served with tha army of tlie 
Itliinc! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, 
anil wss aftcrwards ma& a marsliaI by this implacable 
enemy. 
29 Thnt tlic seventll corps ivas not u~11 aupplied is not to 
bc dispiikd jn tlic fncc of  f n h  statcd by Et. Cyr; 'but if wnr 
were n, ~tfite of ense imd srnootliries~ tlie fiarne which attends 
successful. gencmls wouId be unmsrited. Napoleon seleded 
Bt. Cyr becnuse he tliought liim a mpahle commmderj in 
feeble han& tlie awsntli oorps u~ould be u~eak, but with St. 
Cyr he judpcl it abIe to overcome the C~talonians; nor was 
he raucii mistakcn. Barcelona was isaved, h a a s  mas talreni 
and if Taragana and Tortosa did not fall, tlie one after the 
battle o£ Molino del Rey the otlier after that of TJalls, it wari 
bemuse the Frencli gcncral did n ~ t  choow ta attack tbem. 
Those towns were witliout the sIightest preparation for 
defcncc, moral or pliysicnl. Nor can tlie irncxpectcd res&- 
ancc of Gcronri Znrtigoza antI Vnlcncita bc citcd n,pinRt thiri 
opiuion; tliose cities wcro previou~ly prepared, yet in the twa 
1st there were rlisrnay and confusion, not fatal mly becanse 
the besieging genernls mantea tlie &y vigour chmkriatic 
of great cnpt ains. 
3'. 8t. Cyr, aware thnt numbers and q~ipment  are a poor 
measure of the sitrength o f  m i e s ,  exdts tbe cnthusiaam and 
coumgc af tlie Chhliane, and tremblcs nt the dange~ whicb, 
owing tu Nn1)uIeon'rr siiicidtil jealou~y, mennrxd r~t hat period 
tha sevcntli wrps nnd even the mith of Fmnce? Rut St, 
Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen tbousand men, liavjng no 
artiliery, rind &g only sjxy mnnds of masket-amrnuni- 
fion, to plnnge i n h  tbe midst of tliose terrible armie~; to 
mar& t h u g h  $he mountaina for whole weeks aiid attacg the 
strongest, positrom with the bayonet done; nay wen t o  dis- 
penae with tlie me of hrs artiUery when he did bring it into 
action, lat his men should not Iinve n mfficicnt eontsmpt f o ~  
their enemies, dnri who were tliese nndaunted soldiers, so 
bigh iin conrage, so confrdent, so regardless of tlie p a t  .tTeeapon 
of modera d a r e l  Baw levies, tlic drcp and scmpings of 
ItsIy, tlie refrise of Naples und Rorne. Witb such soldi~rs the 
battIes o f  Gardarleu, Molino, IguaTda and ValIs were won, 
yet Bt. Cyr al l s  the rniLpeletcs tlie Iiest light troops in the 
mrld! The bmt ligiit troops we the bcst troopsin tlic world. 
Bad t l ~ e  four tliousand mcn composing Wcllington's lighh 
divisioti h c n  nt  Cnrdudeu, instend of fiftcen tliousund migue- 
letes, St. Cyr's sixty rounrls of nmmunition woiild scarccly linvo 
mirried Iiim to Biircclonn. 
4", If tlie injurious iiiffircncc of pcrsonrtl fcclinp on tlie 
jndgment wcm not ktiown, it might excita wonder t l id so 
gootl a wwiter and alilc solrlier ñliould arIvaucc such fiil1:icics; 
5ut St. Cyr's worIr bczrs tlie mark of carelt?ssnegs. Ue affirnir 
that Dupont's move on Andalusia enconrriged tlie tumults of 
Ai-arijux; but the tumuits of Aranjuez hppened in tlie month 
of Mnreh, and Dnpont'a movemeut took place in IIay and 
June! Again, he says, that t o  malre a soIid conqucst in tbe 
Penlnsula, Nnpoleon sIiould have commenced witli Catalonia 
instad of overmning Sptain by t1ie northern line of operntions. 
But the progrcss ot' the ~eventh corps wa9 impcded by tEie 
wmt of provisiens not by tlie encrny's force. Tmcnty thou- 
gnnd mcn crii~ld hent tlic Spnninrds ir1 t l ~ e  ficld, Iiut cclulrl not 
siihaist: inwcrising tlic nninbcrs woiild inerense tliia difficiilty. 
And in wllat itvrriuld tlie greakr ~olidity of t l i io  plnn lrmve 
consisted? mile tIio Frencli were tlius e n s p d  the patriota 
wonld linve haen or,mizing tlieir annim, and Englancl could 
hm hrought a11 her troops into line; two liundred thousxnd 
men p I a d  between Zaragoza and Sortosa, or breaking into 
h n o e  by tlie wesfcrn Ppeneea while the Austritrns \vere 
ndvancing to the Rhine, mould bave sliaken the solidity of St. 
Qr'a plan. The Prench emperor aaw a nation intrinsicaily 
powcrfd und vehcmenfly mcited, pet ipornnt  of m r  mrl 
mting  the nid wliich Englantl was mgcr to givc. Al1 the 
elements of power existd in tlie Peninsulg nnd they weio 
fa& nppximating to a cantre d e n  11e b m i  upon that 
countrg; and as tiie pthering of a wratsr-spout ia prevented by 
E E ~  
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the explosion of 8. pn, EO tlw rising drengtli o€ Spnin m9 
dissipnted by iiis mdden and dreadrul assault: if tbe war wns 
riot khen finisticd, it was because his lieutenanta were tardyand 
jealons of eacli otlier. 
5'. St. Cyr appews t o  have fallen into an error premlent 
nmong tlie Frencli genernls in Xpain; he considered his tdc 
as a whcile in itself, instead of a wnstitumt p r t  of e peater 
qstern. He judged wcll mliat mas wnnting to subjiigate 
Catitlonia, he did not see that the seventh eorpa slioald some- 
tinies forget Cntnloniz to aid tlie p e r a l  plan apainst tlie 
I'cninsula. Rosas snrrenderccl xt tlic moment d i e n  Napolwn, 
iiRer t.he victorics of Unrps, Espinosa, Tiirlela ~ n d  the Sorno- 
sierra, mns entcring Mnrlrid m rr eonqiicror; the Iinttlctr of 
Cnirldcu nnd MriIiiio Inny tlierefnre lic miid to hnve prostrnt~i 
Spuin, hecriiise tlir Riiglirili army wvns istilated, tfie Slinnish 
milies ¿lestro~*etl nnd Xurn~oxn invpsttd. WIIR tlint a time tu 
caIcntate the weigiit of  powdcr and tlie iiuiiiber of piclraxes 
requircd for n fonnd siege of Tamgonn'i Tlie wliole Prnin- 
suEa was slinlren, the proud heart of S p i n  sunk with terror. 
and in that ,p~t  constcrnnkion to be daring was t o  beprudent. 
St. Cyr wsis not in s condition to bcsicge Txragona formdly, 
but he rnighh have assaultcrl it with Icss danger than he 
inmirred by his marcli to  Barcelon~ The battle of Valis 
wn3 mothcr epocli of tlie samc kind; thc English amy had 
tlicii re-cmlinrlred, the rout of Ucles Iind tnlccn plncc, Por- 
tugnl wns invnrleil, Xnragoxn hnd fnllen. Tlint m s  n time to 
reirder victory fruitful, yet no ntteinpt was mnde %wiost 
Tartosa. 
6'. St. Qr jnstly blamea Paliicios xnd Vives for remaining 
beforc Barceloiia iiisted of carrying tlieir army to the Ter and 
tlie Fluvin. 1-ct he applauds Recling for conduct equally at 
vnriance with tlie true prineiples of war. It was hia own in- 
activity aftcr tlie bnttlc of hIoiino whicfi produwd the army 
of  Rcding; and the impaticnt folly of thnt amp, and of tlie 
p p l c ,  prodiiccd thc rout of Igunlnrlrt nnd the bnttle of Valls. 
Instcnrl nf disqcminitting thirty tliunsnnd mcn nn a line o€ 
~ ix ty  rnilcs, hdirig alioiild hnrc put Taragona nml Tortom 
into a stnte of defencc, anJ lenving II malI corps of o h s m  
tion nmr tho furmer, have mide Lerida the bage of bis opera- 
tions, In thtlt posifion, comninnding the moat fertile pIain in 
Cataloda, he could h v e  acted in mitss on 8t. Cyrk Uanlrs and 
renr by the lima of Cervera and Momblniich-and without 
danger to h h e l f :  nor eould tlie Prench general have at- 
iemptcd augh t u$mt Taragona. 
But it is not wjth referente to the seventh c o q s  aloiie that 
Lerida ~ . n s  tIie propar hase of tht: Eppaiiish army. If tlie Valen- 
Cima at  Modlra, and Infantado's force at Cucneth 11intl mnreiiorl 
on Lridra, fifty tliousand regular trmps ivould Iinve beea con- 
oentrated there carly in February; haring tlic fr irtres~es of 
Monaon, Riilwer, Nequinenxa, Tmgnn;t, nnd Tortuaa a~ 
oovering nnd supportiiig pointa : the Iincs of  operntions would 
have been as numerow as tLc: rnads, tFie Beii rl'TTrgel, wlted 
the grawy of C~rttalonin, ivouid Elave suppIied corn, and a 
dire& cornmunication with JTalencia would have been opm. 
From tliis central manacinz point, such u force could hem 
kept St. Cyr in check, antl even Ame raised tlie sicge of Zara- 
gom; nor could Tictor have foIbwed Infantado's moveinent~ 
without nncovering Jfadrirl, and abandoning tlie system of 
operntions againat Portugal und dndalusia 
73 Xt, C;vs pmiscs Iterlin%s projcct for sumunding the 
French, and very gravcty observes, tlie only ~ l & r l  oi' de- 
Bting it  wns by taking the offcnsive. Rothing can be jiistcr. 
Rut he sliould llave said itwas u eatain mrtaeiIm1; nnd unht.il we 
8nd a p c a t  cornmnndcr ncting upun Rcding7~ principlca, thia 
prrrise rnn only lic tnkcn ns civility townrrlx rs Iiruvc ~ l v ~ r s a v .  
Hirr own movenicrita wcm very diffcreiit. Ha disliked Na- 
pleon pemonnlly, lie did uot dislike Iiis rnanner of mnlring 
wnrj the mlebratd c a m p i p  in the Alps rigainst Bcaulieu 
was not nnheeded by him. Por one of his proceerlinga, how- 
ever, there is no precedcnt, nor i a  it Iikdy it u,ill ei-er be 
imibted; he stopped tFie fire of l i s  wrtillery wlien it was doiiig 
execution, te cstablish the moral ascendnncy of liis troopi 1 
Khat a srircasm on liis encmies l Wlid an mswer to  Ms com- 
plnint that NnpoIeon had maliciously given liim a Bopeless 
t ~ k  ! He could not havc commanded so long witliout know- 
ing &id &.m k in all b a t t l ~  (G dechive m.mm.f, w ? m  m m ~  
~wipm~ evesrj man, mmj cmdina t io~  of fm that can Eis 
hrwight $0 h r ,  6 ~ s ( c r y  l o  pais t l ~  & t o y .  JVilfulIy to 
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negiect tlio means of rsduciny tlic cnemy'tl strength, p h o u s  
t o  t l i ~ t  witiml pcriod oC rtn action, irc n gross follillp. 
8'. I f  Pt. Qr's omn mnrclics iind hnttles dirl not mifficieritly 
expoac thc fitllncy of his oliininno rclntivc to thc v ipm of tlie 
Cntralnns, lord CoIIingwiod's mrres1wntFence ivould siipply tlie 
r1eficieric.y. Tliat abln sud mgacious man, writing at  this 
penoti, says,- 
' I n  Ciitnloiiia, everyhliing ueems t a  Iiavo gane wrong sinm 
Qie fa11 nf Rosnñ. Tlie Bpnninrtls are in considemble force, 
yct are dispersed and panic-stnrck wliencvcr t1ic enemy ap- 
pears.'-'TIle applieabionx for supylies are unlimited; they 
want moncy, arrns, and ammunition, of wliicli no use aplmrri 
t o  be made wlten they gct them.'-' In tlie English papers, 1 
ace accounts of succepses, and convoys cut off nnd mggona d& 
stroycd, which nrc not tnle. Wh& has bcen done in that 
m y   ha^ been by the boats of our frigntee, wliich have, in t ~ o  
or tlirce inñtnnccs, lnndcd mcn and attrackcd the memy with 
grcnt gallnntry. Tlic somrhtencq mngc the hiIla in s diaorderlj 
way aid fire! rit a distinta, but retire nn lieing sli~imaelier1.'- 
Mdtiturles nf men do not malre s force.' Adíl the Spanish 
historian Gabanes' sttitements that the migeletes, aimays in- 
sribordinate, clctested tlie service of  the lne, md vere mmy 
of them m e d  oiily vi th ataves, and me have the hIl measare 
of tlie Catalilnns' rt&istance : it mas not the CntaIaw, buut the 
Englisli, who in thia province, in e v c ~  part O£ tlie Peninsnls, 
retmdcrl tlie yroqeas of tlic Frencli. M'oiild St. Cyr hnm 
wasted a montli befere Roses f WouEd Iic hnve becn liampemd 
in his mwcments by his frms for t1lc mfety of DarceIona P 
TVoirZd he Iiave fniled to bcsiqe and hke  Tamgone and 
Tortosa, if s Frencli fleet had attendd his progres by the 
c m t ,  or if it coiild cven b a ~ e  made two rnns in aafety! To 
lord Gollinpood, who, firm tlie Roman [Jibulus and R far 
hetter ninn, pmixlicd of siclrness on Iiis decks rather tban relm 
in hiñ wnt.cliing,-to bi~ kccn jrirlgmcnt, his nncnising vigi- 
lancc, tlie resistanclr marle by tlie CntnInne cItie He it 
m tliat rntesdicted the mast-line to tlic Frencli, protectecE tlie 
transporb of tlie Spanisli suppIies from Tnleneiq assisted in tlie 
defence of the towns, aided tlie rctrcat of thc bcaten mies, 
di41 that wliich tIie Spnish fleeta In Cadix and C n r t h a p o  
eihould hravo donc. Btit the suprcme jiintn, c ~ i a l l y  dime- 
garding tho rcmon~trances of CollingwoorEJ tlie good of tiieir 
o m  country, the trenky with England by wliicli they ivere 
bound tu prermt tlicir ships from fnlling into the linnds of t he  
cnemy, let tlieir flecta rot in Iinrl)oitr, evcn when money iviis arl- 
vanced and tlie assistancc of Dritish eseamen ofleered to frt tlicm 
out for sea. 
HavEng now related the principal uperationa in the ewtern 
and mntral provinces; liaving sliown that the Spaniardq 
however restlcss, wcre unable to tlirow off the yoke, I must 
turn to Portugal, w h e  tlie tide of invasion still flowing on- 
d, altliougli with diminished volume, was first stayetl nnd 
finally foroed back by a counter dood of mightier strength 

No. I. 
Zb tlie T&tor of tlra ' Times.' 
Sr%-M. Tliterñ, in liia 9th volnme of tlie ' Consnlnte antl 
Empire,' claims for Iiimaelf thc sccret oF the Peninw11n iwr, 
having found it in ccrtain pnpers to whicli he only liw hnci 
access. Thnh may be; hut I ask if he is hcapabIe of drawing 
false conclusions from seeret materiaIs to supporb pemerse 
assertions? To answer ivith good warrant 1ct us examino 
Low he deals ivitli autlientio ducuments, not confined t o  his 
s m t  repertory. 
T1iiers.-6 3,000 briak remlutc Frencbmenbpposeri 15,000 
EngIish nt Rosira. 
Xeply.-Tlie dulce of TVeIIington judgcd the Prench to be 
6,000. Morde,  their commandcr, denied he had 6,000, thus 
bQtly sdmitting he had 5,000 or more. 
Thiers.-Tlie Englisli lrad 4 00 mmlry. 
' Bsply.-Tlie Englidi nrljutant-general's return $ves 280. 
TEiieru.-LSordc wountled or IiilIed 1,200 or 1,500 English 
nt Ronca. 
Bep1p.-The adjutant-general's retnm gives 479 killed, 
wowded, nud missing. 
Thiers.-'Junot colIected 9,000 somc h u n h d  mcn !no fight 
at Vimicro,' 
Iteply--The Frcncli ordcr of bnttle iound on the field gave 
14,000. 
Tlliem-22,000 Fwnch emhnrIrcri untlcr tlie Convention, 
Rcply.-Tlie official French ernliaktttion return givcs ncmrly 
26,000 men and offioem. 
?hiera.-' OnIy 26,000 men followed Junot into Portugal.' 
ICep1y.-Tlie Imperial muster-rolis give 23,534 dective in 
Portugal, 2 3rd of May, 1808. 
T1iiers.-Tlie Prencli army of Spain ander NapoIwn vas 
260,000 strong, of wliid~ 200,000 only were assembled there 
ths end of October, lE08. 
hp1y.-Tha Imperial muster-rolls ahow, an tlic 25th of 
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To il Edi if' f!le mc~:
m, 1>f. hi s, ill his t lu tho < ulat mI
,' i s hi s e e f cnin~1I 1. ar,
ll e i u h b ), has ad
. at incapabl
f lse l sions c l rt n' o
ti s! s w l":l.u le e
bo etl1 w h Imlhclllie ocumcllt.l:l u m t
ecret e t ry.
h crs._' 000 s so e }'rc ' opposed Hi,OOO
lis at ri\: .
l{cply.-The k Wellingto e F e
0 . kb c e , OO , t]lUS
tacitly a ti g 0 .
b ers.- 'he h lU cava
• Reply.-Thc lish llll t- m ' givcs 5
ll CN. uhonlc de k l
at Rori~".
R ly.-'l'he r ' urn ct.l,
unde , anti i i g.
i rs.-' Junot ll t , e ndre e t i t
t e .'
n ly.-The re h r er f !mUl f t fi l
,0 0.
hi rs._ 2, 0 re b k('(1 de Il i u.
nc l .-The i i l ll mbar ati d i e lleu l
G,OOO ti liecrs.
Thiers._' l G,OOO ll t i t t l.'
lleply. The i l t -rolls i 9, 8 effecti i
Portugal, 23rtl of : ay, 1808.
hiers.-The French ar y of J)uin untler apoleon was
,') , str , f hi(:h , lll ere asse le t ere
t e e f do r, ] 8 .
llell]y.-'l'hc I pcrinl uster·rolls sho , on the 25U1 of
October, more tlian 3I9,000 effective; on tFia 13th of N O T ~ ~ .  
ber, more tliaii 335,000 sffcctive. 
Thiers.-8ir drilin Rfoorek troops znived at %lrim~utoca, a- 
hausted by tlieir long march, and by primtiona. 
Rep1y.-Rloorc's despatclies sny hia troops were in hetter 
caqe tllan wlien they stnrted from Lisbon; thcy aufered no 
privatiuna, and their exwlleiit contlition up to Xiahagun wsa 
notorioua. 
Thiem-f Moore advnnccd to Siilinpn nitli 29,000 English 
troops, and about 10,000 Spnninrda.' 
1bply.-Tlie ndj tttwt-generd's return of tlie 1 Dtli of Decem- 
ber fiires 23,583 of  al1 arms ; Jfoore liad no Spriniards, and 
&mana, who did not act iu conccrt, had onIy 6,000. 
M. Ttiiers cn~ieot deny tlie uiitlieriticity of my uumbera, 
aceing tliey wert! tnkcn from tlic originnl Irnpcrinl muder- 
rolls in tlie Frcncb Wnr-ofiicc; not tlic yellom, but the grm 
rolls; the afñoers of that o%ce will appreciate tlie distinction 
of coloum. 
31. Thicm cannot plead ipomnce, Al1 the documents are 
priiited in my history, md 110 liad a c c m  to tlie French 
urigir~iils. 
So much for quantitics. Lct us examine him as to qnalities. 
Z'hiei-s.-Wellington has R contrncted intellect;' sir John 
Mmre was 'irrwoliite in council;' tlie English aoldier ia 
' beaten almost t o  cEcath for thc I c ~ t  fault;' 'be Is IittIe praa- 
tiseti to  rnarcl~; ' is inanirnxte, feeeble, wlien forced to m0T-e td 
attackj' ' 3ie h n ~  no vivmity, no audncity, no enthusiasm, no 
Iinrililinod, no enterprise;' ' t,o tmt hirn Iia must be foroed to 
hice tlie initiative i i i  nttrick,' &c. 
&ply.-Wcllin,gbn'a intcllect, mensurcd by M. Thim' 
irn@iiatian, mugt itppcra~ vcry contrnctctl. Tct i t  is &unge 
that ivitIi a few troops having no entcrpiise, no bsrdihood, nnd 
fearing to be haten to  death fer trifling offenc~nc, he sliould 
liavc rnainthed the war for five yetirs suc~cssfully in Spaiu, 
qainst enormous nmbers of soldieril aud officers tlie h t  und 
most skilful in tlrc world, accoding ta M. Thiem, nnd, firially, 
slioiild cnmy t l int  wnr inta Frnnce! Stmge tlmt tttoops 
unnlilo to rnnrcli shwld lime nioved, in f m  of nn cncrny, from 
Lisbon to tlic ~Igucda, fmm the Afiiicrlo to Mdrid, from the 
Douro t o  tlie Adour, from the Adour to tlic Uppr  Cisronna 
Stjtranpr stilI, if to bent those troops it was anly necessarg to 
make them attack, that they ahodd have at'caeked euccessfidIy 
at Roriya, wliere the French hill was five times more steep, 
rugged, niid dificult than tlie English Iiill at Vimimo, ivhich 
tlie French unsucccssfully nttilclced; tliut t h q  f u r d  tlie 
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p w g e  of thc Doirro nnd rlrovc So>oii?t oiit of Portugnl ; t!irit 
thcy attncked Mnssena nt IWinlira, nt Cnsnl Nova. nt Fonte 
d'hronw, at S~raliugnl, and drove him also out of Yortugnl; 
that they athcked md retook the kcy of the position at 
hlhera, whicli the Bpaniards bad lost; that tiley attiicked 
and defeater1 híarmont at SaFarnanm-thc king at TVitoria, 
driving tiim out of Spain; tliat in the second fight, near 
.Pampeliinn, tliey nt(;ncIíatl Sriulb's mountnin positiun, asid ( ~ ~ Q V B  
him out of 8pnin ; tliiit tliey Torced tlie intrt:nclicd mounhin 
position at Vcrn, antl 3iis fortifiad moirntptin lines on the 
NireHc, covering Bayonne; that they passed tlie Gave de Psu 
in faoe of the French n m y ,  nnd defented that m y  at Orthes 
-that they pnssed the &enno and forced the intrenched 
mmp nt Toulousq tliua terminating tlie war! M. SIiiers is 
not happp in hiu militay reveries. RrilTinnt plirasm conilcm-m 
nntory of revoliitinns wliicli Iic coiilrl ncithcr arrcfit mor p i d e  
are morc consonant to bis genius. 
Thiers.-Sir Jolin Moorc was irresolnte in conncil-'he 
pie2ded to thc irnperious admonitiwa of Mr. Frere-' ppers  
pnblishd by his fi~mily prove tliia' 
Rep1y.-The papers publishpd by >1oore1fi family prove tbat 
he re~ellerl Mr. Frere's arropnce with rlilm digriity, ditl not 
Eollow l r i ~  plranu, nnd clinngri1 Iiis o m i  Iiecniise fms11 evrntu 
d l e d  for chxngc. Hia irrcsoliition in council cxista in M. 
Thiers' imaF;ination,-nowhere elae. Tbofie who knew sir 
John Moore \vill. laiigh a t  sucIi a s111y aqsertion. M. Thiers 
has not becn so remarl<ablc for political resolution himself as 
to give him a right to censure otliers. In what councii known 
to Iiim did sir JiiEin Mnose display irresolntionP TIime wlio 
Iiavc read thnt gcneml's j oiirndñ lcnow of srvcral hclrl mitli 
>fr. Pitt, lord Jlelville, nnd uthers, wherein his rability, unhcsi- 
t a t i q  vigour, and redness to undertnke what he advised, the 
mire sign of resolution, were signally m~nifested. But M. 
lliiers spealra afterwñrtls of liis ' prudent firrnness.' Prudent 
firmnesc combined with irresolution! Indnrnitalile resolution, 
both in counciI ~ n d  in tlie Field, wns Moore's chaiacteristic. 
Nnpleon Iiirnsclf mas not more decided. 
Onc morc example of unfounded censure. 
' Sir John Moore said his dvance served the Xpanisb canse 
drawing Nnpoleon to the north, and gjving the south time 
to  rally.' Tllis 11. Tliiers mlls s 'presumptuous m w e r  of 
preeenting tIie afirir to c o v e ~  n dirinstroua ciitnpiign.' 
The liest reply to tbnt preriumptimus remnrlc i s  M. Tiiicrs' 
history, whcrein he distinctly shows that Napoleon did tum 
alt his f o m  from thc south t o  the north in conaequence of 

rSrq-Prevjoua to noticing M. Thlcrshobscmations whicli 
157. JePs (his boolcl~seller) has pnlilidied in your j oiirnal of tliis 
day, 1 offer the following consolatian to the Ist.nirmed gentle- 
man ;-A pcrsan wisliing to purclinse M. flFcrs' ninth volume 
was told tlmt my criticiam in Tlw Tims had ccussed c?ve ry 
copy to be aold off; there wus not one remnining! Ilieartily 
wish it liad done as rnucli for m;v olvn worlc. hTy conscient:~ 
not bcinp biimlcned, tlicreforc, witli ~ i n  or sorrolv on acconnt 
of Mr. JcEs, 1 can witli grentcr ease af mind meet M. Thisrs, 
whoce work, sparkling with paste lirilliants, wants thnt rcal 
jwel-truth. My prcscnt relily need not, liowervever, be long 
or laboured, M. Tliiers has himself confirmed my j u d - p e n t  
of liis iiiriildity to fuctñ, and liis uiisourid ~icrcuiptory asscrtions. 
Tiiat doco tlit! aniilyais of Ibis letter to Mr. JelTs ~imrrtit in 
ansmcr to tlie long list of crrors I dinrgcd Iiim witli? 
1. Ttint he hiis nIwayu consiiltcd for his niiiilbers the 
government correspondence and that of tlie generals command- 
bg tlie armies. 
S. Shat. 1 bad no officixl French domment te pide me, but 
hd p+Jurp some corntnui~iwtions non-authentlc from some of 
mnrdial 8oitlt'~ oflicers. 
3. Th& his judgmentri on the duke of Wcllington nnd t l~e 
British troope wesc exprcssed in terms ruarking Lis esteem for 
hnth. 
-. .
15 is, fhen, n mark of esteem for P p e r a l  and his trwps tn 
deny to tlie first xn cnlnr~cd aipncity, aiid to  the lnst nearly al1 
the msenhinI rlualitirri ol ~oldiers l Perlittps it is a p~oof I ~ I R O  
of Iiis pslcern for Prrncfi genernls niid soldicrs tito te11 tliem 1iy 
iinplimtion, ns 31. Tlliers Iins certainly done, tlint they wcre 
overcoine not once and nccidentalIy, Liit durii~g a series of yclsrs 
by a militnry chid o+ a contracted mind, anrl an rtrmy inca- 
pnble of doing anytlilng better thnn standing stiIl to be aliot; 
for to that coiiclusioii M. TI~icrs' liisltosq- ittcvitnbly loacls. 
But 1, an innglisli liistoriaii, liaring seen wli:it Frencli geoerals 
alid soltIiers cnn do jn tlte fielrl, trll M. Tliir:rs, tlic Frencli 
hi~tohn,  wfto Iiw not, 1 Iiclievc, cvcr scmed, tlint liis country'a 
genemls nnd soldiem Bre most formidable men to rlexl with in 
the field; md tliat tlie general and solciiers who face them 
mwt be littcd to encounter al1 tliat genius and the sternest 
hariiibood mn effeot in war. 
BI. Tliiers spemks of Frencli governmeut'm and French geno- 
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rals' correspondcnm, m cconcIusive in siipport of Iiis stbkrnent 
of niimbers. Tliey could not be cencIu4ve m to the EqIish 
nnmbers, mhicli be 11s misrepresented as mucli ns he has tlie 
French n u m b e ~ .  f l i e  questim is, bornever, iid mhat H. 
Tliiers con~ult~wl, but wliut lie liw putrlislied Aurl there I am 
,nown forccd qain  to  sny that hc mnet amcnd Iiistrcntrncnt uT 1. 
~ccessible facta, jf he r\+oiild ham iiis nuthority ncccptcd for 
the unkno.int and in~mnible .  
Bc s q s  I had no oficial documents, rneaning nf course, 
tlie correspoudence be Iias consulted, to g-uidc me-nay7 ttlirit 1 
liad only Borne nnnubhentic corninunic:iticins froin some of 
ini~rsliu1Soiilt'~olficeiñ. Ruti l  Isliow Iiimtliat I also Lave. 
sccn most of his governmcnt's and gcncrald corrcspondenm; 
ancl tlmt my wmrniinicntions w r e  nith marslial Goult direct 
-not witli his offimrs-lic will perhzps allow some weight to 
my mthority. dny person loolcing at my history wiIl find 
al I my ulil igntions to Frencli geliernls nntl oficers ac11now- 
14-rl. Diit my btisiness here is to  slio\v liuiv M. Thiers, 
wlrrie thinking tu dispose a1 me as ligEitly ns Iie doea of fiictg 
eiit.irelly criufirrns my j i id~ment of fiis reckless clopnntinm, 
wlirn lio Rays 1 Iind no iuitlientic otKcial Frcncli doc~irneiit~~. 
1. 1 hwl dircct eomini~nirations from marshul Soult, who, 
HiLen n~inister of ivar, scnt mc, tlirough genncral Pclet, mitli 
whom 1 also personal communication, an immense mass of 
oficial correspondence upon most of tlie p a t  opemtions in 
the Peninsula. 
2. I l i d  tlie corresponclonce of king Joseph wilh thePrench 
rnnrcrlinls nrirI gcncrnls, nntl witli tlie errilieror, during tLe 
grei~tcat p r t  of tilo w r .  'Clli9 ~ o r r c ' ~ ~ p ~ n d c r i ~ ,  ci~ifit:rcrl nnd 
lcciphercd, was wlptured nt Vitoria, attiid wrs lcnt t o  me by 
tlie duke of Wellington. 
3. 1: hnd R dircct corrcapondcnet? with marsld Jourrlaii. 
4, 1 htid pemond wquaintance with, antl reccived informa- 
tion from, oficers liigh on tlie staff af niarsbal Sey and mar- 
sIld Massena; and I liad copies of the offibl jourds of 
i n i l i t q  opeixtions kept by the cliief of inar~linl Pictor's staff, 
aiid general Dupent's staff, aurl severd others, as may ba seen 
in my Iiistory. 
Prom nll thcse authcntic dociirncnts 1 itlrio m s  embled to 
estaiilish tlie numhew 1 hwc givcn. 1 ww also enabled to 
compme tlrem with tlie information obtnhed in the field bythe 
diike of Wellington. But 1 did not relp, M. Tliiers s e e a  
to ltave done, u~ioii an estimate nbtrrined from a comparis~n of 
conlrdklor?~ clommmis-' rlocuniens co~itmli~%oires'-tbese 
are- lis words. 1 went directly to tlie friuntain-liead; 1 pb 
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hirinion ta tlio Frcncli ' h m a u  & cEsa Q.' 1 worked 
there for many wccka with gcncrnl Pclct, w l ~ o  was then 
enpged in seelíing nnthority fur his really somd and tmly 
excelIcnt history of  the empwor'~ German campaign of 1509 
--a rmrk 1 recommend to M. Tliiers as liaving no false bril- 
liantg, h t  yet of inestimable worth. Well, then, fmm tlie 
emperor Xapoleon'a muster-rolls, m d e  every fifteen dayiys by 
mnrñhd Rrrtliier-not tliose boiinrl in ycllou~, n~ 1 lirtvc hfore 
said, but tliosc liounrl in grccn for Iris peculiar infoimation- 
1 erhctetl most cnrefiilly the numbera of tlie Freach armies 
tbug l io t~ t  he war, and I have pulilislied t h e a  in niy Iiistory. 
Compnring tliem with tlie duke o€ Wellingkon'si field esti- 
mote% snd 14th shkmentei of khe generals commanding c a r p  
founti in JoseplIs portfolios, anti witli tlie off ¡cid jouri~uls of 
opcmtiona, iirirl witli tlic ern~icror's plima of olicrlitio~is, trrnns- 
mitEed to  the lcing, ia wbicli he details the numbers evm to a 
squad of n fcw nicn-for I found a correction even of mch a 
smaU matter in liis omn liana-writing on one of these memoirs; 
-comparing, 1 wy, al1 domiments togetlier, 1 found the accu- 
m y  ol the iriuster-rolls eonfirmed, as iiidecd tliey were mre to 
be, for wliat ptieral h d  to make a falm return of numbers 
to  tlie emperurl 
If, tlien, tbe correspondcnce of Napoleon, of Wetlington, of 
Sonlt, Jourdan, nnd lcing Joscph, be &ckl antlientic Prench 
documents, 1 was in ns gooii a position as 31. Tliiers to arrive 
at accuracy; aiid I repeat my censures upon liis i n a c m c y ,  
leaving tlie world to jurfge, 
X 'i'liiem says his t ime would be ilt employecl if lie devotd 
a parh o f  it to refute tlie nsscrtions of igiiorunt or inkrested 
critics. 1 cntircly q r c c  witli Iiim; it would be miicb Iietter 
tu empIoy it in writirig Iiis own liistory in a mmner to avoid 
the just censures of lionest and well-infarmed critics. 
W. NAF~ER, major-general. 
W I ~  revect tq the tnmnlt of  the 2nd of S f a ~ ,  1808, I drm my 
inform~t ion from officers, aome French, Borne Ilalian, w h ~  were 
present. On tha vanci ty  of my infomants 1 had thB Ermest 
reliance, thoir acwunts qreed nrcll, and tha principal rcts were 
conñrmed by tLe rcsult of  mp personal inquirjes at Madrid in 
tho year 1812. Jlut ainea the fint edition of t l i i a  work tho fol- 
lowing notos from genera1 lIarispe h a ~ e  been sent to me, and 1 
insert thcm in juutiec t o  tllc col~nel of tbe Jmperial G d .  At 
the slime time 1 have to remark that my statement in respect to 
the la&r r a s  made upon the antbority of an d c e r  of Mmt's 
 tan: 
bu Coloncl (Anglnis) Gcorgo Napier. 
' ~ONSTEUX,J'~~ lu avec nn vhitable iutérbt les passqeei de 
I'onvrngc de monsieur rotrc frhic, qiic vous m ariaz $: 
d'examiner. J e  vous remcrcie de cettc commnnication. 
port6 cn mmargc Ics rectiticntiona nEccs~aircs pour rfitablir In 
v&rit6.-inecevez, monsieur, &c. &c. 
' Le Lieut.-G&n&rd, Comte HdX11wx,' 
Chap. II., p q e  15. h c u n  des quartiern de tmupes h z -  
q&wrn h Mdrid n o  fiit nttqnE, mnia 360 h 403 Iiommca cnviron, 
qui se trouvaient h01& on ocmpi.s h d a  diskributions de pain, 
Smnt ~ a n a a i n l . ~ .  
Cha . VI., page 58. Le batailon Guisae ne ffit pac prie su 
ont Pajaso, mnis bien le lcndomnin de i'nttnquc de ioi 
8ahri~aa.* 
page 69. Z'aetaqne de h ville (Valenda) Me fermina h hnnit, 
aana que lea Eapagnoh eussent fait auLpne sortie. 
Tbis error h a  beeu wrrected. 
onSERVATIONS ON SOAfE PASSAGES IN
CIIAl'TERS IT. & IV,
"WTTI spe o u u ft- M~y, rcl'I"
ll rmntioll s, s Jl som LlIli , ho WCi'll
t. e era y fonTI b IlIa he fi u
eco ul{reo \\'el , e Iwill fac16
fi h e lily i ll.
e!lo Bli siuco Uw rst c h s .e l·
ill~ c ~o l l i ~'i'o o I
ll sti o be olonel h I eri l uard.
a I \'o y t
tter wa u h i office ura '&
s ff.
Bayonne, M(l!l22, 1831.
Au l el glo.is) cor~o n c
• :i\{O:r-SIEV!l,-J'!1i uu orita n C C s ages
l'ouvrng-e o siclU y n ~re uo VOIIS v oll prie
o wn In e n n c o u ication. J'l\i
! ll.l' o le J' ctificat s cces llire8 b.n l la
To itc. nece o;\, , e.
• iout.,Gl5nCrlll, .l.RISl'll.'
Marginal Notel by General Il"arispe.
. 11 . aA'0 Aucwl ti a o ro Frat·
l(aiscs J\, J\[!\dn (l l attuquc s 5 a. 0 h s e on,
i BC isol68 OU eu c a cs tributions .
fUl'('n Wlsal;llinC8,
rage 15. Le colonel de la Gnrde LnplSriale ne fitmettre a
mort jlerilOnnc.
p I.. ll~ , taillOIl S s rut s s a
p t de ai o e a l aUa n IOJ
Cab ill s.·
P ll'll 50 L'at n u o la 'f l ci 80 t ~ lo.nui
s s UIl eB ~pagno18 ut ll cu i •
• hi 1lJl.8 n co rect
vl ie  foIlomin~ ñve Notes, dicbted by the emperor Napoloon, and sigied 
by general Uertmnd, wero found io king Jciseph's portfolio, at tha 
hi,ttle af Yitonn.] 
No. 1, 
ORSERVATIOrIS ADDRESSEES AU GGXCRAL SAYART 
SUB LES AFPhlRES D'ESPACNE. 
Tx 13 JuiIht, 1805. 
1" "8WUm'fo%--L~9 ñ,ff.zircs des Franpia en Espnpe seroi~nt 
dam une excellente osition si Ia divisioa Goliert avait marclid 
aur Vnllndolid, ei si diviaiao Yrbre riit ornipd Snn Clernc,nto, 
syant une colonne inobile iL trois ou qnatro jour~ides sur la route 
dii B n h l  lllupont. fi f '  Gobert n p n t  (t6 dirig6 o u r  le g6nProl Dupont. le $1 
W r e  Etnnt nvce le mnr6clinl Jl onccy, liarnos6 ct  nffaibli pnr d c ~  
ma~cliea et dcs conireniarclics. 12 aosiLian de i'armde Fruncaiae 
- 1 
est de~eniie moins brlle. 
2" 0bservatloña.-Le mr6clid BessiEroa cst aniourd'hni B 
Mrdinn del IZio Seceo nvrc 15 mille Iiornm~s, inffintcri'c, cnvnloric, 
arlillerie. I;o 15 au le 16, il aitaquera DGnavcnte, se rnettre, en 
cornmunication avec le Portugra1, jcttern lcs rebellcs en Galice, et 
s'ernpuera do LBon. Si totiies les aperntions réussissentainsi, e t  
$une manicre brillante, la pouitiou (le I*armóe Xri'rrinpi3e rede- 
medra ce qdelle était. 
Si le ghGml Cuesta se retire de Bbnavcnte sana combattse, il 
se retirnit m r  Zarnola, Salaiiimque, our gag-ner Aviln et 
Segona, certain qa'dors lo mis6clinl Ecssi~rcs ne ponrr~it point 
b ponrsuivre, uisque. dms cetlr: supposilioii, il seraiit m e n d  
par I . m E c  de &lice, dont I'aumt garrle oat  rCunie & Ldoa. 
Hors il h i t  que le géncral qui comman¿lc Madrid puiseie 
prornptement r6unir 6 h 7000 Jiommes pntir mnrcher sur le 
geniral Cuesta. 11 Eaiit que la citadelle dc 8Cgovie ~ 0 i k  occupée 
par qnelqnea gihccs do canon, trois t 409 convaleseens apee s i1  
semnines de hsenit, 
Ccst nnc: pnndt-  fnnte de n'moir na oeciip8 cette citadella 
nnand le rn&jor-~6nérni l.& mandé. ttoutcs Ics poritions pos- 
~ililes, Sdpo~ie cst la plns dan.ngerenscpoar I'ambe: capitale d'iine 
provinee, nssise entre Ies dcirxroutcs, elle Btrrait R l'arin8e touka 
scscommunicntions, et l'ennemiime fois posté dans eeik  citadelle, 
I'mméa Franpise ne pourrnit plus 3'en déloger. Trois ou 4,OO 
convm1escena et  un bon chef de Xiatzillon, unc csoounde d'aptillerie, 
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laissE un aeul hamme B St. bnder. Quelqu'avautage qn'il y e8t 
8, laigser 1% un millrer d'liommes, il a aenti clu'un rniilior d'liommelr 
~ 1 1 ~ ; i i e  d6cidt.r sa victoire. 
Qiinnt A In diriñion di1 f 1  Vcrdirr dcrnnt ntnrngos~, dle arrmpri 
aux trais qnnrts son but. Elle a d6sormwis6 bus lea Arragomena, 
a port6 lo d6roiirrte;cmcnt mi cux,  le^ n, r 6 d u i t ~  h defcridrn le8 
maisons de Ecur capitafe. a aoumis taus lea cnvirons, a lilglu& la 
ville, r t  r i i ini  tnua ~ P R  rnoycna Tour u'cn cmpnrcr san8 quu cela 
devicnne trop coutcux. 
Poilb Yesprit de la pmtii d'Espnpe. 
@i&ted by the emperor Napolwin. 3 
No. II. 
. NOTE POUR riE E01 D'ESFAGXR. 
Ba?/mne, JuilleL 180s. 
Tiarni i :~  ZRspnpe a uon quartinr-g&ii6r:i1 B Madrid; vaici RU 
compositim actuellc: 
lo. C-ps &S P p h d e d  Occidentales. 
Le mdclial  Bessii.res comiiinada 10 corps aes Pp6nhei Ocei. 
dentales, qui e ~ t  fert; de 23 millc Iiommcs, infanterie, car~lc~~ir ,  
urtillcrie, occupe la p1we do St. Sbhsticri. lea troy-s Diricaycs, Ies 
rnonkngnes dc St, Andcr, In plnce dc Eur~os, et cst chargee de 
coinba~tre I'armCo cniiemic dcs Aeturics et d c  Galice. 
Toutes Ics troupcs sont en monvemcnt poiir composer l'arm4e 
de Irt. nianiero sui~tmte.  
Divigion 
dri { gt Bhuton 
. . . .  
. . . . .  
Brigada d ' h s p a c  
I3ngade Bnulois 3S00 
. . . .  , Ilrig~cle baliatluei. ZSW 
. . . . . .  gnt iiferlc. 13rigiirle Uueos 
'"1 
Tritnl . 8460 
e t  16 p i b s  de canon. 
A report~r 13,500 h" 
r Ie 4 regL d'infnnterie 1 
lm batnn de Paria en 
marche 
totnl3MH3 h m .  prCsrns sous les armefi, 
et G pibces de cxnon, ci 3000 h" 
(Celte Iirigadc m a r d e  &T B&hmte.) 
2' hí-i a&, \ 18" regt d'infmterie l6fiure 
1oga1&ey. i ~ ~ i i i e m  
total 2100 Iiommee e t  G pibcen de 
canon, ci . . . . . . .  2IOO 
(Celta h i g a &  est $ Du~gm avec te 9'0Z, 
) S100 1iN 
k et rlo;tjoindrc sa diwMi0~6.) J 
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(Zhte~ m fmpes  marcl~nt  mr B b h t e . )  
f 10e de chaasenrri . . . .  450 
38' irt .  . . . . . . .  460 
Gwde . . . . . . .  3uO 
(Ces froupc8 rniarcliit sur 
B& kum> te. 1 I 
! - . . . .  et 02~t  (ILIpafirll I~rfmnliBre.) ZF" de chasseurm #O (dprsPrs~rrnt is l3uyonlee sms paa Jxjours.) - Totnl do la cavnlerie . 1950 h" 
Les fororcea activcs dumaréchl Ucasi&rcs ~ 0 n t  donc 
de 17,000 P. 11 n'm a giihrcs que 15,000 pour 
l'afFuire de Udri6vente. 
B'ilobtcnait B UL'tiEvcnte ot h Efon un p n d  siiecks 
ooiitro l'arin6o do Gdice, pcut-0ire serait-il COU- 
~ennblc pour pmfiter de In ~ictoirc et dc Iri, tcrrciir 
des premiera inomcnz de se jetter daiis la Galice. 
Tontcfois, 11 devnit cl'abord prenclre position b Lbon, 
eu s'ernparant do In lilt~iriu, jcthiit I'eilneuirii dnns Lce 
montapcs, et intcrccptnnt au moins b datorp*l In 
communicati~n do la, gruiiile routa. 
G a m h  de 13~~go#.-D y a dam le chkteaa de 
B u r p  m gxrui~on de ddp6L" . . . . . .  60a he' 
Cololzne da ginhal  Bonaeti.-U y a enwrc Burgoa 
Ic gni do divirriori Bu111ict, ffiti~unt parlie du mrps 
du m"' Dessicres: ce gU1 T& avoir 90U8 acs odrea 
une colurin~ mohiFo do 1200 Iionuiieti, pour m ~ i n -  
tenir h trnnqulllit4 dan. la ville ct  sca environs. 
Ciilte coloririe etil ~oiri~ios6e coiiiniu il suit: 
dqbatnillon di1 lha fomiant . . . . .  450 liCs 1
(dduelleamt e&lwzt ri Jlwqos. )  
3' ba tdon  du dUpdt bJI1 aetuei lmnt b 
Titoria 4.50 1500 he' . . . . . . . . . . .  
2 comp.'" dn 4@ d'infmterje 1Egbre, fomant 
un putit batadiun . . . . . . . .  400 
(E?a w~~rehe,  uyant p m d  la fromiihe.) - 
13x1 IF 
Eseadron de dragons (en marche) . . .  2UfI 
2 pi;ecs dc omou en marche - 
1500 he', - 
. . .  A reporter 19,450 ha' 
n'ote.-Thesetwo wrd4 are added in Napoleon's own handwriting. 
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I)e l'autre pnrt . . 19,460 p 
ColmPne 6Aradn.-Crtte colonnc, forrnfe d t ~  Iw 
bnhillon de marche, fort de 1000 Ii"" e t  de 4 
pibccs de canon, cnt sc rEunir an beeoin avec la 
mlrnne do f 1  &nnet: dies dairent Bssurar la 
cornmunimtion jusqn'nnx mont npca cn avmt 
d'dranda, ci . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000 h.' 
Ciilanne de Etmi.-h gfnflrnl de bri~odc Monthion, 
e l  le colonel Bt~rerre, occupent Viloiia BTOC uno 
mlonne composdc comme il auit: 
2 compagnics du 15" do li~mo. fomant un pctit 
bntñillon de . . .  M0 hog 
Le 2. b5t'''l du L+ d;ia&erk 1igE're . . Ti00 
Ec B' bnt"" du 2" irl. . . . . . . . .  g(i0 
(Ce qui fnit  cn infiinterie) . . . .  1 5 ~ 1  ha" 
1 estadron de dragonu (en marchef . . .  200 
i bcea de cmon. - 
ees corps sont en marche) 1700 ci 1700 ha 
C a W n  de S€. &baatim.-Le gCn6ral Thouvenot 
commande+h St. Edbastien avec mills hommcs de 
gnrnrson, ci . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10Ó0 he' 
R4cqitulatim.-Le corpfi du m' BessiPree est de 23,150 hm 
El 3 U  pihces de canon. -
h d6tRchcmcn~ ct  troiaibmcs bataillons drs norps qni sont 
aux divisiona actives dn m'] Beesih-s poumont: s o u ~  18 joma le 
rrjoindre, vli qu'ila scront rcmplw4u ii Vitorin cl: 1i Bur~oa par 
d'autres corps. 
2". siwagon. 
Jusqii'h eette heure les b u p e a  qui sont en hrrqon fnisnient 
LIU carpa des PyrénGes Qceidonuiles. Hais le corps dca 
' y f i n f c s  Ocridentnlee se portnnt sirr In, Galiev, il dcvicnt idir+- 
penrable d'cn hirc une division L part. 
Aujourd'hiii, PC comrnnnrlrmcnt rmmpr~ncl Pampcluns, la N* 
vnrre, et les trou ea qui forment le sGge de Saragwsse, sous 108 
ordm dn gdn~maf Y rrdiar. 
Ces troi~pes sont rlivisEcs en qnatre higades, et sont cornposhb 
ainsi a'il snit: 
3 $ h e n a  cl'infnntsrie de l i p o  de la Visde, aymt 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  sotia Ics nmcs 360J he' 
. . . . .  &S deIiF, GCet Y batail10m de marche lf~ii0 
. . . . . .  Lb 3' bntnillon dii 1.1: nroviñoiro 13M 
Le l" rcpjmont suppt&hentairc . .  1 . . . .  
Lcs 4Y, 15' et 70e . . . .  . . . .  Ifm 
Gn 'aataillon des gar&s nationales d'diiite . . .  
L 
Total . . 9500 be' 
Dc l'istitrc pnrt. . .  9500 1i" 
Le cavilei-ie consiste dans un rEgiment ds 
lanciers Polonoia . . . . . . . .  1, Plus un escadron de maiche . . . . .  dm 
A P a m p I ~ ~ w e  le gal Dngoiit mmm11nde. Ind6peii- 
damrnwt d'un dEpUt de 800 hommes, formant (ej. 800 
la arnison de la citadrllc; il n une mlonne 
moFiie oomposfe t311 Y' hntaillon de marclie do 
Portqal, du tlloisibme bataillon dii 1189 fort ds 
650 humnies, eC d'un escadron de drngons, w qui 
forme un total de 1dOQ hommea &~ponibIee pour 
se yortcr sur tous Ics p o h l a  dela Srnvam, st sur 
les communicationa de Snragosse, pour y m e t h  
i'ordro: ci . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14GO 
Artillerie . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  200 
Ii y a donc enccrnement en AmaCi- ct en lTnvmre 13,ODO hc' 
-
Aussitbt que Samgosse sera pris, et que le corpu de l'drryon 
sera mnstitti6, iZ sera niccesaire de faire entra- nn corps du mar1 
Bessii-rea Es bataiilon clu 19', ceIui du 15', et les trois bat aillons (le 
18" provisaire; ce c~ui angrncntcra Tc m'' Ressibea do deux mille 
liommm, aiin de triiir I r s  cope rcnuis. 11 esat poasil~lile qu'on 
f ~ a e  partir de Bayonne Ica lti,;300 hommes de bonncs traupcs do 
livne, pour se cliriger sur Snrapisst:  e t  cnlever la prke de cettw 
~i iutefois elIe n'eat pas encore prise. 
Si Sam~osse  6hiL pris, lc corps du m"' Bessibres pmra i t  &re 
renforc6 de ces trois inille L m e s  rl'élik et de 2W h m e e ;  clu 
curpa do Sarugoasc, m qui lui fcrait un mrps norribrcux pour h 
campqne de Gnlice. 
1nili.pendnmmrnt de Snragossc, ~ C B  rcbcllea crccupent lo ~ i l l e  
de Jaca et plusicim ponta dans IesvaUEes. iI tous lea débouchbs 
dcs vall8en cn Frnncc il y n un gEnErnl de brigdc avcc iinc 
oolonne mobib. Ou atknrlra la prise de Sarqosse OUT entrer 
dnna raa ~ n l l E o a  ct g rnnralior dnns lcr dour scnn. $o gbn41bnl 
I'esprit des val1Ees est bon; mais des troíipes de contrebandiers 
QnC Irs cliefa rleu rebdles ont enrcgimsnlEs les rexent. 
5". GrmlaZo,gm. 
Le ~Enhrnl Duliemo occupr Bnrrrlonc, qni c ~ t  une plnca lui rb 
deux trss bellcs fortmeascs, qui Irt domincnt. C'est la plus 
gr~nde ville dc la monumlliic. 
L g h é d  Duhesmc a dem divisions, la divinion Chabran et 
h divi~ion TAcelii, formant 11,000 1i" d'inhntcrlc, 1600 he' de 
ca~dmir et 18 piPccs de canon. 
Lt, gdn6rul Diihcsmr: n cn pliisiciirs EvEncmcna; il a brRllS un 
pmd nombre de villages, et  mziutcnn en respect le paya & 15 
licues it In. mndc. 
Líi viiie de Ggronne, n'a nt as 6th ocnipée, les inmg15s de 
l n  Cotnlopc ont Etnblis hcur junto, rl'oii ila donncnt lo monue- 
ment au reste de la prorince. 9000 insurgCs aasibgeaient le fort 
de P'i&as. On y avait heurctisrmcnt 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ 6  500 E'rruipis: ils 
a c 2  
ont E t E  obli~bs de t h r  beaump de coups da canon et de Iinllcr 
le villnge. 
Lc $1 de dipision Roille, avcc dlrux I-iatdlona Soscans, a 
marchc sur Figuima, I*a dEbloquE, le 6 du mois, et  y a fuit 
rntrer unc grande quantit6 de +res, ílont on mmquait. Lo 1U, 
ii reunissait sa dirision, qiii arrivait de divera pointa de la Frrsnce; 
il nvnit dfijh BOOO Irommcs, u l  il doil i~iroir u~ijoiid'liui 9MHi 1i"; 
il doit ~'aasurer de Rosas et  mnrchcr sur c6rom~.  Et,ablir ses 
eomrnn&exi,ions nvce Ic g6n6rrtl nirlic~rno ct cnseinlile pwicificr la 
Cataloenc. 
Lrn fiirnrn rfnnica drn ~fní?r!rnirx Duhc~mo ot 
lk i l lo  s'4li.vent done 22,CHSU P. 
Ainfii Ic corps des $rindes Occitlcntnlcs est 
fortde. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23,000 
C~ylui d'+krr~on, dn . . . . . . . . . .  1 3,M 
Celui de Catalogue, de . . . . . . . . .  22,000 
Total . 58,000 hC' 
-
NOUS venons de faire connattre la, sititation dc I'nrmtCe dana 
~ C R  prnvinces do In Biacayyr, dr St. Andrr. dc In CmtiHr, dc IA 
NILV~TC, de l'Arrngon, e t  de ln Catniogric; c'ast dire, sur touta 
la rronti6re de Frnrice. 
'lioici actuellcmcnt la aih~aticin dan9 lrti niitrcs points: 
Lcs dciix corps rlui su eont rciidita IL 3ratlriJ. sous lea orarea du 
génkal  Du out e t  du m'' Jfoncey portaicnt, et portcnt enoore; 
le premior, fe uom do co s d.ohservaliiin de la Gironde cnm- T rnand6 par Eo gnL Dnpont; c ~ccont?, 10 nom dr corprc ílbbserva- 
tioii dcb: CGth  do i'OcI:an, cornrnaniidé par Io m"' JZonce~. 
Le* roi-ps d ' o h ~ m a t i m  de b Girono% cst coin 07.d do trois 
divisions: d m ~  sont cu hdaloiisie nveo lc p006rJ bu ont; la 
Ymn, calle dii gfnirnl  Firke, doit Ctrc i present, R Pm ctrnontc. 
LY c o i p  d'olise~~~alion de8 CdI& (le I'Ochm est composc' Egale- 
ment rlc t r n i ~  rlicisions. TA prcmiaro cut nvrc Ic mni$clid RIon- 
cap, sous Tnlence: lcs deux iir1t.r~~ ñont Madrid, c t  disséminC~ 
cn diíKrcntcs colonncs, ponr rnsintrnir In cammiinimtion nvcc lo 
gEnErnl Dupont. L e a  &tata dc situntion vons feront conndtre la 
fiirco dc ces diriaions: m i s  on pcut rn g(.nFrnl Ics mntiidfirrr Ics 
unes dans lea antree comme Yodes de GOOO bommea prCsens sons 
lcs nrmrs. 
Ii g a it -Wadrid d m  bntaillons de Ia garde, f o m t  1000 
hornmos, cL :~-prbii-prbt: 9-N Iioinmra do cavalcric tlo In, garde. 
hmsi il a. & Jftztlrirl, ct du cfitC de Falence et rIc I'AiadalouBie, 
In, volcm 10 40,000 Iiomrncs d'inf~ntcrir ,  huit millc hornmts do 
cavalerie e t SO picces de canon at celf ea. 
Lo ghdml Junol a cn Prirtng:~l fniia divisionu, fomnnt prk- 
sens SOUS lea m e s ,  compris B O ~  artllIeBe, sa cn~alerie, 33 di le  
Irrlmmes.+ 
* Arofe &y t7ae A at7tor.-Tfiis calculation was maüe uadcr thesupposition 
that general Ami1 liad jmned Dupont. 
Tde crit ln aihuttion de I'nrmEe en Espapcl et en Portugal. 
le" 0Fsmation.-Les 6r6ticrnen~ qui -c pilseent aujourd'lrui ct 
demain am4lioreront bcaueoup lu situation de ~ O U ~ I  les affniree, 
cn jcttanl h i a  la Galicu le gBiiEr111 Cuet;tii, cn Iiií Vlunt sur cam- 
mnnications avee l'J3atrcmndure, Madrid et l'hdnlomie. en 
asaurniit notro commiinicatiun iivec le Porlupl, el e11 assurmi la 
soumission des provinees de Salamanquc, %mora, Toro, F. 
Ln mnnihre doitt ccs Evl:ncmciis aurunl lieii rl6cidsronl :L entrer 
mr le cliamp en Galiee, b soumettre les Bsturics, ou Q d'i6rcr 
ancore qiielqucs jours. 
2" Ob,~eruait~~~.-La Narnrre ct le Bisca~e se sont maintenues 
frontpilles. 
DA hrragon le plat p a p  a 6th soumis, les rebelle~ ont ét6 
hattiis plneicurs POIR; nvce ~ L W X  seuls hntaillons, 8 ?I 10 mille 
insiwg8s out Até d&huits ou disperfiés; le d6couragemont est au 
dernicr point pnrmi eitx. 11s sc sont d6fcndii~ r2rins leiirri milisons 
ii Saragosse; on  ICE^ a liombardli; on leur a h i t  beaucoup {le mnl; 
on aclibve nujourd'lli~i de bloqucr la viIlc cn j e thn t  un pont mr 
1'Kbre. Une fois cctk villc soumise, il 11 a pas rle douis que 
toui Yhrrqon no dr~ienoe hanquilh. &o partic des troupes 
sprn ~ e p s n d m t  nGcessaire pour rnainlooir l i ~  rrovlt ice; niio peLih 
partie pourra aider i la ñoumission de la Catalologne. La partie 
q~ii est n b c c s s ~ u  your le bien dri scrvice du rniti.6clial Iiesxii~rru 
ira le rejoindre. &si mt 6vBnement dquirauclru 2 un s e m s  
consid6nilil~. 
3"" 06servaiiws.-La premiere opdration rTn g6n8rnl XteiUe it 
dJbloqii6 .I+'igiifrms: iI soiimct i~ prrñcnt t o u ~  Icy cnvirons. T I  no 
hrdera pas sans doute ir s'ernpnrcr de Gbronne et k dtablir sa, 
communicdion par krrc avcc Ic gdndrnl lhlhrhcamc. La ddiictiou 
dc S+t:ronne enhumera pmla~lcrnsnt ccllo dc Lcrida; on potim 
woir alor~ une colonnc d c  rlcux ou trois milIe hommes, qu'on 
diripera par Torloso sus Valciico. 
4'" 0bssrt~atwa.-On n'a point de nouvclles de I'expEdition 
do Vnlrncc, ct Ir: mnri:r:lial Moncr a h i t  millo Ilommca. Aveo 
ces Earces il n+n ricn i crnindro. fl ne peut pm prendre 1s nile, 
qui euL trhs ~ ~ a n d c ,  si Ics Iiiysans s'y sent rcnfcmf s c t  nc maip 
nent point de la miner: mnis le m"' IkIonceg se rnaintiendra dans 
Ir lat p n p ,  ocnipcrn Ics rLvoltds, qu'jl cmpbcl~c~zt da so portcr dtu~. et fcrn porter un pays tout le poida de la grieme. 
5' OhsmnfLw. - 0 n  rompte qita Ir: g4nllml I l i r p t  a 
aujourd'hui prbs de 20,000 Iiomrncs. Si lea op6rations du 
rnndclial Rcssibrcs r61iseissent bicn, il n'y nurn pm cl'jncon- 
tenient 2 appuyer encore Ic cCn6cal Dupont et ?t lui germcttre 
dc rcprcndrc I'offcnsirc. Ainsi les dcux point~ impartans, et 
oi on fers, une v6ritxlle guerre r6gl&e, sonh i Galice et l'h& 
Iousie, parccqne lea Iroupes du camp dc St. Uoclie, de Cndiz, des 
Algames, sont prbs de 25 mille hommcs, qu'elles onl pritr parli 
poiir la, s8dition de SevilIe en Andalousie, et yue tout ce qui 
(bit it Podo a ric pmti pour los rehllcs do Galice. 
h point le ?LIS importrnt dc tous ost celui du mml Bemiha,  
wmmc an Ih $!jkm dana la nole qdou a envgv6. On doit tout 
f*ire ponr qw ce oorps n'kpmu~e aucnn monvement rQtrogrude, 
aumn dchee; eelni du g8nbrnl Dupont vient apxks. 
Lea affaires de Saragosae sont au 3" odre; cenes de Palenae 
ne ~ont u'na Pe. 
~ o i l h  l a  uéritrlla sitoatian des &nires militaires du rayame. 
11 parnit convenable de former rlñns l'Arrngon une division de 
10 12 mille liommes que pom-a commmder le gaTerdier. 11 
devrn mrresponrlre dir~ctement avee l'dtnt majar du roi, nvec le 
m"' Dessieres ( our s'eritendre), aveo 10 g1 Duliesme pour sc con- 
terter, et aveoye gfnfrd dc ln  1Y Jiuiaion militnire, qui ac tien- 
dra k Bayouno, afin do wnnaitre ~ U ~ O I E T B  la sitmtion de cette 
fiontigre. Son mmmandcment doit embrnsser la Kavnme ot tout 
'Arqon. 
Alom l'mh ~ m m  compoaEc da corps des PpénEcs Oecidmi- 
t a h ,  de la division de l'brrngon (il est inntile d'cn faire un corps), 
d n  ooi-pa dc In Cntnlognc c o m p E  do t,r:rois dicilriona, y compis 
celle du g6nera.l Reillc, et des divisions ue forment la  corps 
d'ohscrvntion de la Gimnde et rlca CAtCs rlc?'~cPm. 
Cela fera i-pcu-pribs 18 d i ~ i o n s  rhnies, et en outreun certain 
nombro do petites colonncs mobilcs rt du garoisons. 
pictated by the empemr Nayolm.] 
Yo. 111. 
NOTE SUR LA POSITION ACTUELLE DE L'A'RM~F, 
EN ESPAGKF,. 
Bapwe ,  21. JwiZlef, 1188. 
Ic" 0Zservuf~m.-Ln batxille de Medina del Rio Seco a mi8 
i e ~  uffnirca dc I'ambo dan9 ln rnrilli~urt: sitmiion, Jfi mdclral  
Detisibrea ne donno pIua aumme inquiétnde, et toutes Iea sollici- 
tuiirct dorvent se tourner da ciit6 du g6núr:~l Dupont. 
2"" Ob~-sereiatloa.-Dans la osition utuclle des aflakes, l'armée 
Frnnpiae oocupo le centre; finnomi, un gmnd nombre de poiuís 
de la circonfdrence. 
3"'" 06~emaliun.-Dana nno guerre de cetta nahre, il faut du 
sang fsoid, dc In pntience, et dn cnlcul, ct il ne faut pas Epniser 
ICS troupes en j'ausses marches el contrcmamlws; il ne faut pas 
croire, quand on a fajt une f~lusse marche de troia 2 [iuatre jours, 
 cm 1 Yt ib6pnr6e ar une contremarche: c'est ordinairemeut 
eux ft~t~tes tlii lieu &e, 
4"" Obsmatim.-lloutea les opérations de l'arm80 ont rénssiea 
"usqu'h &te lieiire, aiitant qu'ellca de~aient rEusair. Le general 
bupont s'est maintenn au-dclk des montasnos, ek dsna le bwain 
de í'hndnloiiriic; troia fois j1 n dfthit I r a  insagia. 1s marbchd 
Moncey a dCfit Iea inswg6s B Yalence; il n'a, p~ pu prendre IP 
ville, ce qui cat me chose qui n'est paa extrsordinam. P m b h  
e&t-on pu dhsirer qu'il efit pu se camper $une journce de la ville, 
c o m a  a fait le gdn6rnl Diipont; maia. snfin, qii'il soit ib une 
journl~ QU ?I cinq, ramrne h Saint Clhente, Ia diférence n'est pas 
trPs p n d e .  En Arragon, on n. batku sur t m s  lcn points, ct. clnn~ 
. toutea les cireonstmces, l'enncmi, ct port..tk le découragement par- 
tout. Saragosse n'a pm 6t6 pris; il cst riujoard'hul cernA; e t  
une ville de 40 i 60 mille hmes, dEPendne nr un monvement 
npidnira, nc Rr prmd qu'avcc do tcmpa et f e  la piticnee. l e s  
fi.toires den guerrel sont pioines des eatastmyliei dca plus eon- 
sid4rnhIes poiir woir brusquC d #'dire snfouri.6 Juns lcs russ 
(troites des villes. L'exempia dc Buenos Ayres, et des 22 m e s  
Aiigiititi d'flitc qiii y ont pbri, cn cut tino prt:iire. 
5'"' Observutaoe.-Ainsi 1n position de l'arrnie eñt bonne, lcm* 
réclial Monpay Ftunt h Snint Clfmrntc, ou cnviron, et lcs g6n6.ra1~ 
Gobert e t  Tedel r4iuiis au general Du ont en Anclnlousie; ce 
srr~it  une fnnta, ii rnoins dinoidrns et $un crnploi irnrnddidc h 
donner h ces troupes dan8 unantre point, que do concentrer toutes 
lea troiipcs trop prCs de Madrid. Lineertitude: dea CvBncmens 
dumwEchal Ues~iares, et les 25 cfiances qu'il nvoit cnntrc lui 
sur cent, pouvaient ddterminer ib faire am6ter la marche de teutes 
les tmpes  qui 8't:loignaient de la cxpihde, afin que lea colonnes 
pusaent;tre rnppelldes hMadridsi le marecha1 De~sikree8tait battu, 
et pu~sent arrirer dnns ccttr? ville avnr:i, I'arinemi; mnis ce neribit 
une faute si on etf:  fait retropder cea mlonnes, et  s i  on eQt 
comme si Ie marlich:hnl Rcasi&rca a ~ a i t  Iid iinttn, Iorsquo quclqiire 
jom awt ;  on agissait comme a i  l ' nm8o de Galice n'exitrtait pas. 
SOCl clievnnx et 1800 hommcs d'infnntcric dirigia sur Vnllndolid 
6taient tow ceqn'il fnIIait. Si cette colonne Ct;tit partie trois joura 
pintcit, dle y serait nrriv6 10 16. Lc mnri.clid Beameres a 6tB 
rainquenr, et avnit pour Gire vainquvnr 75 cliancea wntre 25: 
maia la fatigue qn'on a donnE k l'arm&e, et  les mouvemens r f t n  
pndes qu'on a orrlonn6 inutilcmmt, puisque mUme le mar6cld 
Bessieres battu, an avait S B 10 'onra pour r6unir l'rum8e. ont 
hit un rnnl moral at phyaiqoe. U {aunul csyirer que la nouuello de 
Ia victoire a r r i ~ b e  b hrn s aura mis l'état mnjor t m&me $&ter 
toiit mauvemeot aor hfdrid. ct  qniic r l ~ n p o  colonno ac tronvora 
plus~6r i  du point oh clle doit se tmurer. 
6 0h~eriration.-Dms la situntion aetuelIe des affaires, le plus 
importnnt de toiiei est le &-n&ral D u p t .  On doiklui envoyer le 
reste! de la dicision Gobrrt, ct  cmplqw d'autre~ troupes p a r  
miiintenir la communication; il faut tenir k Gto de ln divisioii du 
mai+ehal Moncey sur Snint CICrnentc, et menacer ;Goujoirra la 
prokce de Valcncc. si le mwúcllul Bessihrea a Iiiittu ~xtis  cKort 
e t  awc peu de perte, l'armdc de Galicc, ct a cu m&ns de hnit 
milles h o m e s  engagds, il n'y n pns dn dotitc qii'nvrc 20 rnillcs Iri 
~bnéral Dupont ne culbute toa* ce gn'il i devant lui. 
7"" 0bsmal'im.-Lii brigíuic du grSnfirnl l le rend i ' m C e  
plua qn'elie npa erdu ar le d¿tacliernont qui a & fnit sur Yaya- 
Uid. Toutoa l a  rcfnbilitfi Iiumnines sont que le marOchal 
~ E S ~ & E S  pina %esoin d.uu~un renlort, du inains pour 6ire 
mnitre de toute la Castille et du myaume de LBon. Ce n'est que 
lursqu'oi~ aura rep  la nouvallc di: ce qu'ii aura fait h B6nbvoute 
et i LCon qu'on powra dCcidcr a'il doit aetaquer la Gdice 

jom entr'em et nvec lo gdnfiral Droitct, qiii e ~ t  I&s6 en r6~sme 
n Ba oane, de mSme ue lo g6n4 Prrdier do Swagossr: et le 
g L 1  %agmilt da ~ o m ~ o f i i n c  doivent eorrc~pond~e tous les jours 
RVCC le genhrnl T)roricl~~I3i~yontie, ct  avcc >Tuirid, liar le cmid de 
Brayonne et de Titoria; jusqu'k ce quc lrs cornniunications di- 
rcctcs ~oirnt ~6tnlilirs. irn r:nrii.icr partnnt de Aft~ilricl peul si: rrndre 
pr 'Gltorin, Tolosa, Pnm elunc, devnnt Sar.yosse. Ec peul point 
~mpor tnn t  done ~ljo~irri '  Y iui cst Ic ~&nlcrnl I hiponi. Si l'cnnrmi 
ym,enail jamais s'cmp,arer des difiles de la Sierra Morcnn, il 
seraitdificrle de l'cn climser; il fmt done rcnforccr Ir gfiil nirpnnt, 
dc manilro qu'il sil 25 millo hommes, oompris cp qu'il faudra poiir 
arder lea pacsiye.s des montqrnrs, ct lino pnrtic dii chcmin dc & hl*n~Ur. Il p o m a  rliaposar les troupcs de rnanihre quo Is 
jow oi i  il voudra ntlaqucx, la brifinde de dciir ii irois millc Iionimes, 
de~tin6e b gwdor lcs monhgtics, arrivc au canp du gen1 Dii ont A P marclies forcécs, c t  soit su~~~~sivem~ntrcrnpIuc& par lea co oniies 
yti ~crnient rn mii:rc, dii R D ~ ~ O  que 111 g(:rl1 nllpont ait porir lo 
j01r de la bahille plus de 23 mille homnira ?L mettrc en l i p e .  
Une fois qu'on oiira Ziien h u t t i ~  I"rniicmi, unc pnrt,io ~ C R  tmupc~ 
se disaipaa, e t  d o n  que la victoire sera plus ou moins dl'cidCc, on 
poiu~u Fairt! rmntinucr lo moiivcmcnt h d'nutrcs hoiipcs aur Ic 
ghn&ral Dnpont. 
1-2*"" 0Iifieriiation.-Snrngosm pis,  on nurn des troupcs dispo- 
nible, soil   pon^ renforcer I'aimBe do Catalogue, ~ o i t  pow marclier 
sur Vdenrc dc conccrt svcc Ic madchnl Monccy, soit pour 
renforccr lc mnréclinl 3assiErea o t  rnarchcr crt GJice, si aprihs la 
viotoirc qn'il n d4;~ rcmpo~t6, ct ccIlc n'il rernport,era i Lbon, il 
no n w i t  pw z r ~ c x  iort ou i  s i  porhr Q7alior<l. 
13"' ~bsen.ation.-P~ i e ra~t  importm~iit de clioisir deiir oint. 
bhrn6diair.e~ entm Andi~jar e1 Nuirid, poim pomoir g Eissibr 
gamison permanente, un commaridunt, un di5 8t de cnrtouclies, 
niunitions. onnons, rnngmins do biacuit, di.8 fuius, du h ~ i n c ,  et  
un IiBpital, dc sorte qlic clc 3 B 400 Iiommes dCfcndenb le inagmin 
ct l'liiipitnl contrr toirtc tino inñirrrcction. T I  cst  [IitTi~ilc TIC I'M~M 
qn71 n'y ait point" quclque chlteau ou donjon, ponrant Cixc re- 
tmclib gromptrmcnt rt pF0pn: ii mln. C'cst pnr cc ~ c n l  rnoyen 
qa'm cut ruccourcir In ligne #op&ration, et  dtre siir d'avoir 
. tnutra Pea tinia ou qiintrc grande. mnrches, une rnnoutonlion ot 
irn point de repoa. 
IC'"' 0hsm)atin.-En rCanm6, lo pnrtngc dc l'tlm6e parait 
rletoir Etre mlui-ci: 
Corps do Cittnlognc, tcl qn'il existe bpen-prhs , . 20,000 y* 
Cwps ~E'hrrngon, te1 qii'il existe k-pou-pro@, 15 
miilc homrncs, jils i i  n rc que Snragrisue soit prit 15,000 
Cmps dii marbeUd %,daes, ce qu'ii a 
Fi-peii-prbs . . . . . 17,000 
Colonne de B u r p  . . . . 2,131fl 
CoIonne da Vítorin . , . 2,m 
Garni~on de St. 86bastien . . . 1.500 
Corps d'llrandn . . . 1,000 
Total du wrps du mar1 Bcasibrce m 24,000 L" 
446 APPERDIX. 
AprEs Itb prine de Samgosse, Iomqne les affnirem de Getnlogne 
seront un peu appais4es, on ponrra, seIon les circonstancea, on 
renfarccr 11, rnnr4clid T3cssii.rra. ou roiifcirccr le gtn6rnl Di~pont, 
m cntrcprendrc I'opération de Valence. 
Ai~jourd'liui, lo sed pnint qui mrnítco, oi i  il fnut pmmptemrnt 
avoir un succba, c'est du c&t& da ginérnl Dupont. avec 25 mille 
bommm, infnnteric, cnv5lcrie,, ct nrtilteric comprisr:: il n, lienu- 
cwp plus qii*ilne fant pour avorr de p a d s  rhsiiltats; k In rimar, 
avec 21 millo hornmcñ pr6scnñ sur Ir clinm dc: l)ntnillo, il pcut 
hsrdiment prendre I.offeosire, ii nc scra prs $tu, ct il avrapour 
lui plus de 80 chanceti. 
No. R. 
NOTE 8FR LES AFFiURFS D'XSPhUKL. 
Sd. Cloud, cc 30 Adt,  1808. 
lcm Ofimatios.-Dans la osition de lkrmPe $Es ame on a 
b nrnindre d'dtre attaqu6 sor E (Imito ai i'armbe de Ealice, sur 
le centre pm I.nrrn&e ~ * e n ~ n t  do ~ a d r i z  aur la grucLe pm l.nrmde 
vennnt de S m ~ o s ~ e  e l  Talence. Gc scrait uiie grande f d e  que 
de laismer l ' m d e  de Saragoasc et  de Valenco prentlre position R 
Tudcla. 
Tudek doit &tra ocmp4, pilrceqtte c'est nnc position honorilbln, 
et &T~lagco me position obscnre. 
Tudela cflt itur  le^ communicationa de knprhine,  a nn beax rt en pieme, et pst L'aboutiasant d'm c a i d  sru Sarqosse. 
'est une poaition offcnsivc snr Sn~mp3e tel!e uc l'ennemi ne I peut pss la n8gligor; cct te position scule cuiino a Nilvarre. En 
g n d n n t  l'tidcln, on ga~cle unc grande: qiinntitb de bakaux, qui 
non1 seront bient6t nnEccasaires our le aibge de Siiwosse. 
81 l ' m o m i  &hit rnaitrc dc &irlrln, touto In Navnrrc a'inmr- 
g!r~it, I'ennemi pourrait miver h Estelle, en n<gli~e-enilt n posi- 
tion dr: M i l q o  c t  cn cou nnt lacommi~nientioni~vcc Parnpcliiiie. 
D*Eseila i: serait sur diosa;  ii y wrait dmmr le t e m p  
dc fnirc lrs dispoaitiona roncenaldcs; iP n'est pns b crnindrt, an 
contraire, que l'ennemi faese aucuiic opération sur Pampelune; 
tmt que nous aurons Sndeln. il. ticrail: lui-m8nu mup6 fiur Sitrn- 
gosse. 
Le Enfirnl qui commnnde i~ Tudela, pent m a i r  1 1 3  hnntcura 
do reckutea; a i  orest une armée d.inror~6i. don spproclier et l a  
Xiattrc, L tonir carista~rim~nl eur la dErc119iv~ pm le9 ~conntl l~-  
sances et ses rnouremoua sur Snqosse.  
Elt si, au lien do cela, nne partie de l'armifi dn ligno Espagnole 
marcliait sur Tudela, le gsnéral Franqais rcpassera 1'Ebre s'il p 
esl forcC. dispukra la terrein sur Pmpelane,  et donnerrt le kmps 
an gCn6ral en chef de i'armic Frmcaise de prcndre sea mesures. 
Ce mrps d'obsemation rcm lira nlors son Iiut, et auc,une opEra- 
tion prompte snr Tololosa ni ksteili n'cst k crsindre. 
bit lieu cp'sn ocoupiint lu, posilion de Milqro, Ycnnemi scrn 
h BtcIla, le m6me jour qu'on l'apprcndn. au quarticr-gEn6rul. 
Si on m ~ p e  Tiirldn, il fmit s'y ai(1r.r rlr. rctloiitrli, ct s'y 6tnlilir, 
n'y mnserier aiienne esphce d'crnbarms, et lea tenir toas dans 
Pam elune. Si I'cnnrini I'occ~ilic, il fuut l'cn r l i ~ s c r ,  et s'g 
éiadr; mr da.. I'ordio ddicnsif. ce smi t  une grande faute, qui 
cntrdnerait dc fhlipuees consiqiicnrcs. 
~h~mutlwa.-La position dc Burgos 6tait 6nr;Liment impor- 
fante tenir, mmmc cillc do liaute n$utation, commo centrc de 
mmmunication et de rapports. 
De IB des partis non ~culemcnf dc cavnlcric, mais cnwrt3 dc 
deuir ou do trois mille komnics d'infaiitcric, eet mema qnntre on 
cinq rnillc hommes en Ccliclon~, peuacnt poster Ics pmmiEres 
ptroudles d'Iii~stiiuds d a i ~  toutes lca dirtlciions jusqti'h ileux 
mnrches, et pnrf:iiterncnt informes de tout ce q~ sc Qit, en 
inslruire la quarlier-@~i.ral, de niinii:rti qilc ~i l'elinemi sc pr6- 
senteen force sur Biirgos, lea dif6rcntcs divisions puiawnt; k tempa 
a'y portor pour le aoulcnir ct  l i i ~ t ~  lla bntaillc, on si celun'cst pat3 
jiig6 convenabic, 6dnirer les mou-íemens de i'ennemi, lui laisser 
cmirc qti'on r c i i t  sc pnrtcr sur Hurgos, o t  pouvoir cncuite ftiirc sz 
retfaitc pour se porter aiIleurs. 
Un c o r p ~  do 12 h 15 millo Iiommes na rend il pas m pwiitions t;, - .  
dan8 1s journée su scu1 commandcrnent un adjudant mBjor? et 
non tronprs sernient-cllcs dcvcnr~cs dea levéee en mnsee, 
faudroit ~lacer  15 iouni d'ayancc dans les uositions 05 
qa'elles :e battenib 
S i  cela eiit dtli i u ~ d  ainai. la coras da mariclial DessiEres efit 
pis la position dc~fiiiranda bu de ~ h v i c s c n ;  mñis lorsqiie I'eniiemi 
est encore h Ndrid,  loisqii'on iaiiora O& est l'wm6ti de Gdice, et 
y'on a le soupoon que Ics rebollci powont employcr une pnrtie 
t e  leun efforts erintrt: Ic Poriiig:il, prendrc, au liou d'utie puui- 
tion menaqante, ofcnaive, honor:ilile, mmme Bur os, une pogition 
bontni~c, hnrgnr cnmmo !l'rcrino, deat ¿tiro b fliinrmi, ' Vous 
Caven rein ii craindre; portcz ~ o u a  illcurfi; nous nvoas fait nos 
diap i t iona poiir nller pliis loin, ou hicn non8 nrons choisi un 
chrrmp de batadle pour nons Iiattic; vcncx ici, vous ne m g n e z  
pnr d'ttre inquiEtfis.' Mniñ qnc fera le gOii6rnl Fmnqnis, si l'on 
marche d e m h  sur Burgos? laisserrirt-il yrendm par GlXlU insurgb 
13 citndellc dc cctte villc, ou si les f ianqaia out IaissCs garnison 
dan3 le cli2tcau (cap on igfiore In paaitirin et  Irt silwtion clc l'ar- 
m;?), conirnent nne garnison de 4 6  ou 800 hommes se retira-t-elle 
daw uno ai m t o  pIKine ? Et d a u  lors o'est r:ommo s'il n'o uroit 
ncn: l'enmmi mnitre de cette citadelle, on ne la rcprcndra 
plus. 
Si, an contraire, on veut gader la citadde, on vent done 
limer Ii~t,~iille it I'cnncmi; car crttc citodcllc nc priif pnn tcnir plus 
de troh jours; et si on veut livrer bahilie k l'eunerni, ponrquoi lo 
mal Be~siErea abnndonne-t-il le terrcin 06 onvent livrcr baliiillr? 
hs dt~liositious pasnissont mal rraisonii&es, et quand l'cnncmi 
innrchcrn on fcrn emuyer k I'armfc iin iiffront qni d~momli~ern 
les ti-oupcs, n'y eit-il que des corps 1Egm ou des i n s q é a  qui 
mnrdinssrnt. 
En ksuiné, 3a position de Rurgos dcvait Vtre gardbe; ton0 les 
jours Z trois lieures du mntin on dcvait btrc aous les nrmea, et 
nnc lieurc du mntin il dcrait p@ir dcs rcwnnaissances $ans toutes 
les d'ictions. On devait ainsi rceueillir des nourclles R h i t  oii 
diir lieucs b la roiidc, pour qii'on püt prcndre eusuite le parti que 
Ics cireonriinnces iiidiqiicraicnt. 
C'etit la. prcmibre fui8 qii'il asrive k une arméedo guitter t o u h  
lcli po~itions off'cnsiven, pour aemottrc dans de mauvnises po~itiona 
dPfensices, d'ai-oir l'air do cfioisir dos cliamps de Sntaille, lomqus 
laCIoipement cle l'enncmi,Ics mille et iinc conibinnieons rlifirenta 
qui peuvent avoir licu, ne laissent poii~t 1.9 ,i ii itG (le prévoir 
si la bltnillo n m  Iicu L Tudela. entm T u ~ u r l a ~ ' ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ e l u n c ~  entw 
Soria el I'Xbre, ori entre Burgos et  Mimuda. 
L~position de Burgos, trnuc cn force ct  rl'ulio rnaniha o~cns~ve, 
menaco Palcnria, T'iilldulid, has idu,  Mdrid  minio, U faut 
aroir longtcmps fait; In ~wcrrc poiw Irs concwoir; ir, fnnt nv& 
entrepriñ iin grana nombre d'op6mtions ofrensiveh: pour mvou 
comnic 10 moindrr LrvGncrncnt ou indice cneourage m démnrnge, 
dbcide une opEration ou une antrp. 
Eii dcux mota, si 15 nliIle iiisurgi5a e n h i i t  dans Bnrp, as 
mtranclicnt &ins la ville, et occupeilt le diitcau, il faui c;iIculer 
une marche dc plit~iiciirs joiirs poui- poiivoir a'y poster et repren- 
&e la ville; ce qui ne ~ c r a  pw san# quclqno inconr6nien~; si 
prnd~nt cr temps-li~ la rEritriblc aattnpe cat sur Lagrcinoou Pnm- 
n une, on aura fait des contrmnarclies iniitiles, qiiiauront fati& P" 
~irrnbc; ct  enfin, ~i I'cnnrmi orrupc .Logroi"io, l'tidrln, ctBiirgos, 
Tambo Prancaise sernit dans unc triste ct manraisc poGtion, 
QnnnrE on ticnt ii Rtirgoa dc In cavnlcric snns infiintcrir, n'cst-oc 
pas di1-e b l'enncrni qu'oil ne veut paa y hn i r ;  n'eat-ce pas l'm. 
p E c r  ii y vrair? B i i r ~ o a  n uno p n r l c  influcncc d n n ~  l o  monde 
ar son nom, dans In. Castillo pmceque c'eii est la ca itaIe, dan3 
E s  oy<;rulious pnroequ+ullu doiinc iinu fiomrnunicdion girooto wec 
St. Ander. Il nii'est as pcrmili B 300 Jieucs, et n 'qan t  as meme 
un (tal de sitiiition L Ihnnhu, ac presorirs iu qiiuoo Qail fare; 
niais on doit dire que si aricune force mnjeure ne I'empGche, 11 
faiit ocauper Biirgos et  Tudeln. 
Le corps d4taclif de Tudcln a gon monvement assur6 sur Pam- 
pelune, n lu rGle do garcler la Ka~arre, a, ses ennernis tenir en 
tkliec, Saragosse et teus les insurpes. Ii 6tait plus que sufrlsant 
pour surveiIler TiErlela, I'Eliire, et Pampelunc, pour dissipcr la 
riissemlilcmciis s'il ti'g nvnit qiie dee bsurg63, oonknir l'cnnemi, 
dorincr (les rpiiseigncmeua, e l  rehrdcr Ia rriarclio siir l'ampeluno. 
Si, au licu dcs ineurgEs, c'cst l'armbe cnncmie qui mnrclie de ce 
r5t.4, jl suOit cncore pour rlouucr le tempa h l'armée de Diirgos, k 
ccllc di: Mirnndn, dc marchcr r6unie nvce 36 millo hommcs, soit 
pour prendrc l'oíícnsive, soi t  pour prcndre en flaue i'onnemi gni 
mnrclie RIIT Pnmpcliine, soit; pour sc rcplicr ct rentrcr dana la 
Na~+arre, si toutc i'arm6c ennemie arait prh cette direction. 
Si ces observations parai~scnt bonncs et qu'on les adopte, que 
I'mnenri n'ait encore rnonti.6 nirciin ~ I R I I ,  i l  lnl~t, q ~ i ~  le g6iiCriil qiii 
eornmandc le corps de Saragosse fasse condniii*c quclqucs rcdoui es 
a u h r  dc Tudda, onr f:ivoritier i;c,a eliumpa de btiluillo, r6unissu 
des vimi de toas !es cbtós, et soit l k  dons unc poaiiion ofbnsiie 
Iiur Sarngosse cn mninknnnt fin comrnnnir~titinn nvcc Tfigrtda par 
aa droite, mais au moins par la rivc g~uchc  de l'Ebre. II faut 
qiiele rnnr6clinl Beasilrcz, nwc torit son cborys, renforc6 dr In 
ca~alerie J4pLIr~, aoit cam d clans le bois pras 1Jrigw, la citil<leJle 
bien o c a  (c; yuc tous ~ C P  l dp i l s~x ,  Ir* dfpilia, loa rml>nnia 
aoient au ~!o;?i de lUEbre; qiiil soit l i  en pofiition do rnnno?uvrcr. 
toua le# jours, b troia hcures dtr mntin, mira I C R  U ~ P A ,  J I I S ~ ~ I ' R F I  
retour de toiitcs lcs rrcotiiinissnnccs, et dclairant le pays dnris la 
plus p n d e  6tcildue; qiie le corps du mal Monccy E O I ~  n Miranda 
et i Brivicscn, tous aes cmbarras ot IiSpitaux dcrriiirt! Vihrin. 
toujoura en batriille a ~ n n t  lc jour, et envoynnt des recomaisaariccs 
~ u r  Soria et les autres diecdons d c  l'onncmi. 
Il ne fnnt piis prdrc dc t.uc quc les corps des mar6cltaux Bes- 
siiires et &loilccy d~vilrit Dtrcrkunitr, il rnut se lierle mohs ossilile 
nrio Lapoiio, et ervndznt eonsidórei lc oorpr du gfnérnl eefcbre 
wmme un corps dFi~iclib. ilui u. urie Iigiic d'o~idruhiiti ~iilrliculii,re 
sur Pampclune et nn riilc ac aré ; vonloir conRcrvcr Tudelacomme 
iine pnriic contipnii: dc In  ?ignc, c'eat ac riiia<'mincr Iionueoup. 
C n h ,  faire la guerre, c'est h dirc, avojr <lea nourelles par les 
C I I ~ ~ ,  lcs filoadra, Ecs ciiefs dc couvent, Ica rinr:ipuux prtipri6Geti, 
les postnn: on sore dors pu~fritomcnt inf!md 
TRR rceon~tn i s~nn~r~  111 t,nira los jours s r  diriccmt du cOt6 de 
Sorin, de Biirws, aur$alrncir, o t  du c6tb c l ' i hd ,  pewent 
formcr toiia Irn jmrs t r o i ~  postm d'intCrpcptmi~n, t m i ~  rapport~ 
d'hommes arr&tés, qu*on traiterabicn, et qii'on relachera qurind ils 
aumnt donnE lcs rcn~cignemcns qii'on ddnirr, On vwrii, nlom 
ve~iir i'ennmi, on poma rúuiiir toutcs scs forces, !ui dCrobcr des 
mnrcherr. rt tombrr anr wu Ilnncs nri momcnt 0% 11 mdditrrn un 
prqiet: off~nsif. 
3'" 0b~mntion.-L'stmdo Rsnnmnla d'Anddousic Ehit neu 
nombreuse. Toutes les Grizettea dngiaises, et les rapportacde 
I'otbeier ir\ngla:s qiii Etnit an cnmp, noira Ic rouvent. L'incon- 
insble ineptio ciu gGn4ral Dupnt, sn p z n d e  iporance des 
cnlr.iils d'nn g6nEral cn chef, son thtunnemcnt, i'ont perdu: 1R 
mille hommes out pos6 Ics armes, six millo seulemcnt se aont 
bntt~iiis, tt oncorc ces 6000 hommes quc le gen1 Dnpont: a filit battrc 
b lapointc tlu jour, R ~ T E S  les ayoir Tait mai-clier touie la n~iit,Etaient 
un contre trois. Mnlgs6 tout cela, I'enacmi s'cst si mal Linttu, 
qn'il n'a paa fait iin pfisonnier, pris una pibcs de canon, pgnB 
un ponw rlc tcrrein, c t  I"armEe de nupont cstrestEe jntactc dans 
Rn position: CP qui sans doiite a 6th uri mdlirilr; cnr 11 (ifii, mir:iix 
~ d u  que cettc diviaion efit Ctd mise en dhoute, 6parpillCe, et 
diiruite, plisque les diiíiaions lTeedel et Dufour, au lirii rle se 
redre par ln capitulation, auraient fa i t  leur retrnite. CommenV 
cos dmñ d~viaiiins orit-cllcs 8th coiiipriscs dnns la capitrilaiioionP 
c'tst par la llcheté imdtuntc et l'irnbhcillitt. des hommea qui 
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ont nigoci6, e t  qui püderont sur 1UcWaud la peine de ce grand 
crinc nntional. 
Ce que l'on vient de dire p m v e  que Iea Espapol~i ne ~ont  pas B 
craindre; teutea lea forces Espsgnoles ne sont pns captpalilca de 
culbuter 25 mille Franpia, dzns uiic position ruisoiinalile. 
Depuia l e  18 jusq~'au 19, lc $ n é d  Dupont n'a fait que dea 
bhises, et malgr6 tout cela, s'd n'avait psa hit. la fmte de se 
s6pwer de Y c d ~ l ,  e i  qn'ii etlt marclib avee luj, Ica Espynols 
aur*riipnt 6tb baltns et cullriut&ñ. A lx erre les hommes ne sont 
rien, c'tst un homme qui ost toiit. % ~ s c ~ u ' i  oette hriirc nons 
n'aions tlvvd cca rxeml!ies qiio drins l'liistoire de nos snnemis: 
aujonrii'hui, 2 est fhclieur que nous puissions les trouiTer &ns h 
nolre. 
Une rivihre, fht-elh nnssilargc que IR Vi~tc110, & U R S ~  m idc ~ C I  
le Dsnulio ir son emliouchure, n'est rien si on n'a des dL%ouc'B& 
siir I'nutre rive, etune tete prompte kreprendre h f f e n ~ i v c .  Qumt 
B lXlil-e, c'eat moins que rien; on ns la regarde qne mmme una 
trnrc. 
Dan8 touha ccs obsemations, on a par16 dani Ia position o& re 
f rouvni t r n m E e  dn 20 nu 26,lorsqu'cIlr: nhrnit niillc pnrt nonrelle 
de I'ennemi. 
Si on continur! h nc prmrlre niimnc mesnw ponr avoir desnou- 
velles, on n'ap andra que l'armbe de l i p e  EspagnoIe est mivée  
sur TucIcle ct, E: nmpclunr, qu'rllr cat siir les cornm~inicationa, sm 
Tolosa, qlre lorsqu'ello y sera dcjh rendiic. Ou a hit conndtra 
dnns la note pdeddenh commrnt cn fnisait k la pmre poiw avoir 
des nouvelles. Si la position de Tudela est occupéepar l'ennemi, 
on D e  voit piis qnc 1'Rhrc ooit trnnblc. Commrnt n-t-on 4wlcu6 
Tudela, loreqn'm avait mandé rlaria des iiotcs rCcldcnt~a qu'd 
Bllnit pnrder cc point, et <I"C Ibpinion mbmr fcs gbn0rau.~ qui 
aenaient de Sam~osse ttait d'occuper cette importante posithn? 
No. V 
NOTE SUR LES AFFiIIRES D'LYPAGKE. 
R. C h d ,  A d t ,  1808. 
1'" 0bsera~a~k-n.-Tudela est impvrtant soum plnsienrs points 
de vne: il it iui pont atir lEhre, et protege parfaikment la 
Nnvme: c'est le point d'intersection du canal qui va h Sara- 
gossc. 
Les convois d'&ilIerie et  da vivrea mettent; pow ae rendre de 
Pampclirnc ii, Tudda troia joum, dr Tiidda B Saragosae trois jom. 
Mais en se ~ervrtnt du cznd, on va de Tudela. Saragosse en 14 
lieiires. LOTR ue done les vinm, les Itbpitanñ, aont h Tndela, 
o'eat comme (h icn t  L Saragossc. 
La premíbre opErution que doit faire i ' m ú a  lorsqu'alb r t ~  
p n d m  son ñystEmo d'oEensif, et u'elle sera forte de tous ses 
rnqens, rs dait Ctre d'inrnrtir rt 40 prendn Snrngoasc; e t  si 
cette ville rbiate comme clle l'a fnit la pmiEre  foia. en donner nn 
egemplc qiii xct~nt i~so dnna totitc I'R9pnpc. 
Una rin rtzine de pitcca de 12 dc c n m p w e ,  uno vin&he 
d'obusiern kc aia ieocs de cnmp;igno, iinc doiixuinu [la rnorlicrs, 
&une douraioe b>o piaoes & 16 et dc 8. pariaitement zpym- 
rision&ea, seronf nEcessuires, ami quc dca rnineiirs pow rcmplir 
ce liul. 
U. n'ed ancun de cm boncliea L feu qni doive wnsominer son 
np rovisionncmen t d e  camprigiie. 
fh appm~sionnemcnt eitriordinaire de So miUa eoapa de 
canon, bombea ou obus, p~rriit nEceuarho pour prendro cette 
viiie. 
U fandmit done. pour no pns rctnrdor IR, rnnrchc dc I t t  p d e  
m&, 15 jours atmt qu'cllc ne pukse arrivei., commcncer le 
trnnsport dc Pnmpclunt: i~ "hidcln, rt que dnna Ics heiirca nprEs 
luirestisriement de Siiragossc, Yartilkrie y arrivkt itw  de^ b"t :ietlu~, 
de mnnibrc nc quntrc jonra nprEs on pdt eomrnencer troiii at- 
tqnes h la tis, et  avoir wttc ville en pcu ddc joilrs. ce qui sernit 
nno partic dro ~nccba, cn y emplogant 25 E, 30 miUe bommes, ou 
plus s'il 6tait n6ccssah-e. 
On snpposc que, si l'ememi a, pris position entre Madrid e t  
Burqs, ii tium &ti. bnltir. 
1 faut done occuuer Tudela. Ce noint est tellement imnortant 
qu'il R P W ~ ~  :L dbsirc; qu'on pfib mnpfoprr un m o i ~  iL lc foriifier et 
i S'T rctrmcher, dc mmibrc quirir miITier d'hommes avec 8 10 
pihccs do canon a'y trouvn~scnt  cii 8firct6 ct h 1'rtbri dc touto~ ICR 
insnmctions possil-iles. II nc faut Fas surtout soufffir TJe Ies 
r6rolGs 5'y retrarie~~isaent; cc scrnit: dciix ~ibgr8 nll jimi d'nn; 
et il seraii irnposaibIe de prendro Sitr~osse nvnrit d'nvoir Tndela, 
i cause du cand. 
Ou irouvera ci- joint des observntions da colonel Lacoate sur 
Twlcla; puia ue Ics locdit4s emp&client de nser B le fortxer, 
il ríit i6t iiitjc do l'ooriiper ru lieu de &%m, qui nhhoulit 
h rien. 
5;'. Soriit n'cet j o  mis qu'ii dcux P P ~ A ~ B  m m h e ~  dcs posiiiona 
sctuelles de i 'mke.  Cette ville s'est eonstamment mal eomporte"e. 
Cnc c ~ k l i t i o n  qiii RC pnr t~rni t  at~r Sorin, IU d h n m ~ r ~ i t ,  en 
prendrazt une trenhine Khommes dee plus consid~mblas, qu'on 
rnrcmit en h n n c o  ~ o u r  btwca, c t  q~i i  cn fin Iui forni t fournir des 
rima 4m I 'nrmde, scrait d'rut bon cffet. 
zme. K n a  troisihrnn q f ~ a t i o n  qui scrait ntiie se& lbeeopntion 
de St. Ander. U aerait bien avxntageux qu'eUe phh ite f&re par 
lamiite dircctci dc Hi lb~o  L S8t. bnder. 
dm. Il fmt s'occuoer de dCsarmer h Riacave wt la E~varre: 
dcst tm point importknt; tout Eapapol pris lea armes X la majn 
doit btre fnsilld. 
Ii fnut veiller sur la fabriqne $armes de Placenma, ns point 
l n i ~ ~ w  tprsyaillcr les ouvricrs pour 1~ rcbelles. 
Le fort do Pancorvo doit &re armC et fort i f ié  rivec La plus grande 
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nctiVih5. Il doit y nvoir dnns cc fort dcs fonrs, d c ~  mngnains de 
bouches et de gucse. Situé presqu'h mi-cliemiii dc Uayonuc i 
Medrid, c'c.st iin pode ititcrm6dinirc pour I'nmCe, ct un point 
d a  pui pour lcs opCrations de la Qallce. 8 y n dnns i'arrnde pliia dr g61ifinmr yilii n'cn fmt: deur 
seraient nécessaires au mips qui h i t  sous Samgosse. Les g6nC- 
raux de division La Grangc,,Bclliard, ct Grnndjcnn sont sans 
emploi, eh tous trois bons génaaus. 
11 fuut rcnvoyer lc plw promptcmcnt: poaeiblc, Ic régimcnt et  
le général Tortugais pour Lloindre leurs corps L Grenoble, a i i  2 
doit sc formcr. - - - 
emv. On De discutera nm ici ai la lime rlc i'Ebre est Iionne. si 
rllc a In configiirntion rGiiiac pour &&c rl6Vcndnr: ravec nrnntnke. 
On discutera cncorc moins si on ebt pu iie pas 6vacuer Mndrid, 
conserver la l i p e  dii Uucn,  ou prcndrc! une positian qiil efit 
couvert la eibgc de Saragosse et cüt pcrmis d'nttendre que cetta 
vdlr fut prjm; toutea ces rlui>stions uunt  oiucuare. 
Nous nws contenterons de dire, piGsqu'on a pris k li ne de 
I'Etirc, que les toiipcs ~ ' y  disstiu~ ct 6" rrposi:nt, qu*cl -7 c n an 
moius l'avnntage que ic pa s cstplus sain, etant plus élevé, e t  qu'on 
pcut ahtcn<lir quo los e&pui~ suient naci.s. 
~i Paut aurraut ne paint quititt.r ectto &ne Lms W O ~ T  m pmjat 
d&ierminG, qui ne laiust: zur:urir: incertitulla d~liis les opireiionu h 
snivre. Ce serait un grancl maiiiew de qnitkr wttc ligne pour 
etrc c?nsuito obligi! do la rcprcnh .  
A la, guerre les  trois quarts sunt des affaire5 morales; la b h a e  
den furcea ke l l e~  n'est que puur un mire qiiart. 
6"'". Xn gardant Ia ligno de l'Ehre il faut qnc le ~ 6 n 6 r d  ait 
bien prevu touia co que l'enncmi pout rair~ dans tous les 
hp otlieses. 
j!,eune, peut se ,,enter &van* ~ n r g o s .  ,m+, de ,mi, et  
rnarclier sur Logroiio, oii, cn pnrtnnt dc Sitrngoaac, se portcr sur 
Estellii, et menaner ainsi Tolosa. JI faut, dniis toutes cea livpo- 
rli?,ses, qu'il n'y nit point un lono; trmps pcrdu en d&lihfimt;ona, 
qn'oi~ puisee se ployer de sa droite i sn gauclie, et  de sa gaucho 
h sa dmitc, siins iüire ancun ancrificc : enr dlins Ics munccuwm 
cmbht:cs, les thtorinenicna, I'irr6solut.ion qui naissent des nou- 
vellcu contmdictoirca qui RQ succ2dcnt rnp~rlcmont, oondiiiscnt b 
des makeurs. 
C e t k  clivrrsion do Bmgosse sur Tolosa ratunc des raisons qui 
a lon$emps fait penser que L position de Tudela devait btre 
grdtc,  so~t siir h rivo droik, soil uvco 1 i ~  f ~ c d t 6  dc rppmer 
sur la rive gauclie. Ellc crt  offcnsire sur Snrapsse, elle pre- 
vicnt h temps rlc bus lcs moiivomrna qui pou11nicnt se fitim do 
ce cBtE. 
7"". Cne ob~cwndon qu'il n'cst, pns hom de propos de fnirc ici 
c'cst, que rennemi, qni a int6rl.t de masquer sea forees, sn 
caclianil 10 véritablo poiiil de sou i~ttaque, o Gro do -re que 
le coup qu'ii veut porter n'elt jnninis inJqu4 $une mnnicre 
iciaiiiro, c t  10 gC1i6ri~I rie peut dciíinrr que par la coimaissance 
bion npprofomiie do #a positioii, et  lo maniero dont ii fuit cntrpi 

ancune rclafion direch, et  dont il ignorait absolument la aitnation 
~t la comporiition. 
Vhgt jours apGa ss ~ o r t i e  de Madrid b mi s%et trwv6 1i. la 
Qte d'unc armbe de cinqnante mille hommea. IA fea tic la ~ E d i -  
tion n'a pas u BR wmmuuiqaer sur los pojnts parconros par les 
trois oorps !'nrn<bc dors rdunia; Irs oornmunirntiona naco 1s 
Frmce out 4th ~ d 4 c s ;  l'inaurrediou de 13ilbao a. CtB 6teinte dan8 
le ñang cle 1200 ins~irgEs. Peii dc jorim apxbs, 20,000 d'entre 
eu9 &uriis b rfi lieues de& 1 Tudela, k Yautre extr6miti de la 
Iipne, ont &ti? dispersés et poursiiivis ripuieiisemcnt. Les pro- 
vlriccs de la Disc:tye, de Bur=.oe, e l  le royaurne do Navarre ont dt6 
conttnus. Une orpnisation intEricure a prbpar6 les moyens de 
nourrir l'armhe, rl'rip rovibronncr lcs placce do Pampelune, Bt. 
Sdbnstien, les forts de $anancko et  de Uiirgos, en rendaatla maina 
insupportnble possilile B wa provincev c e l b  dmrg~ 6videmment 
dis roprtionnbe 'L leura moyena. % matbiei de i.utiuc~-ie a f te et mis en ftait ser, 
I 'amkc rEorgmia6c, Ics hornmee et les chevanx sont a~ijonrd'lini 
enbon Ctat. 
C'cst a i n ~ i  que s'est pnsaC le moia d'hofit c t  psrtic do ScpL 
embre. Les renforts arrivh de Prancc oiit k cine inclemnis8 
I ~ ~ ~ E P  dos pcrha qu701~o n iprouv~cs par I ~ B  mQo,~c. ct  la sikge 
de Sarwosse. 
Voici fin rorce, ct  mn organitintion aetiicllc: 
Lc coms de droitc, mmmandé par m" lo mar"' J3ess2rea, at 
fortc dc ir;!wil hornmcs. 
Celui de ganche, commmd& par m' le m d L  Moncey, eest de 
18,000 liornmce. 
Celni du centre, aux ordrcs de m"lo d' Key, e ~ t  de ones 
mille hommes. 
La réserve du roi est de quntre mille hommes.* 
Le oorps de drriitc occupo Ic phys dcpuk Burgo# ju~qn'k pan- 
como, et Ponte de L m .  
Le eorpti de gaudia depuis Tudda jusquY% L o m ñ o .  
Le  COY^ du centre dcpuitr Logofio juaqu'h 
La réscrre Miranda. 
Ln noiivcilr: linnition pmsc pw I'armde dcpuís qnt? lw EvEnemeni 
del'hdaiousie zvaient fiit pksagcr unc gucrre rc~ l lo  eiiEspa,~e, 
Ctnit hvidrrtmcnt eornmantl&o pnr les aimplcs notions dc ln enino 
raison, qui ne ponvait permcitre sa sfparation 5 plus de clix 
joura dc marrrlio, dc trois corp.pe a'nrniGr, dont lc plns f& 
n'arrivait. s ii 18,000 hommes, aa milicu d'une nation de onze 
milliona d7Khitnn., qui sa ~Ibdnroit enncmi, ct so mcttnit uoiver- 
~eIlcment en 6tat de fiueue. 
Cin iinutc millc Rnnpnis ont pn so tcnir nroc aiierhs airr une 
ij,gne %e p i n ~  de W licues. gardant les d e a r  pandes oomrnuniea- 
tiuns $u Burgo8 st de Tudela rpontrc dos orinemia quinbnt pu 
On ne comprend pas dana m dmla lea gamiaons ric F'ampFiine, 
St. Sbwtien, Vitoriñ, Toloas> Bilbao, &c. : il n'est p question non plus 
de P ~ r m C e  de Catalogue. 
'np'ici  porter nnr l'un on I'autra do ccri pointa plus da 25,M 
\ornmes: puisque 15,(X10 FrmcYa powaicnt Gbc reunis sw i'unl 
ou l'nutre de ccs &ux cummu~cnlions rincipulea cn 24 l~icnrcs. 
Si les oorpn d.amiha dirigCs a i i i  l 'gr  ngui haiaisnt arriver 
dnna lo moia de Srplcml>w, vab ayeterno Picitnaii er o&nsif la 
foia se mntinumait avce avanta~e,  puiaqu'il tcnd B refaire l'armde, 
attendrn ocilc qui doit h v c r ,  et cunlinuc i mennccr I'cnnrmi; 
mais il no s a w i t  se prolongcr jusqu'au mois [le Xovcmbre. 
L'ennemi n'n pii rentcr trois inoitr S:LTIR fiiire de grnnda progrL:si 
bientbt il sera en etat do prendre I'offcnsif nvec de ~ m d s  c o y  
org~nitrbs, ob6iscnns ii. iiuc dmiii i~trntion centmlc. q ~ r i  nurn cu lo 
ternpñ de se former k Xarlid. Tmt nms annoncc ne le mois 
d'ocbbre est uno de ors f poqiies dCoirives qui donno! oeliii qui 
sait s'en emparer la riorit6 rles mouvemens et des succbs dont la, 
progression est inoaEnhblo. 
Que1 e8t lc pmli ii prcndre d m  h position 0% se troure hm&, 
et arec i'assurance u'elle R de voir entrer cn E s p w e  dans le 
mois da Xwembrs !mx csnt mille Franqais? 
Si manibrca de voir se prkcntent h reaprit. 
1"". D'usaayer do wstor cncoru h s  l'hlrit oU Yon elt. 
Ce s~stkme est Cvidemrncnt insoutcnablc. Dc Tudeln k durgos 
ot ii Ri'lhm i l  y pl~lris dc 00 licuca. L'cnncmi pourra altncliicr Iti 
puche dc cctte l i g e  avcc quarante miiic hommcs, 1s droite tlvec 
quarnnte millc Iiornmc~, lc criihe ~rvct: rics f'omcs bgdcs. Tudela 
ct la Navarre juqu' i  Lo,mño dcmandent 25,000 hommes pour 
h e  ddrcfenclues. 13iiigos ne pcut $t;rc rl6fenduc que par iinc ann& 
en Btat de ~ 8 ~ k t e r  anx fmces reunis de MM, Blake, Cuest% 
qui peii~ent prcscnter 80,000 homrncs. J1 est doriteux que Ics 
rO,W bayonettes qu'il serait ossilib de leur pr6scnlcr piiissent 
lea brtnrc camplhtrmcnt. ~ i ? c  succes ert douhix, ocs 20,000 
hommes seronl k c e l 6 s  pnr les iusurgQs, qui p o i m n t  alora 
sonlever les tmis provinrxs, Im sCpare~ totdement d'avec le corps 
de gauche do la Einnco. 
%le. Forter le corps du centre et Ea reserve par Tudels au dewt  
de l'ememi siir ln mutr! dc Sarago~se, ou sur wllo d'Alharrm; on 
rEunirait ainsi 30,000 hoinmea, an chercherait i'ennemi, et nul 
douto on le liattrni1 fii on lo renoonlmrt de ce cUtB. 
h rnhchal tles~isres ~erai t  cEimgL: d'obssrvcr la gande com- 
miinication dc I3iirgos h Jfirnnrlib, Ini~~crnit gnrniscin dnns lo 
clihtean do Bwgus, rlans lo fort dc Pancorvo, occupernit I'cnnemi, 
snrrcillmnit Ics rnoiivcmciis (ira m0ntnpCA dc Rcyno~n. lea 
d;barquemens possibles dc Santandcr, Sa tkche smait difficilo 
~i I'on con~jdfirc! quc Ic dffilE clc l'nncorvo n'cst pns le seul nccca- 
ellile ii I'nrtilleric, qu'h trois iieues de Ib on asrive sur Minmda 
sr una roiitc: pmticnhlc h l'nrtilimic, qnc quclques Iieues plus 
foro l'Ebre &re uii troisiiine pnslu;w sur le poiu t do Li t ' h e  
qn'il hwerse cntrc Bnro et Miranda. 
3'"'. k s o r  la miricliul Mouuey !yi la d f  fenao de 1% Navnrre, 
st se porter avec lo corps dn ecntre et la rdscne sur Burgos. 
Rknni i ~ u  mar6ohal Rea~ibrca ori poixrroit r~ierclicr l'rnnemi, et 
aitnquer avec avmtage, on marcherait iL lui avec trente mille 
6 I H 2  
homrn~s, et on n'attenrlrait piui qu'il fi2t rEuni arec tonten sea 
fo r r~s .  n serait peut-dtre possible de donncr pour instruclion au 
nwCchal AIonccy, dans le cas oh il sernit di.bord6 sur sa 
sL qupil ne uerrait as prolinbilih! da hattro I'aanemi, ds kr8"hO; 
mouaement par aa Xroite, rt se porter p x  LogroIa s u r  Bririeson, 
oU il se rhunirait an resle  de 1'nmLc. Dana ce m, la Na~wre 
~"nsurprait, Ica eommunications avec la Francc scraient wupicu, 
m a i ~  1':trrnáu rdunic dms I*. lifaino scruil t t ~ s c x  forlc! pour altcndrw 
les carps qui nrrivent de Pranw, ct  qui scront a~isscz foris pour 
6n6lrer pzrioul. 11 oer:iit auvsi possilile r ue, dnns tous  le^ ms, 
fe rnardcliul hlonory se rnainiiennc dnna !o onmp rctrsnoli& de 
I'~mlielu~ie; innnmuvrarit auioiir do cctto p l m ,  il y attcndmit I R  
r&aulmt dcs op6rdioiin dca drux cor a tYarrn6e qui ~araient CtB 
corps de la ~ m d e  armce. 
S nu dcvunt de l'eiinrtirii daua la pltlino c Burgos, ct I'mivbe des 
Km'. Passer SElixe, ct eherclier ?t etmener i'cnnemi k une 
bntaille ilat~s la plniiic qui est entre Vitoria et I'Ebrc. 
jcmr. SU relii.cr, t~l~tlipug~rit ~ t l  auclio sur Pmp~luno,  et sa 
draiti sur les montapos do 3fonLgone. 
BE"''. L~lisser une gnrnison cn dtat de se d6fendm p e n h t  sir 
aemnineri k Pam clane, St SL'tias~ien, P ~ ~ n c o i ~ o ,  et Riirps, 
rfunir le reste de P'armée, marclicr ;l la rcnco~ltre do I'ennrmi sur 
I'mc ou l'autro des pnndes conimuniciitians, lc liattrc wtont oU Y OU. lo tmuv~ntit, at,ttcndro, ou pr6s do Madrid, ou di~uso paps oU 
les rnou-remens de Ycnnemi ct  la possihilitfi de rim aurñit port4 
I ' m E o ,  les troupes de Franca; on rib:indannersil ses derriibrcs, 
sca communicatinns; maia la grandc armfe scrait assez Eorte pour 
en ouvrir pour cllc-mfinio. Et qilant h l 'amée qui est en E 
r6nnie ainsi elle aerai t en Aat de brnrpr toiis les efforf s, KIP??:; 
cerlor tous les projels de l'cnnemi, et d'attentlro clitiis una nolile 
nttit,uude lo mnuvcmcnt gEn6rnl qni scrn irnpRm6 pnr s o h  
maiesl6 lors de l'arriv6o de toutea le3 troupea dana ce pgs .  
1)e tous lcs projets lo dcrnic~ pnrait pr6fi:rnble; il est p l u ~  
nolile et masi RGP quc le 6""'. 
CPR d ~ n x  prnjcts sont ~r111llt1 al~aolnmcnt offcnsifs ou aliso- 
lumcnt: dPfcnsifs . On peut les reprder. i'en ct l'autre. comme 
pro "es h ~ ~ S U T C T  Fa ron~cwnf,ion rlr I'nrmbe jusqn'h I'arrivbr drs 
rcnkrtg. Le dcmier a sur l'autre l'avantnge $arr&ter le propPa 
da I'ordro nouvcnu qui ~'6talilii on E ~ p w n r  ; il e ~ t  111s digne dmi 
troupos fianpnises, e t  du Bere dc votre rnajesté. 8 i s t  aursi aiii 
9?1n ccllii dc la, ~fvbrc  t  hontcusr! dhfrnairc propode par I'nrbicl:: 
cinq. Je l'ai eommnniqnE ni1 mar"' Jourdan et au marnL Ney, 
qiri I'un ct; I'niltrr sont. dc cct m i s .  .Tr! ne douk point qiie lca 
autres rnar~clinux nc partqent lcur apinion. 
Bu pxcmitr Octohrr: ' c  piiis nvoir ln. dponso dc  V. M., et 
m8me a v a n t , p q u e  je iui ai mnaifosté oette opioion par rna 
lellre du 14 cplcmbrc. 
Si T. M. approiice ce plan, il sera po~slble qn'clle n'ait-paa de 
moci noui-rllcs jiisqu'ib I'nrriv6r: dcs trniipes; mnis j e  BUI~ 
rxinvainru qu'elle trciuvera les affaircs dan8 une bien meilienr~ 
sit i ial ion qu'en suivnnt aiicun des auiros cinq projets. 
Miranda. Ee 16 1808. v 
Xa VIL 
S. 
EXTBbIT8 DES LETTRES 138 MAJOR G ~ ~ B A L  AU 
GI::N~BAL SAVARY, k MADRID. 
Bayonne, 112 Ju%'llat, 1808. 
&.&m 1 . S a i  rendu corngte k I'empcmur, g6niral, de V o h  
lettre du 8. S. M. troure que voiis voiis Btcs dfigiirni, dc tfop dr! 
monde k Madrid, quv vous avcz hit marclcr tmp de troupes au 
secom du 8' Diipnt, qu'on nc b i t  pns m offcnaivement 
usqu'h cc uc Ion afluiros Lu Gilioa soiant óhm!oa. Ue tous 
lea point. !c i a m i c ,  &nCrri. le plus irnportuit o s t  la Calice, 
pnrccque c'cst In, scule prorinco qui  ait kellemcnt conclu un 
traité avea i'hdeterre. Lh di\-lsion de ligue  de^ troupes 
X s p q n o l ~ ~  qui 61:iit i~ Oporto ti'ost. juint B cclle qiii 6hit  on 
Gdice, st enfin par la position de cette pml-luce estrBiiicmcnt p e s  
de l'tinglctrrrc. I ndfpriidamrncnt de cea mnsidirntions, ln  
po~ition la rend eneore plus iutCrcssante; cnr lea mmmunicntione 
dc I'nm6o sc trouvcraiciit comliromiaes si Ic m d c l m 1  Bcssibres 
n'rtvait pas un criticr succlis, ct il fturlrait bien :tlors repluyer 
toutea vos troupca, et mnrchor iaolkment nu secom du rnnrt:&+ 
Bcgsibreres, Xucorc uuu bis! gL:nCri~l, vous vous &tcu hop di.g:lrm 
de Madrid, ct e i  un Iion r6gimctit dc ciiiras~iers, qtielques pltces 
d'irtillcric ct  1000 b l NXI liornmcs rl'infiiiitcrio nvilicnt pii n,rriver 
& l'nppui du marieliul UcssiErc~, le lb, ccla lui aurait &té d ' m  
dmincnt aecours. qiinpmtr: pse V a h m  xoit sowwe's Q'imppop.6 
8 0  s o  o hais, gónórd, le moindm succbs dc 
ennrmi du cat6 de la Galioe n w i t  dca inconv6riicna irnmen9r.a. 
h tn i i t  comme voiu 1'Eticz des Eurces du g6n6ral Cueqta, de la 
ddaertion des troupea d'Oporto, M'. . . . . S. _M. trouvlr qir? 
po? bien riianmuurcr il aurriit fiillu vous mnnger do manikj? a 
asoir du 1 8  an 18. 8000 Iiommcs our rcnforccr lc m a d c h d  
JJessSrcs. rTno Lis noa derr2ros ~ ~ ~ M M ~ c R ,  et o e t b  -(e 
do GnIice d6truite, tout le rcstc tornbe et ae aonaiet do soi- 
mbnie, &. h. 
S. 
E x m m  DE LA L ~ R E ,  ik 
Bupm,  13 Jaillet, 1808. 
Se& Y.-hrm r(\cevon~ TOS Iettree do 9 e t  du 10, gen4d. 
Ucmpcrciir me char r de voiitc fnire conndtrc qiic s i  lc gCn6ml 
Cohert Etnit i ~ s l l d l i d ,  le gEo&~al PrOro ?r San C!omcnk, nyant 
une uolonno dma la ~ I M E ~ c ;  si 300 B 400 conraleacem. un boa 
commmdant, ib piEces cle canon, ruie escouidc d'arLiIIr>ri~, ului~i rt 
mille rations dc bisciiit itaient dan% le chiteau da SCqone, b 
y i t i o u  de i'nrmea serait siiperhe r l  h I'iliri [ir toiito sullicihide. 
a conduite du gxntrd Frbrr! ne par& pas cluire. L e a  nouvelles 
qu'il a eues du iii3ín:cli~l Mmnoey pttrlti~sent i~pocrypliris, II cst 
p o d l o  que sea 8000 hommes et son wtiiicrio n'uieut; paa B t e  
suitisana pour milever IR villo do Palcnco. Ccla &tant, le r n d c h d  
Molicey ne l'enlererdt pas d'avantage avec 20,000 hommea, pme- 
qu'alors c'cst une i ~ f a ~ r u  do cnnoIis et dc mortiera, K. P.. . . . 
Valeiics est c o m e  Ia Ca falopts a l  I'dwagm; CM twia phta 
soni 8cCOndaif~~. J,ca dcux m i s  point~ importans ~ont lo ggnbral 
Dupont ct particulihernent le markhal BcssiGres, pameqne le 
prcmier a dr~nnt Pui le corps dn cnmp dc St. Eoch et Ir: coi ps de 
G adk, et le maréchd Bessihes parcequ'il adevant lui lea troiipca 
dc In, &lico ct crllcs v i  Jtuicnt iI Opori,o, gl:nf ra1 D t l p ~ ~ t ~  
p&s de 20,000 hommes ; il ne peut pns avoir contrc Eui un pareil 
nomhrc de troupes; il a d6jh olitcnu d r ~  sue~Ea t r h  mnrqiims, ct  
nu pis dlcr il ne peut gtrr contraint gu'b rcpaaser lea moutapncs, 
ao qui n'erit qii'un 6v6ncmant dc pmm. Lo mar6Cclid Bussibre~ 
eat benncoup moins fort que le g6ntrrnl Dupont, et les koupce 
EA npolrs d'O orto ct de la Gnlico ~ o n t  pliis nombrriiars qiie 
oelfes de l'hd%u*ie, et  lea tronps de la Odioe n'ont paa encaro 
Bit: enkmdes. EnEm le muinclrc in~uccha dii mai.8clial Bes~iGrtls 
intercepte tontes les eommunicntions de l'armée et coqmornettrait 
nitzmc su si*rol<. JA gbiidral Diipont BG bat pour dlidujur, et Ic 
mmE&nl Bessihrea se bat pour Ics communicntions Jc I'nrmke e t  
pour lea op6ratiozia lo plus importnntea m x  d a i r e ~  d'Espngno, 
h. &e. 
S. 
E ~ X T  DR LA Ltc~mn, &c. &c. 
B a g o ~ ~ s ,  18 JiiIlel, 18(38, b d h  Roare9 d~ a o i ~ .  
&ion S . 4 e  repois, g&nEr=, vos lettrea dn lC Z'aide-de- 
mrnp du marédial Moncey a doun6 B sa majest6 toua les r l é t d s  
sur ce ni s'est pasa&. Lrt condiiitc di1 mar6clinl a Ct-4 belle. 11 
a bien %attu les rebelles en cnmpnqe. 11 o s l  taut simple qul  
n'ait pii entrer b Vnlence; e08tnit iinc affaire de morticm et dc 
pibccs do siEgs. Sn oaition a San Clfiniente est boniie, de lj il 
cst h memo dc rernnreter sur Ydenoc. no roste, ghEral, l.nffaire 
de Falmce es£ une ~faa're m n d  o d r e ,  m h e  ceUe lec Smqosse, 
qni ccpcndnnt cst pliis importnntr. L'dhiia di1 mnrklinl Jlca- 
si8ies b i t  d'un jnterht majcur pour les afdires d 'Espapc,  et la 
prernibra riprh ccltc uil~irc c'cst cello di1 gfn6rd Uupont, e t  
c'est Ic rnoment dc laisser 3c gEnéral Gobert siiime la. roiite. Le 
rnnrLrchnt 3lonccy so rcposc; l n  gfnhnl licillc rnnrclio airr 
Gironnc: ainei trois colonnes pourront mnrclier enssmblo sur 
Virlc~irc; Iu corps du g6riririil Roille, oclui do QUT~#ORRC, et celui 
du msréchal hfoncep, cc qni formcm lcs 20,000 Iiomrne~ que ce 
mar~~linl  croit ~~Ccrssoirca. RTak I'crnprrcui; gC~iCrnl, troiiro quo 
vous nvez tort de dire di1 n'y a rien Eté fait dcpuis six semaines. 
On n Iiattu los rnscm!dcmena de la Gsiise, dr St. Ander, orux 
d ' h n g o n  et de Cahlogne, qui dans leur aveuglement m p i e n t  
qu'ila ii'avaienl qu'it niarclicr paiii clutruim les Fmnqnis: lo 
rnar6elal Monceg, les gEnCraux Dxihesme, Dupont, lTerrlicr, ont 
fsit dr honnc besope, ct tous les hornrne~ sen~cs  en Espu 
olunn.4 dans le bnds do i e o r  opinion, et voient rrer 
granlo poine Ipmsurrcotion. AU reste, gdnwsi, les &niroa BE* 

prhvoir que: les plus heureux r6snltats: maig de Iamanikre dunt ii 
a marcho vis-bvis du ginCd Dupotit, iout donne it croire qu'il 
mcttra la lus grande circanspection dans ses rnonvemens. R i  
par 1s F a n i  de. n r l c m a ~ ~ r c s  1'0, peut ftai>lir une ~uspeniion 
d'armes san8 quere roi y soit pour riin en appnrence, wtte erpEoe 
d'nrrnistice pourrnit se romprc en EA prir6ren:mt de parl ct  d'nulre 
hnit jours #avance, donnant aux Franqais la l i p e  du h e m  pas- 
slatit  par Alrriuwtn p u r  joiildre 1'Ebm. Colte s~lsperision rl"armrs, 
que les inriurgfs ourraicnt regarder comme ai7mta=;ense, nfin de 
r'orriniser b ~ n L i d ,  ni nous ~erail pua ÚEfarorrLla, zrceqdon 
verrait penhnt ce hmps l'orgmisrtion qne pron&aient les 
pnrticii i u s u r ~ 6 ~  de 1'Xapase, et ce que veul la n:Jion, h. h. 
LE MAYOR G~N&RAL AW Ror ~ ' E S P A ~ N E .  
Xantes, 11 A&, 1808. 
S*tion 5.-Sire, lo gEni5rd Snvnry ni v n ~  rninintrca A nnnzra ct 
Ur uijo ne sont &ves : il parait qu'il a des rassemMcmens H 
~ l i i ? &  d.sprEs les nouvel1c.s que nous retevmi. S. M. ponso 
qu'il esk bnportant 0 fairc marclier le plutbt pos~ible une 
c:cilonne poiir y rCta.blrr Ibrdrc. T< M, xait p w  la miw'fid dn'/! 
Sai.ago$se &fuit m nvtw pmwoir, et pte smrs pnc on esp&ail ami? 
le rede de I u  nille. J ~ r s p e  b .q&n~+al 1lellias.d a d m d  IOPdw 
de Zme~ le si& 81 eUt kié ic d;sirer pue c e l  ortlre f% coñditionnek, 
cwnwio mla pcarai~.~ail iltv Ki'inlwiliow de V. M ,  ainsi qa'v~ 1.5 em'c 
dans sa w r r e s p d m c e ;  dmf & dfm, qtce Ze &&ya ap $3 ht pie 
dans le cm I'on m'auraii pm m Blm ma!lm de la vzlle iruanf 
chip m k j o u r s .  Cela aurait prdscnt.6 dcs circonatancc~ meil- 
Icrirea ; cm si  lo g6nóixl Vcrdier rjvamc en eniier la Navarrc et 
I'ilrragon, il est ta mindre que la Kaaamc ne ~'inaiirgr. et Pam- 
pelunc no tarderait pas h 6t1-e cemdo. 6 a i  mande h T. M. que 
d6jh $ea co 3 enticrs dc la m n d e  m 6 e  Bont cn mouvemenf 
poiir re mn~ro en p o ~ t e  en Bspngno. Les dispasitions lea plue 
~ i g o i ~ r r ~ ~ ñ c ñ  sont priscs de tous eat4a, c t  dnw Ri3: smmnim wr 
deux ?noh l ' X ~ a g ~ e  sera m u m h .  L'rrnpcmur, qui ccintiniie i 
'oiiir (['une bonnc ~mtd,  quniqu'fl uoit tih o c c ~ ~ p f ,  nrt d n n ~  una 
hevr povr contini~er sa mute sur Angers, ~ a u r s ,  et paris. V. M. 
dait Otra prrñntidtco que tontcs nos pcns6cs sont sur 0110 c t  sur 
l'nrmde qu d e  commmde. 
No. mII. 
LlTIXR FEON DIWMMOKD TO SJX [REUXnNDER 
BALL. 
P a h o ,  &cZy 41h, 138. 
MY D ~ E  SIR,-Hjs Iiigliness the dukc of Orlenns Iina applid 
to me to rrrite to yun on a subject a b t  which he appeass to be 
exhernolp intcrcstcd. 1 tnkc it for grantcd tlint you are 
wquainced with all the events ~i1Jch h v e  Iately hppened in 
h PPENDIX. 4Ii l 
Spain. Thr dtiltc thinka thnt  tho appenrrtnw of  n membor of 
the lionse d Bourbon in h t  country miglit Iw aoceptable to the 
SpRniarrla, nnd of grca t  scrvice to the c.onirnon cnusc. In this I 
pedcctlp concui witli Lis higliness, and if you be of the same 
opinion p n  will probably have no objcction to send a nlii hcre 
to i~lrry his Lighess to Gibr i l~n .  He Iiirnseii is exoco8iugly 
~nngine .  We Lnva lettcra fmm London d o m i  to the 5th of 
Jnnc. Podu~al has fohwcd tho e m p k  of 8 ain, aud k h o n  
h p b a b i y  now in othcr hands. dn inritntion \m been apnt to 
air Charles G ~ t t m .  
(Signed) WILLXAX D R ~ M Q N D .  
P.S. WGjgh well whut i~ said here, writton at the aidc nf the 
wa 
31% DRUHHOXD TO SIR UEW D A L R Y M P ~  
P a h ,  dasly WJi, 1808. 
D ~ n a  Sta,-Tlus 'tetter ni11 be delivercd to ~ o u  by 11ia ro 
higliness rince Lcopold, sccond son o i  the king af the & 
Biiilirs. %lis priiioe Coca immdirtelg to Gibrnllar t o  oarnmu- 
nicate imrnediat~ly witli thc loyitl SpmiKcls, and to notify h 
them that Lis fatlier wiii accept tlio regency, if tkov desire it, 
ulitil bis ncpliss  Pcrrliaand tllc Se\-entli be delivered frorn ea - 
tivig. Dou Leoyold nud his oowin tho d d e  o l  Odoms a$ 
offer tlicmsclvcs AS so1diel.s to thc Slianimds, nnd sil1 accept sucli 
sicuatious as may be ircu to t l i c i i ~  suitaLEe to tlicis íllustrious 
n IE tlieir iisit %odd not be acccptable to tlic Spnniads. 
don Leopuld wiii return to Sicily, antl lii sereno higli~iess tlir, 
duke of Orleana will proe~ed to J1:nglund. Boing o f  opinion 
thrit the appcarance of uri iiifant ot S niu may bu of tlie gre~lbst, 
utili$ at tiie gresent crisis, and in n l L e n t s  can hardlv be pro- 
ductivc of hasm, I hnvr! iirgrtl liia Sicilisln rnajcsty tu dctrmino 
npon this measure, rrliicli 1 conceive to be requircd nt his hands, 
iii mnsequcncc of Ihc rnnnifcstci of' Pirlafiix, wliicli yuu llave pro- 
liabl.bly seen. At the distancc of lOOO miles, hoivwcr, ~e cannot 
bo fiupposcd to bo uccirrntcly informrd hcin ot' mnny circnm- 
a h c e s  mith which you probnbly mzy be intimlitely acquainted; 
primu Lopold thereforo will lio directcd lo aomdt ~ipith you, 
and f.o follow your arlvicc, wliich 1 have no doubt ou will reetdily 
md dieerfdly d v o  him. I rrlco tlic iibcrty at tzc samu tima o€ 
reaimmending him to your care land protection. 
(Sig-ned) WH. DB~HHORD. 
~ T R A C ~  OF A LETTEE P B o M  SER &W DALEYMPU 1'0 
Lom C~ISTLERUGR. 
C&firaltav, Au& IWh, 1808, 
MY LORD,-ht night thc Thuuderer ~rrired liere, lütvin- on 
board tlio diilrc of Orlcans, the semnd grince of the TRO ~iciTiw, 
and s considerable niimber of nobbmen and otlicm, tlie uuite of 
thc latter. As tho sliip enmo t o  nnclior nt a latc hoiir, 1 h d  nnot 
tlio lionour of s e o 4  IlrB duke of Orleans nntii near tan at ni&, 
mhcn he m e  accompanied bv Captnin Tolhot. TIio dnke fimt 
nt in'm mgr handa s Jetter from Mr. Dnmmond, ae cnptain 
%alblunl did a doapilch Erom sir Alnran<lcr nrill, r a p i ~ a  oi riiidi I 
liave the honour to enche.  As the lntter seemed Lnllc~,  I did 
not irnrncdintcly oprn it,, nnd tlierefore did not immediatelr 
rcmnrk thnt nir Alcxmdcr Ball did not sewa~aaw that tlie prince 
of tlie Tvo Simlics wna coming down, mticli less thnt Iie medi- 
ttifed cstablifiliing bis residcncr nt Gibraltnr for the a-rowed pnr- 
pose o€ ncgotiating fbr the rcgcncy of S p i n .  O€ thia objwl tlie 
duke of Orlcnn~i made no mystery, md proceeded to a m g e  tlie 
time and rnenncr o? the prince'u ncception in t l i ~  morning, nnd 
tlie accommodatioii tliat sboiild be prepared for him, airited to 
u i s  rank, and capable of contnining hiri attendnnts. 1 hdc enrly 
occasion first to rernark tlie ill cfect tliis mensurc might procluluce 
in Spnin a t  tlir momcnt ~ 1 i e n  the estnlilisfiment of a central 
y m m c n l  l i d  bocomc ohvioiisly iiecea*nr,v. snd would nahirnliy 
cncl to miich intripre nnd diaiinion, iintil the srntimcnta of tlie 
people and the m i e s  (whiclim-ould ~iatiiriilly assrmblc Eor tlie pir- 
poac of  e' pelling tlie enerny from their territory) ~hould be 
pronoi~nccA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
EKTRACT OF A L ~ R  FROX LOm C ~ L E R E B O R  TO 
SIR BEW DALRYIIPLE. 
h i a g  SYwi, h. 4fk, 1MR. 
' I h a ~ e  p a t  pIeasure, however, in assnring yon that the 
measiires 1iuraued hy j-ou on tliat delicate and important. ~ubjsct' 
(the unexpectad arrivd of prinec Leopotd and the duke of 
Orleana a l  Gilimltnr) ' recoivcd kis majestg'~ ontire ~pproba~ion.' 
(Siped) GASTLEREAGH. 
No. IX. 
SIE ARTHUR WELUBLEY TO SIR LVLnRY BURiLiRD, 
Heend-quaríer~, a€ Lavos, A u p t  $t i ,  1808. 
Srn,-Daring received inatructions from tb ~ecrctary of strtte 
thnt yon wero I;l:rly 6 0  iirrirc o71 t hc mnst of I'orhignl wi th a co M 
o€ 10,WO men, latrl omplo e J in the nortl~ of Eiiropc unUer x e  
ordira of sir J o l ~ n  %ooro, {non ~ n h r n ~ t  t o  poii aiieli i n i m n t i o n  
as 1 have recci+ccl regarding tlie genml state of tlic ~í-ar in 
l'orhignl and Spain, anti thc plnn of opcrntions mhic.h T nm nbout 
to carT into exccution. 
Tli r mcmy'n forcc nt prcsrnk in I'orhgnl rnnai~t~,  IW far as I 
m ablc tc f o m  an opiuion, of From 1G,000 ta 18,000 mcn, of 
wliirll niimlirr thcrc are aliout 500 in ilic fort of  Almeidn, ~hout  
the same number in Ehos, aboiit 6 or 800 in Penich6, and 16 or 
1M in tlio rovincit of Alcrntcjo, ut Srtnml, &c.; nnd thn rc- 
mainder are dlisposable for tlie dcfonca of Lisbon, ind ara in the 
fvrtfi of St. Juliiin nnd Cnscaes, in the bathrics nIong Lhe constas 
far I ~ B  t.he mck of Lisbm, and ths oId citadel a+ ttsbon, towhich 
tlie mem hare lately d d e d  ~ o m c  works, 
M the &roe disposnble for the defeme of Liabon, the enemv hare 
lntcly detmhcd a corps of alioiit 2000, under gcnerd ~lioGiorcs, 
principdly 1 believe to aatcli m movements, whieli corps js now 
atUeobnqa; and another c o ~ u  o f4000 mcn, iinrirr pcncrnl T~ison, 
I T ~ E  sent across ths Tagus jnto Alemkjoonthe 26th of last montl, 
the object. of wliich dctaehcnt  vns to dispcr:rric tlic P'ortap~ctie 
inm~fientc in thnt quai-tfx, ln forec the 8 ~ ñ 1 i i ~ l i  eosps, consisting 
of ~.bout 3000 men, wliicIi hd ncivanced into Portugd as fnr na 
Evorn from Xslrematiura, to rotirc, and ibrn to be riiabledto ndd 
to tlio force destinetl for the defcnoe of Lislion the corps of Frenrh 
troo sliieh liar1 licen st:ltioiird at Eetuvnl nnd in tlie proviace 
d .gmtcjo; at al1 ercntr Loison*~ aorps nill  r e k  to Liabon. 
und the Frcnch corps dislioaahle fm tlio rlefrnna of tliat plme will 
mbzbly be abont 14,000 mcn, of diich at Icast 3000 must Iier F?R in f h ~  garrisons nnd forta un thc eond nnd in tlir rivrr. 
Tlie Frencfi nrmF iinder Dupont, in Audalusia, surrendcred on 
tlie 20th of lnst rnont,ti to fhc Spnnish nrmy undw Cnstnños; so 
that thre are now no French troo a in tLe south of Spaiii. S110 
Spaniih nrmy of Cinllicia nnd ~ n s i % e .  to the northaard, r~ceired 
a check at  Rio Seco, in Lhe provinee of Vallaciolid, on the 14th of 
Jnly, fmm s Frcneh mrp3 ~upposcd to bc under the oommnnd of 
general Bossidreo, nrhicIi Iind n d v a n d  from Burgoa. 
!be Spanish troops retircd 0x1 the 15th to Bcnevente, and 1 
undcmtand tlierr: hns ainci: hccn un nfftlir Iiobccn tho dvnnccd 
osta in that neighbonrhood, but 1 arn not certain of it; nor am 
!ncqunintd aritli I,lic position af thc Spunisl~ nmy, oor d tliat of 
the Prench, s inc~  the  14tli July. X h e n  pon wiil hare been EL 
shoit time in tliis couníq, nnd will III~.F+C obserped the rlc,pe to 
whieh tlie deficienc of red  infomation i s  supplied by the circu- 
Iniion oi  uofoundckrcports. you will not bo surpi-ised at rny a int  
of a c m t e  knomledge on theae snbjects. 
It is, Iio~revcr, ccrtain tthat notliing cif im odnnaehaa occurrcd 
h tliat quurter sinco tlic IdLh af July ; and I f _  this Urcumstanoe 
1 conclnde that thc mrps c&d Ucssidres' attrrckcd the Spmish 
rtrmy at Rio Seco solely rr-illl a riew l o  eover Ilio mar& oí' king 
Jose 11 Uuonnpmte to Madrid, rrliere he nrrived on thc 21st Julg. 
~ c s i S e a  (hair ~ iubnt  at burliluaia, tlie e n e m ~ ,  m yon rnay proliably 
have hearcl, have bccn bcat or in nn attack upon Zamgoza, in Ara- 
gm, in anotlier upon tlic city of Vnlcncia; (in Iiotli. of which it ía 
Mid tliñt they have lost many mcn;) and it is re orted that, In 
CnUonin, t r o  oillieir dctrcl~menls hsve been m t  o$ snd I h t  thvy 
hnve loat tha fort of Piperas in the l'yrenees, and tlmt Barcelona 
is bbcltded.  Of thesr, Imt-mentiond actions and oprrntiona 1 
have seen no official accounts, but t h e  rqor t  of them i s  ~enerally 
c h l n t r d  nnd h{:licvcd; nnd at nll rvcnts,ahctlicr thc,st! r r p o r t ~  are 
founded or othernse, it is obGons t h t  the  insurrectioa against 
the fi-cnch 1s gcncral thson~houC epain ; thitt 11nrge ppiirtics of 
Gpaniards are iñ arma; nmongst othcrs, in particular, an army of 
20,030 men, inclntiing c a d r y ,  nt h n r a e  on tho Tagw, in 
4 64 APPENDXX. 
Eatrcm~dnm, and that the Frrnch emnot c q  on tliei operationn 
by means of mal1 corps, I sliould imagine, from tlicir iuacti~jtg, 
and from the misfottunes they hnve sulibred. tliat tlry Iiave not 
the mmna of collrcbining a force auiricieutly large to oppom Bho 
pmgresa of tlie insurrection and the cfforts of tlieinsuyrnte, niid 
ki nIForrE supplies to tlicir dilfererit delaclied corps, or tliat tLcy 
Sind that they rannot carry on thcir opcrations with m i e s  
so nnmerous m thcy mfit iind it necossasy Cu cmploy witbout 
ma~3zinep. 
I n rcspcet to Porh~gnl, tlic mholo kingdom, with tho exception 
oftlie neighboitrlioocl of Lishon, is in a atate of insnmoction apiningt 
tlic Frrncli ; tlirir mrnna oí' rrsrñtnncc are, Iio~ci,er, lesti porver- 
fiil ilian h o s e  of the Spaniards, their troops harc been com lekly 
dispersod. tiicir ollirrrs hnd gone off t u  tliu Brnrila, anf ihiir 
arscnds pillapd, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt 
under ilic cirrurriñtnnecs in rrhich it had tokcn placo is still more 
exlrsorclinary tlran tliat of tLe Spnnish naiion. 
l'lic P'ortiipirse mny h a ~ c  in tlio nortlicrii part of  the kingdom 
aliout 10,O. O mcn in m s ,  of  lrllicl~ nuniber 5WO are to marcli 
mitli rnc t o m a d s  Lisbori. Tlie rcmnindcr with n Spnnish dctnch- 
mrnt of aliout lSOO men which cainc from Gailicin, m cm loyed 
in s diatoni blookadc of . i lrndn, nnd in fUo pmtootionof &orto, 
wLch ia now tlie seat of go-rernment, 
Tlie jnsunrciion is pnrral iliroiighoiit Alemtcja md Algame 
to tIie southward, and Entre Ninlio c Duero and Tras os Nontea 
md Usira to Ehc norlliward; but Sor nant of ams tlic peopIa can 
[lo nolliing qainsi. Iho cnamy. 
Havina eon~ultcd eir C. Cotton, it n p p e n d  to him nnd to me 
tIiat t l ~  altack pro oscd u on Cascaes-liny ivas imlmcticable, be- 
oaiisc tho bv is w e t  defontfcd by thc fort of Cnsuies snd the o t h o  
wo&a constructed for ils drfence, and t1ie ehi 9 of u-ar could not 
n roael> sfioiently near to ~ilrncc ~liern.  %le lrtnding in tho 
3 assa d'hrcos in tlic Sagu~ coalduot bo cffeckd witl~out silenung 
fort St. Jnlim, which appeared ta be impractical-ilc to those ñlio 
ere to carry thaf o erztion into execulion. 
Thorc nrr ~rnall %nya witliin, wliioli rnight ndmit d I snd i l  
troops, md otlicrs to  the norlhward of  i l ~ e  rock of Lisbon, but 
tlzry are all defended by rorlts wliirh miist Lave been silenced; 
tliey are of smali extent. and lint fem- men could bave lrinded at 
GIie anme time. Shm i s  alwap a etirfon them whicli dltcts khe 
facflit of lnnding at different times so materidly, na to renderit 
rirg &ubtfiil ahctiicr fIio trwps fiwt landrci aoiild be ~upported 
jn xuficicnl lime by otliers, and whetlier ILe Lorsrs for tlic arLil- 
iery nnd rnvnlry, nnd the nertssary stores nnd provisiona codd Iw 
Ianded at nll .  These ineonvenienciebi attending a landing iu nng 
of tlie hays near i he  rock of Li~iabon woidcl h ~ e  been aggravated 
X1 tiie n&ghbourliood of the enerny to the landing-place, and l?p 
t l e  erhnii~rrd daf r  d t h e  aoontrg in nhirb flia irnoiia sould Iinva 
been llaudcd. I t  was oliviously the best pliirr, tlicrefore, to hd 
inthe northern paca of Portiipnl, and 1 fixed upon Mondcgo lmy 
as tlio nearest place whch dorded any f d t y  fa lmding* ex- 
e @ n ~  PenichE, tAe Ianding-place of  which paninsula is defended 
by a fort oo~iipicd by thc enemy, which it tirould be newssq to 
a i k k  replarly, in order to place tlie ships in ~afrty, 
h landing tu Ihe northw~rd wns furtlier recornmended, as it 
woulrl ensure the m-opcratf on oF tlia Portu,nuese troo s in tlie er- 
pdition to Liilmn. Phe wiiolo of the eorpa plaoei?undsr my 
crimmaiid, incliiding thosonuder ilie command of genorrtl Spencer, 
harina l a d e d ,  1 ro ode to marcli on Wednesclily, and 1 sliall 
tdmiile romi ~ProRr~n ma ouicins, witii r vi,, keep np my 
communicntion by the sc;t.wast, and to examine the situation oE 
Peniclih, srid I s h d i  procecd torvards Lisliun by tlis muh of 
ICafra, and by the liills to thlia northward of tliat city. 
hti 1 under+tiiiid from tlic secwlary of stab tliat n body of t m p s  
undcr tIle eommand of brigndicr-gcncral hckland may be cxpected 
on tlin cowl nf l'ortugsl Iicfi~rr: yo11 arrive, 1 hwo writtcn tu desire 
bc wiil procecd from licnce aiong tiie mast of portu d to tlie sontli- 
w o d  ; nnd I projwiac to oommiinicatc witli him by t f r  manita ofonp- 
titinDlighof tlie hlfred,whowiilattend tli~movcments of tlic 
with fcw trlinsi orh,  haping on board proriaiona nnd milztorg 
storea. I ilitenl to order brigadier-general Acklrrnd to atta& 
hnichE, if 1 ~lioiild find it nccrasur t o  obtniri oss~tision of  tliat 
e ,  d i ,  1 mpoae to o r d ~  Zrn to joio &o flcet statiou~d 
off thi Tapa,  ntR a Rca to Uiscmbmk in one af tlic b g s  nezr 
tlie rock or Lidioii, as Boon as X ~liall  up roach sudcir:ntlv war :o 
cnable him to perform thnt oporation. f f ~  i m e e d  th& genrrai 
SckImd's cnrpa iuoa equi ped in such a munner as to bs enakiled 
td move Fmm the mnst, fl a h l d  hwe directed him to lmd at 
Elondcgu, and lo  mar& upon Stbntarom, froin wliicli stalion Lo 
aould have been aat hznd eithcr t o  assist my o crntions, orto cut 
off'tlio rctrcat of tho cncmv, if l in ~ l i o d d  i.nfe3vnur to mnke i t  
eithcr by thc nortli of  the hg-us md Almeidn, or by the xouth of 
the T n p ~  nnd R1rm.q; bnt as L ztm convinced thu t  genernl Ack- 
hd's  corps i a  i n t end~d  to  form a part of Borne other corps wlich 
lu providcd ~ i t h  n commisaariu~ thnt he will have none with km, 
and coneequently thnt liia corps must depend upon +he countrp: 
and AS no relinncc cnn be plnccd iipon the  reaoiircea of thia soun- 
trp, I have considared it I ie~ t  o dired the enaral'a attention to 
thesea-coast,; if, Iiomevcr, 11ie mmmnnd of t % e mmy rernuined in 
my hands, X sliould certninlp Iand h e  corps whicli has lntely bern 
uiider the command o i  sir Jobn Mooro at Mondego, aand sliould 
move it upon Santarem. 1 liavo ttio honour to encloae a returnof 
tho troops, &c. &c. (Signed) ARTHQP WELLESLEY. 
f 7 a ~  at T..gavI 8 m i k ~  m f h  ilfJ,q4 Au,qwf 10,ZFIOS. 
813,-Sincelu-c~te to ou outhe 8thinst.,l.lravereceivedle#en 
hom Nr. Stunrt aod coino1 Doyle at Coruiia. of wl~iali 1 andore 
copiea. FFom them pou will learn the stzte of the war in t h t  part 
of Spain, ~ i i c l  you will oiiñeme tliak Ms. Stunrt and colonel Doplo 
pre of o p k n  that marahal Be~ai4res will h k e  advantage of the 
ine&ency of t h  Gdician army under generd Blnke to de&h 
a corps to Portugd to the aapktance of general Junot ; we hare 
not Iimrd vtit oT that detacliment, and 1 m convinoetl it will not 
be mnde tfil king Josepk Ruonapaite mil1 cither be reinforced to 
siiclr a drgrcr n~ 7.0 Iio in ñnfc$v in Xrtdrid, or till he ~liall hava 
effected his retreat into Prancc, +th wl-Lich view it i s  reprted 
tlint Iic lrf't Mndrid an tlie 81ftli of lnst rnonth. 
1 oonceive, tlerefom, that 1 have time for the oper~tionswhich 
I proposc to cnrr on bcf0r~ nrcinfor~~meril cun nrrive fruni Teon, 
eren supposing tEat no obstacles aauld be opposed 0 its mnreli in 
Ppnin or I'ortiignL ; but i t is not pmbnblc tlint? it: can nrrivc bcfora 
th diffment reidorcementa will amive frorn England; and as 
mnrallnl Jlessi>res Iiod not  morc than 20,Oo mcn in tlip action nt 
Rio Scw on tlie 14th July, I conceive that the 13ritisli troopa, 
which d be iil PortngaI, wjll be equal to  contend i t l i  myprt 
d that mrps wiiieli lie inay detach. 
Tlio poa;iihilit,y thnt, in tho pwscnt ~ t a t e  of affaim, t h e  Frencli 
cwps at prcaeiit iih Portu,d maF be reinforced, affords an d- 
ditionnl rcnson for tnking thr: p i t i o n  nt Snntnrcm, which 1 
apprised 70% in my letter of tlie 8th 1 should oecupy? if tbe 
conimnnd ol  tlio arrny rmnninctl in my hands uAcr t h e  remforoe- 
nienls shonld amive. If you 8hould occiipy it, yon wiU not onl 
b i ~  in tiin best riti~ntion to support my o rrntions. nnd t o  nit 06 
tiie reheat of tiic enemy, but ii 6np reinkroements oE the Frenoh 
~ T O O P R  ~hou ld  ontcr Portugal, you will hc in thc bcst sihntion to 
collect your mhole force to op ose Lim, &c. h. (sifl.$ ARTUL-~ WIELLBSL~Y. 
No. X. 
ARTIC7,FS OF TRF: DEFJXITXVIE CONTRATTON FOR THE 
XVACUdTION OF PORTUGAL BY THE F I W C H  ARMY. 
The geneda commnnding in chicf, &c., &c., bsing detsrmined 
to negotiate, &c., &. 
h i e l o  1. A1 tlle places md forts in tbe kingdom of Portugal 
occnpied by the Frcnch troops ahnU be given up to the Bntiali 
armv ín tlio shte in viliich Ihey arc at tlio period of &e signakure 
of the preseni coni-ention. 
Art. 2. SIio F~encli lroops s h d  evaminto Forhigd with their 
nrms and Iiaggage+ they &al1 not be considered as prisonas of 
war, and un iheir wrili'd in F T ~ C O  they sh11 bo at lilirrt~ to 
0erve. 
&t. 3. n i e  Englidi gevcriiment sliall fumish Zho nenns oi 
conwyance for the French arrny, ahich h l l  be disernbarked in 
my of the ports of Franca Iietween Ilocliefort and L'Orient 
inelusivelg. 
Art. 4. Tho Trench army sliall carry with it: di itri h11ery 
of h n e h  cdibre, with tlie horaes belonging thcrcnnto? nnd tha 

nnd witkin n a i h n c c  of about two lcugae~ fmm it. The Eoglisli. 
army will appronch within tllree Ieapwee of the capital, and wdi  
be m plncc,d ns tu leuvc nliout ofie lcnguc bctivcrn tlio imo 
armics. 
i irt .  12. Thc fortsi oF St. Jiilien, the Riig~o, and Cmcncs, ~hnll 
be occupied by the Dritisli troopa on tlie ratifieation of the con- 
rention. Lisbon nnd its citadel, togethcr with the forta nnd 
liatleries as far as tlie Iaxarcila or Trdi~ril~ m one side, md fort 
St. Josepli on the other, inrlwivcly, sliall be giueil up on the 
emhmlcution of tlis 2nd division; as slidl dso Ilio hFiour aiid 
al1 amed  ~esscls  in it of evew descriyiion, witlz tlieir riggin;o, 
paila, storcs, nntl ammunition. 'Tlic ior~rssses of Etvas, bliiicid:t, 
Penicli4, and Palmela, shall bo g i v ~ n  up as soon as tLc Brirish 
trooiis wii R W ~ P C  10 OCCUPY tlicrn. Iii tho xncunliino, lho gcnernl- 
in-chict'of tlic Britigli army irill g i ~ c  nolice of tlic prcscnt con- 
rcntion t o  ilio ~ n r r í x n n s  of iliusr: plar:cs, nu also tci ilic tmops 
before t h m ,  in ordcr to piit a stop to al1 furthr hostiiities. 
.bt. 13. Cornrni~sioiicr~ tihall hc namt:d on liotli sid(ns to rrgii- 
late and accelerato ihe execution of t h  arrmgements agreed 
uprin. 
Art. 14. Should tlim arise doubts as t o  the mcnning of any 
artirl~, it; will hr cxpliiincd f'nvniiralily to thc I+~nrli nmy. 
rlrt. 15. Fmm tlle dnec of tlie ratiiication of tlie prcseilt con- 
srntion, nll nrrcnm of coiitri hutions, rciliiisitions, or ~lnirna mliat- 
ercr, of tlie Fr'rench governmeut againsl whjech of Portugal, m 
anp otlier indiiidunls residing i n  tliis country, fonnded on the 
occiipaiioion of Portu~al Iiy tlie French troops, in the month of 
I)eccmbcr, 1807, wliicli m:y ~ i o t  lisrc Iiccn pnid up, nm cnnccllcd; 
and dl seqnestmtions ltiid upon tlreir pmprrty, rnorenble os 
immovcnblc, nrc rcmnvcd, nnd thc I'icc dispounl of tlio sume is 
restored to tlic proper owncrs. 
Art. 16. Al1 riitl>jccta of Fr~ncc, or of poncrs in friendship or 
altianec, rlomicilrritcd in Portugal, ar accirlental\y intliis country, 
~ l i a l l  ho rotrctcd; tlicir propcrty of ercy  kind, movcalilc nnd 
iiiimaveaFie, sliril br rospoctedi rnd t1io-j ilidl bo st Iiborty eithcr 
t o  nccomlinny tlir %bcnch rirrng cir to ~rrnnin in Y,,rtugnl. In 
either case thrk ropcrtv ie guarantccd tO thcm, r i t h  tlle liberty 
af retniiiing oi- oPdioroibg af it, nnd pn~aúi: tlio roduro of tha 
srlc tlicieoi into Branoe, or rny 0 t h  m t r ~  a f m o  ihey mny 
fiu tileir residrncc, tlir spme of ono ycar bcinc nllnwcd thcm for 
tliat piirpoae. It ia fnlly undcrstoorl tlint slilppiiig i s  exeepted 
fivm tliia airnnp-mcnt, only Iiowcvcr in na ftir it4 rngnrd~ lenving 
tliti port, and tliat nonu OF tlie stipulations &ove mciitioned can 
be m d e  tlre pretext of nnv commerei~l sspeculntions. 
,4~t. 11. No nativa of J!orlugal. sliall be rendered nccoun~b~.e 
for his politicd conduct dwing the lieriod of the occupation of 
tliia countr by the Froncli ariny; md al1 tliorio wLo have cm- 
tiniled in t& erereisr of their empioymeots, or aho Iiare aecepted 
situittions undor tlie Frencli governmonl, are placed under tlie 
protcctioe of the Britisli commnndera; tiify s l i d  suatriin no 
uj njury in their persona or property : it not having licen at  thev 

Art. 3, Tlrc gencrnl cnmmnnding thc Britiah trnops d l  t&e 
the necessar measures for re-eatalilisliing ihe free riretilirtion of 
the mrsni ofnub5istonc.e b~twecn tlic eoiintry nnd the capital. 
Done and coucludcd at Lisbon this 30tli dity o[ bugnst, 11308. 
(Signed) G EO-~GE XURRAP, qiirtrt cr-mriskr-generd. 
&LLEEMAN, le gh6ral de division. 
RaOified, &c. $c. 
No. XI. 
Ist, L E R .  FROM BARON TON DRCARY TO TAE C I R N m L  
COMMhNDIn'O TIIE ABMP XN PORTUGAL. 
Opmlo, Ayust  18th, 1808. 
S~a,-Thc bishop of Operlo havinfi expresscd to me bis wish to 
ACC mc in rivntc, 111 ordcr to mnlw mc tui irnportxnt; cornrnirnicn- 
tion. whiaf he desired to be kept seerct. I aent to Mn prlree lnst 
nialit" nt n lnt,c hour. Shc hisliop told rnc t l i n t  hc Iied takcn t l i ~  
govcrnment o£ Portugal in his hands to sztisf~ the sish of the 
coplc, but with tl ie intcntion io w-cstnlilish tlie go~*ernmcnt of 
iwfuI ao~ereign; and 1,. hopd ihat hii~. rnriest .~ tho Júng of 
Grent llritain liad no othrr point in vicw in scnrfing troops to 
tliis count,ry. dfier having given Iiim al! possilile tulsmance on 
that bcad, tlle bisho aontiliiicd t l iat m tlie prineo regent, in 
iea~in: Portu~al. ~ia%cst?biisliocl a. rcgcncy for iiie gorernment 
of tliia country duiiiig hie nlisenw, he considered it IUs rluty to 
resign tlic ovcriiliienL iuto ti10 Ilauds of that regency as soou as 
possibk. i f y  mmor wna, that 1 hnd na in~tr i ic~ ion Fmm my 
go~crnrnent on ihnt head, Iiut that X b e g c d  Iiim msider 
mbatlicr tlic cauac of his sovcrcign wonld noG tic llurt in rrsigr~ing 
tlie government into tlie hands of a regency mliicli, from its 
linving n c k d  undcr tlio iniliience of thc YrcneIi, Iiml I n ~ t  lic 
mnfidence of tbc nation, and wlietlier it would. not Is more 
adislililc for him to ltccp thc  gov~rnmrnt until thc le~siurc of 
the pincc regent. ass Imoro. Túo bishap allawe! that the 
rrprriey np oi~i i i t~d by tlic pinto ~cgrnt  (lid ntit poawss t,Iw con- 
Grlencc of &e pcoplc, tlrt ievcrnl rnembcra o€ it liad r c t~d  io 
siicki n mnnncr tta shuw t1irmsr:lvcs i~o fricnrla nnd pnrtiians o f  
t L e  French, and tLat, at ali events, di thc mcrnbers oE tlic lnte 
rcgcncp coirld iiot bo m-cshblislled in  tlicir tbi-mrr powrr; hiit 
he r a s  afraid tliat the proviuccs of Estrcmadura, rilcnitpjo, and 
dIgnrv6, TOUILI not, nrknon-lcdgc l i i ~  nrithority if tlio britisli 
po~ernment did not interfcrc. After a v e s  long con~erration, 
it s a s  ~ g r e e d  that J shouIrl inform onr miiiiatcrrs with wliat the 
bisEiop lid communiczkd to me, nnd in orclcr to lose no time in 
rniting for un nnxmcr, tho biahop dcxirrii mc to commnnieate 
tlic same to you, expressing a. wish tliat yon wodd be lessed to 
w i t c  LO him nn oOicin1 Ichor, in odcr to  crpwaa yoir  ksiw thnt 
ho might mntinue the government until the pleasure of hia 
sovcreign wns known, for the sake of the operatima of the 
Britisli, and Portiigcse troops nnder ymr comn~and. 
TIlc srcrctnry ot' thc biehop, who acted as jnterpwtter, told me 
nftenvarh in privnlo, tliat tlie utmost confusion woaId arise from 
tbc bishop rcsignin,rr thc govcnimcnt n t  zliis monicnt, or nem- 
ciating w i h  peoplo wlio wore ncilhcr liked nor estcemed by the 
nation. 
1 hg leave to ndd, thnt dtliou 11 the  liishop eqressed t h e  con- 
tmry, pet it npperrod to me tliei i e  waa not avrmo to his krrpiog 
tlin prernmeut in his h d s ,  if i E  could 11s done by tlw iriter- 
ierence of our ~overnment. 1 have tlle honour to be, &c. &c. 
(Signetl) Fazo~nrcx Vor~ DECEEX, brig.-gen. 
2nd. D ~ o  TQ Drm. 
@~Euj  Alqgwt 22, '2,@38. 
 SI^,-yoiir r.xccllm~will3ia~o rcrcir.cdtlie mcrct lettcr wbich 
1 h d  iths honour to scnd you by brindier-general Stuart, on 
tbe lStk, m~pcding tFic commirnientinn ot' I i i~  rxecllcncy the 
bishop of O p t o  rrlatitme tu his rcsiriiation of thc gorcri~ment 
into the linnda of tlic rcrcncy established by the prince rcgent. 
Li. nddition to ñ-liat 1 have had tlie lionoiir to stxtc upon that 
~ubject, 1 hc: Icnvo tc ndd, tllnt hiei crccllcnc~ tlic bisliop hm 
this da7 deakd me to make gour evcelleng aware, in cuse it 
r n i ~ l i t  bc wi~licd thnt hc ahoiild kccp tlrr govcnimcnt in hia 
haiids vntiI ilie plcasure of tlic prince rcgcnt may bbe knom, 
tliat be could not l c ~ ~ c  O orto; and tlic sent of g o ~ m i m c n t  Y must in tliat case newsrari p remnin in ibis t m .  IIic excel- 
l e n q  tlie bisliop tliidcs it hia dntp to infom you of tliis circiim- 
stiince aei goon ris possible, as  ho foresees tlist the city of fislion 
si l1  be prefcrrcd for the seat aaf govcrnmcnt, ns soon ns tho 
IIiitisli army h a ~ e  got; poseession of it. If the seat of the kin- 
porary government diould rcmnin at Oporto, tlia bcst mctliod to 
udopt with respcd to t ! ic  otlier provinces of Portugal appearrp to 
be, k~ cnrrae thcrn to scnd deptillcs to i;Iint plnce for tlie p q o w  
of tranancting I~risiness relative to thcir own provinces; in the 
namc mnnnrr nri tlic provincc~ of l:ntrr: 1)oiiro y _Minlio nnd ' h n s  
os Montes now ~ c n d  tli~ir e esentativca. One of tEie principnl 
rraqons aiiy hia eioellocy bisiiop uin ooIy ncoede tn ron 
t i n i i ~  at  tlic Iiead of tlie govmmcnt mder tlie mndition of 
remnining nt Opnrto is, lircnuac Iic j u  persiindcd t l i n t  tlic inlinln- 
tanta of tlis t o m  will not pcimit Lirn to Eeai-e it, unlcas b order 
oi ilie prinw rcg~nt. It rnight LISO bc ndrisnblo to Icrrp &e sont 
~f p ~ e r n m e n t  at Oporto, ns i i  may Iic supposcd thnt Liaimn mal 
be m a ~ t n t e  nf cnt eonfiision for thr fitntit two montliq nftcrtlio 
French ha+-e 1 c K t .  I liwc tlic honour to be, sir, 6e. &c. 
(L%gncd) I ~ ~ E D X I L I G K  Vox DECKEIP, brig.-gcn. 
of this kingdom. His excellency tho liitikop of Oporlo has 
reccived latcly deputies from the provinco of Alemtcjo and tlic 
kizdom of Alprre. Ehrl of Es t r emad~u~~  yiz, tlio h u m  of 
Leirix, has also submitted to bis aiithority; and ii; may be tlere- 
forr: ñnid thnt  tho  whale kin~rlnm of P o ~ t i i p l  hm ~ : l r n o w l c i l ~ d  
the aut l ior i~  of  tlic tempomry go~ernment, of ~ h i c l i  tlie bisliop 
ot' Oporh ifl at tlir: Jiciirl, with thr: cxccption of Lislion md tlic 
town of  Setubal, (St. mes.) AltliougL the reasons why t h c ~  
towna hnvc not yet ncknon lcdgcd tlic riiitliuri? of tlie tamponiry 
r m m e n t  mnyba erplainod l.17 their bcing in possoasion of the 
'rench; pct thc bislio~ ia convincrd tliiit tho ínlinbitnnts of 
Lisbon will r e f u e  to subrnit to tlie tcmpomw govemment of 
O orto, in whicli tliry m i l 1  brr stronglv ni, pnrtrd by tho mcmbcrri B o?the forrner regenoy eahbiished by t e prinee repcnt, nho o€ 
conrso ~ i l l  be vcry nnxiom t o  rcsumc t,lieir formcr poma. Tlia 
bishop in asauming Qie temporary governmcnt complied anly 
witli ilio wislirs of tlir! pmplc: !ir: wits snrrt thnl it nns tlio only 
means of sa~rig  the camtry; but Xiaving Jind no intercst of hiir 
o m  in vicrc, he iei n-illing to m ~ i g n  tlic nnthnrib, wliich hc hna 
accepted with reluctanee, as soon as he is convinced that it can 
bc done ñrltlioiit Tiiiriing tlic eniisc of l i i a  povcrcip, nnd tlmwing 
the m t r y  into confusion. Tliere i s  erery reason to apprehnd 
tliat tho inlinliitnritu ot'tFic t,hrrc northorn pro~incca of J'ort~igal 
ñill never ermit the Lishop to ~es ign  tlie govcrnmcnt, aud 
sui>mit tn t\i firrnor ri:p:ney. Viay f r ~ i  oxtrrm~lp pmud of 
h a h g  i i r e t  taken :n torms, and cosisiclcr tlienrselres 8a the 
dclir~rcrs nnd savioiirs of tlirir cotintry; nnd na tlic inlinbitants 
of Lisbon u~ill bc as much disinclied to snlmik to tlic teni orary 
qorerninmt of Oporto, n rlivisiun of ths pmvinooo, whiifi RII 
excite interna1 commotion, mili natarally follow, if not supportcd 
by your cxodlency. I I  lins :ryipr:md tu  me Ilint Ilie bepl iiFng to 
reconeile these opposite pndies would bc in  endeavouriw ta 
uuitc tlie present gov2wmcnt i ~ t  CIporta with such of the mem- 
bcrri of' tlio former regency who have not forfeited by their con- 
ducl (he cuiifidsnce ot' tltc peoplu; rind liavitig opcrit~d i i y  idw 
t o  the bisliop, liis answei was. that Lo would not object t o  it 
if propo~rd Ily ou. 1 ihoreforo taka tlie lilii!rty of s n ~ ~ ~ s i i n g ,  
fM the difi& nbove mentirniea aould bc iri a grint meesura 
ren~oved jf your clcocllene wodd be p1~:iscd to m:ike il Irnown 
aftcr Lishin has suircn<iered, thr t  uu~i l  the plcrnure d the 
pritlce regent wns lcuown. you wodd considar Ilic tomporary 
~ovcrnmcnt estnlilished at; Oporto rrs the larrfal government, 
will: the itddtion oC tlie four nienibers oE ilie late regenevi ii.110 
have becn pointcd out t o  me 1iy tlke bishop as anch d i o  hnve 
belitivrd faitlifdy to tliair sovercign nnd country-m. don 
P i r a n c i s ~  ~T'urnnAai, Yramhco da Citleh, t 7 ~  Nbnteim Nm, a& 
tHri ~atijial Cwtm. Thcse rnemliers to t e  placed at; ihe head 
of $e di i ier~nt  depwtmrnts, d to  considcr tiio bishop aa ths 
presidont, 11 hose direcliuns Iheyare to fo~low-a plan wliicli aill 
meet with tlie less di%mlty, na the prcsident of tlie former 
regoncy, nained bv the prince regent, h quitted Portugal, md 
ia n m  in France. The circums~nco that Liahon is now in a 
rtate of tho ~rea tes t  oonfusion wjir furnisli a fkir prettxt ior 
fixing t1ie scnt of  lJic tampnriirj govmnmrnt iin Idir: f i r ~ t  instanr:e 
at Opr to ,  to whieli placc tlic gcntlcrnen nbove-numed wonld be 
ordcrd to mpnir wltlíoitt IO~R of lime, and tn rrporl thrmsclvca 
to tho bisliop. Indihpcndent of tlie reasons which l had ths 
honniir of ~tstting t o  yoiir cxc:ellrncy in my lettcr of thc BSnd 
inatnnt, wliy it ia impostiibIe for the biahop to lcavo Qporto, 1 
innst; Lirg Ieavc to ndd, tliat, from whnt 1 iindrrstnnd, tlin p ~ t r r  
p r t  of t+ inliuhihnh of Lisbon nre in tlie Prench interest, and 
thiit it will rrq~iiil: s gnrri~on of Rritirrh troops t o  keep thnt rity 
in order. Tlic bishop of Oporto, althongh con~inced of thc 
nrccssit.y of considrring TAidion nt pmsent nrc a militnry stntion, 
md of placing a Dritish commandant and a British garriaon 
thera, c t  froin n dctliro tlint tlie fpclings of tFio ínbithitnnkq 
mi@ hte aoundcd as little as poisible, &es that you rvoidd 
bn lcnscd to put alaa somo Portngnerrc troopa, in garrison nt 
lib>on, tagether ritli a Portupese commendant, aiio, though 
mtircly undc,r tlic orders of thc Hritisl~ gavernor, might d i r~c t  
the pbce in that t o n  or at least lie cliarged ñitli piilting into 
esecution ~ r ~ c h  ordcw as he mn mceivr fiwm thc Brititili govcmor 
ondar thst hord. IE par eroeieno7 aiiould he plcnsed to ap r m  
af this prapo~al, the bishop titinks brigadier Antonio Sinto 
Bscelar to be the propercst officer o€ tliusc who are now witli 
the Yortuguese arrny to be stationrd nt Lisbon, and who mjght 
also be direchd to organizo the m i l i l q  force of the pmvince o€ 
E3tremadura. Tlie biahop is fully eonvhcad tliat tlie k n i p o r q  
orernment of tlie counlry cannot exiat without tlia ~upport o f  
Rritiih tmops: i ~ c  ~ a p e s  that our pmmmcnt aiii leme a oorpn 
of  60M) men in l'orl,ugal afler h e  Frcncli Iinvo teen subdued, 
nntil the Poritogneae troops may bbc auiriciently arganiaed and 
drseiplined ta Ino nlila te protect tlieir o m  government. 1 have 
tke lionour to be, sir, yom most obedient and humble smmt, 
FJLR~IEIIICK VOX DIECREN, brig.-gen. 
No. XII. 
MQST TLLUSTRIOW AND MOST ESCELGEBT 8111,-Sbngth ig 
the xesidt of union, and ttose rrho have reason fo be g r x ~ f t d  
ñhould Iie most nrgent in their endeavours to promote it. I 
therefore feel it to be my duty to Iiave reconrse to om ex- 
cellency to  koow hou I rhould act ritliout diturbing tl!e union 
ao advdeeoua  t o  m7 counlr~. The supreme junta of tlie Por- 
tugueso go~crment  establishcd at Oporto, wliirii I hnvc liitherto 
obcged as thc rcprcsentntives of my sovereip, h v o  seni; mo 
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~rdors  by an olT;cer, dded tlio lat  instnnt, to  take pspas ion of 
the fortrcas of Elvm, as- Boon as it 8 h d  be eumat.ed. A b r  
baving R C C n  thwc anmc Spaniarda d i o  got posscssion of om 
strong places as friends, ta lx  ao mucli upon tliemselres as even 
to  rcvcnt tlic mnrr.11 of tlic gnrrisnn s l i i rh  1 ha8 ordrmd to 
repeca tlie ioasea siiitaiocd in the I>dtlc oE Euors, wiiieh dcpriwd 
mib of t h e  little ohrdienc~ tfint mns uhosn hy tlic c i b  nf' Hcjn, 
alwys fiivoured by tlie S znieh autliorities; aker harin seen 
tlie Yortu~nicae a<iillcií i t ieh ras  sirod dtor  t l ie aaid tattic 
titlreri possession of by ihosa eame Spiiiwds, u,lio bad lost tlieir 
oirn. rr-itlioiit ticing u+'illinq e ~ e n t o  Iend me trro tl~ree-pounders to 
analilc mc 10 join liis cxccllcncy thc &Iontciro Mor; nftor linvina 
aeen thc amti which mcre saved from the destnictivc g a s p  o? 
tliu c o m a n  enemy m d o  une oF by tlioso snine Spanirirds wla 
promised mucit d did noffiimy; aftcr havinn seen a Spasish 
Liri~ttt:urlicr tliapiite my aulliori& a l  Campo KTapor, N-hcre Iw:w 
.id& o f  tlic junta, nnd from whoncc his predeeea~or had tay;; 
away 60,033 rrowris williout reridcring :iny wucount; in a wor& 
after linring seen the mnrcli of these Spmiards marked by the 
drvashtion of our fields, and the cntmh-y dcecrkd to nvoici tlio 
flrinder of their light tmops, 1 cannot for a moment mistake tlie 
wiise of ihe orders ,$ven by t l~e sripreme junta of Oporto. A 
corps of English troops having ycaterdq passed Estrhos.  on 
tlicir rond to BIvow, lr~ioririg lliat in H. co~nl)ined arrng uo oficer 
slioutd nndcrtake eny operntion which muy be in~ended for othera, 
tltcirhy cniintcracting eaci otller, 1 consulkd licuienaiit-g~ncrd 
Hierre (Eopc), who has referred me to voiw escellencp. to whom 
in conscqucnce I send lieuteiiant-colonel tlie mlirquiti of Terncg, 
my qiiarter-mnster-gcnornl, that he may deliver you this letter, 
aiid cxplain verlially evcgtl~iof: you m g  wiah t o  know m l ~ i c l i  
refates to my sovereip and ilie geod of my country, alredy no 
much indeblibd ta ihe Rni.lrsh nalion. 
God prcsprre your excr?lcncg many years. 
(Signed) P ~ m c ~ s c o  DE PAULO LXITE, lieut.-general. 
(Dntcd) X a t r h ,  16th &ptmber, 180s. 
To tlie most illnstrions and most emollent 
sir Hew Ddrpp le ,  
Xeari-ptí~Ws, Bm~Jto, 93136 Sept. 1808. 
Srn,-Impediments having ariaen to tlie fulfrlment of that article 
of t l i c  convcntion irllícli t~ tlis ccssion of l < l v ~  Iq tlw 
Frene11 to the British m y ,  in conscqucnce of the nnexpected 
nnd nnercoiintnhlc conducf; of tlic cnmmnnder-in-cliicf of tlie 
amy of Estremadma, in bombarding tliat place nnd endeavour- 
fnp lo irn otre irprin thc Fr~ncl i  gu.rrinoii iiirme r i f  ciipil,ulniiou 
different &m tliose whicii rcro sgreed iipon by the British siid 
French generals in oluef; ancl ns tliu Britiuh corps nenL to lake 
posaessian of the above fortress, and to hold it in tlie ame of 
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the prin~e regent nntil reinfarced by abod of Portugneae troops 
is nol of suffieiont atrcnath t o  p c l u d r  t l e  poraihility of iapuit 
~hould the general &ave-mentioiied persevere in t l iv  oontenip- 
h o i i a  and Iiostile disposition hc has hitlicrto aliovin; 1 hnve 
therofore tliouglit it ndGable to orrler tlie mmainder o f  pur  
dirision, and gencrni l'aget's dvmcrd pini-d, to CTORR tlic T R ~ A ,  
and to oocupy crintrinmrntti as near as pos~ible to tlic place  buv ve- 
mcntiond. In t,hr: mcnn time colonel Brnlinm i~ gonc tu Bndajoli 
lo ex ostulate with g e n d  Ga¡lwzo on the singular and very 
inerp&oablc Line OI condnot Uo 1- seen cnuae to rdopt. . . . 
No. XIIT. 
J [ISTIFZCATORY EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE 
OF SER J O I U  MOORE AND OTHGB PERSOXS. 
S& John iVoora io lord 'bV2112'am Bentisck, &Ohw 22, 1805. 
'Sir David Baird has unfortunakly been mnt out without 
money. He h np l iedto nia, and I have nontilo givc Km.' . 
. . . '1 undrrt3co my mnroii in tiie hope tlmt some 
amivo; if it docs riat, it will d d  ia tho n d c r  of a grcat many 
distsesses.' 
' Braird has sent his d o - d e - c a p  Cordon tome : he ia without 
money nnd Iiia traops only puid to Scphmber. He unn gct nono 
& Coruña. 
' Wo are in such vant of money at this pttaco, t h t  it i~ witli 
diíñcidky 1 hare been able to spme 8 W t . ,  whkh went ta  you in 
the C h p i o n  this dar. 
'It is npon thr: gcncral msiirnnotr of  tlic Bprtniah government 
that 1 am leading the amy into Spain irithout any eritablished 
qmincs. Xrr Ihis silualiori nothing is moro c~sontially requuisite 
and unfortunately we h v e  been al>lo to procure 
'1 undeiatnnd from sir David JIaird that youwer!ro kind cnoug11i 
to lend him 40,0031. from tlte monep ~ o u  Lirouglit with you from 
En ltmd W e  nie  in the grcntcst diatrcss for moncF. I doitbt 
if tfwm i~ nliereaitlal afbrr the 34th oi tLia montii to pag t i  
t,roope thcir aubsiskuce.' 
' 1 am without a 8hilIing of moncy to pap, ~ n d  1 arn in da2 
spprcúen.ion tUni rmrn lho want of i L  aur su ppl ies nill be 8 t o p p d  
It is impossibIe to describe the embarrassmenh we are thrown 
into f i o a  the wmt of tliat esnentid arliclu.' 
AdmBml &e Co~cry to  Hr. Sfuart, Corilñai, OcfoJlur 21,1808. 
' Mr. &cm ~ i l l  h n ~ e  told on that tlic Scmirnmi~ hm bma ht 
s miliion o i  dollar., in ordór to  bo at iiie dispo.nl, beaifea, 
50,OM)I. in dollars, ~vhich me to be presenkd lo tlie rnarquis of 
Roinzria's army. In the meaihme. h e  Dritisli troops rewin 
in thcir transports at Corufiu, uticcrtain whetlzer they #hall !e 
invitsd to tko wnr, arid witILw.41 a sl~illing lupay t 7 & ~  eqsnsm.  
SFCTIDK D~IIRELATIFQ TO EOADS. 
Sir Joha Xmm do g m a l  Amtmtbw, at Almíida, ctated Xi~bof i ,  
Oetoher 12, 1808. 
' h dimsion undcr Bcresford is rnnrcliing npon Coimbrn, nnd n 
p& of jt ñill promed on to Oparto or not, as infornation i s  
rracircd fmm you tliat tlio rond from tlicneo ta Aimcida, is or is 
not pmcticable. Somc ofüccra of tlic SpanisL migineerei, employed 
in the qtinrtcr-mnstcr-gcn1:rn1'~ drpnrtmcnt, with comrniaanrica, 
are sent from Nadrid to obtnin inforrnation on ilie mbjects yon 
will wunt witlz reapccb to ~onrls, subsiskncc, &C. &c. from Alrnculm 
to Burgos.' 
Sir Johm Noore to lord m71iam Bmtsiick, Oclofier 22, 1808. 
' Colonel Lopez has no ersonal knowledge of t,his ppart of 
S ain ; but what he has 1,011 me n c m d a  with other informati~n 
~Ead befora receired. that &e p t  Yadrid rond r a s  ihe anb 
one Ii wliicli artinery could travel ; tlie 17rench broiiaht theira 
from 6iudsd ~ o d r i ~ o  to Aioantara, but by t ~ s  i t  war destroyed.' 
. . . . ' l'lic dttfrculty of obtnininn corrcet inforrnntioii o€ 
roaas, and tlie difficulties atknding the subsiatence oP troops 
through Portii,d, nrc grcatcr tlrnn yon cnn kiclic~c.' 
Siv John n b p e  a'o 8 % ~  JOAA Maore, Zíad%, nTmbw 20. 
' J. ssnt Wiiis of tho cnzinecrs by mnecntia to Salamanca, and 
befort? Uis timc I anppose he may llave made hi re ort to you of 
thr mndr from tho Tngus rtt hlrnnror. and Pumto j c  Cardinal io 
Salamanca.' . . . . . . ' Delancy is upon t I i is  road, and 
I Iinvt! directed him to cornmimicdc mith you nt Salamnnen, as 
80011 as possible.' 
Sir J h  M m  to Éwd C7asble~eagk, Oct&r 27, 1808. 
'1 m under the neceasi of asending lieutenant-general Hop, 
with the artillery, &c. by t ? le great road Bading h r n  Badajos to 
Madrid, as emy <lofomaliun agreed that no etlier waa 61 for the 
artillery.' 
W r t a m  of a vg&from captain CamnicRoel Srn.a/th, of tlre 
.mgim~m, 26th DewmLw, 1808. 
'The coirntry round nbout Añtorgn is pcrfcctly opcn, nnd 
aFords no advantqe whatsoewr to a mal1 corpa to enable it to 
opposc a Iilrg-c iorcr d t h  nny prospcct of RUCCPRP. In rctrentin~, 
howerer, tomarda Villa Franca, at the dishnce of about tnro 
lcnpcs from Aatorgn, tlic Iiills ~pprortcliing cach other fom 
soma strong ~rouiid; und tlie h i ~ h  ground in  particnlar in tlie 
rear of thc village of I<odri~fnbs nppvnrñ ut f i r~ t  ~ igh t  to ofkr a 
most adrantqeous osition. One rcry ~scrious objection pm- 
~cots  itsclf n i v i r t l i ~ ~ ~ ~  to 0111 mnking a ntnod nour lloJrii;nion, 
or indeed at any posítion hefom we come to the ~i l lagc o [  Laa 
ilbrrss (nbotit ane Icn,~iie f'rom Bemliibre), ns tlie tnlus or slope 
oE tho jiround, from Xanzand (close to ILorlngntos) unta Las 
Torres, woiild bo in f:wour of Rn cncmy, slioulrl wc be forced 
nt Ilohfgatos, and we sliodd be consequentl abligecl to retrcat 
down vil for nenrly t i r o  Iraguos, Le rncuir l k + i n i  rinpcvry adran- 
Me that siieh a circumstanco would nntnrti1Iy p v e  tliem. 
' h m  Lna Torres to Uembibre tlie ground becomes more 
Ten, hut with tlie disadvauiqe, heii-evcr, o[ the d0pe being 
etill qainst U8. Fmm Bcml,ibre to Villa F r m n  tllerc i s  geat  
iariety o€ pound but no ~ i l l o n  tlli onnnoL easiip bu turncii, 
exeepting the grotind in t le rear o€ Calct~mllos, arid aboiit ono 
l e q u e  iii Sront of Tilln Franca. This i s  Ii far tlie strongest 
position between nstorgn mti ITilia Er is airo neasrary 
ta ndd, that I l i a  usiliuii a l  Rodrigalios can casily be lurned by 
the Fonoevkdon %ond (whioh, bofori tho establishment of the 
Cmiiia, Xlod, was thi, hig-11 roarl towards Comrin). This is nat 
the case with thc positian in froiit of Villa Franca, as tlie Fonce- 
vadon mcl joins tlic Camim &d tn Cdcavcilos in front uf tlio 
pmposed position.' 
Mimor ~ c h ,  mjd m9t-s, to  #ir Johm Mwe,  l 3 e t a ~ s s ,  
Jan. 5,1809. 
'1 hnve the honour to rc ort to yonr cxcnllcnc 
ohbienos t o  our orders, 1 %ve examined tUc ncet ?!z 
betwcen tbc Lbarbour of Fcrroi nnd ths bridgc of Pucnte de 
~ u m o .  p n n r l  does not appear t b  poescss any position 
that has not several defect8.' . . ' 1 did not find my grolind 
so decictedly ar lvant~eous and mntilininfi a small spam, as to 
rsnder it tennblc for tho vanpma of an mmy to cover tho 
emliwhtion o€ tho main body.' , . . '1 should h v r !  eenb 
this rcport mtich sooner, but found it impoasible to  procure post- 
Lorses unt2 my arr ivd ftt Lugo, and since t l int t imo I have had 
vcry liad onw.' 
Dith f.o ZXlto, Co!OPUnh Jm. 0, 1809. 
" am therefore led to BU gest, that as C d  is fortiEed, 
revetad, and tolcrnblp flnntr! (tiioiigh tlis proond rhuut il i a  
cerhinly not fíi~ouralle), a3 i$ could not be c&ed by a eoup- 
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de-main if propcrly defended, as i1 contains a grcat qnuntity 
o€ cover for men, and aa, eves qainst artillcr , it mi.rht m& 
rc.i~t.nm of so1.e diira, i t  muy uo  ~uorlli eolisi6ni1.ion~rht\~lIef, 
mder present circumstmces, it may not he desimlile tu occupy 
it In prefcrencc tAo tFic pcninsula of 43ctnnzos, slioiild tho nriny 
not 'hirn off f3r Vigo.' 
& John ~ i o o r e  to h d  Casa'.he&, 0.4. 0,1805. 
'dt this inshnt the armg ia without cquipment of zny kind, 
either for tlie camiage of the Ijglit baggw of rcgimenb, actillery 
stows, comriiissari~J iitorm, or ollier ~ililiendu~cs ol'm m y ,  anh 
riot a magazine i s  fomed on any o€ tlic rouics by which ITB me 
to rnarcli.' 
Xir JoRn Mom do EDTd CasfImayB, Oct. 18,1808, 
' Xn nena o€ tlic dc &menta is there an want of zed, but In a 
aomc importaot ones $CE is much m n t  o J experionce.' . . . 
' I h a ~ e  no hope af  p t t i n g  fommcl at present with more than 
thr liglit h g g q s  oi' 11ie Irnolis, ihe aritniunilion iminctlintely 
ncocwilry for tlic service of the artillcrg, and a very scanty 
suppl y of medicliias.' 
1 S i ~  John Moore's Jmmal. 
' My mxicty i~ to get out of thc raggod ronrada of Portngd 
before tko rains,' 
Sil- dahn M m  to  h 8  ~ l l h m  Bmtimk, Ort. 2'2,1808. 
'The season of tlio ycar dmitting of no delay, there m a 
neccsaity fox beginning the mureh, and tnisting í'or idomation. 
and supplies as rre gut on; uiifortuualely our cornrnissariat is 
incxpcr onccd, and a scoandrel o£ n eontribctor, Mr. Sattaro, has 
i i vce ive~ l  us.' 
Siy Dnkd Baid to  ~ i v  dohr Jfowe, Oct. 20, 1808. 
' TLe m t  of provisiona f3r the mcn and f o r a ~ e  for the Lorsem 
has been one of the mocit serious obstaclcs ~e hnvo hnd to con- 
!ond vri~h. Km do 3 at prcscnt feel at dl ensy iipoii thnt sub- 
ject.' . . ' Tho horsea w e  suffpring very fievercly, both Br 
want of proper accommodations and food.* . . 'Fmm lord 
Gmtlcreqli's letter, I was led to eqeci i  that every prepnration 
for our e niprneot hrim been mada previous to aiir leavuig 
1:ngimd; ? n e d  Iiardly say how different tUo case naa, and hoa 
niuch 1 have becn riis~pyoulted.' 
' The continnod downess of the junh is tha only expIanalion 1 
can offer for the wnnt of pmpcr arrangemenh on tlie mutea for 
tLc rcecption of thc Rnglish troops.' 

tion, cvcn if aneh inforrnntion uhould nnt br! krpt brlck, which 
does not come tbrou~li the channel of a SIritish oficer. It is the 
choice of officera rntlier than tlie system, thnt seems ta Lave 
failed.' 
N-. X t W  do sir Jtkn Mooi-e, Madrid, 8'rl,%w, 19, 1808. 
' In yom direet cornmunicat.tions wjth Spanish generals, yon 
murit, Loirover, be roa~entcd ~ v i l l i  tlleir vcrsian of the state of 
affaire. wliich 1 do not think can alwava be relied on, becanae 
tlicy put rnattors in tlic ~ i c w  in w h h  iIicy wish you tu wo 
thcm. 
Tl>e caldation of fores wlcch the junta hope m? be- mitea 
jnthearmyundcr yonrcommmd~iUbensfdlorrs, nompedi- 
mont preveni8 th,o different corps reaching tbe points selccted 
for their junction. 
Romarks bv colmol N ~ I I J C F .  
Dritish . . . . . . 85,000 They weré only 23,500. 
La Humana . . . . . 20,000 . . only 5000 armed. 
San ,Juan . . . . . 15,000 ~ o t h r i ~  disperscd. 
1,evieafrom the snuth, ~ n ~ r  90,001) None ecer arrived. 
-
80,000 Tteal total, 28,500. 
'1 R ~ G U  con~idnr OF any means that muy moro completcl 
enme ilie earlient informrtion d the enomyh morrments tonard 
this clnnrter; Iiut ihe Spaniarde are tlie most rlificult peqle in 
the sorld to employ in this way, thcy ate eo slow, so talkntive, 
and so creclüioua.' 
Sii. David Braird €Q &T Johm Mom, Coriuña, Oct. 1W. 
'Tlic mswcr o€ &e wprcme government to  wr application, ae 
read by M? Rere ,laat night in tbe presence of tlie junta of this 
ronnce, 1s c~rtainly vrry difirent from w b t  I expeekd. 
Rsterd of eaproasing m anxiety to promoto aur ~ e a s ,  and 
dissatigfaction at the impcdimen~ti t h w n  in the m y  of onr 
measmes Iiy &e Gallician government, It merely perrnits UA t o  
land Ilcrc in tlio w e n t  of i l s  lieing found irnpracticab1e to send 
us Liy sm to  81. Andero, and Jirecta that, il" our disembarlceliorr 
tnkes place, it shonld be made in detnchrn~nta of 2000 or 3000 
nirn encli! to be sui:cossively pu~hlisd on inlo Cantillo, without 
waifing for the neeesaary equipment of mules and horse~.' 
* We have received no eiort of mkttmo from tho govern- 
ment.' 
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'Had the Spnnish govemment affo~dcd ns any activo assiti+ 
ame, the ~ b t e  o£ our eguipments nodd  b e  bcen much more 
ad~anced. 
"A11 t l i is ,  iiistcnd or at onm appoiatinrr tlio littest men in tlio 
conntry tu he rninistcm, looks much i%e private interest; antl 
patsomge being I ~ B  ubjects morc than Iho yuhlic good." 
Dittü, Ffideh, Nvu. 9,1808. 
'a k Bqped that the Aragonese army wil1 come over to fdl it' 
(the lime) 'up, h t  being an independcnt eomrnand, no o d e r  has 
rt hceii seiit. .kn exyioss wmi l  ailcr Palnfox, 5ilio will returv 
ere this morning, and thm B't PB ñqpcd that he rrill scnd nn order 
ta gcncral O'Ktil at- Sangne~sa t o  niarcli jnstmlly; nndfu~1'Kc-r 
it ts Jioped thnt  general O'Neil x d l  obcy tlus ordcr Gtliout 
wsiting Cor Qnr? from &S immediato chirf, palafox, the captaio- 
general af A q o i i ,  d o  is at Zaragoza; at aJ1 events. there is a 
loss of ahove t,ii.enty-rour Iiours Iiy tlie h a p p  system of indepen- 
dent commmds, wliich may mdce tlie dilferenco of our Iiavjng 
18,000 men more or Icsa iil tlio Iialllo tlinC n i y  Lo J'ougl~t wlia~l-  
erer the French are rcady.' . . . ' Making me oomplimcnts 
of Lhem beirir no uecrels ~ i t h  thoir dlics, Ihey' (Illo rnenibem of 
the ~ouncil of wnr) ' oliliged me to sit down, which X did for n 
quwicr orar1 Iiotir, enoudi l o  bc quito satisGed oí' tlie misoral~le 
~ystem csti~blisbcd by tliis junta. , . . 'h sliort, 1 pitied 
poor CnslníÍou iiud poor Spaiu, uid carne away disgustcd to tha 
peatest dcgee.' 
C;olml G7aham to lord W* Bcntia~nck, Cmdmmigo, 
Nw. 13, 1808. 
' If myt11ing can mah tIie junta sensible of the a b a d i t v  of 
their condiict tlUs will. It wouid indeed l imo bem mm-e fdt if 
a great nrt of tlic rlivision liad becn lost, as rniglit acll  Iiave 
bap e n c l  But uio diffiou?@ of passing so  rnzn men r i t L  
ndiRa-, ,a in s m n ~  uoatr, rna tiio timo timt aou~X hnvo uoou 
~quired  so great, t h t  I cxn hzrdlv persuade myself llicse 
peoplo rnn hc tio foalitili as ever scrioudy to Iincc rntmtníncd tbe 
idea. BuL with wliaiever intentiu~is, n.lictlicr mcrely us a. pre- 
t~nc.e for a s s ~ i m i n ~  the mmrnand for the purpose of irritriting 
Castaiios; whetTicr from tFie silly saniv of excrcisinp poerr, 
and doing aomething whicli, if by grcrit good luck it uad suc- 
ceedcrl, rniglit Iinve provcd what miglit be done with a more 
active commn,ndcr; or wlirthcr Srom n rcd conmetion of tlic 
excel~euce of tlie sclieme,-it mufit be equally e ~ d e n t  to e v e 7  
militav mnn, indccd to every man of common senar, thnt it rs 
Impssible t l i i g s  can suceeed in thiq way; nnd then the junta 
itsclt'intcrfercs, nnd to m m c  puíponc. 
Ccrstaiios' f3adieafion. 
' The nation is deceived ti n tliwaiand wa~rs; as an exampl~~  
it is lielieved tlint our armies were patb superior to those of 
tho enemy, reekkoning HO,OKM) men tlrut ot flie centre, when ynur 
ercelleneies' (thc junta) ' Iínen- that it onIy amounted 26,000 
mrn.' . . 'Madrid nsscsscd moncy end riclics; thc nohlea 
and loya1 inlinbitznts ofthnt capital ainhed to gire b41i the ono 
and tlir othcr; hnt wliilst thn nrmios ñ-(%re sufiring the l i o m s  
of fíunine, n d e d ,  rtnd miscmble, tlie po~sessirins and jmela of 
tlic good Spnriinrda remarncd quict in Mndrid, nnd tlicy migiglit 
be soun seized by tlie tyrant, as they were in the end. 
Shdari's Beqatelb, Aupd 7, 1808. 
' iTn vinm  har res thn uiicmurs grantcd by GrenI; Britnin, 
s ~ t h o n g ~ h c ~  rnay not be aohially usefui to thcmaclws. Y O  
gun+l-inltts h v c  licim sent from Frwal t n  pratcct Snniandcr or 
the toast of Eisc~y; a i ~ d  tlie Asturians have in vain aakcd for 
~rtillery froin tlre d6 ibis of G:illiciü. "Thc ~ t o r e ~  Iiuidrd nt 
Gilian. nnd not iised bg thi hrtiirinnr, haw remaiued in tUst 
p i - t  mnrl in Orictle, riltliorigTt lhcy ~ n i r l r l  h v c  nfiortlctl a season- 
able irlief to the n m y  of ~wneral Blake. The money brought 
Iiy tlio Pluto for T m n ,  wliicll hna not rakrd a mnn, rcmnins in 
tlie port wLcra it waa Janded.' 
Hujm COX i?o 8ir H .  Dalymp?e, &ville, Awywt 3,1805. 
$1 freely conress l l~at  I eannot hclp reeling some degree of 
apprclirmsion tliiit t l i i~ grcat nnr? ~ l o r i o u ~  cause mny be suined 
by tlie liüiiorul oiT~ctu o£ jciaiongy : ya  divieion.' 
Bilto, Avgwt 27. 
' The fwt is, their' (the 'unta of Seville) ' athntion hns Leen 
for somn tima pnst so m u c i  oacopirri ~ > y  ~ a i n  nn<i ~ I - ~ V O ~ O B R  dis- 
putes, and bp vierrs of prirate intsrest and adantage, rtnd they 
secm to Iiavtl ncglcetcd cntisclgr evcry coticrirn of real imporlance, 
nnd almoet to have lost siglit oF tlic general intere~ts oF tLe coan- 
try.' . . ' A  million of ilo1Iars llave, 1 undc~stimd, lirrn scnt 
out.' . . . 'It ceertain1.v aoultl not be pnident to intniat so 
h r g ~  a sum to 1Lo rnsrixjismciil of ilie ternpurary governmtint oF 
a particular province, without liaving a suflieient seeuritv for i& 
propcr qililiciltion. hly own opiniori ís, Ilid tlia lcsa munep 
m l ~ i e l ~  is pven to thcrn the better, until tlin general govemment 
js Furrnctt. T h i ~  junta harc shoivn toa cvidciit ~ i g n ~  of n rish to 
qgmid ize  themselves, md a disinclination to afljrd tlioge aida 
io u t l~c r  ~irorinres, ~ I ~ i c l i  tliey 111id il in tlicir power ta grant, 
not to &mcl just p ~ i n d s  of suspicion, that thek boasted Eopalt? 
aiid pndriotisrn hiive at times licw mixetl ~ i l h  uuworhy coiirri- 
derntiona of sclf-interegt and personal. advanhge.' 
m o ,  Spd. 5. 
'By Xr. D a s  present imtrnftions, he wouid have hrid no 
e n '  (diddnting the mancy), 'ovcn tliou~h tho iniquihu~ 
pq7wt arlition, wliieli~our excelleng h o i n  waa onw eon- 
tcrnplntedfreri alili in rxiskuco.' 
Major Coa to  sir JJcm Dalympk, +t. 7. 
'A disputo Iietreen tho twa juntaa' (SeviLlc and Glrenada), 
'which hnd ncnrly Iirrn mdiictivr: of tlio most ficrious crinsc- 
qorncas, and would pmba!lg Iioue cnded in o en hostility, lwid it 
not been pwaontrd by tlie muderato, biit Rooidrri, eunduet of 
general CashGos.' 
Ditto, iSer~illB, S@. 10. 
' !be  Rnpreme jiintn of Sevillc hnve lnttcinly mnifestccl vcry 
diffeient vicivs, nnd, I m somy to sap, thev seem almoal to 
have lost aight of tho common cause, and to he wholy nddictcd 
b llieir par~ic~llnr iiikrc~1. Jiiste:td of llirerti their elfurls b 
ti. restoration of tlirir lrgitimnte sovercign P.% tile estal>lished 
form of national govcrninriit, tlmy are soclcinñ t1ie rricaris of  
fixing the pcnnanency of thcir own, and endeavouring to sepa- 
rntr its intrrests frnm tlinsn o f  thc otlii?r parts of  Kpnin. To 
~3iat otIicr purpo~cs cnn lie nttribukd tIic ordcr +en t o  ?eneral 
Czstaiios. not io murcii on nny oooonnt br ond ~ . u i r i 8 ?  '~i> 
rha t  thc inatruetioo< gi-ren to their deputy. dón ilndrea hlinirno, 
to uplinld ilic ~ ~ ~ l l i o r i t , ~  t~iid 7rr:Rcmc tlie intrprjty of thv jiintn 
of Sevilla; to distinriiish the ni-rny t o  rrliich Iie 1s ñttnt'licrl by 
the Romo of  tlic nrmy of r\ndnliiqin; to prcarmc cnn4nritl,v tlie 
qpellation, xnd not to receiire nnr ordcrs h t  what carne directlv 
from l h i s  govcrnrncnt ? h n d  ~ b o v e  ni!, whnt otlicr motirr! coiild 
induce tlie ~trong nnd d~cided meaaure of ciiforcing olicdicnce to 
thosr: orrlm, by aitlihnltling frnm grgncrnl Cnataiios t h e  mrnns 
of rnaintaining his  troops, in cnse of Iiis rpfusing to com 1~ with 
tiierny . . . wimt has arrn the tato oenipi~tion of tRo innln 
of Seville? Setting aide tlic plan8 whicli ivere fortnerl for 
aiigmenting tlie Plinnisli nrmy in tlinsc prorincrs, und nr~lecting 
tIie considcration of tllose d i c h  Iiave becn rop~sed in tlieir 
strnd. iiieir a t p n t i o n  Iirs bprn t i r n  up in t1c  nppointinont of  
secretaric.ries to t1ie differeut clcpartrtrnenta, in  disposiiig of place* of 
cmoltimcnt, in mn king pronintions in tlir nrmp, nppointinq 
cnnons in thc cliiirch, nnd in~titutinfi o d m  of kniglithood. 
Siich a t c p ~  nrr thcsu mrtlre ilicir draigns too rrirlcnt.' 
' Tliis prorinee' (Asluriw), ' tlic first to declare warwiIIi Frnncc, 
haa, dnring sevcn monilis, taken no ekps t l int 1 ean discscowr to 
make armngements V U ~ U R ~  tlte uvenh of tliu crirm s cntcring 
the p v i n c u . '  . . a Wliat has bean done nith tievast num 
of moneg that carne from EngEand? you wiii naturdly aalc. 
Plundered und mitinpplied: evcry pcraon who liad ar Iins a n p  
tliing l o  do witli mouc mncerns enrIeavouring to keep m Iinnd 
sll he cm, knrl be re&, lot nfiirs turn out ns thcy mry, to Ueip 
Iiimself.' 

demsnd la conveyed, and the conversation I have subsequently 
had upon the suliject. Hoae~er  willing I am t o  make every pos- 
QIDe nllomnce for tho embamssmenb of this rising governmcnt, 
aud t l ~ e  inwqerience or intempernncs of man among i t8  mem- 
bcm, I eaaoat bot feel d i n t  the genemsity a ? ~ r e n t  ijritain not 
orilg cdlcd for some o,ekna\rlcdginen% of what hm been already 
. done in fsvour of Spnin, but that it l i lre~vkmight h n ~ e  clrserved 
o. etition couched in t m s  Iess r~smblinl: a rnllilmyrequisition.' 
&en it v u &serred to Mr. do Viilrsr (the nutlior of tl ie note) 
i h d  ' tiae demnr l  far eipavio mucli exceeded tlie means of anp 
countrj in tlio world, lie aaid credit or specie was indifferent;. 
proridcd they muld obtain a arl of wliat m requisite for 
p ~ s ~ i t t  serrices. NI. dr J ~ ~ ~ R -  . rtas nm not so moderate, and 
l z h l l y  proposed Ilirst I sliould cErxw billa itt once on I l ie  trea- 
8 \ 1 9  for tlle wltolc, OP ut lcast cncngc tho faith of his majestp's 
government 9 aucl~ a promise as ~houlli enahle them to mise 
m o n q  by anticipation, upon rny sigliature, unta the &rival of s 
British siihsidv.' . . . ' It was scriously demnnded also, 
tliat tlie En$tsh go~emment sliould seize the sums which the 
Prince ol Pesce nncl otlinr fricncls of tlto Frcnch inhrra t  ara 
mpposdta have in the English funds; nor muld my explmation, 
eiliiig severa1 well-known insliinvcs h pmve tlic impmribility of 
snch a measure, aed thc determination to keep inviolable wliat- 
erer wns dcposihd undcr the giiardiansbip or thc puliiio f n ~ t h ,  
re~ent 3ir. de JovelI~os and others from testifyiing some 2- 
Riimoiir nnn inmcauiip nt rny msmcr. 
M Elliam Bdiwk  ¿o sir John Hwre, Nadvid, Oct. 4,1800. 
' I am sorry to 9 2 ~  that iho new government do not bieem to 
p ~ c d  w i h  tJie CICA~U tc!~ znd enerm wbiclr the critica. situakon 
of the oountrg dmands. 
Bith tn & A. Burra&, ~~, Oct. 8. 
#In my Iast lettex I ridvcrkd to the inactiviq and a parent 
so ioeoeas ahioli prevailailed in the central oooneil mrw! t. the 
Atav ,  y. wrell as to the o t h r  business of the gouernment. 
B t t o  to & Johm si, f i n .  s. 
'Bnt it ia npon tho spot P T ~ W C  the cxmt statc o€ tlie amiea, 
md tlie cKtraordhary ineifreienc of tthe govcrnment, whose pnst 
windoot promiics eo litilc Eor tKe Futurc, sre known, ~ l i a t  the 
danger mnst be more justly appreciated.' . . . . 'The most 
simple order, lioii-ever urgen t Ihc case, cannot bo obhined from 
lhe government without a ddñculq, ~olicitation, and delay t h t  ia 
pite incredible! 
#ir John Hqs do JoAm Mom, X a M ,  Toa. 20,1808. 
' Ib ia peffcctly evident that they' (tlie jnntn) ' are altogctlcr 
pnthout a p h  as to tlicir futuro mili opcntions, either in tlie Y case cf auccess or rnkfortune. Ever~ l  rmch is rrffeeted by tite 
disjointed m r l  inoEcionL mnstrnction oi tlieir gog.overnment' 
VOL J. a K  
Lord Wiiam Bcntinck, as. weU as mgrseIP, h a ~ e  made repeated 
represcntntiuns, and 1Iin.t-e given in paper n h r  pnper Lo oblain 
8omctliing like promptitndc ancl vigaur ; but though loaded +ith 
fnir pmrniscs in thc rommonrtmcnt, we w~irccly quit tlic mcm- 
bem o£ the 'unta Lefore their altention i a  absorbed in pettp 
porenita, rnd the wrnnglinling whioh impedes oren tho .mplest 
mangementa neceaenry for tho interior government of a countr 
. . . ' In &o&, Re are doing what ae can, not what r e  wisi;  
and 1 sssnre you me havo infmom Loola ta work w i t b l  
Ditta.  Seville, Jan. 2, 1809. 
s mor la'^ tlearron is abuscd, but assed orer ; and the nrrival 
of mane7 from Mexico. ahich is resi tha srrisal of spil  Eor the 9 Fmndi, secms to llave extin~uialiat eve acntimeiit the bd 
n e a a  and lhs desperate stak oT liiiugs ou$ l o  hava areatea' 
 cado^, Heredia, Ca~telar, and Gdluxzo nrc nIT h m .  The~c 
unfortunate cificers are either priaoners or culprits, waiting the 
decision of govei-nmcnt on their conduct in thc latc tranwtions, 
If the stak of affairs should dlow thc gapernment to mntiiiue in 
cxisteece, they will probably sait mnn months, for no determi- 
oation i a  to be eapooted fmm peopre aLo  Uare in no one 
instame pnnished giult or rewardsd m e i t  sincc they ruled tha 
country. The junta indeed. to asy the trulh, i s  a t  preseiit 
absoIukly null, and rtlthough they represent tlie sovemign nntlio- 
ritv, I llave never iñjtnessud tho excrcise of Ilieir power ior the 
pubIic g o o U  
'me anbject of the sbip~ in Cadiz had not eeseapcd me, bat I 
thought i% BO w e ~ $ r  dan emw to sucgest f.o tho juuta nny idea 
cxoept thnt of living nn8dying aii Bpanish gmnnd, that 1 aroided 
the meniion of ang suliject that could seem to imply that 1 enter- 
tained any other pm~pccts.' 
Johm ~ i m ' a  J m t ,  BC. 9,1$08. 
' &i thb part rhe yople are psiire. W e  Gid tbe geatelt 
aüüoulty t o  get peop e to bring in information.' 
SsT JP~A X o t m  io XT. h, Sa7wgtan, Dec. 23,1808. 
' If the Spaniaxda nre enthuaiastic, w mnch intercated in tbi 
oanse, theis oondut* ia tlie motit ~xtmrdinnry tliat was m* 
dib i ted . '  
E ~ P  Joña Nww $0 bcl  Cmtlmgh, Aslwyu, h. 31,1808. 
' 1 &ved lierc yestcdny, whcrc c o n t r p  to his promise, and 
to rny expcctation, 1 found the mnrquis la Romana, dtli a p a t  
part of ti13 truops. Nobody can denmibe h i ~  troops t o  Iic urnrso 
tiim he doea, and he oomplains as much m ase do of the indife- 
renee of the inhalitantg, Lis ditiappointmcnt ab tllcir wnnt of  
entliusiasrn ; sntl siid te nis in diwct terras, that liad he kiiown 
bow thirigs werp, he would ncitlicr 1mvc nccepted tlie commend, 
nor hnrc retnrned l o  Sp:iin. TTilEl dl tllis, bowovoi., Iio talks of 
artacks md movemcnts whicli are quite nbaurd, and thcn returna 
to tliri Iiclplcas ñtnts of 1 1 i ~  nrmy ancl of tlle country.' 
Mr. Btuwt to  eir J ó b  Xome, Xm. 17,1808. 
The tranquillity of &iadrid is tmly wonderfnLi 
Sir David &id í~ dr Jok Mmw, h. 6, 
'D~t~iitiito na we m of mngnrsines, ibnd withont recciving even 
a &ow of assistance either from the pvernment or A b i t a n t s  
of thc coiintrv, who, oa tho eontr~ry, In many iastnnwa, cvrn 
thwarted our plane and measures, F e  coda not have adranced 
mitliout exposing omelves to dmost certain destmction.' 
f i ~  David Daird fa Ewri Cadlereagh, Astorga, 1Tm. 22,1R08. 
'hlnjor Stuart, of the 95th re~iment, mho was dcqatcliad In 
h i t  oí' this place ta obtain information, re orts that t h e  inh-  
bitmts ap ea= pcrfsotiy doprcased l>g their tases, aod seem to 
ribandon & hope oE rniuing a suocessfni resirtaoce.' 
Crpfaim CamZ i o  &T Johs Mom, 17ec- 17, 1808. 
*On my amival at Oviede al1 was oonfusion and dimiiy; the 
confidente: betmeen the poplc, &e nimy, and the junta destroyed.' 
. . . ' h il ta  be expe~led that the peaaantry can be as liear:y 
in the cansa of patriotisrn aa if they were treated with justice P 
&t. BmthBy to  H'P J. Mowe, Puebla, dan. 1, 1809. 
'The Spanish soldiem now here (ahout 700) are merely on their 
w q  to the rnarqnis do 3n Romana; and aa to my nrighbouring 
pmpaa, them are no eople whom 1 can mllupon to occupy Ilieni, 
or sliodd orpcot to Befend tliern, horever natural1 stmng they 
m o  be, for I see no pcople aho are tiini,in o f u i e  eum,-'s 
d v m  ni& any sentiments be ond sisive f d k e ,  snd hopei 
ef pmtection h m  God &nd the Jngliag arrny.< 
&fmdfrn g-a$ Fanena J m a k ,  1808-9. 
' FivB bnndrcd and twenty-nine miles of onr m d e a  have been 
in Spaie, and notwitbstanding dlwe have resd about Bpani~h 
patriotiam, wc Rnve ncvcr hcen joincd bg m mm, nor ~ R V O  wc 
seen olae q s  in m. The eople have offered UB no n6cliatancic~; 
ahile not sven a oart ar n hnva been to bc procurod bu5 by 
K K 2 
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8iatiW ofei~hfy @pie% waa already embmked for Caain, nnder tha 
pretext that they M-ere wanling for thc defcncc of its worlts; md 
that cveq-tliing a a s  prepared ter bming- the Lasness, timbers, 
kc. &C., of tlio Iield picccs; thnt hc intcnded to fnlI gradadly 
back upon Caclia, if forced to refmat; and 11iat Lo did nol at rc- 
aont doaire tlilrt any Englisli troops ehould be landad tiil &ir 
numbei.8 sliould amount to eigbt or ten thousnrid men, lest tlle 
ardour ol tlie peoplc ~lzoulci oblige him to commcncc an off'ensive 
Rystcrn of wni.ínrci hforo thc conceutmtion of a considemIrle 
Gpmisish and Eiigliah forco ~hould &ora reasonable hopea o f  
BUCCPSR.' 
Capt. WXifta'ngAam i% & H. Dalynpk, U h ,  Jzne 29,1808. 
'me president q~provss of the idca, condmned the policy 
which lwl led Spnin lo a#crnpl to cstalilisli rnanuractures I>y forcc, 
and shonped clearly tliat thc result hnd been tlia Ioss of a con- 
airlcrnblc brnndi o i  tlic rcvcnur, fhc inmrnsc of ~mng~l ing ,  md 
consequently m cnormons expense, in the p-ment of nearly 
oi~e R?fnd~ed tIi~11sand custom or r n t h  excise oíiicma, clistributed 
abm~t lie wuntry, niid tlio ruin of ntunberleas h d i m  serluced 
by the prospect of immediak pmfit to cngagc in iUiict h&.' 
fid Williarn B m f k k  to gBpi E. Dnlrppk, M u d d ,  
Oct. 2,1808. 
* A  passago of l e  Gastlerengh's letter, of which 1 moeived 
fmm you a cnpy, m~truetcd you, iF possililq to nrr~lrloin tlic 
intentions of the Spmish govcmment after tbe expUhi0n of tlio 
E'rcnch. Tlmgh not pmitivcly dirrctcd by you to nak tliis in- 
formdion, yet the occasion aliycmed to rnakake the qaestion so 
naturd, nnd accmingly oP coitrse, nnd even naccssnry, thnt  I 
availed mysrlf oT it, atid p v c  to  general Ca~tarios, to be laid be- 
fom coiint Florida Rlnnca, a memoxandum of wliieli X encloae a 
copy, marlrod h.' 
Enhetftwtn tho cvy ~ ~ h d  A. 
' It seems robable, in m h  cnse, thnt  no divenion eonId be 
rnm affectuJor more- formidable to Buonaparte thsn Lhe mar& 
of a largo combined 43ritish and Spnnish amy ovcr tlio Pvrrneca, 
into th ( i  par1 oE Frranw w11cm tllcre aro 110 fortificd p~wea lo 
peeist tl~eir nseagc into the very 1ic;irt of the country, nnd into 
khnt pnrt w ~ c m  ~ r &  dienffcclioii i a  still bilieved Lo exist: 
No. XIP. 
JWTIFICATWRY EXTRAefS FROM SiR JOHN MOORJW 
CORRFSW NDENCE. 
Bk % A W m  fo dfr. h, & l m w  ATm. 27,18Q8. 
'me mo~emenla of the fianeh givc us litlle timo fw dirima- 
aion. As Soon as the Britiah mmy  ha^ fomeda jnnotion, 1 must, 
Upon tLe  supposition thnl Gastaiios is cihcr 'bentcu. or retreatsd, 
mrch iipw Madrid, aria t l w w  m y ~ r l f  into the hrnrk of Spnin, 
and thns m al1 risks and aharc tha fortmes of tlie Bponish 
nntion, or 1 mnst fnll bnt!k iiEpon Portiigal.' . . . Thr movemrnti 
into Spain is cine of grcnkr hazartl, as; m xet-rest to C d i z  or 
Gibrnl~nr muat bc vcry uncertnin. I s h d  be entirelv in the 
pomer of tho Spnninds; but; perhnps tliis iri wortliy o f  &k, if tlie 
yovernment and p~ople of Spnin are tliought to h a ~ o  still snCi- 
fiiont rnnlrgy, nnd t81iu mrnna to mcovcr frrim thcir drfrlais; xnd 
by collectin: in tlic ~011th ba alilc, vith tlie aid of the British 
nmy, t o  resid, and fin&lly rcpcl, tlio formidniilo nttnclc which ia 
prcparod a~rtinst tliern.' 
Sir JoA* X o o r e ' ~  Jorna l ,  Salamanca, Nov. 30, 1808. 
3n ~ I E C  ni&t of thc 28th 1 rcceivcd i ~ n  rxpress from Mr. Stuart, 
at BIatli-id, oottainiiig a letter fiom 1ieut.-colonel Doyle, aai- 
notincing thc dcfcnt of Cnstniíou' army ncar Tudeln. Thry seem 
to h v e  made but IittIe resistance, iind aro, like Ulalre's, {ying-; 
tliis rcnclcrs my junetion witl~ Jhird so extr~mdy Iiaaadoun that 
1 dam not attcrn t jt: but even ivere it marle, wlial cllance lisa 
tlis -7, now tEat di t11o.e of Spain are boatcn, to shind ngainst 
tlio force di.liicli inust bn liroiigllt ngninut iIP TLc Eren~li have 
eiglity tlionsand in Spnin, nnrl t l i i r l  ihonsand wcre to arrivc in 
twcnty i I n p  from thr: 15th of t l i i u  monih. Xfi Inng nñ Cnatniios' 
armg rcmaincd there KM a hope, but. I now see none. J. am 
thcrcforc dcterinined to withdraw the nrmy.' 
Ditto, Dec. 9. 
' A h r  C~ttiiios' defeat, tlio French r n d i e d  from Nndrid, the 
inhabitants IIew to asma, barricadoed thcir street, and more to die 
rnthrr than ~1il)mit. Tliis l~ari arrcskd tlio proFrcRs i i f  tlie Freneir, 
and Madrid stiIl holds out: this is tlie first instnnce of eiitliusinsm 
~liowii; tlicro is a chnce  tlint ihc cxnmplo miiy Iiii folluwcd, nnd 
the pcople be ronsed; in wliich case thcre is still a chancc that 
tliis r:ountrp rnay bbn savcd. Upon tliis chnnra 1 limo xtoppcd 
Enird's retreat, znd nm tnkin: rncmrires to form our 'unciion 
whilst tlie Firndi nrc wliolly ocriipierl a-itli Mnilrid. b e  nro 
bound not to aliandon the cuiso m long as Bere i s  hope; but tha 
courqe of tlic popiilmc: of  Mnrlrid mny fd, or at nty rate tLey 
mav iiol be xbla lo  rcsi~t  ; iii sllort, ir1 a moment ihirig~ maF be 
aa tad na ever, unleas tIic wliolc count,rry i s  anlmated nnd flock to 
tEie aid .af tlie cnpitul, and in this pnst tho peoplc nru ynssivo! 
Sir Jolaa Muwo f~ l d  Cmtlereagh, Salmanca, Dec. lQ, 1808. 
' I eehinly tKnk the cause dcape~ate, because 1 cee no deter- 
mined npirit nnq.wlicrc, nnlctrs it bc nt %xrrigo:orr~ Shcrc i g ,  Iiorr- 
ever, R d i ~ n c o ,  and whls t  i h r e  ia that I I liinlc myself bonnd to 
run di risks t o  s i l  port it. 1 am norr difcrently sitii~ted from 
what I urs  alien Emtniius nna defartad: I lirvo beon joined b T p e n e d  Rope, the artillcry, and ri.U the ravalry (lord l ' t~c t ,  wit i 
threi? reginient.9, itr iit Toro); nnd my ,ilincliun i~,iLIi sir David 
Erthd ia  securr, thouí.111 h a ~ e  not heard fmm him sinm 1 ordered 
km to reiurri to datorgh' 
iSir John Moore fo lwr8 Cwikreagh, Lbkagun, DBC. 12. 
'1 ahd tlireaten the French oomm~uiications and creak a 
divmion, if tIie Spnniards can ninvoil thcmselres of it; bnt t?ie 
Prench bave in tlie north of Spain from eighty to ninety thoa- 
~ n n d  men, nnd more are cxpcctcd. Tour iortialiip, ma7, tlicw- 
foro, juclge what wili be OUT sitwfion if tlic S aniards do not 
disploy n dcterminntion v q  dilkrcnt to nny hnva shom 
hitlerto.' 
Sir J o h  HOOP~S J-l. flahugun, Dec. 1808. 
'1 p v o  up the mnrch on Cmrion, w i c h  liad never been under- 
G e n  but rnritli the rierr of attracting the enemy'~ nttention rrom 
thr: imics n6-semliling in tlir: rioutli, :ind in Ihe hope uf  boirig ublo 
to strike a lilow at a acak corps, wldst it wag ata1 thougIit tlro 
British army wnii rctrcnting into Portiigd; for tliia K unt: awnm 
1 lislírd inhik ly  too rnuch, bur sainctlilng I tlought mas  to bo 
kkcd  for thc lionoiir of thc scrvice, nnd lo rnnkc it apparcnt thnt 
ñ e  stuck to the S aniards long after they tlieniselres liad given 
np tlieir mnse as kat.' 
Sir J. jWUm to  lord Cmtlwoag&, Corttña, d i .  13,1809. 
' T o u r  lorkhip knows that ctld 1 followed m;p own opinion ns a 
rnilitnryrnan, 1 slioulrl havr:retircd with tlw a m y  f'rom bnlnmnnca 
The SpanisIi armies were then teaten; thero was no Spanish 
force to which we col~ld nnitc; and from thc cliarncter of the 
ga~ernment, and the dis osition of the inhali~tant~, 1waB satia- 
iied tlid no eforta r o ~ ~ l f b e  made to nid us, or Eavm tlie enuse 
in wLch t h q  were engaged. 1 was sensible, howar~er, t1isL tlie 
~ p t h p  antl hdiffmncc of" ths  Spaniards would never liavive been 
believed; tliat Iind tlie 3lritisli bcen witlihi.~mu, tho lose of tke 
cause would have bccn imputed to their retreai; and it aae 
neucssasp t o  risk L h i ~  army lo coovince tlie people of England, as 
meii ns the rest of Europe, that thc  Spnniardn lid neither tlie 
power nor tlie inclinr~tion to miike nny vltiirts hr thomsclves. It 
was fm this aeason tEiat 1 rnarelied to Snlizvn. AA a ciiversion 
it lias aiicceedcd. 1 hrought tlic rrlioln rlisposublr: foms of tl is 
French ngninst this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, 
without a sirigio movcment bcing made by any or what the 
Spaniarde c d  m i e s  to favonr its retreat. 
No. XT, 
'hrrls des atcli from the connt of Belvedere to the m t  of 
Florida ~yancn, rclntiie to the hattia of Gamonal, is an eanmpls 
~f the habitual q e r a t i o n s r  of the Spanish generals. 
-tiun.] 
Since. my nrriml at tturgoa 1 hnvo hoon ~ b c i : o d  b~ €he miemy; 
h txo 1 repnIsed b; bnt to-day, dter hvjng suatnined 
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l i s  fire fnr thirtcen Iioim, he chniged me wlth donbIe my fom, 
besides citvalry, as 1 tielieve he liad thrco tliausnnd oC tlie Inttcr, 
and six thousand infantq at lexst, and I have siiffmed ao much 
tlrrit 1 hnva rrtired un Lemn,  and mem to asscrnlile my i rmy ~ r t  
Aranda de Duero. 1 L a ~ e  sustained a great ioss in men, equipnge, 
anrl nrtillcry; m e  guns h m c  liccn suvcd, Iiot ver feñ 
Jum Uenestrosa. niio earnmnndcd iu the aotion, t!kn~ii:i 
himselr, and mnde a moat ~lorioiis rehnt ;  but as soon na tilo 
cat,dilry attacked, dl wns coiiruüion and disorder. I slid eend 
your excellency the particnlars by an officer when they crin be 
promed.  Th volurlterrs ol ZaTm, of Sesena, of Talcueia, md 
blie first battalirin of infi~ntr of Trnxillo, nnd the proviiicids o f  
Radajos, LrU noh nrrivod ui md cansegiicnlly I ihrll bs 
able ta sustnin myaelf at ,hncla, btlt ihcy are williout; cnrtridgcs 
nnii ammunition. I Iiimcnt tlint tlic ammiinitíon nt 13urgos could 
not be brouglit off. Tlic cneiiiy followed me in smnU numbeni: 
I am now rctiring (10 P.x.), fcar in~ tlicy mny follow me in 
the morning. 1 yes ted l y  Leard from gcneral DlaLe, tLat he 
fcrarcd t l i c  cncmy rrould nttack Iiim to-&y, bnt his dippositionn 
fmstrated the enemj-'s deeigns, beginiiiiig tlm wtiori i ~ t  ~leren 
at nigkt. (S i y ~  c d) CONDE DE BELPEDEBB. 
No. XVI. 
' Dxns lernbme lettre que v o u ~  m'avez fait llionnenr de m'kcrire, 
vous me prics aueai, ATonsisiir, do rous donner quelques 1urnii.m~ 
sur la poursuib de Mr. 10 gCnErnI sir John Mmre. qumd il fit ga 
retnijtc sur In Goroyno cn 1HWa #do no pen:nso pns que wua 
desiriez des dEtails sur cette opérstion, cm ils doivent voua &tre 
pnrbiteme~it connw, mnia jc  süisirai arco cmprc~semcnt i'owis- 
sion que vous mc procuroz pour r c n h  X la mCmoire de sir John 
Moorc Ic thmoignngo que wa di~poaitions íiirent toujours le4 pliis 
conveliablcs aux circosistances, ct; y ' c n  proIittant haliillernent 
dca avnntngcs que I r s  locnltt~n pouvnient liií ofSrir our nccondcr 
sn vdour, ii m'opposa pnrtmt la reaistmce la plvs &erequc e ~ I a  
mieux ealcul6c; c'est ninsi qil'iE tmiiva iine inort glorieiiae derant 
la Corogne au milieu d'wi combat. qui doit lionorei eou muvenir. 
'Pm's, ea 15 nTwmb, 1824." 
No. XVII. 
LElTlCR FnOM 3iR. CANNING 'CO h. FRWP:. ' 
hdm, &c. 10, 1808. 
8rn,-The messanger, Mills, n h v ~ d  hoi-e pestcrdny ~ 4 t h  yoa 
despntclies, No. 19 to 26 iuclusivc; and a& tlie s m e  time daices 
ucrc receivcd fmm iieutcmnt-gcncral sir Das Baird, datcd on 
tha %th ultimo nt Astorg, wliich &ate t h t  general to ha- 
recavcd intcl1igonm from sir Jolin ?nonre of the complete dcfent 
oi general Castaños's army, and of the determination taken b 
sir lolin Monrc. in oooscqaonee, to fdl hmk iipan ~ o r t u p {  
wlde sir David Daid is directecl bp sir John Moore to re-embark 
his troops, and to proceed ta the %que.. Thus nt the carne 
mornciit at which 1 rcce iv~  imm gon tlie caution enterlalned ia 
vonr No. M), t h t  a retreat into Portugal would bo oonaidcted 
tlw ~ c n t n l  j u n h  as iutlicttling an inlention to nbandon ilie 
cama of Spain, liis majesty's governm~nt receiva the infomation 
thiit thia mcnctwe liw nctiinlly liecn ttdoptod, hut iindor eimm- 
atances wliich, it is ta be supposed, could not llave been in tho 
contemplatjun of  the ccntrnl junta. To obviah, homcver, tlio 
oaailiility of sucli au imprcasioii aa yon apprcliend lieing pro- 
auced ort tl. Spaoish gorernment by the ret rcat  of tho Britiah 
m i o s ,  losc no tinio iri coovefig ta gou Iiis mnjestfs iom- 
manda, t h t  you sliould fortliwith g i ~ e  tho most positive = s u r -  
nnw, that tlir: ohjrat of tliis mtrrnt i s  no other tlinn thnt of  
effectin~ in Portnnal the jurvetion which tlie svmts of tho war. 
hnve u n f u r h ~ t e l y  rendemd imprncticnhlo in Spnin, with tho  
p o s e  of prepai iq  tlio nholo znny to movs fornard again into 
paln wliencver and in whatever direction their sewiocs  may ba 
bcst emplqed in su iporb 06 tlie comrnon cause. Li proof of 
this inteution, ou will ioforrn tiie Sprnish goromment. thst sn 
additiod rriniroemeot oP cxvnlry i i  nt ~ l i b  mornsnt sr i l in~ for 
Lisbon, and that tlie Britisli army in Portugal al11 he still 
furtlier augtncnkd, i l  necessnry, ao aa lo malru i ip  n suba/an.ntiv~ 
and effectiire force, adequate to any operation for wkieli nn 
opporttinity mnlp bo offcrcd in tlio contre or sonth of Spnín, 
ac.corriiiig to tlio c o m e  wliich the war m y  take. But mhile 
vou mrllíe thiri cornmiiniention to tlie Spnnish government, it is 
extrernely uecessrir tlinl you sliould mcompany i t  wilh a di- 
tioot nnd preiiing Hrnaod far «ie oomrnunieation to you ana to 
tlie Britisli gonerd of ivlratever he tho plan of oliemtions of tho 
Spanisli armies. Sir Jolin Moore eomplains tliat Le Iiad not 
rcccivcri tlio tili~htcct intimnt,ian o f  nny such plnn ak thr: tinta 
of Eiis last deapntcli o£ tlle 20th ultimo; and 1 am afrnid tlio 
nppointmcnt wliicli you mention in poiir No. 20, of goncrni 
?iEorln t o  discnea witli the Brihsh commaoders the mode of 
co.opcmtion lietwccn the Britisli and Spankli armics, d l  not 
linve taken place ti31 a h r  the defoat of tlie S anish nrmies will 
have entirclp disposod of that qnestion for tle premt. TU, 
Ianguago oF iiir David Baird, Rilh rsupect to defe& of informa- 
+ion. is prcB~iely the same as t h ~ t  of sir Jolin Moore. Sir David 
B~iird Iius indeed h d  thc ndvnnti~gc of snmo intcrcourac witli 
the rnnrquis de la Romana: but tlze rnarquis de ln Rornaim 
himerlf cioc~ not appcar t o  hnve becn in ossession of any part 
of the ~ i a a a  of his gorernrnent, nm to !are reoei~ed mg dii- 
tinct accoitnt oF the numbew, atate, or deatination even, of eitIier 
of tho nrmies whicli he was Iiimaelf appoinled to aoinrnrand 
The British government has most cautiously md sc~npulou~ly 
abstained from intcrfcring in any of the conncils of the junta, or 
precruming to awgest b them by what plan the alould deí'ond 
thpir country. l lut when tUe g~icstion i s  esto tk ro-operstion 
of 3 UiIlish f o ~ w ,  Lhey h e  a righl aiid it is I lwk  duiy lo 
reqiiire tliat some plan sliodd have been formed, anri Fieing 
formcd, ~Iioirld be communicnted to tlic British commmdcs, jn 
osder that t o  may judge o[, and (if Le s M l  sppro~c) may be 
reprtrcd to executc tEie 8hre  intended to be xsaigned to h. 
%ou wril roeallcat, t h n ~  tlio n v  nliioli Uns  becn aypmprded 
by- hihia majesty to  the dorenoe of Spain and Portugd is not 
niercly a considemblc part of tlio dispostiblc forr:c of tliis 
i k  is, in fmt, the 13rilhh m y .  Ilic wuntry has no a 
zihPT%ee disponnbla. l t  m., by n grent clfiirt, rcinforco tha 
arru [ur oran adequale purpose; Ziut auollier army i~ liu not to 
nend The propornlr, therefore, sliieh are mnde, somwhat tao 
ligtilly, for iilipu~iding Iiartu of tliiti Fiirce, sotnctiines to unti of 
tl ie Spmish armies, sometimes to anothcr, nnd the  hi l i ty with 
n Iiicl~ ita ~crricca aro c~i~llcd tiir, mli~rcvcr thc ciripncy of tho 
moment happcm to presa, are by no mems suited to tlie nature 
of tlio Porcc itself, or mnsonnnt to tlic vicm with which hi 
niajesty has eonseiikd to emplciy it in Xpuin. You art: d r d y  
appriaed by my former despiikli (cnclosing a copy o€ generdl 
&l!lvorv'n iiiatrtrclioiis), lhut lllc Iirilisli, army must tic ltcpt 
tageeher untlcr its oan commandcr, mwt  ncl as one body for 
somc distinct objcct, ~ n d  on sonic P C C ~ ~ O ~  plnn. 
1Ct will rlccline no dilíicnlty, i t will aLirinIc from no rlan~m, when, 
tbrougli. tlint rtilEculty nnd dnngcr, t2ie remmnncler i a  cnabled to 
soe Iiiti way to some definitc piirpose. But, in order to tliis, it 
wilI be necossary that sucli purposo shodcl have been revionslg 
nrrao~crl, niid Liirl iiia Britirh arm? should not %sin%e le'&, as 
that OS sir Jolin Moore and sir David Baird Imve recently been, in 
tlio licarl uf Spuin, witlioirt one word uf jiiformnliou, cxcept sueh 
ns tliey could pick up from common rumonr, of tlio emnb paiising 
nroirnd thcm. I'rrr ioirsly, tllcrcforc, to rncrnl sir J o h n  Moorc'a 
~ a i n  e tering Spain. ii mil1 be oxpectefthat some elrni. erpo- 
mtion slioiild ho mndc to him of tlic system upon which tho 
Spaniards intcnd to conduct the ~ a r ;  thc pointswliich t h e ~  mean 
to contest witli thc arlvaneíng cnrmy, nnd tlrose wliicli, if preascd, 
'by a series of reverse, tliey ultimxtcl~ propose to defend. 
She part msigned to thc 31rit14i nrmy in the combine& 
tion miisl be seltled witli sir Jolirr Moo~w, md ha will be rs 
not unambitious of that in rrliich he mtiy be opposed most directly 
to tlio enemy. Tlie oourngo ~lnd constany displnyed by ths 
junta, under the f i s t  reverscs, are in the highcat denme wortIiy of 
ndmirat,inn.* And if thcy ~hnl l  pcracvcre in tlir! anma spirit, and 
ean. rouee tEio couiitm to adquatc exedions, there is no remm 
to dcspnir oi' t,hc itltirnntc s:tScty of Spnin. l h t  it is most 
earnestly to be lroped t h t  ilio sama eonfidenc~ shicli Ilicy 
The extract which foUorrm thi letter furnishea a curious wmment ntn 
this pwrge. 
appar  to  h a ~ e  placed in the abili of tlieir armies, nnder Bl&e 
anrl Onstofion, h r r ~ i ~ t  tlic nttne "K a of tho cnomy, wilZ not lio 
qain doptcd as their guidc, again to deecive &cm in tite 
ulterior opcrntiona of thc mar. It-ia to lic Eiopcd thnt they will 
aeigli well ilieir rcnlly oxisling mcans of dcfence ainst tlie 
mema of nttnek on t i lo  prrt of tlic encmy, and that ?tliey h d  
tlicm uncqunl to mnititain s linc oí' defcrico ns extended ns tho 
hwe Iiihrto attcrnpled to rnnintrin. tUov dl at once fa bao$ 
to that poiiit, whcrcrcr it mny hc, nt which timy cun 110 mire t l i ~ t  
their stand aill  be permaacnt aiid tlieir resistance effectud. It 
is olivious hlint ndcss tlicy cnn rcekt cffcetunlly in tlic pasacs of 
the Gidnrarna, or in tlie Sierra Morena, tlie ultimatc point of  
xetrcat, aftcr a series of defeatc: more or less numerous and 
edausting, acmrding. na tliey s t id  tlio sooncr or the later maka 
up tlieir minds tu rctreat, i s  Cadin. Gupportcd by Cadiz on ons 
s!de, nnd 3ip t l i c  fnrtrcw of  Gitir~Itnr on ldic otlicr, Uir! rcmnining 
armies of  Spfiin miglit nnguc~tional>l~. rnaltc such a stand. ns no 
force mhicli Itrnncc wnld hring ngainst t ticm could occrpomr; 
and tlie assietanco of tlie British ariiiy would be iii tliis sitnaticiu 
incalculnbly augrncnt~d bv the communicntion rvitliGibrd tar mcl 
the sea. 1 am nvrase of tlic jerilousy with wliicli tlie mention of a 
British force of anp sort couplcd with tlie name of Cdia wiII be 
rcwivea. 13ul t l iu  lime ecems io  be mrivutl a t  wLc?l WO must 
commiinicato wiih epch othcr (thc S anish ~ovemment and Enp 
iand) W ~ L I I ~ U L  jodousy or IPEPIVC, Rii nlqjrat . lias zliiurad, in 
the faco of the rrarld, soy motire of intcrestedpo~cp,~you are 
aiitlioriaril to rcprnt in tlio most ~ o l o m n  mnnnrr, if ncmsnrg, 
iliat abjurntion. Jliit if in tlie midst ~f ñudl ~ncrifices and sncll 
eñertioiis ns Grent 1Jritnin js rnnlring for Slinia; if nftm having 
forc~one aU oljecta of liartial benefit, many of which tiic state of 
Epain (if we Iiarl been so uncenerotis m to mlle tliat advmtage of 
ii i muld llave liroughl wiihin our rcach, klie fair opinion ol tlie 
dritisli ovcrnmcnt cnrinot hc reccivctl ~ i t l l o u t  auspici~n; tlierc 
is littlc fopc o l  real ~ n d i d i t y  oontinuing to aubairt u oder rsscrscs 
and misfortiines, sn& ns Spajn mmt iiiit too siirely cxpcct, nnd 
such are at nll limes tlio testa of sincerity and confirlcncc. It 
i s  the opinion of thc 13ritisli covcrnment, that t l ie la~t  staucl {if al1 
elso fiiil) niust hu mndu at Catlíz. 11 is thu opinion of i l iu  Dritísli 
govcrnment, tliat tliis stand nill be mnde in vain onl/ if tho 
ncccssitp of ra~oiortiiig to it i a  too lnta ncknowledgrd, and tho 
means of malting it cffectuaIly not providently prepared. It 1s 
t l i o  opinio~i of lie Brilisli ~uvcrnmcul thnt on no account shonld 
the naval mcans of Bpaiii be suffered LO fa11 into tLe I~ands of 
France, or tlioso of Fr:~noe to bo rccavcreil I?p lier. It is tlicir 
opinion tlmt tris may be preventerl; but to  prevent it, tlie ohje& 
must l)c füirly InoTcicc?d iitlicforchanrl; arid it is lioped thiit a ~iiirit 
of distn ist  unrortigr boih o€ tliosc aho cntcrtain it, and of tliuse 
iritli rcspcct +a wliom it, i s  cntcrtaintd, 1141 not ho ~ n f f c ~ ( l  to 
interfere between an oliiect of so grcat importanw and tlie mems 
of cnsurinp its mc~implishment, 11 is :~bnoiu~ely neceñsrtly lo 
imc: no tiinc in hringiiiq tllk subject fiiirlv brfore the Spanish 
Eovernment; md ii; in doing so, you sliodd tioe either in ,lL 

No. XFIII .  
ABSTEACT OF TFiE BULITABY FORCE OF GEEhT URITAIX IN i R O í L  
Extracted from the  Mjutant-general's returus. 
Cadry..  ....................................... 30,000 
Foot g m l s  ............................... 6,000 
Jnfantry of the line.. ......................... 170,000 
htillery ........................................ 14,000 
Total ............... 220,000 
Of thww M t m  50 and 60,000 were employed in the Colonies in Xndiz, 
the rerndnder \vere diapo%t\ilc, beaziise from 80 t o  100,000 militix, d i f b  
ing from the r~gular troops in nothing bnt the name, wcre mlffiicimt for 
tho home duhm. If tu thia force w e  add 30,000 marinetr, the nnilitary 
power of England niust he considered pdigiow. 
RETURN OF BRITIsn ~ m o m  eMBanKm FOR POETL-QAL 
u-D SPAIN m 1808. 
672 i sa  ... 
94 ... 
9384 Cmmanded lrJ1 Si d Welleslq; em- 
barked at Corlr the 15th, 1 Gtli, and 
17th Jane, 1808 ; d e d  12tli July; 
landed st Jlondego, Augutit  IR^. 
4702 Comniandcd by genernls Aclnrrd mi 1 Anstrutlim: emhark~l  nt lIarPnch. 
July 18th 8:nd 1 9 h  ; landed at ML 
ceira, A~igwt 5'0th 1808. 
4T13 Cw.1nnandd by g e n e  Spencer; em- 
Li~rhcd iiICadiz; Iaridd ntlllundego, 
Auyst 3rd. 
11,824 Coninixndwl fimt by air John Moore, 
~econdly by sir Ilarry Bumrd ; em- 
barked at Porhouth, April, 1808; 
sailed to the Ijaltic; wlunied, and 
mil4  tu Portucal, JuIg 31st; Imded 
at Ilmin, Augst 2Pth. 
879 I ~ n d e d  ~t  Lishon, nec. alat, 1808. 
1129 hhbarkd at Gihraltar,gailed hug. 14; 
landd ;it the Tagus in September. 
1023 Cornmanded by g e n e d  Ileredord; m- 
hrkudat Hadeira, saiied Aug. 17th; 
lnndcd et tlie l h p  in Seyitcxaber. 
812 Commnnded by gcncral C. St tnrt  ; 
m1isrk~d tLt Qraveicnd ; Irrncled at 
Lisbon, Sepkmhr 1st. 
11,068 Commnnded by &ir l). X r d ;  cmbarked 1 at Falmoutli, s d e d  Oct. 9 ; arri~ed 
at Cw1'i1fial(3th Oct.,landed 2Y tli do, 
1022 1 T w o  reginients aent mund to Lilion 
S frm sir D. U n i d a  faroc. 
2021 ' Conimnndccl by lord Pnget; embarked 1 at  Fortmoii~h ; Irnrleti nt a d n ,  
- October 30th. 
46,719 1 
1623 A d d f m o r e ~ e n t s n e n t t o l i s h h m  
- Corufik 
48,341 Gand total, of which 800 wera arti5- 1 cera,aagg;oa t r d i i 4  a n d c o ~ i ~ w ~ k  
No. Xx, 
RETURNS QF KIU;LHD, 'FOUNIIED. hM) MTSSING, OF T I E  
AIEMY UZJDEIL TIIE COMMttYD OF GIR h. ~rELJXSLEy. 
3rd ditto, major-general Nightln- 
................................. gale 82ud 
5th ditb, O. Crawfurd ............ 
4th higade, brigadier-peral 
.............................. 
Total miüah .............. . 13,899 
... 
... ............ 
hfme of the line 1000 
For tapw,  colond lPFsnt... 400 l,fibO 
250 .................. 
CC 
Q m ~ d  t*Cal, British 2nd Porbgem, i jndading sick men, &c. &C. 251642 
No. XXI. 
BRi'TLSFI ORDF=R OF l3ATl!LP,. VnZmRO, 23ut AKGUST, 1808. 
ñatracted from the Lldjutnnt-gemda date% 
6 ditto, bri1zdier-gcnersi Fane . 
Centro. 4053 
7th ditto, brigiulier-peral An- 
fltrnther ........................... 
2nd b r i p d ~ ,  rnajor-general Fer- 
p o n  .............................. IgH3 Iass! 
ara ditto, nmjor.gcncral Nighk 29th 
ingde ............................ ( 82nd 
wing. 1 1 lrza 743, 6th 4th ditta. brignlier-gen. n m e s  1 32nd 1 1829 8th ditto, m,mnjor-~m1hcIanddd. ] i:th 1 1880 1 
45th 
Rewm 5th bripde Lrig.-pn. C. Cmwínd 511th 
J 1 Uln  12144 2744 
Total Britiah .................. 18,089 
Portngncse, colonel Tmnt. Infantry, 1400 ..... ............... 1,850 
ansid total, including sick, woundd, and misshg ......... 20,639 
No. XXIL 




~ ~ ~ I ~ h T I O N  R.ElWEN O 3  THE FREXCE AXIMT UNDER 
GENEILIIi JUh'O'l'. 
G k a d  total, 25,747 men, 1655 h m ,  and 30 pieees nf artiiiery. 
Note.-On tbe a t a  of each divísion there are- 
1 Uenernl of diviaion. l 1 Inspector of rereviewa. 2 Uenemls of lirigde. 1 Cnmmiriawy of ~ n ~ n e e r s .  7 Aidea-decamp. 2 Oficem of engineew. 
.......................... 
I General. 
Artillcry 4 CoIonels. 
2 Chefs-de-bataillon. 
Engimm 1 Colonel. The remainder in t h s  ........................ 1 2  cnptnins. 1 ~ r i s i o n ~  
TTE FOLLOWING EXTRACi' F n O M  A MINUTI KiDE BY 
RIS ROYATJ EIGHMESS TI-LE D U U  OF Y OltK IN 1808 
Provcs thnt  sixty thoirsand mpn muld huve hcon provided for 
h e  campaign of 1808-9 in Spaifl, without detriment to otlicr 
Bcmcea : 
'There are at premt in Por- &mIq .................. 1,640 31,446 tvgal ......................... 1 lnfantry, 34 b a t ~ o n p  29,806 1 
.................. 3,410 14,82D 
................ 
*Of thia force tha 20th drngoonar nnd ei@t battdions ahmld reinain in 
P&upl. The di.sposxblc fnrco mould tbm lm- 
Cmvatm. Xnímtq. 
FromPortngril ........... ....................... 1,313 23,575 
Under d e i s  ................................ . 8,200 11,419 
.................. Force t o  bo dram frpm &cgy 8,000 
- -
Totd.. ............................... 4>518 42,994 
* n  thia mny be rddeil, four rcgiments of c r d r y  1 2,660 2,151 and thc two brigadee ofgusrrls .................. 
- - 
Cirand total .................. .,.,. 7,015 45,428 
'When to thisym cdd four h t h i i o n s  oF infantry, which may be 
%p"r"d, nnd tho artillery, it will f u m  s corp  uf about akty tlioumnd 
rank nnd file.' 
Note.-me detaiia of names and strcngth of &e regimenh m 
oniitted te save apaoe. 
No. XXV. 
Thid M m .  &md fih"id-iwa, m mt%eion. 
Lt.-gon. MnKon&Ia Trascr, L1,lmit.-gen. slr John Aope. LL-$en. slr David Balrd. 
mh,3Btii. 31-4 43nI, !23rd, 76111, Wth, Slsl,9Qnd, 719t, Ilst, lGth, lnk óMh, 42d .  
Bth, 6th. Sfith, 32118, 14tli, 5th. 2n4 dlh,  Ist, R3rd bat.~usrdn 
Wllmots hi-~p. of nrtiltcrs. D i m i n n d ' s  hrig. of  art. Uean's brignrlc ot miI1cy. 
G pieces. G piccea. ti picccs. 
let battlllon 2nd bnttdlon Blst, !2Qth, 1st M.%th, 2nd bnt.85th.Pnd ba. bmd, 
K.U.L. K.G.L. S2nd. 2nth. 1st bat. 4 d d .  
Carlbcw's liiis olarW- 
lery, 6 pleues. 
Cwalvy. 
h t . - p e r d  lord Paget. 
Eght dt%gmm K.G.L., 15th liglil; dmgoona, IOth, 18th, 7th humrh 
DO-u'e md Evolin'~ troope of homs artillery, 12 piem, 
a d i l l e y  Pare ~ n d  R e s m r i .  
Colonel Emlimg. 
B brigsde. ........................................-. 80 pieaea 
fi dith, attachbed to the divisiona ............... 56 ,, 
- 
66 
V O L  l. L.L 
Extracted &m the djntmt-genernl's mming  date of tht  dsy. 
Note.-Of 66 p s ,  48 wew attached to tho diGions, the 
rernaindcr in resme,  wilh ihe exrwplion ef one brigado oT 31bs. 
No. XXVI. 
T m  following G c n d  &hrn, c h c t e d  from eapecial re+ 
mental: reporm, received at  the Horse Gnards, contains the 
whole nnrnber of non-mmiasioned oficcrs md mon, c a v d q  
and infmky. loi t  during sir Sohn bloorc's campaigm- 
Of this numlier 200 rere left in the wine-vaults of 
Bembiljrc, und ncnrly 500 wcre stnyglers from thB 
troops that m m h e d  to Vigo. 
Lod beheen the depadure of the 6adT..+ 
rrmy fmrn lngo mil tbc smbarkn- 1 Inimtrg... 262: 1 2626 
................... tion at Comiin .. 
OF the whole namber, above 800 centri~ed to esmpe to Por- 
higal, and bein united with the sick left by the mniments in 
&ey formed a co S of 1816 men, uiiioh being 
: P P e r n ~ ? ~ U c r  the name OE ;Re uattaiions of btacimenta, 
1í(! ood a e h o  at Oporto and Talavera. 
rRe iewa or m o l i , ~  abmdrned aanng the rebeat nere a i r  S-,,,L. 
These guna were landed at Coruña w-ithont the geaerd'a know- 
lerlgo: tl~cy nevor went beyond Viila Franca, and, not bein 
horscti, fiey aere thr~m down tbe raolts w ~ e n  th W p s  cpitte! 
that town. 
me ems ased iu the battle of C s d  were s~ iked and thrm 
i nh  thc su:i. 
X.B. Some M n g  errora may asibly have q t  into the 
regimantnl statoa in consoqtianec o f t h e  diíüouitg of nacertnining 
exactly w h c ~  emh man was loet, but the inaccuracies mdd not 
xffect ths total monnt above fifty men more or Iesa. 
No. XXVIL. 
M following staks of the Bpankh armiea are not abictIy acw- 
rate, because the original reporta fmm whence they have been 
drawn wem gonorally very loose, often inconshtent, and some- 
times contradictory : ncverthelcss, it i s  believed that the approxi- 
mntion is suficient1y nloose for any useful purpose. 
Nnmbers of tho Spanish armies in October, 1808, mmding fo 
t h e  reporta transmitted B &T John Moore by h rnilitay 
agenk. 
A m d  pfwm 
Regalarir inempmetd with 
U i s  rcgolar rroopo. 
Dittn ncw lovioa from Gisnadtb ......... 
In the M r i s  ........................... 18,000 
XoaI nnmbera of t h ~  SprinIah amies iu l is  of battle, in tlie 
months of October, November, and December, 180s. 
Calalq. 
Anng oi Pdafm ............... 560 
Army of Castaiíos ............ 2200 
Armg of Blake ............... 100 
Army of  Romana ............ 1404 
Asturiana.. ................. ..... ... 
Amy of wunt BeIvedem ... 1150 
Total ........................... 5404 
Dednct Rommab cavalry 
anrl p a ,  which nover 
kvneinto tbeline ofhttle 
80,ORO 26 Dith  at tho bnttlca 
8,000 25 1 nf Xnrnnia anl  
8,000 ... Espinom. 
TOtd. htOught jnbfimt line 1 4000 g9,150 121 ............ 103,150 
..................... of battle 
Xarnutry. Ci*. 
Were h t m  &t the Somo- 
... 
sien%. 30th November; 
General St. Juan's divisim 12,000 murdered tlieir p n e d  
ai Txlavern, Uewinhr 
7th nnd dispersed. 
Fiigitivas from h o n a l ,  
... 
Fld from 8eguvia and Se- 
..................... 
commanded by general pdwda, Uec. Znd, d 
TIeredia dispednt'l'zla~em, 7th. 
Fugititivm from Bhkek ~ r m y  Bcratcn nt Ainncilln, 20th R-Dpirod by Dno.; reiriii iiiinOal3icia. 
Infantry diriperaed there. 
. - 
Astorian levies d e r  M- 
laaterwi ..................... 6000 ... Were not cnopged. 
... 
Defwted anci dispersed, 
... 
F*tives isnemMd hy 6000 21th Dersrnbsr, hy tha lum IreIiinci 1L l ' a p  4th corpm, nt Nmnrns. 
-- 
Total, bmght  into 2nd Iine 88,000 1400 
To onver Mnnre'~ advsnce t h e ~  wem on +he mro, iin Bis- 
ay, anrl in the Autirrimii, accorrling to the Slmnisli and 178,006 
tho mili* wmtfi3 ~ o r t a  .................................... 1 
... Tho reel numb~r brought into tho &Id waa .........,.... 103,150 
-
Exaggemtion ............ ., ....... 6$860 
Note.-The real amoant inJ.o.de the aick in thc 6eld bospitds. 
APPENDTX. 
No. XXmT. 
mOTION 1.SThTE OF THE FRENCR ARMT, C A L W  'TRE, 
FIlZST PAZT OF TEE A M Y  OF SPMN,' DATED OOT. 1, 
1808.  
Red-qun- Vitorin. 
TkmpitnIntion, extmcted h r n  tho Tmperial ataha, signcd by the prinoe 
of Neufch..tel. 
Ofücicwa induded., presant nader arnur. 
Mtu. Hom 
Division imperial @, commaaded by gen. Doraenne 2,423 786 
Do. reserve mmiry, imperial gen- gein. SaFipy .+. 
damios, sod othcr t r q s  [ 94 4 ............ 
C o y  of rnarshal & ~ i h  ........................... .. 15,595 2,923 
Corpa of marshal Ney .................................... 13,f 56 2,417 
' 1 ..................... 22,640 3,352 
Troop emplnyad 5~ mweablo colnmns 
in the rlefence of the fmtior from ..................... 6,042 261 
ih yonm to Belgade. ................. 
............ Fort of Femndo, Fiyara~, gen. R s i  4,027 557 
Division of gen. Chabt ................................. 1,484 ... 
--
Total ..................... 109,960 19, S12 
.¿Vote.-ht this pariod the Spaniards and the d i b r y  zgenia dwags 
that t'ae Frwnch h d  onfy from 35 to 45,000 meri of sli m p n s .  
STATE 6X' TTIE FR.iWCIT U M 9 ,  C m  TEE 'SEWND 
P M T  03' TBE ARMY OF SPAIN,' O@I'OBEXt 1,18rJ8. 
Tn~s army, compoacd of tho troopa coming fsom tlio grana 
m y  m d  from Italy, wne by m imperial decrcc, dated 7th Sep. 
ternber, divided into six c o r p  and a resame. 
P r c ~ n t  under m 
Mm. Roma. 
1st mp, rnamhd Pictor, duka of Tklluno . 29,547 5,552 
5th do, ,, Mottier, duke of Tmiso .  21,405 3,495 
6th do., datined fos Ney, duke of Eichingen 52,691 3,945 
... . Infa,n~ofthevicetoyOfSpain'~yarda. 1,913 
Cavalry ditto . . . . . . . . . . .  456 551 
. . . . . . .  1st divisionofdqoonri 3,595 3,994 
2nd &ti% . . . . . . . . . . . .  2,040 8,069 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  3rd ditta 2,020 2,239 
4th ditto. . . . . . . . . . . . .  8,101 3,316 
5th Jitto . . . . . . . . . m . .  
. . . . .  Divigion of general SebhFthni 
5th repiment of dmgoonn . . . . . . .  
G m a n  diviion . . . . . . . . . .  
Poli~hditto. m m .  . m 
Dutch brigade . . . . . . . . . . .  
Wdphalian light horse . . . . . . .  
( X e n d  Souhsm'a divipion . . . . . . .  
General Pino'a ditto . . . . . . . . .  6,803 
24th rq$ment ofdmgoons . . . . . .  664 
Regimant d royd Italiam chawnie . . , , 600 
negimmt of ~~poIeon'a dragoom . . . .  500 
ArtiUery and engineera in m b  for Pwpig- 
w - . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,706 
- 
Toh~ofaeoondprsrt . . .  182,5111 
Totalof M@ . . . .  109,960 

SECTION m.-STATE OF THE PRENCIE AEMY OF SPMN, 
TRE EMPXROR XAPOJ,EON COMNAXDING IN 
PEltSON, 25th OCTOl3ER, 1808. 
lhtntnudrrarm. Dehrkd iiomilal. PrbmcMbmc~ Total. 
Mn. Horapa. Wh Horafa. Blcn. Men. Man. Cnv. H. Art. R. 
54!),04G 55,733 3:1,4YII 4,343 31,158 3,5!12 IIlH,U34 4A,Y4% 15,498 
Graud totnl...... 318,934 menanci 60,740'lioraes. 
STATE QF TIiE FREKCIT AIEBrP l3 RFATPT, THE EMPEMR 
N M O I E O I  COMMANDIXG, 16th YOTE:bfDER, 1808. 
Rronil u d r a r w .  U c l d .  Bwrtal. P n m m .  W 1. 
Yen. no-. Mei. Homsa. nren. Mw. Mm. Cav H. hrL H. 
% S . ; , R ~ G  5 ~ ~ 4 3 ~  .PY;MJ 8,9:15 49,107 i,n:is 8a&,2$8 42,120 IG,irO8 . 
...... Grnnd t o h l  335,222 men rind 60,728 homnn. 
EECTION m.-STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMT IN PORTUGAL, 
Id JJhh'UARY, 1808. 
PxErxcted from tho imperial rchrna.] 
General Junot, commander.in-chief. Genemi Thiebault, chief ofthe stañ 
. - 
2nd ,, ,, Loinon 
3rd ,, Ravot 26 batblions, 7 sqdrone .  &vaG ,, Kellcrmnn 
10 guns of SIhs. 
4 6-inch howiteere 
spmiin. 
Men. i iorui .  Wm. I l m a  
X6, lSO 1,114 27,736 1,3i7 
At Sdamanca, or in march ta join 
the army in Porlugd 4,705 1,298 .a,rsn 1,290 ............ 
-- 
Tohl .................. 20,985 2,810 28,530 2,678 
STATE OF FRENCH ARMT M PORTüEiQ 
. 23rd MAY, 1808. 
w d a m .  Dilachid. noiprbt E#&. 
Wen. Horacs. Mm. IIaeas. Men. I e n .  Hnmn. hit. 
h c h  ............... 34.448 2.189 ...... 2.415 29.684 8.286 888 
- m- 
Total ...... 44,857 4,317 1,831 947 8,ab7 62,684 8,881 629 
..... Gmnd toCa1. 52,634 men, 4456 hmes, and 86 guns. 
SE@PION T.-STATE QF 'mF, SXCOND ARMY OF OBSERTA, 
TION OF TRR GIRONDF;,' l~it FER. 1805, SPATN. 
&mera1 Dnpont, c o m m a o ~ g .  
20 iiuttalions and 1 division of cavslrp. 
E&-qmrtem, Vdarlolid. 
Piar i i tndnm.  Drtarhad. Hmpktiir WdtlW. 
Aoraea. Iikcn. Flmm Xpn. Man. Borne. 
2tYi9  2,684 1,308 334 2,277 24,309 5,218 
Total ...... 24,809 men and 3,218 homs. 
Sl3CTION VX.-SThTE: OF 'TIFE ARMY OF OJBERTATXON IIF: 
WTE D'OCEAN,' lat FED. 1808, SPALN. 
h n f  wdn arma. D i t u e h m t .  HbsplluL F e .  
Nea. Hames. Mea. I Innii .  Me. Neo. Hmm. 
21,878 2,547 2,144 ... 4,404 28,486 2,541 
M n  of  the gmrd .............. , ..................... 225 509 
Gmnd totaI... ... 28,711 men nnd 3,891 honies. 
No. XXIX. 
T ~ R  following lettem h r n  lord Gollinpood did not come into 
my ossessiori Iieforti thc first sdition OS tho rcscnt rolume waa % in t c press. It will be soon tlint tlioy oorm!oratc manv of t h i  
opinioilu snd Borne of tho fwts Iha l  I h v e  slatod, md ihcy m i l 1  
doubtless Xic read ñith the attention duo to the observationa of 
R U ~  &n hon~nr~b1e znd ~ b l o  inan. 
Oceum, Ghralhr, 30th A ~ p t ,  1808. 
MT DEAB Sta,-1 hnve bccn in rcat expcctation of h m i n  of 
yow progrese rrith the -y, and $ope $lis fii-st a m n n t  vilf be 
of yoiir auccesa whenever -you move. 1 have heilrd nothing 
JateIy of Junot at Carlix; bnt tliere h v e  been wwiuits, not i e r y  
wc11. autbenticated, that dosepli Uuonaparte, in b i s  rctiring tu 
Fri'rrincs, wria stopliod by tlio musei risiug m Riscay, to the amonnt 
of fonrken tlioiisand well-nrmecl men, which obliged him to 
retnrn to Durgoa, mhere tlio body of tlie Prench mmy waa 
0htionH-i. 
At Zaragoz~, tho French, in m&: their fourteenth a t t d  
upon tlie t o n ,  were defeated, repuhed with great loss, and kad 
mlired from it. Thore ili, a doiiu~v here from that c i h  with a 
mmmission from the mmqui~ 30 "~alnfox to icquest hpplies. 
The h t  aid n p  their ki8t ia for ten or fififteen thousand trmps. 
Tlie deputy stntrs thcy Iinvo frw rcpllnra in tlic pvincc,  nnd 
tlie war has hitlierto been carried on by aU bein armed. Tu 
t h i s  gontimnn's oon-irrs~tion I obaonc, nhnt f hnd bofore 
remarked iu others, that he liad no vlerr of SprUn b e p d  thc 
kingdom of bswon; nnd in rcply to tho obsr,mntions 1 madc on 
t3ie neccssity of a central ~overumont, bo liad Iittle ta Ra if 
thot bnd nat et been a aiilyeot of miioh oon>idorntim. 
peat Iiopa tgt geneneral C;ista!áos, Cuesta, snd tlioie ca taim 
$on:ml p bp aill now meet ni Mndrid, Kiii do some!l~in cl!eitiid 
1. ~implifpne the governmcnt. Io a uinasrsatian f h a d  r i t h  
BTorla on the necesaity o€ thia, he seemed to tliink the jnntaa 
would make many diiTiculliea, and r e l a  tlieir pvrient pomr aa 
long ns tliey could. 
1 hope, ng dear #sir, yon wilI gii*e Borne directions abont tliia 
puzzling: island (Fered) ,  wliich it appcare h me wiii no* be o€ 
any Stiture use; bnt tlic peoplc who are on it wiIl suíi'ox much in 
the: wintm. without hnbitations. e x c e ~ t  tents: 1 mnceir~ tim 
piqose f& whicli it waa occuiied is' past, Ad will protiablF 
ncver retiirn; rvhenever thcy qirit it, they should bring the 
~ h r e a  %$Fay s quietly as possiblc; ror, if am nol mislu.1ceu, t h  
emperor hna an intcntion to keop tEicm, and will remonstrato 
agiaiiist tlieir go' 1 hope you Irave m i v e d  gmd nccouuta 
f r m  lady ~al$!3e ,  &o. 
-* # * B * # * 
1 am to mil to-a~y for Toulon, whre  eve thing idcates  an 
iritontion in the Iirenoh to *sil. hkr. ~ ~ ~ f f ~ m ~ m u ~ h t  s miilion o. 
dollurs to Seville, and haa instructiom to commiinimte nith the 
'unta; but he appears tome t. be too dd to da it as major Cox 
%aa done ; he is still thcre, and I conclade will wait l'or our 
iustructians. Mr. Mrrkland wauld aeoept wiaitli p a t  th íd fa i -  
nct;s tho proposal you m d e  t o  liim to go to lrnloncia. 
1 beg my kind regada, &c. 
COLLENEWOOD. 
P.S. Princa h p o l d  is still hm,  md I understand intends to 
dn,y iintil hc henm from Englnnd. 1 bave given pasqorta For 
Diipont and n number of Fiench oBcera to o t o  Prance on 
pnrdc, ninotg-tliroc in nnmiicr. Gcncrnl ~ o r r a  war impntient 
ta get them out of the countrg. The 8pa;nida mere much 
Irritn tea wainat tlirm : thog wero not safe from their revengo, 
except in St. Sebastimh tastle. 
To SIR Bew DALRYMPLE. 
( h ~ m ,  off fiukm, Octo5w 18* 1808. 
MI- DEAR Srn,l h v e  received tlie favonr of onr Ietters of  the 
21Hi A y t  nnd 5th September, and beg ta a!& you m sincere 
ampt-i tionr on the suocenr of thc Ikitiah -y in J!ortugal, 
which :li hope will have ~ a l i s f i d  ike FrencIi thnt tliey me not 
tlioae invinclble creatures wkick Buonaparte liad endcnroured to 
persuade thom tlisy wsrs. 
It iu a happy ment to havo reseucd Portqd frm tho govem- 
ment ~f France; and their carrying 08 a little plunder i s  a m a ~ e r  
of very s e c o n h y  consideration; porliaps it m q  havc tlie p d  
e&ct of  kceping np the animosity of tlie Portngnese d o  suircr, 
anrl incitc thcm to moro rcsiqtance in fiitura. 
The p t  business n o n  i s  to endea~our to sstabhh that s d  
of govcrnmcnt, nnd orgmiac thnt sort of militury f m c ,  which 
may @ve secufity to the country; and the peat  dificulty in 
Portugal will be to finti men who nre of ability to pliic~ at t h ~  
l i a d  of the several dcp~rtments, who Lave patriotiem to devoto 
tliesnaelves to  ib service, and rigour to mintain ita indepen- 
dencs. h a country exhausted like portugal, it will require 
much ingenious expedient ta supply the m t  of wenlth rind 
af everylhmg militwy. If i t  iz not .found in tlio lirnasts of 
those to d o m  tfie people Iook up, Portugal wiU rem& in a 
h ilesa ancl unwrLqiti atate etill. 1 have not liemd from sir CharIea Cotton how ha settled hia 
tem~ with t l io Rii~einn ndmirnl; hut nri ho hns got posscssion of 
the ehips to be aont to England, they cannot bnt be ood. Ths 
haidinp tho Rnrliah Rn: on tho fort irliich siirron&rcd ta o u ~  
troops, 1 wnclude, wodd Se explnined to tho Portupeso as not 
ta be undorstood as t a k i g  pyieasjon by Englmd for other pur- 
me than to be restore to its pmce, as was done at Nadeira; ht in thio inatwica i t ooght to have becn tlimight nocossnry 
to deprii~o Siniavin of the mgumeni he would hava used oE h e  
nmtrdity of  tlio Portumese &E, nith whom his nation was not 
- 
at wur. 
I leR C& the rnoment werything in that; quartcr was 
SL and a. D d  m v e a  tiiere with a miüiori of dollars 
K t h &  use ; this money vas sent t o  tbe junta of Sedlo, whero 
1 arn draid thero are many m e m h  unworlh of the h a t .  
I have odg heard mrr fiom Car sinoe hft that poarter. 
Aftor gotting tho mou* htlier Gil sccrncd to Iinvo drtipt hia 
communications with W*IOT C., m d  thek diseussiom wcre not 
of n nutari: to cxcite m& pt-bho intcrch; thcy consi~trd more 
in nvi~te bickefi~iji- t h u  of grave aonsult for &e ublic x-eal. 
aoams to have hcin entirclp disnp intci! m {ii. pmjeot, 
bo th iu res ect to tUr annerntion of ~ o u ~ g r n  Poc,ugal to Anda- 
lusin and &c cnsion of 12,000 dollurs for l i s  scrvicc in ths 
aupreme munc$: of thoss you wiü be infomed by majm Cox. 
I am afraid 1 reIated the ~ e d i n g s  to his mnjesty'e miniatara 
of erents wkch were passing almost under my eye, and @ve my 
o inion on them with too great fresdom; 1 mcan witli a freedom 
is not usual; but they wers fsots of ioliioh, nitlioul being 
poseesired, his majesq'a miuisters m d l  not hare a horrledge of 
tlie real s t a b  of a f f ' m  in Spain; and the sentiments &ose facts 
inspired Tere neceasiuy to explain my motives and the rule of 
coiiduet wliich I umued. Aiid stiU 1 consid~r tlie great and 
oniy dmger te  w El 'ch Spain is now mpoaed is, the wppopitioii 
thut tho wliolc nation i~ poasessed of tho same pntriotism which, 
in hddnsia,  Axagon, and Valencia, lea to auch glwions reault~.  
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Xt i* fnr othcmiae. Thcm m not many Caxtañosea, nor Cuesta#, 
mor Piilz~~fiiur~; nrid kilcc from Sjii~in tliu iniiuencc o€ tlic clcrgy, 
and its bcst s o m  of  poi~cr would bc losl: wherever tliis idu- 
cnre Is Icnst, tho wnr i~ lnngnid. 
1 mmtc ta ~ o n  some timc since to rcpresent the date of Cata- 
lonin. Nothing cnn bc morc indiffcmnt to thc calmo thnn thcy 
appear to Iio; yct ltie aommon pewantr have not lcss a irit iiar 
l rs. deairo to repcl thek enemy. Ther il ave no leadon. $nln,ios 
tlia captnin-gonrray, utavs at Villa Pranca, mest of Barcelona. 
talkirq of w h t  he h t e n a a  to do; and tlie people speak of him ns 
citlier wanting zeal iu tlieir cause or abilitgr to direct t h m ;  mrliile 
tlic French from BaiwIontb and Fi~mcsus do just what they 
flelise. I!%on the Frencli allncked Gerona, lie diJ nohi  Y" suemur it. The gcatcst diacomfiture tliey suffered was rom 
lord Coclirnne, who, wIlilo tliey were employed at tho aic~o, blow 
np the r o d ,  making deep trenches in a part where the &e of 
liis sliipa could be brought u on; nnd when LIiey cdme tliers he 
drovr tiicrn fmrn thcir guns, & l l d  many, nnd twk rome mmoa 
TIie Freucli fleet is licre quih ready for wa, ttnd 1 am duing 
al1 that; is in mp pomer to meet thcm whon tllep do come wt. 
It is nn ltrduous sewiee: tho l& ten r l q s  we I in~e  hnd plea 
of mind incessant!?; the diculty of keeping a siilricient squarlron 
1 ~liinlr the sloniis fiurii iliose -4lliinc rnountains 
1 licg my best reptrtis lo captain Ddrymple, and my aincersst 
wkhes for every success to attend you. 
1 nm, my dcar sir Hew, 
Your obedient and most hmble smant, 
COLLI~GWOOD. 
P. S. In the letter mhih 1 mote  to yon on the shto of  C a b  
Toniit I rrprc~rntqd tho ncccaaity of sending n bocly of British 
troops to Cntalonia. TLere is no 0 t h  pros ect o€ the Freneli 
being kopl ir1 rny Iiounda. Tho nvcnnes 1I Lance srs 8* open 
nom as at any thme thcy hare aeen. I haw kept a ahip always 
at Eososlss Bq; Iicr mitrioes have gnrriaoned tlte rmtlo, ancl her 
company nssisted jn rcpeiring the ~rerks. FLe Prench appear to 
Iiavo desi n3 on that place, Tte pressnm of tlic Riiglish dono 
prcvent-. fhem. I f  18,000 men vere iiere of our m g ,  I tliink 
they ivould make Mr- Palacio come forward, and ptit i l i o  whole 
country into acthitg, whieh ti11 then I don't think they ever 
rrill be. Co~zrncweon. 
They want an Znclish reaident at Gcxonn, tJmt they may bv-e 
somebody to apply tu for succour . . . . 
[The rest torn off in the original.] ' 
To SIR HEW Q~LRWPLE. 
O m m ,  of Hixma, ApTRk 8, 1800). 
MY DEAR SIR,-1 received thc favolir of  yorir 1ctflcr n foiv d q s  
np ,  whieh gave me p a t  pleasure. sfter dl the tronble and 
rexations you havc h d  te hcar ~ O J T O U  wom nll wcU. 
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f WM exceedingl sony mhen 1 sam the n n m  mood in whieh 
t b  conrontian in bartugnl wns takrn up, oven iw~oro tiio oir- 
cumstances which led to it were at d h o w n .  Before our arniy 
Iandcd in Portiignl, the F-.nch Toree n-nrr rc orlcd t o  be r q  
amcll. I remembcr it. boing said that a boly of 5WO tmops 
wns d thnt W ~ R  nccPRsnry tO ditlpossc~~ .Tunot. 1 conrlndc the 
m e  sort of  rcport went to Englmlrt: and tliis, ai th tiie ~ ic ta ry  
tlint wns obtninrrl, lcrl pcople to e q c c t  tlie rxtenninntíon of tilo 
fcw Frencb ahicIi were su posed l o  Lc thcre; and wlren once 
tho idan is entcrthed. poopri shut tlicir cyeg to di8ciiltios. 
I iwmcmber wliat you tolcl me, tlio last time 1 saw p n  oiI 
Cadix, of tlie eomrnunicntion wliicli miglit be marlc to yo11 by an 
olliucr ir110 pos~cased tlic oniiro coiifidcnce of niiriistcra. 1 
Cliouglit tlien, that wwlrnte~er ministers liad to mrnmunicate to a 
commander-in-c:lii~f, could nol ha done lictter tlinn by &m- 
selves; for internediste communicatioris are always im dxniriger of 
bcing miaiiiidemlood, and nevcr bil to cauiuse doubta nntl dialurb 
the judgrncnt. X hope now it ia aii over, and your uneasincss on 
fnti&o uf mmy rnind, with a m i e t y  nnd sormw; my hcailFi i~ ver; 
much impnired; nnd mhile ciur affairs reqnire nn inereased 
encrgg, :í. Iind rnya~lf lcos able to conrluct tliem from nntural 
causcs. 1 glve al1 my tlioughts nnd time, h t  h e  iuhmptions, 
from my wc& atatc oi' body, wliicli tlio service will scarccly 
admit oc 1 never fult tlic severity of winter nore tlinti iliis 
last. 'i'hey werc not p l c s  o€ wincl, but liurricznes; and the 
conseqnence is, that tlie f l r h e t  liaa surered very much, and many 
of the aliips vcry infwm. I rroidd not h a ~ e  kcpt the sea so long, 
becuusr: 1 know tlio sy~ t e rn  oC blockirding musk be ruinous t o  our 
h c t  a t  last, md in no instance that J. can rccollcct lias prevmtcd 
i,lic encmy Roni siailing, In tlic ~priri:: \VD nr t  fi~ilnd 131 TUES, 
while tLcp, nnrscd tluongh the tcmpcst arc al1 trirn. 1 wodd 
nut linvt! clonc it: hnt whnk would fin\-r: hrromc of inc if', in mp 
preserving the ships, the Fmnch had sailcd, and effected my- 
tliing in nnq. qiinrtrr! Thc elamonr rrotild hnvo bcrn loud, nnd 
tliry wouTd hare s o n ~ l t  onl for &e cause in my trenchcry or 
fnily, for nonc nao anricwtnn8 tbnt tiiare is ang Iind wcnther in 
the Mediterranean. T l i o  a stcm of blacltndc is minous ; ht it 
Iins oontiniird ro lang, nng ao much tu thc  d r n n t q c  of uie 
nercantilc p& of the nation, that 1 fear no minister will be 
f'ound hold rnou~l i  t o  diocontiniic it. lVe nndrrtnlcr: nothing 
ainst thc cnoin but sccm l o  tliinlr i t enaugb tu preccnt him 
a c i n g  oiir brigs; tleet i s  pmwinc ta nrnonstmus force, nMe 
ours c v e y  dnj- g i w s  more rool of ita inmensiug decrepitude. 
Of tiio Spuninrds I icouicfnot sny m&; r r a s  neror snnguine 
in tlie prospect of auccoss, and Irave no reason to clinuge my 
opiuion; tlie lomer clnss of people, those who are iinder tho 
influence of priest S, mould no nng tkng itere the under pmper 
direetion; bot diieotors m diilicult to be founi There is n 
d e r  in ilic stats: none of the superior orders aro ssrious in tlieir 
resistance to &e Frencli, and h v e  only taken ibpart qainst them 
t l i n ~  fnr from thc nppi-rhcn~ion oF the rescntment of tlic roplc. 1 
belime te jnnta i. not fr. imm tito taiiit of tha id%tioii, or 
wouEd they have continued Don Mipcl  Vives, in Ligh and 
irn rtant oomrnand a h r  such evidont yroofs m 11e ave of wnrit 
of c y d s ~  1 do not know whkt ia thought of fnfantado in 
Endnnci; hnt in my rnind, I l ic mnn, ilio diilro (for h i ~  rarik lim s 
p a t .  a e d  to do with it,) wha wodd seat himself in Bnonaparte's 
council imt Be onne, ~ i g n  hiu decmcs, ivhirli n-ere ili~lriliuted in 
Spain, and d e n  say he aas fmed to do it, ia not the mnn aho 
n ill do mur11 in rnninlliining the alorg or thc indspendenm af 
any c o n n t ~ ;  no sueh man shonld be troated now. The Yrench 
tmops nre rnostly ~it~lidrawn from Spnin, cxcept such nri aro 
nrceasary to Lold cortain strong posta, and enable them to rcturn 
witlioiit impcdimcnt. Figiierns, Bnrcelona, and Eosas, mc hdd 
Itcrc in Gatalonia, and of course the country quite open to them. 
Wiii the Spnninrda dispossess thcm P '17ie junts docs nok s c m  
to h o ~  anvtliing of tlie provinces at a distihnce from t h .  At 
Tniv-wgonn tho troo R are 111-clotlicil, anrl without pnv; on ona 
occnsion U i ~ y  iaol! not maro11 qninst the enerny, h v i n  no 
~hoen, and yct at Cadiz tho have fifiy-ono rnillions d dokm. 
C.& scems to be a generJ dópVt of ereqthing tLey can gai 
from Englnnd. I f  t h ~ y  are eot active thc next twci months, 
Spain is l o ~ t .  
1 bope lady Dalr pla, h. &c. Ger am? my i~em sir* 
Your v e q  faitbful md obedient a m e ,  
COLLIN~WOQD. 
No. XXX. 
SHXION 1.-UEXERAL STATE OF 'JDX I?TiENCII hRNT 
IM SPMM, 
%FPRACtED FROA m RJT'EBTbL XüSTEWROIW, SlGRE3 BX 
THE PTüNUE OOF NEUFCEiTEL. 
Cornmnnded by tha emperor Napolcon, in pemon, 16th Jan. 1809. 
Prraoit u d e  m &ialac&d B"tak M-1. TolaL 
.*a i Ionrr. M i e .  I l 5 ~ t k  Mtn. Men. XTra Rmm. 
291,010 4tf,82I 24,519 8,521 58,026 826 324,411 64349 
~ * m l ~ u k r ~ .  n a d  tl.rprt=t. -. m í ~ m - .  
m .  I l n m i .  Mm. Iinrwr. Ten. Mcn Wte. 11- 
193,446 33,203 36,326 9,553 68,404 1,843 288,019 42,726 
No¿@.-The imperiai guarda, t l ~ e  reserve of hfantry, and seved  %m- 
mn¿l noa-oommirriioned &mes and old mldiers, m k d  f o ~  the war 
in Austria, in ali about 40,000 men, were &U& off the rolh since 
the h t  retama. 
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l a t  July, 1809. 
r f h m  
Armit rdrr m. Iktaimil .  axd ~ E ~ f w t h  
B h o o l m .  
--  
Mcn. Homrr. Men. Hmwa. U n  M E ~ .  Men. Ame*. 
601,482 31,537 11),598 1,513 60,785 7,301 28P,7RR 86,060 
Deduot detmhed men wmpriacd in govommenb li),bDB 4,513 
--
Red total .................. 269,lTO 31,587 
--
15th Sub, 1809. 
196,144 31,lN 19,122 4,608 58,230 8,089 282,585 35,739 
Bduct detaclid in governments 19,122 4,608 
-- -
RmZ toC1 .................. 282,468 81,131 
-- 
15th Angost, 1809. 
187,560 80,319 12,697 3,930 58,588 7,403 206,248 34,880 
......... U d u d  Eur g o m e n  b... 12,697 3, Y 30 
--
h l  totd .................. 253,551 3@,956 
--
S x c n o ~  1 1 . - R ~ R N  olr T ~ E  Fn~lccn A n m  nr Conm. 
h p a  immediately mder the king-let Jnne, 1309. 
Tbe king's p a r d q  sbout 5000 men, of  a,U a m ,  ~ i u e  nekwr borne m 
the MUB. 
First corps, maralmi Tictor, oommxnding. 
Hend-qumra, Torremodia. 
Psesent under m s i  Total. 
Mm7< Yto. 
4 divisiona of inf~ntry 41 battaliona 21,208 32,819 
2 Atto cavnlry 27 s q d m n s  5,238 7,344 
Artillery and equipage 40 companies 2,984 3,810 
Niimher of  fgnnci, 4s -- -
Total pnesent nnder m ...... 29,454 Q m d  M 43,773 
- -
W r d  strprptt2lst June, 1609. 
IIead-quarters, h r m .  
S divisions of infnntrg 33 bathlions 18,367 25,633 
2 ditto mvdry SO q u d r o u s  4,259 5,7(;2 
Artiiery and quipige 1 s  2,635 2,800 
-
Totd pment under arms...... 25,161 Gmnd tofd 34,256 
- -
Sirst mp-15th July, 1181). 
IIead-quarteq Casalegas. 
8 divisions of b t r y  39 httaliontr 18,890 26,373 
S dittu a v + r y  18 sqwdroris 3,791 &,OSO 
drtille~y and equipage H 2,566 &O05 
- -
Tutal pment ander 8ms ...... 25,257 Gima total 34,458 
- -
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First coi-ps-1st August, 1809. 
Hd-quartem, ñlaqueda. 
Present under armñ Total. 
mn. Meii 
S divisiona oE infantry 33 hattaliane 15,OflS 25,068 
2 ditto mdry 18 ~guadIWn3 1,967 4,953 
Artaes and equipage 31 S,3fi-2 4,873 
F d  corps, general Sebastiarii-10th d u l ~ ;  1809. 
Hmd-quxrtera, bl&. 
S divisiona of i n f a n t ~  21 bnttrtlione li,100 25960 
2 dittn mmly 21; qundrnns 8,670 5,859 
Number of artillerymen omitterl in tlie returna ,, 9, 
30 guns - - 
Total prewnt under arms ...... 20,770 Orarid total 31,819 
- -
15th Auppt, 1800. 
3 Gbisions of infmtry 27 b*ttalionu 14,259 25,801 
2 ditta mw1ry 2 5 q u d m n a  3,430 6,801 
- -
ToM pwent under amo .... .. 17,679 Grand ktñl31,602 
- -
Division of Reserve, general Demlles l5th  July, 1809. 
nead-quarters, N d r i d .  
Present under m. Total. 
Wrn. Mrn. 
I division ufinfintq 10 Gnh'lions ?,S81 14251 
Number of guns unlulown. 
Xciierm~n'a divi&m-2Ist ~Ipril, 1808. 
Readqusrterii, da*. 
10th Jnne, 1109. 
Bead-quhr9, Dviedo. 
Under arma T-l. 
15th July, 1809. 
Hmd-quartera, Ydhdolid. 
8 sqt~atlron~ 2,291 2,360 2,489 2,5PS 
g w  
Sflcaon m. 
l& Febru~ry, 1609. 
Under m. 
Hm. 
Divisíon Jcapisse infantry 12 battslions f,G92 
Brig.adu MüulieLit cavairy 6 aqusdrons 910 
-
Total onder gwml Tfipimr! at hlamnnw 8,602 ~ ~ T C E I  and bayoneh 
f i m b e r  &$una and artillerymen unknown 
SRCTIO~ IV.-RRTUIIN OF T~oors  XINLiER TIlE IMACELEDXATB 
COMXLYD OF MABSDAL SOULT. 
Secnnd corpn, %u1 615th Jnly, 1809. 
Ilead-quarters, Toro. 
Pivscnt under m r n  Total. 
Men. >lfnv 
4 dirisions of inhtry 47 bnttdiona 16,686 . 35,188 
S dith ca~dry  19 squdrone 2,883 4,540 
ArtilIery II l , r iSl  I ,ü20  
40 P - -
Total pmcnt undcr nrrns...... 20,590 Gmnd h h l 4 1 , 8 1 8  
- -
FiRIi wrpq Martier. 
Hwd-quartcrs, Talladolid. 
!2 diviaiona nf infintry 24 bathliona 15,036 19,611 
3 bri-de of kzvxlry 6 quadrotu 896 1,492 
Artillev JI 648 803 
SO gum - -
T o a  pment undm zms. ..... 10,580 Grand tokrl 21,835 
- -
Sixth corptr, Ney. 
IIead-qulurtrtcm, Ucnevcnto. 
2 dirisions of infnntrg 24 hnthlions 18,700 17,587 
I ditto ciam1ry IQ qiinrlrons 1,446 2,092 
-4rtillery a> 1,115 1,293 
37 &tus - -
Tootal prestmt ununder amos...... 16,259 Qrmd totai 20,972 
- -
Qcnernl totnl ander Soult, 15th July, 1809. 
95 batttrlions-35 q d m n a  58,529 84,166 
107 p n a  
~ E C T T O N  V.-~nooI'$ ENPLOYXD JX SHE SIILGB OF ZARAGOZA, 
UNDER M a n s n ~ ~  LASRES. 
15th January, 1809. 
F'ramni antler armk W h c &  Hospital. TotP eikct laa 
Men. I lpn,  Wmi. Mcn 
n i r d  corps 17,40G 6,780 .13,UG8 36,863 
FiAb corps 18,284 81 4,169 21,173 
l5tL February, 1809. 
TIiird corps 16,035 4801 
Fiftli c q i s  17,933 1,73S 
- -
T&L ...... 83,968 7,616 
- -
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P m m t  undcr arme. Dctaahd. Hosplrd. PrLwnsm. Told. 
Mrn.  Nen. Mcn. Mcn. Men. Hnne4 
41,386 39 9589 513 68,518 5,409 
16th June, 1809. 
42,148 1,699 10,222 406 54,473 5,355 
No. XXXI. 
'In wnseqiience of tlio unfavouralile news from 8pain, yesbr- 
day, the popuince, in Bndnjoa, ~ n r d e r c d  a Spmiah wlonel, and 
one or t ~ o  inora of note.' 
Lieutma~t Rllh (m oficer mplvpd fo  EN in fellyence) to 
C~loncl ICrn~sPs, lLulioa, Uecember 27. 
' Tho FrcncL cntmd Tnixilla, estwday, at eleven o'clock ; 
and frorn thc circumstmce of tlieir K_ng reoonnoitrcd túc inter- 
mediate villages, miglit be exp~etcd to vrrive at Meiida in two 
houra after we left ii.' 
' Dadajos cannot make resistance in any degee, either to chck 
orto etop the progess of the encmy. From tlic ahtcmcnt mude to 
mc, lnat n i~h t ,  by the governoi.. ilicy wzntckrms, ummzcwitioa. and 
p~wrbshns.'-'Tlie encrny marched into rlhuiüo, on tlie 28tI1, at 
h&€-pact twelre o'dock in thq dzv; Iiut, at ttiuo, on tkc Collowing 
rnorniri~, a Prcnclz oiiiccr arrnverl thrrc, and they fdl back foiir 
Iongues.' 
f i e u l m b  B l i s  lo colonel Kmmi&, BemIrm 38. 
'1 pmceeded cautioady to TrnxiUo. The majn bodg of the 
encmy, six thousnnd jn niimbcr, liad rctircd across the bridge o€ 
Almmaz, andIisd not tnlrc11 tha road to Madrid, but hnrl pro- 
cocdcd to Pln~cncin, lrnving Iichinrl more khm haIf Ilie rpquisition 
for moncy wLch h d  been lmposed on tlie tom of Truxillo.' 
E me corps of four thouannd infantry and two tliousand c a d y ,  
dJch had marched from Talavera, md kad actuall y passed tlie 
bridge of h2mnrm, haa fden  bnck, and is illreadynelar Plasencia, 
on itri wny northmrd.'-' Tlic cxtrcmo nkntíon of Hiionnppnrto 
b ~ i n g  at  tliis moment d ic ted  to the Endish army, everytliing 
which cm be mllccted is opposed ta p &na" 
SECTIOX Ií. 
NI-. Sttm~i! to  J. Jfoore, Beeembw 27, IMR. 
'You ai l l  rcccivo t~~ot'I1er w i h  this, sevord lotters from 
Dogle, wliicli describo avcnts in Gahlonia m way d ~ r ~ r l ' n y  fmm 
.nuhat me ?mae witncsscd in othcrpark of Spaiml'-' Shs junta 
lime eatablished tl~emselvlves hero, and, whtcver may llave hecn 
tlic oxpecttiliun ~vliicli t.licir nlurm on tlic rot~d mny liw~ve jliduced 
>fr. Frere to f o m  oi' their futi ire procccdings, a cialpalile relapse 
i d a  &ir f i m  aputlq ~ c c m s  fi~l~ccptibll: of no otllcr rcnipdies 
liut such as wiil be mueh stmnger than any Spaniard ia likcly to 
ni1opl.'-'Altdioir~l~ C&ro 1ironii.red to e ~ i t o  r5vrr-F ~inrtíi:iiIitr of  
Lis wn~ersrttion with you t o  tilo junta X buve hitlrerto bocn 
urinblo t o  sce kis Ictler. I tlicrcf(irc thougl~t it cxpcrlicnt to ~ iu t  
the whole te mitin$, and, a5 tAe #ame tinte, to e q r e s s  my cmz~k-  
f b n  bolh p r  i ! A c j ~ h ~ f + r n  a?ad pwp-iefy oofpur w I ~ l e  mmdwt &~ra'np 
ti2e late a m f ' s ,  when it mas imposgklile, mder any ci~cumslanccc, i o  
hatic adqter l  oflaer &wminrrtion coniei8tently wlth tke mfetyof the 
m y  cmmifted l o  ~ O U P  eharye. Tliongli 1 doubt if this will stop 
thc elnmoiir which 11im hccn raiscd on tlit: siihjcct; nnd Iliniigli 
cvents have proliabl.~ since talccn place, whicL may materially 
chmn c tFic ~ h t e  of nffaim, it rnny bc untisfncto~ to tcll yoii tliat 
Mr. %rere aVpeare to  enter into tbe rovsons nllagcd by yoa, snd 
to  fcc!, in t.lirir fiill forec, t,he motives which indiicrd yoii to art 
so cnutionaly, mR to p n n d  no opyation on tLe hope of any 
effcctiial anpport from t ho Spmiurdti. 
atto, Bmilh, Ja~uury 2. 
'The president, Plorida Blanca, died two h y s  since, and 1 mns 
in hopcti tlint thc jitnti~ would 11n.i.c nvniled themselvcs of tliis 
cvent to makc some change in their government.'-' I aee, bom- 
cvcr, little link good disposition, ~ n d  am d i l l  do h k  fOr Uat 
enera in rewzrtiing aervice and pnnialiing treachery whch can 
done mcnd mnttcm.' 
Betfo, Sm'lle, Jmuary 10. 
'Fhding ia at Tara.yoom<a, eqecting to ba atlnckd, anal pos- 
aessing a foree composed chicfly of peasltnt but of wliiicl~ he 
cerlaiol cnrinot cvrnrnund aboi-o ten Illoiisriny~cn in n m i  liintion 
to faoo gis  o ponents at nnv given p0int.I-' Wliittingliam aniaed 
herr grstcr<?v, laat frum ha duke of InfintadoJa Iiond-qurrtora. 
Re assures me the dnke hnd a h a d p  twenty tliousand men when 
Lo kfi Cuenp.'-' Oit ~ I M  si& qf E.vbremudw.a, rnattors are not 
olng on aell: Galluzzo, allo dlowed tlie enemy to paas the 
fridues, ia here prisoiiai, and Lis eorps ia placed undsr tiis com- 
mana af Cnesta. 1 mnnot aay, ~ O L O W E V B T ,  that 1 aee mucb sctivitp 
since the clinnge ; pmtics of i,he enemp cover t h e  conntry 
bctween Madrid and Aitnaraz, whde tlio o o q s  oT six Lliousnnd 
mcn, vhich liad bcen pushed fori~arrl from Marlfid, hnve, I 
unrlmln~id, a1rr:uIj- paswd Plafi~n~ii~,  and rolittblv are on Ihe 
otlim sido of t h o  laucrto, ibr ihe piirposo ofiiiiling'an the hl;r 
mitiira coiiiilrv, alid, ir po~~ibin, euttiiig off y m  communication 
with Ciudncl &¿trigo.' 
SscTsow m. 
X r .  Pwm lo Nr. Canaileg, Seuilh, Muy 8, 
' Denides tho advzntages whioh m q  Iio looked for rmm placing 
so extensive a command undcr a pcrson o€ ancli tried nliilities as 
general Ililnke, it i s  lo be hopcd thal it will put an ciid to  Qo &s. 
trmtions arising from the contyaetcd views of tlioso a.ho direcwd 
tlio provincial junta, pnrtieularly &al of VaLenck, wkieh have 
been so crnbmriasing to hia predecessom,' 
'As tlie dwa~tationa wlich havo boon oommittcrl have, in 
mrany instnnccs, dcprived t l ~ e  peasanh o f  thc mcanb: of pnying 
whnt j, duc to tlic proprretors and to  tho chiirrli, a gc~~crnl 
spirit of resjstmce to al1 clraima of tlUs lDnd hns begun to show 
iiaclf.' 
Sir JoAn Craduck to  lord C"mtlmayfi, Bemmhm 24, 1808. 
'1 mnch f c ~ r  tliat nlarrn and dc~pondcney hnvc gninrrl groirnd 
about Badajos and that part of Bpain, aiid that therc is so libtltt 
m-operotion in tlie m t ~  of thrir acvcrnl juntna, a~id such n mnnt 
of sulio~dinakion and common consent among tlie umed bdies, 
4x1 sliich tlic dcfcnc~ of the conntry i s  erltnistcd, q ~ r i i i a t  sricli tui 
united fmco ari tltat of fhe Frencli, tht cxtrenie wnfusion pre- 
vails wcqmlierc.' 
' He (lieutenrint RlJia) haa been living with general Cuesta fm 
t h e  last t-iro daya,'-'who has assured him that the Spanisli 
t roop~ in Mncirid foroed thcir wny tli~ongli tlic bbench army; 
a11d he expreascd g e a t  somw Ui ddlng tlint, thougli a Spanish 
force js ofbn coiiectcd, tlie smallest check dieperaea them; tbnt 
i i i  fen instnncea depDtm w m  provided. and hose iU  supplicr$,' 
&c.-'tliztt,, asiich W+L< thc dis erñion nnd flight of tlie hpnnisli 
amies, betreen Badajos an$&~adrid, «iei.e &d not renisin s 
singlo rnnn.' 
Colo~eel Xmmis to lbd.-colc-nel R p e l ,  milifary smqeiary l o  dr 
JaAn Orulock, &&Zk, l ~ e t ~ w a y  7, 1309. 
' In passing thongh the Sierra Xorena mountaine, where 
Nnluro Las done muuh for tho deferice o l  t l i i  provinco, it w a ~  
ainfiil ;Go observe the pitiful worka they rrere about t o  tbrow up. % this rrliole direotion iiiera is Iiut oue bodj tiist has angthing 
l r  ke tlie apparance of a ~loldier, m. dismountcd c a v a . '  
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Genmal iiacEm& to  & JoBn+ C t í c k ,  Cadiz, F~~hmamJ 9, 1sm. 
T i c  Spnninrds here aecmed Iullcd in thc W O A ~  fatnl accirri.. 
m ~ e y  nrc ignuranl of tho e ~ e i l t s  in tlic nortli of Spia, ar will not 
givc crcrlit ivlicn thcy do h ~ n r  thcm. Viip~c rrports of tlie empc- 
ror of Austria's hviiig declarecl wnr, and. Uuonnpwte's retorn to 
3rant.e gnin iinIimitcd crrrlit,'- ' The equipmcnt of tlie ílret 
coca on vcry slewl tliougli tlorc is no mnt of cxcrlion now on 
tho pnrt of ndmirn?~i>ririis or Yr. Showt; oiPrs of evo nssist- 
m o e  are daily nide, biit tlie nill ncitlior work theinsxes nor 
parmit our pcople to work &r tliem. The prepnrntiona of tlia 
ships for carrging off tlie French prisoners go on equally ill." 
Duc de Al&qwpzts to  Nr. Bm, Xalavm,  Jdy 31, 1809. 
'Ihiring our msrcIies me a ' q  to reposa. J3ce flocks of  shecp, 
williorit tnking ayi nny pmition, so tlint, i f  tlie eiicmy bneii- tlic , 
condition m-e were in, they mould defeat tt wherever they attackcd 
na. If, in tlir rvmiing oi' thc 26th ,A Iind not gonc out dircctly 
with my di&ioa. ancl snceeeded ;n dheclring tlie cnerny, thc 
wholc nmy woulrl,Iinr-o disprrncd, nnd nll tlie artillcry nnrl hng- 
gaze aliicli were In the shcetc of St. Ollalln, tronld have becn 
loñt;  nnd UR n pmof nfwltnt roiild Iiavo hnppnt~d,  hnrl nat tila 
enemT, rrho mas within muaket-shot, becn cfiecked, f o ~  mñny 
hüd alrcatly throiun awrij* thcirarms, &u. thri comrnissririt:~, nliiirl- 
doning more than fiflccn hundred rations of brcad, the cartB 
uvcupying m d  hlocl~inq up thc strceis uf ilie bim; nnd to tliia, 
I repcitt, WG are daily exposcd, m wc march as if it ame w a 
pilgrimri r, wtilioiit iiny rimg~~i-d ta rlistn.~~i:r, onloi: or rnet!iotl, 
m d  Ti$ the whole pnro oi aAllillery, iriiioh ought. datnnya to 
rmrsin ah ths dishnoo oE two, ~ I I M O *  OP more lelagiiei.' 
Sir Arthw Tellcslyr to  h d  Wellesdmj, Hm'da,  Sqdenaáw 1, 
1800. 
' I am mnch afrrtid, from what 1 b e  seen of tlie oceedinga 
ofthe oontrnl jnntn, thnt, in tlin diahbition of tlisir grm, tho 
do not mnsidor rniiitmy defonce uid militarg operations so mucK 
RS they do politicnl intrigue and thc nattinmcntof irifiingpoliticd 
oiijects.' 
h d  WelhZq to  HT, Canming, ~ k ' l l e ,  le,tensbw 2, 1809. 
' M ~ i l c  the intelligonee receivd from air Arlhur Wellesle 
to tllc date of thc 54th i n s t a n t ,  continucd ta furnish h e ~ i 8 t i d ~  
yroofs of the F~ilurc oi' ci7erg promise or eflurl n i d e  by Ihis 
g o ~ e m e n t  for the immedizte relirf of our troops, no satis- 
fmtion wus nffordcd i o  nia raspocting any pcmaricnt plan for 
their htme aiipp1r.'-'The troope of P o r t y l ,  rrliich cntered 
Spxin, under gc~~icml B~cresford, sullcrell ~ i d a r  diotreas, snd 
esperieneed similar ill-treatrnent; altfiough the efforts of Por- 
tugal, En iho cause of S iliu, Iinve bbccn as gra tu i tou~ as tliose ot 
Great Britsin; nnd aldan h S Nn possenoes no einim, of nny 
dosmipkon, to ths aiil o! a $orLu9ess -y.' - ' In this 
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calamity, thc peopEe of Spain ~&nnot fail to acknowlcdgé 'ihc 
natml conflsqncnccs of  tlzcir own weitkiirss, nor to discover the 
urgent necessitv of eoforcing n more aterdy. %m, and rigoioiis 
systcm, botli of: council nnd nctioa. A rclaxc stntc of doinestiB 
g o v e m e n t  md an indolent reliance an t1ie activity of foreign 
assistance herc cndnngcrcd al1 thc liigh and virtuous objects for 
whicli Spain hns mmed and Med. l t  m u ~ t  IIOW he evjdent, thnt 
no nlliance can protect lier f'rom the inevitnlile result of interna1 
disorrler and nriiional i d m i t ~  She must amend and slrenptlirn 
her gaverment; rih must unprove thc ndministration of Iier 
rcfiources, and the structura and discipline of her armics, IicFore 
plie can hcome etipnble of derivinq bcndfrt fm foreign aid. 
Spain lias provcd unirue to oirr allimce, becau~e ahe is not t r i ic  
tu herself. -'Unti1 some g e a t  c h v e  shall be effccted in f i e  
conduct rif &e militar resources of fi ain, md iir. tlls state af 
Iier mznics. no ~ritisg n m y  cm ~ f c  7 y r t t emp t  to eo-operate 
irith the Spanish tronps in the territury of Spak.' 






